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This thesis examines the theory and practice of humanitarian intervention in the early post-
Cold War era. Taking as its basis US policy towards Somalia, Rwanda and Haiti between 
1992 and 1994, it develops a theory of humanitarian intervention based on constructivist 
and scientific realist principles. Using identity as the organising concept, the thesis 
examines the meta-theoretical precepts of constructivism and scientific realism, which are 
developed into a methodology for analysing questions of foreign policy. Incorporating 
critical insights from sequential path analysis, morphogenetic social analysis—the notion 
of a dynamic mutual constitution of structure and agency—and constructivist social theory, 
the case studies provide a useful new means of conceptualising humanitarian intervention 
as a foreign policy practice through an identity-driven analysis. The findings of the 
research shed much light on this practice and its future prospects. They also suggest new 
directions for a scientific realist/constructivist research agenda. 
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Introduction: Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-
Cold War Era 
It is often suggested that the post-Cold War era ended on September 11, 2001.1 A corollary 
of this argument suggests that, as this era ended, so too did the sun set on one of the more 
notable features of foreign policy action in this period: humanitarian intervention.2 Such 
arguments may have merit. Indeed, they seem largely borne out by the empirical record. 
While it is easy to point to a flurry of humanitarian interventions in the immediate post-
Cold War period—northern Iraq, Somalia, Liberia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor and 
Sierra Leone would feature on most analysts’ lists—it is much more difficult to do so in 
the post-September 11 era. This decline is not for a lack of candidates. Civil strife in 
Sudan, Chad, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to mention but a few, 
would all seem to share the features of chronic civil strife coupled with grave humanitarian 
emergency that characterised most of the sites of humanitarian intervention in the 1990s. In 
many of these places, too, the international community has been moved to action. In 
Darfur, an African Union (AU) peacekeeping force was replaced by a hybrid UN–AU 
force in late 2007. In the same year, the UN, in concert with the European Union, 
established another peacekeeping force on Darfur’s western border, in Chad and the 
Central African Republic. In Somalia, Ethiopian troops unilaterally intervened to support 
the provisional government, and an AU force was later established to support efforts to 
establish a stable environment in the country. And in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
the UN mission has slowly evolved from a small group of military observers to one of the 
largest and most complex peacekeeping missions in its history.  
But few would suggest that these actions constitute humanitarian interventions in the way 
we normally understand the term. It is difficult to put one’s finger on exactly why: perhaps 
                                               
1 For nuanced views, see Buzan, “Will the ‘Global War on Terrorism’ Be the New Cold War?” 82(6) 
International Affairs (2006), 1101-1118; as well as some of the contributions to Booth and Dunne (eds.), 
Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2002). 
2 See, for example, Weiss, “The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect in a 
Unipolar Era”, 35(2) Security Dialogue (2004), 135-153; Farer, “Humanitarian Intervention Before and After 
9/11: Legality and Legitimacy”, in Holzgrefe and Keohane (eds.), Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal 
and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003), 53-90. 
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it is the lack of great power interventionism with which we have come to associate 
humanitarian intervention; perhaps the interventionary element is missing and these actions 
hew more closely to our understandings of traditional peacekeeping. Whatever the reason, 
these actions simply do not ‘feel like’ humanitarian interventions. This argument is, of 
course, problematic. If we are to argue that humanitarian intervention is dead, we should 
surely be able to establish quite what it is that has died. The literature on humanitarian 
intervention has struggled nobly with this issue. The definition of humanitarian 
intervention has been one of the major sites of disagreement on the subject, and there is a 
surfeit of different views, which perhaps itself has contributed to the murkiness of the 
issue. At the same time, the definition of humanitarian intervention was rarely the primary 
concern of those analysts who engaged with the issue. The notion of humanitarian 
intervention raised all sorts of sticky ethical, legal and operational questions and, to a great 
extent, it was these questions with which most scholars of humanitarian intervention were 
primarily concerned.  
In this context, humanitarian intervention became one of the most contested concepts in 
international affairs. Its study became a battleground for competing and often incompatible 
visions of world order, its literature replete with paradoxes, dilemmas and disagreements. 
Some of the starkest challenges faced by scholars of international affairs have found their 
heuristic frame in the concept of humanitarian intervention. Humanitarian intervention has 
raised questions about the relationships and tensions between order and justice and how far 
these values are reflected in a pluralist or solidarist international society.3 It has raised legal 
and moral questions about the relationship between sovereignty and human rights, the two 
pillars of the UN Charter system, the foundation of the post-war legal order.4 Legal 
positivists and natural lawyers, and restrictionists and counter-restrictionists, have debated 
the legality of humanitarian intervention under international treaty law and international 
customary law.5 Debates have raged over the authority of the UN Security Council to 
                                               
3 See, for example, Bellamy, “Humanitarian Responsibilities and Interventionist Claims in International 
Society”, 29(2) Review of International Studies (2003), 321-340; Akehurst, “Humanitarian Intervention”, in 
Bull (ed.), Intervention in World Politics (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984), 95-118; Wheeler, Saving 
Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000). 
4 See, for example, Ayoob, “Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty”, 6(1) International Journal of 
Human Rights (2002), 81-102; Parekh, “Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention”, 18(1) International Political 
Science Review (1997), 55-74; Abiew, The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian 
Intervention (Kluwer Law International The Hague, 1999); Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: The UN in 
an Evolving World Order (Pennsylvania University Press, Philadelphia, 1996). 
5 See, for example, Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention; Holzgrefe, “The Humanitarian Intervention 
Debate”, in Holzgrefe and Keohane (eds.), Humanitarian Intervention, 15-52; Delbruck, “A Fresh Look at 
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intervene in domestic conflicts under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.6 Much fiercer have 
been the debates over the authority of states and other actors to do so unilaterally.7 
Utilitarians, communitarians, social contractarians, cosmopolitanists and others have 
debated the morality of a doctrine of humanitarian intervention.8 Questions have been 
raised about the meaning of self-determination, the weight of competing rights claims and 
the very nature of international rights, responsibilities and duties.9 The very basis of 
humanitarian intervention has been called into question in almost every conceivable way. 
As such, most definitions of humanitarian intervention have been produced within the 
framework of such engagements, and consequently have been influenced by their subject 
matter. In particular, given the overriding focus within the literature on ethical and legal 
issues, there has been a tendency to focus on definitions in terms of ideal types, which 
could then be compared against some sort of legal or moral compass to see whether they 
measure up. As such, some studies have focused on the motivations for intervention to see 
whether they accord with standards of acceptable conduct;10 others have focused on the 
outcomes of intervention to see if they measure up with standards of desirability;11 while 
yet others have diligently sought to establish robust lists of criteria against which we can 
                                                                                                                                              
Humanitarian Intervention Under the Authority of the United Nations”, 64(898-899) Indiana Law Journal 
(1992), 887-901. 
6 See, for example, Reisman, “Coercion and Self-determination: Construing Charter Article 2(4)”, 78 
American Journal of International Law (1984), 642-645; Buchanan, “Reforming the International Law of 
Humanitarian Intervention”, in Holzgrefe and Keohane (eds.), Humanitarian Intervention, 130-175. 
7 See, for example, Brenfors and Petersen, “The Legality of Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention—A 
Defence”, 69(4) Nordic Journal of International Law (2000), 449-499; Byers and Chesterman, “Changing 
the Rules About Rules? Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention and the Future of International Law”, in 
Holzgrefe and Keohane (eds.), Humanitarian Intervention, 177-203; Chesterman, “Legality versus 
Legitimacy: Humanitarian Intervention, the Security Council and the Rule of Law”, 33(3) Security Dialogue 
(2002), 293-307; Bannon, “The Responsibility to Protect: The UN World Summit and the Question of 
Unilateralism”, 115(5) The Yale Law Journal (2006), 1157-1165. 
8 For an overview of some of these debates, see Holzgrefe, “The Humanitarian Intervention Debate”; Teson, 
Humanitarian Intervention: An Enquiry Into Law and Morality (Transnational, New York, 1997). For 
particular viewpoints, see, for example, Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical 
Illustrations (Basic Books, New York, 2000); Buchanan, “The Internal Legitimacy of Humanitarian 
Intervention”, 7(1) Journal of Political Philosophy (1999), 71-87; Nardin, “The Moral Basis of Humanitarian 
Intervention”, 16(1) Ethics and International Affairs (2002), 57-70. 
9 See Bellamy, “Humanitarian Responsibilities”; International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS), The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty (International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, 2001); Walzer, Just and Unjust 
Wars; Reisman, “Coercion and Self-determination”. 
10 See, for example, Verwey, “The Legality of Humanitarian Intervention”, in Ferris (ed.), A Challenge to 
Intervene: A New Role for the United Nations? (Life and Peace Institute, Uppsala, 1992), 112-136; Parekh, 
“Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention”; ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect. 
11 See, for example, Teson, Humanitarian Intervention; Wheeler, Saving Strangers. 
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measure when and where such interventions are appropriate.12 The common factor linking 
such attempts, however, is a concern with establishing the legitimacy of humanitarian 
interventions, an effort which often seems to come at the expense of establishing the 
content of such interventions. If we are to establish what humanitarian intervention is, 
therefore, rather than what it ought to be, the question of the definition of humanitarian 
intervention may need to be revisited.13 I address this question in Chapter 2, where I 
develop an operational definition of humanitarian intervention, drawing on the existing 
literature but moving beyond it.  
The purpose of such an enterprise is relatively simple: to clear the ground for an 
examination of why humanitarian intervention became so prominently engaged in as a 
practice at all. Without such an understanding, it seems premature to suggest that the era of 
humanitarian intervention is over. However, the simplicity of the question, as is often the 
case, belies the complexity of finding an answer. Indeed, surprisingly enough, few scholars 
have actually engaged directly with this question. A brief discussion of a few such studies 
only highlights the continuing paucity of concrete knowledge within the field upon which 
we can draw. Laura Neack approached the question in the context of UN peacekeeping 
missions between 1948 and 1990, assessing motivations on the basis of national interest 
and humanitarianism, and concluded that national interest was the primary motivating 
factor.14 Jakobsen, meanwhile, found national interest to be a vital factor in only one of the 
cases he analysed. Admittedly, Jakobsen assessed five rationales rather than two: 
international support, domestic support, national interest, the CNN effect15 and chances of 
success. However, at least one possible explanation for the divergence in findings is the 
differences in case studies—Jakobsen studied peace enforcement operations, a motley 
conglomerate including Kuwait (1990), Northern Iraq (1991), Somalia (1993), Haiti (1994) 
and Rwanda (1994)—a point only confirming the need to establish a robust definition of 
                                               
12 See, for example, Farer, Archibugi, Brown, Crawford, Weiss and Wheeler, “Roundtable: Humanitarian 
Intervention After 9/11”, 19(2) International Relations (2005), 211-250; ICISS, The Responsibility to 
Protect. 
13 Ramsbotham and Woodhouse provide the best definition in this respect and I follow them on several 
important points. Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict 
(Polity Press, Cambridge, 1996). 
14 Neack, “UN Peace-Keeping: In the Interest of Community or Self?” 32(2) Journal of Peace Research 
(1995), 181-196. 
15 Understood here to mean the proposition that the news media has the power to set policy agendas and push 
states towards intervention through the impact of widespread and emotive reporting. See below for further 
discussion. 
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what is actually under consideration.16 Stephen Garrett, in his book Doing Good and Doing 
Well, devoted a chapter to the question of what prompts states to engage in humanitarian 
intervention. Providing a comparative analysis of a number of cases, purely limited to 
humanitarian intervention, Garrett concluded that humanitarian intervention occurs in 
cases where there is a mix of humanitarian and national interest motives, where a degree of 
empathy is felt for the sufferers of human rights abuses, and is also affected by the fear of 
disorder, the actions of the protagonists, and the personality of the leaders who chose to 
intervene, a complex mix indeed. While Garrett’s choice of case studies is perhaps more 
relevant to my current interests than those of Neack or Jakobsen, the weight of his 
conclusions are not aided by the rigour in his approach. Garrett is anecdotal in his choice 
of examples to support his arguments, citing individual cases in support of each of his 
arguments without subjecting each case to a test concerning each argument.17 Chomsky, 
meanwhile, adopts a neo-Marxist framework, which unfolds almost as a realist approach, 
in which he argues that states only ever engage in humanitarian intervention for personal 
profit.18 
While these examples hardly represent a coherent body of literature, at least one important 
point emerges from their comparison. Most analysts, it seems, view the question of why 
states engage in humanitarian intervention as a contest between national interests and 
humanitarian concern, or, in other words, as between realism and idealism, an ages-old 
debate in the context of international relations scholarship.19 The relevance of this enduring 
dichotomy appears supported by even a cursory glance across the relevant editorial pages 
of most Western newspapers. More importantly, however, we can deduce such a 
conception from an examination of two schools of thought that do constitute coherent 
bodies of theory: the English School and neoliberal institutionalist approaches to 
humanitarian intervention. The English School and neoliberal institutionalist approaches 
have dominated the literature on humanitarian intervention to an extent not seen in most 
other areas of study. While neither has directly shared the primary concern of this thesis, 
there is nevertheless much we can learn from them.  
                                               
16 Jakobsen, “National Interest, Humanitarianism or the CNN Effect: What Triggers UN Peace Enforcement 
After the Cold War”, 33(2) Journal of Peace Research (1996), 205-215. 
17 Garrett, “How Governments Decide”, in Garrett (ed.), Doing Good and Doing Well: An Examination of 
Humanitarian Intervention (Praeger, Westport, 1999). 
18 Chomsky, The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo (Common Courage Press, Monroe, 1999). 
19 The classic text on the realism–idealism debate is Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939: An 
Introduction to the Study of International Relations (Harper Perennial, London, 1964). 
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Unfortunately, a set of unhappy meta-theoretical commitments in mainstream international 
relations theory seems to suggest that attempting to engage in ‘inter-paradigm’ dialogue in 
this manner is not only difficult, but philosophically unsound.20 I engage with this issue in 
Chapter 3. Arguing from a scientific realist standpoint that it is not only possible but 
fruitful to attempt to bridge some of the discipline’s apparently insurmountable divides—
on questions such as rationalism and reflectivism, materialism and idealism, structure and 
agency and causation and constitution—I expound my own position on these issues at the 
same time as developing a meta-theoretical framework within which the examination of 
humanitarian intervention can proceed. In the course of this enterprise, I engage directly 
with the neoliberal and English School approaches, and conclude that here, too, is evidence 
of the juxtaposition of realism and idealism. Though proponents of the two approaches 
would almost certainly not put it in this way, their fundamental ontological beliefs about 
the world suggest the dominance of contrasting conceptions of agency in their work. 
Drawing on neorealism as the basis for its explanatory framework, neoliberalism tends to 
treat agency in Hobbesian terms. Though far more flexible in its conception of agency 
(and, indeed, the relationship between agency and structure), I nevertheless argue that 
English School scholarship on humanitarian intervention, to a great extent though not 
exclusively, and primarily within the solidarist wing of that body of work, has tended to 
conceptualise agency in more Lockean terms. Clearly, the Hobbesian–Lockean divide is 
merely another way of conceptualising the realism–idealism divide.  
The question nevertheless remains how such insights can be woven together to provide an 
analytical framework. Scientific realism continues to be useful in this regard. One of the 
best known exponents of the scientific realist approach is Alexander Wendt. While I 
disagree with Wendt on certain important philosophical points, as discussed in Chapter 3, 
Wendt’s seminal work on a Social Theory of International Politics remains one of the most 
important works in international relations theory of recent years.21 In particular, Wendt’s 
conception of the potential for a ‘via media’ between the rationalist and reflectivist 
paradigms seems to be of particular relevance to the problematics raised here. So too does 
Wendt’s elevation of the notion of identity as an organising concept for the study of 
international relations theory. Wendt’s three identity-based logics of anarchy—Hobbesian, 
                                               
20 See, for example, Keohane, “International Institutions: Two Approaches”, 32(4) International Studies 
Quarterly (1988), 379-396; Hollis and Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1990). 
21 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999). 
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Lockean and Kantian—are clearly reflected in the dominant approaches to humanitarian 
intervention identified in Chapter 3, and identity would seem to be a fruitful dimension 
along which to examine the issue.  
At the same time, the approach based on identity is not without its problems. Wendt’s 
work itself has been at least as heavily critiqued as it has been lauded (though criticism is 
its own form of flattery).22 In a much broader sense, identity itself is viewed by many, 
often on very good grounds, as a problematic concept. As Brubaker and Cooper noted in 
an important critique: “[i]dentity, we argue, tends to mean too much (when understood in a 
strong sense), too little (when understood in a weak sense), or nothing at all (because of its 
sheer ambiguity)”.23 The extremely broad range of very different analyses that have been 
based on the notion of identity has done little enough to mitigate this shortcoming. Though 
an analysis of the varying understandings of identity and the core components of the 
concept would, in such circumstances, constitute a research project of its own, there is 
nevertheless a need to operationalise the concept of identity in a more satisfactory way if it 
is to be a useful tool in political research. I engage with this question in Chapter 4.  
Equally, though there have been numerous uses of identity in international relations 
scholarship, few enough of them bear any similarity to the approach taken in this thesis. As 
popular with radical post-structuralists as it is with weak constructivists, identity has often 
taken on different shapes depending on the meta-theoretical commitments of its end-users. 
Even within weak constructivism, where this research can be broadly located, there are 
fundamental differences between scholars in regard to their approach to political research, 
opening the paradigm up to criticisms that it is less a theory than a school of thought, or 
that it suffers from a lack of methodological clarity.24 These criticisms are not without 
basis.  
Nevertheless, the weak constructivism espoused in this thesis vests a great deal of its belief 
in its own viability on the basis of its flexibility, a natural consequence of which is a 
plurality of different approaches. At the same time, I would argue, there has indeed been a 
mainstream research agenda that has become established within the constructivist tradition, 
                                               
22 See, for example, Guzzini and Leander (eds.), Constructivism and International Relations: Alexander 
Wendt and his Critics (Routledge, London, 2006). 
23 Brubaker and Cooper, “Beyond Identity”, 29(1) Theory and Society (2000), 1-47, at 1. 
24 A point accepted even by many of its advocates. See Kubulkova, Onuf and Kowert (eds.), International 
Relations in a Constructed World (M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, 1998). 
 8 
albeit slowly and haltingly, and not as explicitly as within other paradigms.25 Largely, this 
has been along Wendtian lines. Wendt’s primary focus has been to develop a structural 
theory of international relations that addresses questions of systemic order and change. 
Arguably, the considerable bulk of constructivist research has proceeded from a related 
structural perspective. Consequently, at the same time that constructivists stress the 
importance of the mutual constitution of structure and agency, as discussed in Chapter 3, 
few enough constructivists actually seriously engage with the empirical applications of this 
notion. With such rich empirical ground to be tilled in purely holistic theories, it seems, 
vast tracts of theoretical ground remain fallow. 
The structural approach that is so popular in much constructivist research is of only limited 
use to the question under examination in this thesis. To determine why states engage(d) in 
humanitarian intervention, it is first necessary to examine the empirical record in some 
concrete cases to find examples of such behaviour and to establish their basis. However, 
while structural theories may tell us important things about general trends in international 
life and provide key ideas that constitute a useful starting point for such analysis, they 
provide considerably less leverage when applied against particular events or occurrences. 
At the same time, however, it is a fallacy to suggest that structural theories cannot be used 
to derive causal propositions. Identity is an inherently structural notion, but, in Chapter 4, I 
use dominant understandings of identity derived from the analysis in Chapter 3 to reach 
some causal propositions for the ways in which identity may cause foreign policy action, in 
this case humanitarian intervention. In so doing, I do not move to an exclusively 
individualist approach to the research, but maintain the meta-theoretical commitment to a 
mutually constitutive notion of structure and agency developed in Chapter 3, and apply 
notions of morphogenetic social analysis to the development of the framework.26  
Of course, this framework does not have to be built in a total methodological vacuum; this 
study is hardly the first to consider the causal implications of identity.27 Nevertheless, such 
                                               
25 For further discussion, see Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory”, 50(2) 
World Politics (1959), 324-348; Finnemore and Sikkink, “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research 
Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics”, 4 Annual Review of Political Science (2001), 
391-416. 
26 See Archer, Culture and Agency: The Place of Culture in Social Theory (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1988). 
27 See, for example, Ashizawa, “When Identity Matters: State Identity, Regional Instititution Building and 
Japanese Foreign Policy”, 10(3) International Studies Review (2008), 571-598; Barnett, “Culture, Strategy 
and Foreign Policy Change: Israel’s Road to Oslo”, 5(1) European Journal of International Relations (1999), 
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efforts remain in their infancy, and there is much to do to develop an appropriate 
methodological framework to analyse such questions. In Chapter 4, I try to move beyond 
the extant focus on the nexus between identities and interest, which, though important, fails 
to capture, I argue, the complexity of the relationship between identity and foreign policy. 
In so doing, I draw upon the work of Christian Reus-Smit, which allows for an 
examination of this relationship along four dimensions: identity (idiographic reasoning); 
interests (purposive reasoning); dilemmas (ethical reasoning); and actions (instrumental 
reasoning).28 This framework, I argue, allows for a more robust understanding of the ways 
in which identity manifests in foreign policy and a deeper analysis of the causal pathways 
through which this process moves.  
In Chapters 5, 6 and 7, I then apply the framework developed in the earlier chapters to 
three cases studies of the politics of humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold War era. 
Taking the policies of the United States as a useful starting point, I examine the US 
approach to three humanitarian crises over the period 1992–1994: in Somalia, Rwanda and 
Haiti.29 This case study selection provides us with two cases of intervention and one case 
of non-intervention against which to assess the merits of the theory. Taken individually, 
each of the case studies has something important to tell us about the ways in which policies 
of humanitarian intervention are formulated. More importantly, however, taken 
collectively the case studies tell us as much about the ways in which identities are 
articulated, re-articulated, affirmed and revised on the basis of the policies undertaken in 
their name as they do about policies of humanitarian intervention themselves. These 
findings are discussed at length in the final chapter, which draws together the distinct 
threads that run through the case study chapters into a coherent whole. In this context, 
there is considerable scope for a discussion of the merits of the scientific 
realist/constructivist approach to international relations theory in a more general sense. 
Such a discussion seems entirely timely. 
                                                                                                                                              
5-36; Brysk, Parsons and Sandholtz, “After Empire: National Identity and Post-Colonial Families of 
Nations”, 8(2) European Journal of International Relations (2002), 267-305. 
28 Reus-Smit, The Politics of International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004). 
29 While other states also undertook humanitarian interventions during this period, restricting the analysis to 
the changing approach of a single state removes potential confounding factors in terms of national variations. 
See Chapter 4 for further discussion. 
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Chapter 2 
A Lack of Definition: Towards an Analytical 
Understanding of Humanitarian Intervention 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Amidst the maelstrom of conflicting ideas in the literature on humanitarian intervention, it 
is perhaps unsurprising that no clear picture of what humanitarian intervention actually 
consists of has yet emerged. Our understanding of what humanitarian intervention is, it 
seems, depends entirely upon our commitment to one or other of a myriad of principled 
issues. Yet, the extent of the divide on the central issues pertaining to humanitarian 
intervention is in fact misleading. This stems in large part from the fact that what is being 
discussed in the literature on humanitarian intervention is, to the greater extent, an ideal 
type. Discussion has focused largely on what humanitarian intervention should be, with 
what humanitarian intervention actually is being relegated to the role of comparator. Thus, 
the literature has tended to treat humanitarian intervention as a challenge to moral 
principles, legal precedents and operational doctrines, without also considering the 
challenges it poses to empirical explanation. For the most part, however, analysts of 
humanitarian intervention have at least agreed on the set of post-Cold War cases that are or 
were considered to be humanitarian intervention: the interventions into northern Iraq, 
Liberia, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Kosovo and East Timor are viewed 
by most analysts as putative examples of humanitarian intervention.1 I say ‘putative’ 
because the analyses of these interventions that have followed their identification have 
focused largely on how closely these interventions have resembled the imaginary ideal 
type. As such, a wealth of empirical evidence and a vast literature on the minutiae of these 
interventions has emerged. However, this evidence has yet to be put to systematic use in 
assessing whether or not these interventions share core components and, if so, what those 
core components actually consist of. The breadth of scholarly thought on the moral, legal 
and operational dimensions of humanitarian intervention has not been matched by a 
complementary branch of literature that assesses the empirical content of the practice of 
                                               
1 To take a representative example, this is the list of post-Cold War interventions included in the report of the 
ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect. 
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humanitarian intervention. In a sense, this is unsurprising. The study of humanitarian 
intervention is a relatively immature field, which largely, though not entirely, originated as 
a response to the emergence of a string of so-called humanitarian interventions in the 
immediate post-Cold War era. The questions that were being asked when this field of 
scholarship emerged as a serious body of literature in its own right—as discussed in 
Chapter 1—are important questions, which undoubtedly demanded (and still do) careful 
consideration, reflection and response. However, it remains almost inexplicable why, as 
this field developed, greater attention has not been paid to the empirical content of the 
humanitarian interventions of the post-Cold War era. What we are talking about here is not 
a lack of use of empirical evidence, description and interpretation, but rather the lack of 
systematic use of this data in an empirical sense. The question is one of the mode of 
analysis employed. Thus far, the empirical data has largely only been used in an anecdotal 
manner, to highlight an ethical, legal or operational issue or to chart the historiography of 
approaches to an issue. As of yet, a systematic comparative analysis of the content of the 
so-called humanitarian interventions of the post-Cold War era has yet to be undertaken.  
One of the places in which the divide between the overriding normative orientation of the 
literature on humanitarian intervention and the lack of empirical analysis is most evident is 
in the question of the definition of humanitarian intervention itself. Although the search for 
an adequate definition of humanitarian intervention has been one of the central concerns of 
the legal and ethical scholarship on the subject, nothing approaching unity of opinion has 
yet coalesced in this regard. Again, moreover, this debate has remained entirely focused on 
ideal types. Quite understandably, in law and ethics a definition’s value stems from the 
extent to which it is able to determine the conditions under which an action is legitimate or 
illegitimate. Thus, the search for a definition of legitimate humanitarian intervention has 
largely been transformed into a search for criteria that might govern the application of 
humanitarian intervention.2 In other words, the question of the definition of humanitarian 
intervention has been subverted into a question of appropriate principles for humanitarian 
intervention. While such questions are undoubtedly important, they need to be matched by 
a branch of scholarship that is concerned with the practice of humanitarian intervention 
and a definition that assesses the parameters of what humanitarian intervention is, as well 
as what it should be. Indeed, such work is an absolute prerequisite for a profitable dialogue 
                                               
2 See, for example, the debate over criteria in Farer, Archibugi, Brown, Crawford, Weiss and Wheeler, 
“Roundtable: Humanitarian Intervention After 9/11”. 
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between the theory and practice of humanitarian intervention, between the idealism and the 
reality. In the remainder of this chapter, I will address the issue of what constitutes 
humanitarian intervention and develop an operational definition of humanitarian 
intervention that is appropriate and useful in analysing humanitarian intervention in an 
empirical sense. In doing so, I will break the concept of humanitarian intervention down 
into its component parts: the interventionary element and the humanitarian element.  
II. THE PARAMETERS OF INTERVENTION  
The form of intervention that is most commonly associated with the concept of 
humanitarian intervention is forcible military intervention.3 Thus, Holzgrefe defines 
intervention as “the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) 
aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human 
rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within 
whose territory force is applied”.4 Likewise, Sean Murphy defines humanitarian 
intervention as the “threat or use of force by a state, group of states, or international 
organization primarily for the purpose of protecting the nationals of the target state from 
widespread deprivations of internationally recognized human rights”.5 These definitions 
are typical of those in the literature. Also fairly typical, however, is the fact that neither 
author actually explains the processes by which they arrived at such a definition. In 
particular, the rationale for restricting the concept of humanitarian intervention to instances 
of the ‘threat or use of force’ is particularly poorly explained in the literature as a whole. 
There is an implicit dichotomy that emerges in this approach, between military 
humanitarian intervention, on the one hand, and pure non-intervention, on the other. This is 
at particular divergence from reality, in which states (or other actors), when faced by a 
humanitarian crisis of a scale that seems to demand a response, have an entire range of 
policy options that they might employ, including economic sanctions, economic coercion, 
negotiation, diplomatic pressure, foreign aid, technical assistance, granting or withholding 
of recognition of a secessionist state, collective action through UN human rights 
mechanisms, etc., in addition to the options of military intervention or pure non-
intervention. This has led certain scholars to try to broaden the remit of humanitarian 
                                               
3 This is true both of popular perception and the academic literature. Analyses that take this approach include 
central texts such as Holzgrefe and Keohane (eds.), Humanitarian Intervention; Wheeler, Saving Strangers; 
Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention; Teson, Humanitarian Intervention. 
4 Holzgrefe, “The Humanitarian Intervention Debate”, 18. 
5 Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention, 11-12. 
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intervention to include both forcible and non-forcible actions.6 As Ramsbotham and 
Woodhouse argue, this has the benefit of both recognising the full range of policy options, 
as well as using the “ordinary English word ‘intervention’ … in an ordinary, accurate 
way”.7  
The problem with such an approach, however, is that it may broaden the scope of the 
definition so much as to render the central concept practically meaningless. As Stanley 
Hoffmann observes, under such a conceptualisation, “[t]he subject [intervention] is 
practically the same as that of international politics in general from the beginning of time 
to the present … Anything can constitute an intervention, indeed even non-acts can 
constitute intervention.”8 While Hoffmann is entirely correct to be wary of the dilution of a 
concept to this kind of extent, there are nonetheless certain parameters that define 
intervention and make it possible to distinguish intervention from the general practice of 
international affairs. A useful starting point is to look at R. J. Vincent’s definition of 
intervention, which has become perhaps the most widely cited and authoritative statement 
of what constitutes intervention. Vincent asserts that intervention consists of:  
Activity undertaken by a state, a group within a state, a group of states or an international 
organization which interferes coercively in the domestic affairs of another state. It is a 
discrete event having a beginning and an end and it is aimed at the authority structure of the 
target state. It is not necessarily lawful or unlawful but it does break a conventional pattern 
of international relations.9  
There are three important elements in Vincent’s definition, which are shared by the 
literature on intervention more generally, that serve to distinguish intervention from other 
forms of international action: the action must be coercive: it must be convention-breaking; 
and it must be aimed at the authority structure of the target state. These three elements will 
be examined in turn before the discussion moves to some more general questions about the 
nature of humanitarian intervention. 
                                               
6 See, for example, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention; Scheffer, “Toward a Modern 
Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention”, 23 University of Toledo Law Review (1992), 253-293. 
7 Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention, 119. 
8 Hoffmann, “The Problem of Intervention”, in Bull (ed.), Intervention in World Politics, 7-28, at 7-8. 
9 Vincent, Nonintervention and International Order (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1974), 13. 
 14 
A. Coercion or Compliance? 
One of the most obvious but important characteristics of an interventionary policy is that it 
is a coercive act. As the International Court of Justice pointed out in the Nicaragua case, it 
is “the element of coercion, which defines, and indeed forms the very essence of, 
prohibited intervention”.10 Coercion, of course, is not limited to the use of military force. 
Among the various types of intervention discussed above, a number of the non-forcible 
variants constitute coercive intervention. Economic sanctions are a coercive means of 
attempting to enforce concessions on the target. Such sanctions were deployed against the 
Milosevic regime in the former Yugoslavia, in an attempt to force a resolution of the 
bloody conflict taking place in neighbouring Bosnia-Herzegovina.11 The use of economic 
and political inducements and threats to secure compliance by a target group can also be 
coercive in nature. It is quite clear that the Australian government and its US ally used 
economic and political inducements and threats against the Habibie government in 
Indonesia in order to force that government to accept a military intervention in the problem 
region of East Timor.12 Equally, the delivery and provision of humanitarian aid may, 
depending on the context, amount to a coercive act. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) is 
renowned for its policy of providing aid in conflict situations around the world regardless 
of state consent. It is indeed illustrative that MSF was born out of the Biafran civil war, in 
which the Nigerian government considered the provision of aid to the Biafran rebels to be 
a coercive and hostile act.13 However, the element of coercion does rule out a large number 
of international actions that might otherwise be described as humanitarian intervention. 
The delivery of humanitarian relief, foreign aid, technical assistance, good offices, 
negotiation and peacekeeping, for example, are all normally engaged in with the consent of 
the host government. As such, they cannot accurately be considered to be forms of 
intervention. Of course, in reality, international responses to crisis situations are likely to 
                                               
10 International Court of Justice, Nicaragua v. United States of America, Judgment of 27 June 1986, ICJ 
[1986] 108, para. 205.  
11 For an analysis of the use of economic sanctions in conflict resolution, including the case of the former 
Yugoslavia, see Oudraat, “Making Economic Sanctions Work”, 42(3) Survival (2000), 105-127. 
12 Measures to induce the Habibie government to consent to a peacekeeping force included the United States 
severing ties to the Indonesian military, the United States and EU suspending arms sales to Indonesia, the 
IMF suspending the disbursement of $460 million in economic recovery funds, the World Bank freezing 
$300 million due for disbursement and public calls voicing support for an international force from the UN, 
United States, Australia and numerous other countries. See Wheeler and Dunne, “East-Timor and the New 
Humanitarian Interventionism”, 77(4) International Affairs (2001), 805-829; Robinson, “If You Leave Us 
Here We Will Die”, in Mills and Brunner (eds.), The New Killing Fields: Massacre and the Politics of 
Intervention (Basic Books, New York, 2002), 159-184. 
13 For information on MSF’s philosophy and origins, see the MSF website at <http://www.msf.org>. 
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comprise a combination of coercive and non-coercive actions. Thus, the 1991 intervention 
into northern Iraq to create safe havens for Kurdish refugees and the establishment of no-
fly zones was primarily a coercive action, imposed upon the Iraqi state without its consent. 
At the same time, in April 1991, the Iraqi government signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) with the UN, in which it was agreed that Iraq consented to the non-
forcible provision of humanitarian relief in a number of issue areas, including disaster 
response assistance, and medical, food and relief supplies. While the US-led military 
operations—Operation Provide Comfort and Operation Southern Watch—were clearly 
coercive, the actions undertaken on the basis of the MoU were not. Of course, a number of 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and other actors also chose not to operate within 
the limits set within the MoU and engaged in non-forcible but coercive action within Iraq 
at that time.14  
Making the distinction between coercive and non-coercive action is crucial, especially in 
circumstances where a combination of the two appear. The element of coercion 
fundamentally transforms an action from one of assistance to one of compellence.15 Non-
coercive action could therefore better be termed ‘humanitarian assistance’ than 
‘humanitarian intervention’. This distinction is necessary for proper causal analysis as 
compellent action poses different challenges and follows different dynamics than does 
assistance, for a number of reasons. Primarily, the decision-making process is likely to be 
different. An act of assistance is more likely to be engaged in at a lower threshold of 
interest than is a compellent action: the choice to try and enforce one’s will on a 
recalcitrant adversary will be taken with much greater care than would a similar decision to 
aid a willing party. This is the case not only because such action runs contrary to the will 
of the target state and is thus more onerous to legitimate but also because coercion 
transforms a permissive environment into a non-permissive environment, in which it is 
much more difficult and hazardous to operate. Such should surely be the lesson of the US-
led intervention in Somalia, which began promisingly with the at least grudging 
acquiescence of many of the warlords in Somalia but quickly metamorphosed into a clearly 
                                               
14 For more on the consensual and non-consensual humanitarian actions in Iraq, see Ramsbotham and 
Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention, 69-86. 
15 For an analysis of the nature of compellence and other forms of intervention, see Haass, Intervention: The 
Use of American Force in the Post-Cold War World (Brookings Institute, Washington, DC, 1999). 
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coercive and unwelcome presence, leading eventually to the climactic events in Mogadishu 
in October 1993.16  
The humanitarian interventions of the post-Cold War era have posed a different and 
awkward question about consent, however. As noted above, consent from the Habibie 
government for Australian intervention into East Timor was not initially forthcoming but 
only materialised following a period of political and economic inducement and threat on 
the part of Australia and the United States. As such, was consent in this case, extracted as it 
was under duress, meaningful and, more generally, is consent a useful or tangible mark of 
differentiation? This is, of course, a question with no firm answer. Clearly, there are cases 
in which consent is clear and unambiguous, just as there are cases in which non-consent is 
equally clear. However, a large number of cases are going to fall somewhere along the 
continuum between full and enthusiastic consent, at the one end, and absolute non-consent, 
at the other. There are at least three situations in which such ambiguity may be particularly 
striking: in the cases of states that are under external pressure to provide consent; in the 
cases of civil wars in which effective power is divided between two or more parties, one of 
whom refuses consent; and in the cases of so-called ‘failed states’, in which there is no 
identifiable authority capable of providing consent. Such ambiguity has led certain authors 
to assert that consent is a poor parameter by which to judge whether an act was 
interventionary or otherwise.17  
This is a premature judgment. Clearly, there is a problem in accurately identifying consent. 
However, part of the problem has stemmed from the legal connotations of consent, which 
has produced an overly formal emphasis on technical consent—i.e., the consent of the 
official government. This means that the consent of the Habibie government ought to be 
taken as meaningful, even though it clearly was not. Equally, under this formulation, in 
civil wars, only the consent of the government is at issue, not that of any opposition group. 
Thus, when the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) intervened in 
Liberia in 1991, at the behest of President Samuel Doe, consent was viewed as 
                                               
16 Of course, this action should still be conceived of as having been coercive and non-consensual from the 
outset, as consent was ambiguous in political terms, with the powerful warlord Mohammed Farah Aideed in 
particular having opposed intervention from the outset. Moreover, the United States appeared determined to 
intervene regardless of the consent of the parties. For more discussion of the relevance of the political 
connotation of consent, see below. The change in attitudes was nevertheless important, as it affected the 
overall levels of permissiveness in the operational environment. For more, see Stevenson, “Hope Restored in 
Somalia?” 91 Foreign Policy (1993), 138-154. 
17 See, for example, Hoffmann, The Ethics and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention (University of Notre 
Dame Press, Chicago, 1997). 
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forthcoming, despite the fact that Doe controlled only part of the capital Monrovia and 
virtually none of the rest of the country.18 Finally, the emphasis on formal legal consent 
has caused the issue of consent to become viewed as entirely irrelevant in the case of so-
called ‘failed states’, which lack an identifiable government. Thus, consent was not 
considered to be an issue in the US intervention in Somalia, even though the important 
Aideed faction opposed intervention from the outset and even after it became abundantly 
clear that US forces were no longer welcomed by most portions of the society.19  
Such conceptions of consent appear entirely too generous when viewed in light of the 
reality of the conflict situations in which intervention takes place. Indeed, history suggests 
that it is entirely possible to identify non-consensual situations in which formal consent has 
been granted if one shifts the referent of consent from the state to the nation. Thus, we can 
differentiate the political and legal meanings of consent.20 Consent in the legal sense, the 
consent of the ruling government, is not unimportant—indeed, the presence of formal 
consent may lower the political barriers to outside intervention.21 However, legal consent 
without political consent does not exclude action from being interventionary in nature. The 
political approach to consent must be predicated on the domestic political balance within a 
state rather than upon formal notions of right authority. Nonetheless, even from a political 
perspective consent may be ambiguous. However, considering the more difficult and 
delicate nature of non-consensual action, it appears analytically sound to consider semi-
permissive environments to be non-consensual rather than consensual. There will always 
be cases in which it is difficult to readily identify the levels of consent; however, the very 
fact that there is debate and dispute in this regard is an indication of the prudence of an 
approach in which a high evidentiary burden must be borne in regard to consent. 
B. Convention-Breaking or Business as Usual? 
Another way in which to distinguish intervention from other forms of international action 
is to assess whether the action is convention-breaking or simply business as usual. 
                                               
18 See Yoroms, “ECOMOG and West African Regional Security—A Nigerian Perspective”, 21(1/2) Issue: A 
Journal of Opinion (1993), 84-91. 
19 Such is the argument made by the ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect. 
20 The distinction between political and legal consent is made by MacFarlane, “Intervention in Contemporary 
World Politics”, 350 Adelphi Papers (2002). 
21 As such, Geoffrey Robinson contends that Australia had been ready to send a force to East Timor since 
before the vote on independence but was unwilling to do so until the Indonesian government’s consent was 
forthcoming. See Robinson, “If You Leave Us Here We Will Die”. 
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Intervention (meaning as it does something that comes between two episodes) implies an 
unconventional mode of behaviour, which is a clear break from the norm. It is important to 
stress that conventional behaviour should not be conflated with legitimate behaviour. 
Illegitimate behaviour may become so regular and taken for granted that it can no longer 
be considered to be intervention.22 Thus, the British colonisation of India at the turn of the 
nineteenth century was an illegitimate and unconventional act. However, the following 
century in which Britain proceeded to govern and extract resources from India, though 
illegitimate by most standards, cannot be considered to be a continuing intervention, as it 
had become the normal state of affairs.23  
Equally, conventional action should not be conflated with non-coercive action. For 
example, the critical reports of such bodies as Amnesty International, Human Rights 
Watch and the International Crisis Group are very often coercive instruments aimed at 
altering the political authority structure of the target state.24 However, this practice has 
become so ubiquitous, such a normal part of international affairs, that it can hardly be 
termed intervention. As Vincent puts it, intervention “is a discrete event having a 
beginning and an end”.25 Acts cannot be considered to be convention-breaking unless in a 
concrete sense a particular action distinguishes itself from the norm, in terms of its breadth, 
depth or force. Thus, US criticism of the Sudanese regime for the human rights situation in 
Darfur cannot be considered to be convention-breaking, as such rhetoric is hardly a break 
from the norm.26 However, the early Cold War US practice of ‘psychological warfare’ in 
places such as Guatemala may be considered to be convention-breaking, as such practices 
clearly diverge from the normal conduct of international affairs.27 
                                               
22 This point is well made by Rosenau, “Intervention as a Scientific Concept”, 13(2) Journal of Conflict 
Resolution (1969), 149-171. 
23 An interesting aside can be made here. There has been a tendency among critics of contemporary 
humanitarian intervention to describe it as a veiled form of neoimperialism. However, imperialism, which 
implies the direct or indirect control of the domestic affairs of a foreign nation, is far from synonymous with 
intervention. Intervention may lead to imperialism, but once an action passes from being a break from 
convention into a conventional system of control it is no longer an intervention. Indeed, the very act of 
intervention implies a lack of control of domestic power within the target state.  
24 For such an argument, see Price, “Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World Politics”, 55(4) 
World Politics (2003), 579-606. 
25 Vincent, Nonintervention and International Order, 13. 
26 See, for example, Leopold, “US, UN Pressure Khartoum to Accept UN Darfur Force”, Reuters, 19 August 
2006. 
27 See Cullather, Secret History: the CIA’s Classified Account of its Operations in Guatemala (Stanford 
University Press, Palo Alto, 1999). 
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This highlights the fact that it is not the form of the action (i.e., military, diplomatic, 
economic or political) that here provides the reference point for analytical distinction but 
rather the extent to which such practice diverges from the normal everyday practice of 
international affairs. The class of action thus excluded is neither intervention nor is it 
assistance or non-intervention. Rather, it might better be labelled interference, a term 
which conveys the non-consensual, authority-oriented and ends-directed character of the 
act, but yet refrains from overemphasising the exceptional nature of the act. This 
distinction is important in analytical terms for this research: a radical policy break has a 
different nature to business as usual, regardless of the content of either set of acts, as it 
demonstrates a new determination to deal with an issue on different terms, often more 
aggressively.  
C. Political or Neutral? 
There is a third and crucially important basis on which we can differentiate interventionary 
acts from other acts that take a similar form: that interventionary action is always directed 
at the authority structure of the target state. This line of differentiation follows an ends-
directed logic. Foreign policy behaviour can be classified as interventionary only if it seeks 
to change the domestic balance of power within a target state. Thus, intervention is an 
intrinsically political act that seeks to secure political ends. 
In exploring this dimension, one should firstly stress the difference between an action that 
seeks to change a particular policy within a country and one that seeks to change the 
political balance of power. Only the latter constitutes intervention. Cross-border action that 
seeks to influence policy within another state is a fairly common form of action that, 
although presumptively an act of interference, does not carry with it the full implications of 
an interventionary act. Intervention seeks to change the very way in which policy is 
formulated within a state. This might take the form of a direct change in the personnel 
authorised to make political decisions, such as in the removal of the Cedras regime in Haiti 
or the Taylor regime in Liberia;28 a change in the distribution of political authority within 
the country, such as the power-sharing structures introduced to such arenas as Bosnia-
                                               
28 On Liberia, see Cook, “Liberia: Transition to Peace”, Congressional Research Service Report, 2004, 
available at <http://www.opencrs.cdt.org/rpts/RL32243_20041028.pdf>. On Haiti, see Malone, Decision-
making in the UN Security Council: The Case of Haiti 1990-1997 (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998). 
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Herzegovina;29 a change in the scope of political authority, such as in the unique status 
conferred upon Kosovo or the full independence secured in East Timor;30 or a change in 
the machinery through which political decisions can be channelled, as in the promotion of 
democracy in places such as Sierra Leone and Liberia.31 What is important is that 
intervention seeks to change the ways in which political decisions can be made, not just the 
content of a particular set of policies. Thus, when Milton Friedman travelled to Latin 
America in the 1970s to promote an agenda of neoliberal reforms, which he claimed would 
improve the human rights of the people of the continent, his aim was only to change the 
content of economic policy in the countries which he visited, not the structure of political 
power. It is, of course, notable that the catalyst for this visit was the assumption of power 
by the Pinochet regime in Chile, a situation that Friedman did not oppose but whose 
economic direction he merely sought to influence.32 Such action is clearly not authority-
targeted but policy-oriented. 
This raises an important point about intervention: intervention is never a neutral act. 
Intervention seeks to alter the domestic balance of power within a state, an action that will 
always produce winners and losers, and is in this sense partisan. This analysis has 
important implications, as an intervention will always run contrary to the interest of at least 
one party, at least in part. Thus, intervention is likely to be confrontational and subject to 
higher costs than other similar forms of action. The environment in which intervention 
must take place is therefore less permissive and, as noted above, its modus operandi must 
therefore differ from other classes of action. This aspect of the character of humanitarian 
intervention is often overlooked (despite the fact that it is generally recognised within the 
literature on intervention more generally), yet it is crucially important. It is this aspect that 
most clearly differentiates humanitarian intervention from peacekeeping. The literature 
unfortunately tends to gloss over this fact, preferring to differentiate peacekeeping from 
humanitarian intervention on the basis of consent or the non-use of force. Although these 
factors are important hallmarks of the divide between peacekeeping and humanitarian 
                                               
29 See Daalder, Getting to Dayton: The Making of America’s Bosnia Policy (Brookings Institution, 
Washington, DC, 2000). 
30 On Kosovo, see Yannis, “Kosovo under International Administration”, 43(2) Survival (2001), 31-48. On 
East Timor, see Trowbridge, “Back Road Beckoning”, in Mills and Brunner (eds.), The New Killing Fields, 
207-225. 
31 Adebajo, Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau (Lynne Rienner, 
London, 2002). 
32 See Valdes, Pinochet’s Economists: The Chicago School in Chile (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1995). 
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intervention, whose usefulness as a line of demarcation may once also have been more 
robust, in reference to present-day peace operations they seem insufficiently determinate. 
Peacekeeping forces may use force at times in the expedition of their duties. Indeed, with 
the advent of second- and third-generation peacekeeping, such action is increasingly 
becoming hardwired into the mandates of peacekeeping forces.33 Equally, as highlighted 
above, consent is generally difficult to assess accurately, with most environments being 
semi-permissive rather than permissive or non-permissive. By comparison, the question of 
whether cross-border action seeks to change the authority structure in a state is often much 
more apparent. Peacekeeping forces are traditionally introduced to monitor and support a 
pre-existing peace agreement or to provide the level of confidence in security conditions 
that is necessary for a peace process to take hold. Humanitarian intervention, in contrast, 
seeks to create a peace and a new distribution of power as a direct consequence of the 
military force that is applied in the target state. Again, the compellent character of 
intervention is key. 
D. Forcible or Non-forcible? 
For an action to constitute intervention, it is necessary that all of the abovementioned 
elements be present; each on their own is insufficient. For example, criticisms of a 
government’s human rights record may be coercive and even sometimes aimed at the 
authority-structure of the target state but are not necessarily convention-breaking; 
international assistance in the drafting of a plan for power-sharing may be convention-
breaking and aimed at the authority structure of a state but not coercive; and the severing 
of diplomatic ties may be both convention-breaking and coercive but not necessarily aimed 
at the political authority structure of a state. As such, none of these actions constitute 
intervention. What we are left with is a much smaller class of actions that nonetheless still 
encompasses forcible and non-forcible variants, including direct military intervention; the 
threat of force; economic sanctions; the funding, arming and supply of opposition groups; 
assassination of leaders; covert intervention; recognition of a secessionist state; etc. 
Nothing said so far has served to explain the overwhelming dominance of the approach 
under which military intervention is considered to be the sole content of the concept of 
humanitarian intervention. One can nonetheless identify several reasons why such an 
approach may have so firmly taken hold. 
                                               
33 See Findlay, The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002). 
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The first refers to the occasions for intervention. It is often remarked that humanitarian 
intervention should be restricted to the most grave of situations, instances that, as Michael 
Walzer puts it, “shock the moral conscience of mankind”.34 Thus, in the search for criteria 
of legitimacy for humanitarian intervention, much has been written on the importance of 
force as a last resort, where other forms of intervention have proved or appear likely to be 
ineffective.35 Equally, certain authors have tried to restrict the applicability of intervention 
to certain classes of action, notably genocide and ethnic cleansing, to which it is implied 
the only solution may be the use of force.36 While the context for intervention is important, 
as I will describe below, these considerations speak not to the nature of intervention itself 
but to the specifics of the situations in which intervention may take place. They can be 
decided only on the basis of a case-by-case analysis. They tell us nothing specific about the 
content of intervention itself. 
Another consideration may be the actors involved in military intervention and the 
consequent implications for the power dynamics of military intervention. In the sense that 
military intervention seeks to impose one nation’s will upon another through force of arms, 
it may be a necessary condition that the intervening nation be more powerful than the 
target state. Thus, Hedley Bull writes that: “[a] basic condition of any policy that can be 
called interventionary in this sense is that the intervener should be superior in power to the 
object of the intervention: it is only because the former is relatively strong and the latter 
relatively weak that the question arises of a form of intervention that is dictatorial or 
coercive.”37 Thus, military humanitarian intervention has tended to set the world’s 
powerful nations (often major Western powers but also aspiring regional hegemons) 
against the world’s peripheral nations.38 As such, humanitarian intervention is a projection 
                                               
34 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 107. 
35 See, for example, Fixdal and Smith, “Humanitarian Intervention and Just War”, 42 Mershon Review of 
International Studies (1998), 283-312. 
36 See, for example, Evans, “The Responsibility to Protect: Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention”, 
International Crisis Group, Paper presented to The American Society of International Law, 98th Annual 
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 23 
of hard power that creates tangible rifts between the powerful and the powerless. This is 
not so clearly the case with non-military intervention. Thus, Western criticisms of Russian 
(military) policy in Chechnya have produced only marginal fluctuations in Western–
Russian relations, whereas a policy of military intervention to defend the rights of 
Chechnyans against the ‘Russian aggressor’ would have taken on immense proportions.39  
This reality is important and does indeed highlight many of the normative connotations of 
a policy of humanitarian intervention, taking on as it does neoimperialist overtones, in 
addition to its obvious implications for issues such as sovereignty and self-determination. 
Again, however, the issue is one of context rather than nature. There is nothing to suggest 
that the powerful might not intervene against the powerful, should the rationale be strong 
enough. Neither is the actual incidence of a power differential always as apparent as is 
often suggested. For example, ECOWAS’ interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone under 
Nigerian leadership set an aspiring regional hegemon against two weaker and largely 
failing states. However, the predominance of Nigerian power was less than clearly marked, 
as is evidenced by the fact that these interventions, despite considerable levels of 
commitment in terms of manpower and finances, were unable to secure control of more 
than isolated portions of the countries involved.40 The incidence of power differentials 
does serve to highlight some of the more contentious aspects of humanitarian intervention 
and is thus useful in the kinds of normative enquiry that dominate the literature, but it does 
not tell us anything intrinsic about intervention. Whether the issue of power differentials 
applies is an empirical question that is dependent upon the context for intervention, it is not 
a feature of intervention itself. 
Perhaps the most substantial factor to divide military and non-military interventions is the 
level of commitment required to sustain such action. Although costs may attach to certain 
non-military interventions, such as economic sanctions or the funding, arming and supply 
of opposition groups, these pale in comparison to the costs associated with a policy of full 
military intervention. As a consequence, the decision to undertake a non-military 
intervention may be insuperably easier to reach than one which contemplates military 
intervention. In essence, military intervention is the ultimate form of intervention, in which 
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a state decides that it is willing to take on significant financial costs and risk to its 
servicemen and women in order to achieve its policy goals. Thus, it may indeed be useful 
in practice to differentiate between military and non-military intervention, not only because 
the two may involve different forms and levels of decision-making but also because the 
latter form is where the many challenges and dilemmas of humanitarian intervention are 
posed at their starkest. It is important, however, to state that this is an operational rather 
than a definitional distinction. There is nothing intrinsic about military humanitarian 
intervention to differentiate it from its non-military forms. However, its modus operandi 
may be significantly different and this justifies an analytical separation of the two forms. 
As such, this analysis will focus on military humanitarian intervention, as this form of 
intervention appears to provide the most fertile ground for an analysis of the complicated 
dynamics of humanitarian intervention. In the following analysis, ‘humanitarian 
intervention’ will be taken to mean ‘military humanitarian intervention’ unless explicitly 
stated otherwise. 
III. THE PARAMETERS OF HUMANITARIANISM 
While the literature on intervention displays some consensus on the characteristics of 
intervention and is thus useful in highlighting the parameters of interventionary action, the 
literature on humanitarian intervention has been much less clear and decisive as to what it 
is that makes humanitarian intervention ‘humanitarian’. There have been two main schools 
of thought in regard to what constitutes the humanitarian component of humanitarian 
intervention: one which privileges motives, and one which privileges outcomes.  
A. Do Motives Matter? 
One of the most widely cited examples of a motives-based approach to understanding 
humanitarian intervention is the definition provided by Wil Verwey: “the threat or use of 
force … for the sole purpose of preventing or putting a halt to a serious violation of human 
rights”.41 Verwey has become emblematic of a school of thought that suggests that it is the 
humanitarian motives of the intervening state that defines whether or not an intervention 
was humanitarian. Such a position flows from the very reasonable proposition that an 
exception to the normative prohibition on the use of force across state borders had been 
carved out on the basis that the act itself was altruistic or selfless, hardly the kind of action 
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that the rules of sovereignty and non-intervention were created to exclude from 
international relations. However, the intuitiveness of this proposition also disguises a 
number of significant difficulties with this approach.  
Firstly, it has been far from clear from the analyses of a number of authors just what is 
meant by ‘humanitarian’ motives. In fact, Verwey is among the clearest on this point, 
although his argument seems at odds with most of the rest of the literature. Verwey’s 
understanding of ‘humanitarian’ flows from the understanding of ‘humanitarian’ employed 
by the major Western humanitarian relief agencies. Essentially, Verwey understands 
‘humanitarianism’ to be characterised by the four central tenets of the Red Cross system: 
humanity, impartiality, neutrality and universality.42 While the explication of what it means 
to act in a humanitarian manner is to be welcomed, there is a problem with this particular 
formulation in that it may be somewhat parochial. Fundamentally, such an approach 
conflates principles for humanitarian action with the content of humanitarianism itself. 
Humanity, neutrality, impartiality and universality are no more than operational guidelines 
that have been adumbrated by a certain set of actors in order to channel their actions 
towards humanitarian ends. These principles are widely held, to be sure, but are not 
immune from challenge, as is evident from MSF’s split from the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC) following the Biafran civil war, in which it was these very 
principles that were brought into dispute.43  
Moreover, there is a sense here that humanitarianism is or must necessarily be apolitical or 
purely altruistic (a sense that is often also shared by other authors who do not subscribe to 
this formulation). This conception is, of course, at odds with the definition of intervention 
given above and represents a misappropriation of the term. As Ramsbotham and 
Woodhouse rightly point out: “the projection of armed force across a border against the 
will of the target government in response [is], by its nature, political through and 
through”.44 It is an impossibility for an action that is ‘humanitarian’ in the sense that 
Verwey describes to also be interventionary in the sense that I have described above. Thus, 
Ramsbotham and Woodhouse conclude: “[n]o wonder analysts who employ such criteria 
conclude that there have been no examples of forcible humanitarian intervention at all”.45 
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44 Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, Humanitarian Intervention, 57. 
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It seems that Verwey’s analysis of what it means to act in a humanitarian manner has the 
sole benefit, in the context of humanitarian intervention, of being explicit. This is a feature 
that is notably absent from other discussions of humanitarian motive, which seem to take 
the concept as a given, when it is anything but. It is beyond the scope of this paper to 
engage in a lengthy philosophical discussion as to the precise nature of humanitarianism 
but an understanding must nevertheless be explicated. It appears from the bulk of the 
literature that what is generally understood by humanitarian motive is roughly coincidental 
with Kant’s third categorical imperative, that human beings should be treated as ends in 
and of themselves.46 This seems to be the kind of conception that, for example, Michael 
Walzer is developing when he talks about the importance of having “regard for the 
purposes of the oppressed”.47 This approach is at least prima facie compatible with the idea 
of humanitarian intervention being an intrinsically political act. Nonetheless, the question 
remains whether humanitarian motives are the most appropriate manner of identifying the 
humanitarian content of a particular intervention. In fact, the humanitarian motives 
approach, even with humanitarianism more satisfactorily defined, is subject to a number of 
difficulties in terms of its applicability. 
The first problem is an epistemic difficulty in that it may be impossible to infer motives 
accurately. With no accurate gauge of the motives of intervening states available to 
onlookers, the pluralist objection of the potential for abuse in a doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention rears its head. As such, the motives approach seemed to some to militate for a 
prima facie case against humanitarian intervention on the rule utilitarian basis that an 
exception to the rules of sovereignty and non-intervention would lead to abuse, lowering 
overall utility.48 The problem with this response is well put by the Argentine international 
lawyer Fernando Teson, however. Teson argues that, in reality, the rule utilitarian rejection 
of humanitarian intervention depends upon: 
[A]n empirical rather than a principled claim. It depends on the truth of the proposition that 
governments always, or almost always, abuse when they intervene abroad, even if they say 
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they are intervening on grounds of humanity, and even if the actual result of the intervention 
is to restore human rights.49 
In a later passage, Teson also makes the important point that:  
In any case, it is not clear what is meant by ‘abuse’ and ‘partiality’ in this argument … Some 
legal scholars approach this problem as one of disinterestedness. In this view, a necessary 
condition for the justification of humanitarian intervention is that the interveners act out of 
purely humanitarian concerns. A state acts abusively by this standard if it entertains a hidden 
agenda—if its principal motives are selfish.50  
That a state should be expected to engage in humanitarian intervention on purely selfless 
grounds sets the bar of legitimacy perhaps insurmountably high. As Michael Walzer puts 
it: “[a] pure moral will doesn’t exist in political life, and it shouldn’t be necessary to 
pretend to that kind of purity”.51 Thus, most motives-oriented scholars have retreated from 
a position based on selflessness and have moved instead towards a more realistic view that 
admits other motivations, albeit still privileging humanitarian motives. Thus, for example, 
Bhiku Parekh defines humanitarian intervention as “an act wholly or primarily guided by 
the sentiment of humanity, compassion or fellow-feeling and is in that sense 
disinterested”.52 Likewise, the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS) argues that because “motivations are inevitably mixed … the 
humanitarian rationale need not be exclusive, but it must be explicit”.53 Although these 
positions represent an improvement on the pure motivations problem, however, they do 
nothing to alleviate the epistemic problem. Motivations remain impossible to infer; indeed, 
in an approach that allows for mixed motivations, further confounding factors arise in 
terms of what weight should be given to the humanitarian motive and what the evidentiary 
burden of proof to be met is. 
B. Do Outcomes Matter? 
In addition to the difficulties ascribed to the motives approach above, a further criticism of 
this approach can be raised. An exclusive focus on motives tells us nothing about the 
consequences of action. Thus, an intervention that is prompted by humanitarian motives 
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but is so inappropriate or so poorly planned or executed that it in fact causes more 
suffering than it alleviates would remain legitimate under a motives-based schema. 
Fernando Teson argues that: 
This methodology is unacceptable. If we are concerned with human rights we must look 
most primarily at whether the intervention has rescued the victims of oppression, and 
whether human rights have subsequently been restored.54 
This approach is what I have called the ‘outcomes’ approach and has the advantage that it 
situates the locus of legitimacy in the sufferers of rights abuses themselves. If an 
intervention has alleviated the suffering and restored the rights of the victims of oppression 
then it can be deemed to be humanitarian. There are many merits to such an approach, 
predominant among which is an escape from the (supposed) need to demonstrate pure 
motives and the related epistemic problem. The shortcoming of this approach is that it 
introduces a dangerous consequentialism from which, once committed, it is difficult to 
escape. Nicholas Wheeler, a prominent outcomes-oriented author, is aware of this potential 
and adds the caveat: 
I am not arguing that the society of states should praise those governments that are fortunate 
in achieving this happy coincidence of non-humanitarian motives, means and outcomes. But 
I am arguing that, because they save lives, such interventions should be legitimated by states 
and not condemned or sanctioned.55 
Unfortunately, in practice, the line between legitimation and praise is sufficiently thin that 
the charge of consequentialism creeps back in. The outcomes approach would legitimate 
any action that happens to produce a humanitarian outcome, no matter what the nature of 
the act. This opens the door for states acting out of selfish motives to undertake almost any 
type of intervention against a state with a poor human rights record, assuming the 
intervention causes less damage than the prior rights abuses within the state and, 
incidentally, ends them. Thus, a state that abuses the rights of its citizens opens the door 
for almost any kind of action against it. This seems entirely too permissive and hardly the 
kind of result that the exception to the rules on non-intervention was intended to allow for. 
Leaving aside the desirability of such a test for a moment, it is difficult to see how such a 
test is even feasible in practice. Is it even possible to compare diverse rights abuses such as 
repression of civil liberties, denial of political freedoms, arbitrary detention, rape, torture, 
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mutilation and murder? What weight do we grant to each of these manifold obscenities? Is 
it possible to satisfactorily evaluate outcomes in any but the most cut and dried of cases? 
The contemporary cases of humanitarian intervention have been anything but 
straightforward in this regard and it is hard to see how an outcomes approach can be 
anything but subjective in evaluating the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. 
If retrospective evaluation of the humanitarian outcomes of intervention is, in certain cases, 
difficult to the point of impossibility, prior evaluation of the likely humanitarian outcomes 
of an intervention is even more fraught with difficulty. Such has been the demand of the 
outcomes-based approach in legitimating intervention prior to its inception: that the party 
considering intervention have a reasonable expectation of a humanitarian outcome. The 
indeterminacy of expectations of outcomes in cases of military intervention should need no 
explanation: outcomes depend on a complex and unpredictable mix of factors and can be 
significantly determined by unforeseen events. A striking example involves the current 
US-led war in Iraq, in which a speedy victory was both predicted and announced, and the 
post-war reconstruction of the country was largely expected to proceed smoothly.56 
Whether or not US policy-makers should reasonably have expected the extent of the 
turmoil that has wracked the country since the 2003 invasion is a matter for debate, but it 
seems entirely unclear whether an accurate prediction of the outcomes of the intervention 
could have been expected prior to the war. 
These shortcomings pose severe difficulties in the application of the outcomes approach. 
However, a more fundamental deficiency must also be considered. Here, we have an 
approach that tends to liken purposive acts according to their results, without sufficient 
consideration of the nature of the act itself. A useful illustration is the Kantian analogy of a 
burglar who breaks into a house with the intention of stealing property but in so doing 
inadvertently prevents a murder from taking place. The positive results of the burglar’s 
actions say nothing about the content of those actions. Under an outcomes schema, we run 
the risk of equating such an act with that of a firefighter saving a person from a burning 
building or a simple bystander saving a child from drowning in a lake. Action cannot be 
categorised solely on the basis of its outcomes lest we be left with a hollow concept, the 
objects of which bear no essential relation to each other. A reasonable expectation of 
outcome is a useful normative criterion that may guide when and where intervention 
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should take place. However, if we are concerned to investigate humanitarian intervention 
as an analytical concept, the outcomes approach has little to offer. 
C. Intentions Matter 
Thus far, I have documented the substantive deficiencies of the motives and outcomes 
approaches. However, more pertinent to this research is my contention that neither 
category is analytically meaningful. Both have been developed through the lens of a 
normative orientation towards humanitarian intervention: they treat humanitarian 
intervention as it ought to be rather than as it is. This creates problems when we try to 
apply these strictures to a flawed reality. To move beyond these issues it is necessary to 
redefine humanitarian intervention in terms that might adequately describe the core content 
of those interventions that we have come to consider to have been humanitarian 
interventions. Alex Bellamy offers a solution to this problem in terms of a focus on 
intentional action rather than altruistic motives or commendable outcomes.57 In many 
senses, this can be seen to be a pragmatic solution to the motives–outcomes debate, as it 
occupies a constructive middle ground between these two positions. However, the problem 
with this, as with many pragmatic solutions, is that the solution runs the risk of collapsing 
into one or other of the categories from which it was initially distinguished. Therefore, it is 
worth taking some time at the beginning of this section to properly delineate what we mean 
by motives, intentions and expectations of outcomes.  
Such questions have been poorly addressed within the humanitarian intervention literature 
(indeed, have often been treated as self-evident). However, mercifully, the same is not true 
in ethical and legal philosophy more generally. The distinctions between motives and 
intentions have been extensively treated in philosophical circles; equally, the criminal law 
has much to tell us about the interplay of motives, intents and outcomes. Let us start by 
defining what we mean by motives: in psychology, motive is often used to refer to desires 
or drives, but in philosophy the term is more closely equated with reasons for action. One 
acts out of motives such as jealousy, avarice, humanitarianism, etc.; these are the reasons 
for action. However, motive cannot yet be seen as the cause of action, only as a context to 
action. A motive such as jealousy may suggest a number of courses of action, the particular 
action chosen may depend upon other considerations, such as the best way to achieve one’s 
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goals. Thus, motives are roughly equivalent to reasons and provide the context to action 
rather than the definite cause of action.  
Intention, in contrast, has been defined as “a course of action that a person has adopted as 
well as an objective, end or goal”.58 As such, motives represent the reasons for action 
whereas intentions indicate the course of action decided upon. In this context, one could 
say, being motivated by jealousy, I intend to murder the object of my jealousy. This 
criminal analogy serves to highlight the distinction between motives and intentions yet 
further. The motive of jealousy does not determine my decision to commit murder. In 
response to the same motive I may elect a course of action that does not involve murder, 
such as blackmail, assault, theft, persuasion, etc. Likewise, the intent to commit murder is 
not logically dependent on a motive of jealousy. I could equally be motivated by revenge, 
avarice, anger or even hedonism. This distinction is crucially important to the criminal law. 
Motive is important to police work, as it provides context to action, through which one 
might plausibly deduce the facts of the situation. However, in a courtroom, motive 
becomes less relevant: it is the intent that is important. Murder remains murder irrespective 
of the motive,59 but without the intent to murder, the killing of another may become 
manslaughter only.  
We must also distinguish intention from an expectation of an outcome. The second part of 
the definition of intention given above describes intention as “an objective, end or goal”. In 
some senses this could be construed as an expectation of an outcome: I intend to take this 
or that action because I expect it to have this or that outcome, which is my goal. However, 
one can identify the difference between intended outcomes and unintended outcomes. An 
intended outcome is an outcome one desires to achieve, as it serves an objective, end or 
goal. An unintended outcome, conversely, may indeed be the product of purposive action 
but it is not the product that is intended. This is not to say that it is necessarily unforeseen, 
only that it is not the objective of the purposive action. I may expect that I may face arrest 
for the commission of murder but it was never my intent to seek arrest as an objective by 
committing murder. Nor need the unintended consequences always be perverse. I may take 
aspirin with the intention of ridding myself of a troublesome headache and by doing so I 
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may also achieve the (beneficial) unintended consequence of lowering my risk of heart 
attack through aspirin’s effects in thinning the blood.  
If we are concerned with the character of purposive acts themselves, we must be concerned 
with the intended consequences rather than the unintended consequences. The latter may 
tell us much about how beneficial or detrimental, how good or bad, an act actually was but 
it does not tell us what the nature of the act itself was. The nature of the act is a function of 
the intended consequences of action only. The unintended consequences may even play no 
part in the decision itself if they are not seen to impinge in any significant way upon the 
course of action selected. This distinction is highlighted by Robert Merton: “[i]n 
considering purposive action, we are concerned with ‘conduct’ as distinct from ‘behavior’, 
that is, with action which involves motives and consequently a choice between various 
alternatives”.60 Again, our discussion raises the question of multiple possible courses of 
action, one of which is chosen on the basis of its suitability for achieving desired 
outcomes. 
The implications of this paradigm shift for investigations of humanitarian intervention is 
perhaps more profound than is initially apparent. Taking Bellamy’s focus on intentions as a 
starting point, it becomes possible to argue, as I do here, that humanitarian intervention 
may be a product of diverse motivations, which may or may not include humanitarian 
motives. Equally, the nature of humanitarian intervention is not dependent upon its 
outcomes. Under an intentions schema, it is perfectly possible to imagine a humanitarian 
intervention taking place in which humanitarian motive was entirely absent. Humanitarian 
crises, even if confined within one state, pose real and severe security problems for other 
states in the international system. The flow of refugees across borders may cause political 
and economic problems for neighbouring states, as in the case of India in 1971, where the 
influx of millions of Bengali refugees fleeing Pakistani repression caused severe economic 
and political problems to take hold.61 The development of intra-societal fissures and 
tensions may cause similar tensions to intensify in other states, as in the cases of Burundi 
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where tensions between Tutsis and Hutus were 
intensified by the ethnic conflict taking place in neighbouring Rwanda.62 The flows of 
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small arms, looted resources and finances that often accompany civil wars may destabilise 
neighbouring states by providing opportunities for criminal and violent networks to take 
root in a nation’s society, as in Macedonia, where the presence of plentiful amounts of 
small arms, Kosovar Liberation Army bases and Albanian organised crime networks, 
mainly involved in smuggling, eventually became the basis for the establishment of 
militias among Macedonia’s own ethnic Albanian minority.63  
Perhaps most tellingly, given the current international focus on issues of transnational 
terrorism, there has been a growing awareness that failed and conflict-ridden states may 
provide a haven for transnational terrorist groups.64 Such has been the emergent perception 
in Washington in regard to the ongoing civil war in Somalia, but this reality is nothing 
new; to cite but one example, Algerian militants involved in that country’s bloody civil 
war carried out numerous terrorist attacks in France during the mid-1990s.65 Overlaying 
these issues is the ever-present danger that conflict may spread across borders, as it has in 
so many instances, from Liberia to Sierra Leone, from Rwanda to the Congo, Sudan to 
Chad, etc. In response to these threats, states may well opt to engage in intervention out of 
a concern for their own parochial interests, yet nonetheless decide that the optimum way to 
secure those interests is to engage in an intervention that secures peace and human rights 
within the target state. The crucial point is that such action might be prosecuted in the 
complete absence of any concern for the human rights of the citizens concerned but that, if 
intervention was undertaken with the intention of securing peace and human rights within 
the target state, this action could therefore be classified as humanitarian intervention, 
irrespective of the motives that impelled intervention.  
Equally, I have highlighted above the difficulties in assessing the likelihood of a positive 
humanitarian outcome prior to intervention. If one intends to intervene to protect human 
rights, one is also likely to expect positive outcomes. However, if such outcomes are not 
secured, as has happened many times, this cannot be grounds for the declassification of an 
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action as humanitarian intervention. The outcomes of interventionary action are 
indeterminate, an issue that is particularly pertinent when one is considering humanitarian 
outcomes. Certain outcomes are easier to predict than others. For example, US military 
planners may have had high levels of justified confidence in their ability to defeat the 
Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq militarily. However, the question of whether this could 
also have been achieved in tandem with rights protection and promotion is a murkier one 
indeed. One cannot accurately predict the actions and reactions of human agents and 
therefore one cannot accurately predict the likelihood of a humanitarian outcome in all but 
the most clearcut of cases. As such, an intention to protect and promote human rights 
through intervention may not always be accompanied by a positive humanitarian outcome. 
However, if we are concerned with the type of action rather than its consequences, 
intention should be a sufficient condition for classification of an intervention as 
humanitarian. Greater depth may indeed be added by a sensitivity to the potential for 
humanitarian outcomes but this is a normative element. Reasonable expectations and 
positive outcomes may tell us whether an intervention was, in the event, well planned and 
appropriately directed (i.e., whether or not the decision to intervene was a good or bad one) 
but they do not speak directly to the nature of the act itself. For the latter, we should 
primarily be concerned with the intentions of the actor. 
Both the motives and the outcomes approach have important implications for the quality of 
intervention and may indeed be useful in research that is directed towards normative 
evaluations of humanitarian intervention. However, both are problematic if we try to apply 
them to empirical questions. If we are concerned to investigate the nature and dynamics of 
the so-called humanitarian interventions of the post-Cold War era, we are better served by 
an approach that does not require these kinds of normative judgments. This is not to say 
that the intentions approach is inapplicable to normative questions nor that one can 
necessarily be entirely value-free in the application of this approach, but that the intentions 
approach does not intrinsically require one to simultaneously pass judgment on whether an 
intervention was good or bad in order then to empirically examine it. As such, the 




In the foregoing, I have been careful to try and classify actions according to their intrinsic 
characteristics without falling into the trap of widening the scope of my definitions so 
much that they lose all meaning. However, by removing humanitarian outcomes and, 
particularly, humanitarian motives from my definition of humanitarian intervention, I may 
have left myself open to the criticism that I have done exactly that. By removing the need 
for altruism or, indeed, compassion in any form from the definition of humanitarian 
intervention, there is a danger that humanitarian intervention loses its conceptual 
distinction. In other words, under the approach that I have advocated here, is there 
anything left to differentiate the contemporary humanitarian interventions of the post-Cold 
War era from other periods of self-interested intervention that were undertaken under the 
veneer of a humanitarian or altruistic patina, such as the ‘white man’s burden’ or ‘mission 
civilisatrice’ of the nineteenth century, or the policies of containment or the ‘putting out of 
prairie fires’ of the Cold War?66 Equally, how different were the interventions undertaken 
in the name of the ‘war on terrorism’, which also were presented as forwarding 
humanitarian and idealistic goals? There is, as yet, no definitive answer to this question, 
which will depend in large part on greater empirical research into the dynamics of these 
actions. However, as Fixdal and Smith put it, “[g]iven that humanitarian intervention 
contains aspects of both realism and idealism and is a topic born of the post-Cold War, it 
offers us a new context and a different set of problems and issues to examine in exploring 
this old debate”.67 
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and 1954, respectively.  
67 Fixdal and Smith, “Humanitarian Intervention and Just War”, 284. 
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Chapter 3 
From the Abstract to the Concrete: Using Meta-theory 
to Inform Mid-level Theory  
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is not yet possible to talk of a theory of humanitarian intervention. At first glance, the 
issue appears to be related to the long-standing debate in international relations between 
realism and idealism. Proponents of humanitarian intervention often seem to imply that its 
agents have somehow transcended the narrow narcissism of world politics in pursuit of a 
progressive agenda. Those who challenge such a view stress the immutability of material 
self-interest in international politics and/or the pageantry of those who veil their power 
political agendas with proletarian reference to human rights and universal principles. Yet 
these are both extreme and unexamined positions. As Jakobsen puts it: “a systematic, 
comparative analysis of the factors triggering these interventions has yet to be 
undertaken”.1 In Chapters 1 and 2, I suggested that the question of why states have chosen 
to engage in humanitarian intervention may be important in terms of understanding some 
of the changes that have taken place in international affairs since the end of the Cold War, 
as well as to assess the likely frequency and type of interventions in the coming years. 
Despite the recent interposition of September 11 into the political landscape, this remains a 
pertinent question; indeed, has become all the more pertinent if we accept the proposition 
that, despite being fundamentally different types of intervention, the wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq may have shared many of the same logics as the humanitarian interventions of the 
post-Cold War era.2  
In this chapter, I will provide the groundwork for the development of a theory of 
humanitarian intervention, which may help to shed some light on the transformations of the 
past two decades. In order to map out the terrain within which such an enterprise should be 
located, I will engage with some fundamental issues of the philosophy of social science. 
                                               
1 Jakobsen, “National Interest, Humanitarianism”, 205. 
2 A point most sophisticatedly put by Rieff, At the Point of a Gun: Democratic Dreams and Armed 
Intervention (Simon and Schuster, New York, 2005). Others have even asked whether we can class these 
wars as humanitarian interventions. See, for example, Roth, “Was the Iraq War a Humanitarian 
Intervention?” 5(2) Journal of Military Ethics (2006), 84-92. 
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An engagement with these meta-theoretical issues is a necessary first step in the 
development of theory, as our answers to questions of ontology, epistemology and 
axiology will fundamentally determine the kinds of questions we ask of social life, how we 
ask them, which methods we should use to investigate them and how our answers should 
be presented and understood. Just as empirical investigation lacks substantive meaning 
when shorn of a theoretical framework, so too does theory demand a properly explicated 
meta-theoretical framework in order to be fully meaningful. In the remainder of this 
chapter, I will map out the contours of my approach to the research by engaging with three 
of the main problematics (or, better, debates) within the philosophy of social science: the 
materialism–idealism debate; the agency–structure debate; and the constitution–causality 
debate. In doing so, I will explicate my position in terms of two meta-theoretical positions: 
scientific realism and thin (or Wendtian) constructivism.3 Although Wendt himself 
subscribes to a version of scientific realism, it is necessary to distinguish the two, as the 
scientific realism that Wendt adduces differs from more conventional understandings of 
scientific realism in certain important respects.4 In particular, Wendt’s explicitly positivist 
methodology constrains some of scientific realism’s more critical insights into social life in 
terms of causal complexity and the dialectical relationships between structure and agency 
and causality and constitution, particularly in terms of historicity. As the remainder of this 
chapter should demonstrate, I hew more closely to the traditional understandings of 
scientific realism on these important questions. Nevertheless, once shorn of its positivist 
methodology, Wendt’s realist–idealist ontology is not only compatible with scientific 
realism, it also has much to offer in developing the kinds of rich, thick understandings of 
                                               
3 For a discussion of scientific realism, see the special issue of Millennium: Various, “Forum: Scientific and 
Critical Realism in International Relations”, 35(2) Millennium: Journal of International Studies (2007), 343-
416. See also Patomaki and Wight, “After Postpositivism: The Promise of Critical Realism?” 44(2) 
International Studies Quarterly (2000), 213-237; Patomaki, After International Relations: Critical Realism 
and the (Re)Construction of International Politics (Routledge, London, 2002); Wight, Agents, Structures and 
International Relations: Politics as Ontology (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006); Collier, 
Critical Realism: An Introduction to Roy Bhaskar’s Philosophy (Verso, London, 1994); Wendt, Social 
Theory. For a discussion of thin constructivism, see Wendt, Social Theory; Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of 
National Security (Columbia University Press, New York, 1996). Rather than belabouring the necessary 
distinction between the thin Wendtian variant of constructivism and its more radical counterparts, in what 
follows I shall simply use the less toothsome moniker of constructivism to refer to this particular brand of 
constructivism and rather specify any other variants of constructivism that should come under discussion as 
and when is necessary.  
4 See, for example, the discussion of Wendt’s approach to scientific realism in Wight, “A Manifesto for 
Scientific Realism in IR: Assuming the Can-Opener Won’t Work”, 35(2) Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies (2007), 379-398; Wight, Agents, Structures and International Relations; Brglez, 
“Reconsidering Wendt’s Meta-theory: Blending Scientific Realism with Social Constructivism”, 4(4) 
Journal of International Relations and Development (2001), 339-362. 
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causal complexes that make scientific realism such a compelling position from which to 
analyse international affairs.  
In what follows, I will develop some of the insights of scientific realism and 
constructivism by unpacking some of the issues surrounding the materialism–idealism 
debate, the agency–structure debate and the constitution–causality debate. It has become 
the norm, especially following the not uncontroversial address given by Robert Keohane to 
the American Political Science Association in 1988,5 to frame these debates in terms of a 
seemingly incontrovertible set of epistemological and methodological divisions between 
rationalists and reflectivists. Given that the literature on humanitarian intervention has been 
dominated by two primary schools of theory—the English School and neoliberal 
institutionalism—which correspond to these two approaches to the study of international 
relations, many of the arguments I will use in this chapter will be framed in these terms. 
However, such an approach brings with it the dangerous tendency to create ‘straw men’ to 
be deconstructed. This is not the aim of this chapter, which is rather to explore the 
potentials and pitfalls inherent in trying to develop an explanatory theory of humanitarian 
intervention. Thus, two points of explanation are necessary to flesh out the aims of this 
chapter.  
Firstly, both the English School and neoliberal institutionalism have provided important 
insights into humanitarian intervention but neither has engaged in a sustained effort to 
explain its practice. As such, I will explore the insights these theories might bring to the 
development of such an explanatory framework, as well as the space left vacant by their 
different theoretical priorities, in order to draw out a viewpoint that builds upon, rather 
than challenges, their conceptions of humanitarian intervention. Secondly, it should be 
expressly noted that this enterprise is entirely coherent with my methodological pluralism. 
In using scientific realism and constructivism to inform my theoretical approach to the 
study of humanitarian intervention, I am explicitly engaged in an effort to break free from 
the unrealistic constraints of the kind of calcified thinking inherent in framing the 
rationalism–reflectivism, materialism–idealism, agency–structure and constitution–
causality debates in terms of problematics. Whether one prefers Wendt’s metaphor of a 
‘via media’ or Wight’s rejection of this term in favour of ‘restructuring’ the debate such 
that a ‘via media’ is not necessary, both scientific realism and Wendtian constructivism are 
                                               
5 See Keohane, “International Institutions”. 
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engaged in an attempt to transcend the traditional dichotomous view of international 
relations scholarship such that inter-paradigm dialogue is not only possible but fruitful. 
Thus, my use of English School and neoliberal institutionalist theory aims not to sustain 
this dichotomous view but to synthesise the apparent approaches, with the important caveat 
that the research question should dictate the methods, not any set of a priori commitments. 
Thus, in Section II, I address the materialism–idealism debate, engaging with some of the 
traditional rationalist and reflectivist conceptions of social ontology and epistemology. In 
doing so, I take the Wendtian line that, while many of the most important entities in social 
life are ‘socially constructed’, the social world cannot be conceptualised as ‘ideas all the 
way down’. Rather, I advocate a realist ontology, which accepts a ‘rump’ materialism, in 
virtue of which material entities have objective qualities that are both independent of 
discourse and resistant to inappropriate discourse as to their nature. However, my ontology 
incorporates many idealist insights regarding the socially constructed nature of much of the 
social world, including the contention, shared by thin and thick constructivists alike, that 
many of the most important effects of material entities are mediated through discourse. I 
argue also for a ‘deep’ realism, which accepts the reality of unobservables—a necessary 
step for causal theorising properly understood—irrespective of their socially constructed 
nature. Even socially constructed phenomena may be apprehended by the observer as 
objective facts. Contra Wendt, however, and in line with scientific realism, I maintain an 
insistence on epistemological relativism: arguing that there is a reality ‘out there’, about 
which our theory attempts to engage, does not necessitate having a corresponding belief 
that we can ever fully ‘know’ the nature of that reality. We can have better or worse 
theories about the subjects with which we engage but never absolute truths. The role of 
science is to seek added confidence in the approximate truth of our postulates through 
evidential enquiry but, as we can never fully know how closely our theories correspond 
with reality, this process is, as Wight points out, “potentially infinite”.6 
In Section III, I engage with the agency–structure debate and, in particular, the fairly 
common practice of epiphenomenalism. I argue here, in line with both scientific realism 
and constructivism, that neither agents nor structures are reducible to the properties of the 
other but rather that they are mutually constitutive while retaining important properties and 
characteristics that are irreducible to their interaction. Thus, I reject the post-structuralist 
                                               
6 Wight, “A Manifesto for Scientific Realism”, 383. 
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claim that agents and structures are indivisible as strongly as I reject the extreme 
individualist and holist claims to the ontological primacy of either structure or agency. In 
developing this conception, I argue that much constructivist scholarship, while laudable for 
highlighting the interrelationship between agency and structure, has failed thus far to fully 
explore the dynamic relationship between agency and structure. Thus, moving beyond 
Wendt, who prefers to locate his analysis in the structural domain, despite a recognition 
that constructivism could be applied to both agency and structure, I draw upon the work of 
Margaret Archer and Walter Carlsnaes to elucidate a dynamic, morphogenetic conception 
of agency and structure that fully exploits the potentially rich ground to be explored in 
terms of the interaction between them, as well as the consequent implications for foreign 
policy decision-making.7 
Finally, in Section IV, I discuss questions of causality and constitution, arguing for a 
dialectical relationship between them, in which one creates the conditions for the other’s 
possibility. In particular, I argue that the Wendtian argument that we need to separate out 
causal and constitutive theory only tells part of the story. Certainly, an important analytical 
distinction to raise is that constitutive theory provides explanations of what an entity is 
whereas causal theory describes what it does; nevertheless, it is unnecessary to separate 
causal and constitutive theory so stringently in terms of their ‘effects’. A constitutive 
theory may not depict causal flows but a constitutive relationship may nevertheless have 
causal effects.8 Equally, I engage with post-structuralist arguments on the ‘impossibility’ 
of causation,9 arguing instead for a scientific realist conception of the ubiquity of causality 
if we move beyond the strict positivist definition of causality in terms of constant 
conjunctions of events. Indeed, scientific realism is centrally concerned with causality, but 
takes important steps forward in our understanding of what causation is by adducing 
notions of multiple and complex causality, the reality of unobservables and the centrality 
of interpretation to causal analysis, all steps that bring scientific realism much closer to 
post-positivism than positivism, though still capable of engaging in dialogue with both.10 
                                               
7 See Archer, Culture and Agency; Carlsnaes, “The Agency–Structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis”, 
36(3) International Studies Quarterly (1992), 245-270. 
8 See Wight, Agents, Structures and International Relations. 
9 See, for example, Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War (Routledge, 
London, 2006). 
10 See Kurki, “Critical Realism and Causal Analysis in International Relations”, 35(2) Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies (2007), 361-378. 
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II. ON MATERIALISM AND IDEALISM 
The materialism–idealism debate has been one of the longest running in the philosophy of 
the social sciences, although it has gained particular importance following the major post-
positivist turn from the 1960s onwards. It has been unfortunately riven by some 
terminological confusion, however, with some treating the issue merely as a continuation 
of the realism–idealism debate in international relations theory. I argue here that the two 
should not be confused. Although there are some points of overlap between these two 
debates, there is much more that divides them than unites them. Even a cursory 
examination of the classical realism of Morgenthau and Carr or Machiavelli and Hobbes 
shows a significant element of idealism in their theories, just as an examination of the 
liberalism of Bentham, Mill or Locke reveals a healthy dose of materialism. The conflation 
of these two debates is probably rather the product of the behavioural and post-positivist 
revolutions in social science scholarship, both of which posited the unreality of 
unobservables, thus consigning ideas to the category of the non-real. Though 
fundamentally opposed in their ontological views of the world, behaviouralists and post-
positivists nonetheless share a common epistemology and axiology. For behaviouralists, 
this takes a rather more moderate form: they argue that, given that we cannot apprehend 
unobservables, we can never therefore truly know that they exist. Post-structuralists take 
this further, arguing that even observable entities are only known to us through the 
mediation of discourse and thus science offers no privileged insight into them.11 As Wendt 
puts it, “epistemological anxiety makes for strange bedfellows”.12 Likewise, the two 
groups share a common axiology, in that both privilege epistemological issues over 
ontological ones (a view not shared by scientific realism).13 This led to the view that, given 
that we cannot apprehend unobservables,14 we can have no objective knowledge of their 
existence; therefore, they cannot truly be said to exist. Epistemology thus ineluctably leads 
to tacit ontology—or, in other words, idealists cannot be realists. In what follows, I argue 
that this need not be the case.  
                                               
11 Although this is an important extension of the behaviouralist epistemological standpoint, I will keep to a 
discussion of unobservables for the time being. A discussion of external realism in all its forms will follow. 
12 Wendt, Social Theory, 49. 
13 See, for example, Wight, Agents, Structures and International Relations. 
14 The post-positivist argument extends to observables, which have no greater ontological status than 
observables, given our epistemological fallibility. Indeed, the problem of apprehension itself is at the centre 
of the problematic. 
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In particular, the inference of ontology from epistemology is, I contend, an ecological 
fallacy. There is a gap in the logic between arguing that the social world is inherently 
unknowable to us and arguing that it therefore cannot be said to have an objective 
existence. Scientific realism turns the behaviouralist/post-positivist axiology on its head, 
arguing for the primacy of ontological matters. Even so, an explanation for why the social 
world should be assumed to exist, even if we can never truly know it, is required. Perhaps 
the strongest positive argument for ‘external realism’15 is Putnam’s argument on the 
‘miracle of science’.16 According to this line of argumentation, if there were not an 
external reality to which our theories correspond, the ability of natural science to 
manipulate the entities found in that world would be nothing short of a miracle. Of course, 
this is not a watertight argument; if the social world is entirely of our own making, as the 
more extreme versions of post-positivism may seem to contend, then there is no reason to 
suppose that our scientific theories should not succeed, given that both the theories and the 
world to which they apparently refer are products of our own construction. However, the 
‘miracle’ argument is further supported by Andrew Sayer’s argument on the “evident 
fallibility of our knowledge—the experience of getting things wrong, of having our 
expectations confounded, and of crashing into things”, which suggests that the external 
world is not entirely of our own making or we should not so often be wrong about it.17 
Both arguments provide provisional support for a claim to external realism but, given that 
scientific realists, along with all but the most ardent positivists,18 accept the 
epistemological limitations of our knowledge, it is, in fact, a claim that can never be 
incontrovertibly verified. For the behaviouralist and the post-positivist, this is where the 
matter should end; if we cannot know it, then what is the point of assuming that it exists? 
Scientific realism takes a more practical view on the matter. Even if we accept that the 
world is never truly knowable to us, we can nonetheless have better or worse theories 
about it, as the miracle and fallibility arguments show. Moreover, in a practical sense, the 
entire enterprise of science loses its meaning if we discard the assumption of external 
realism; if there is no real world ‘out there’ that our theories seek to describe, then there is 
little point in having theories at all, as they simply become meaningless jumbles of data 
and discourse.  
                                               
15 Meaning that there is an external reality that exists independent of our knowledge of it. 
16 Putnam, Mathematics, Matter and Method: Philosophical Papers (Cambridge University Press, London, 
1975). 
17 Sayer, Realism and Social Science (Sage, London, 2000), 2. 
18 Of which Wendt, apparently, is one. 
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Having dispensed with the extreme epistemological arguments of the behaviouralist and 
post-positivist camps, it is worth considering rationalism and reflectivism more generally, 
as most within these broader groupings would eschew such absolutist arguments. 
Nonetheless, although many rationalists accept the existence of ideational entities and 
many reflectivists material entities, there is still a tendency to grant ontological primacy to 
one or the other. Thus, most rationalists argue that the majority of explanations of 
international relations can be given by relation to material factors whereas most 
reflectivists argue that ideational factors should have ontological primacy. While by no 
means a forum for this debate, the literature on humanitarian intervention, as is the case for 
the international relations literature more generally, shows evidence of the influence of this 
debate in the different approaches of the English School and neoliberal institutionalist 
approaches.  
As Alex Bellamy notes: “[i]n recent years, debates about the legitimacy and efficacy of 
humanitarian intervention have predominantly been the domain of the English School or 
‘International Society’ approach to International Relations”.19 A primary concern of 
English School scholars is the extent to which the international system can be considered 
to be a ‘society of states’.20 In perhaps the most famous English School tract, The 
Anarchical Society, Hedley Bull explains that: 
A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of 
certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive 
themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and 
share in the working of common institutions.21 
Just as the existence of a society of states depends upon the existence of common interests 
and common values, so too does the content of the rules of the society of states depend 
upon the contents of those understandings. In this regard, Bull identifies two (potentially 
conflicting) understandings of the values held by the society of states: a society based upon 
order; and a society based upon justice. It is these conceptions to which we refer when we 
talk of pluralist or solidarist conceptions of international society. For the English School, 
                                               
19 Bellamy, “Humanitarian Responsibilities”. 
20 See, for example, Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (Palgrave Macmillan, 
Basingstoke, 1977); Wight, Systems of States (London School of Economics, London, 1977); Vincent, 
Human Rights and International Relations (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986). For an overview 
of the English School and some of its key thinkers, see Tim Dunne, Inventing International Society: A 
History of the English School (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1998). 
21 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 13. Emphasis in original. 
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therefore, it is idealism that has ontological primacy; the mode of explanation is to describe 
patterns of interaction in the international system by reference to shared understandings, 
rules and norms or, in other words, ideational factors. There is nothing inherent in the 
English School ontology that rejects material explanation per se; rather, it is simply an area 
that is set aside in favour of a focus on ideational elements. Indeed, the English School 
recognises both the (material) anarchy of the international system and the (ideational) 
pluralism/solidarism of international society.22 As Tonny Brems Knudsen puts it: “[t]hus, 
the overall ontological position of the English school is one that explains the possibility of 
conflict with the anarchical structure of the international system, and the possibility of peace 
and order with the element of international society”.23  
Nevertheless, despite such ontological openness, English School theory has tended to grant 
ontological primacy to ideational factors, as is certainly quite understandable given the 
overriding focus on international society. Materialism, when it does come into the analysis, 
tends often to be a means of mopping up unexplained variance rather than an explanatory 
component on an equal footing with idealism. To use an example from the humanitarian 
intervention literature, Nicholas Wheeler, one of the foremost scholars in the field, seeks to 
explain the increased incidence of humanitarian intervention in post-Cold War 
international society through an explanation based upon an emerging normative consensus 
as to the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention; thus, he argues that “legitimacy is 
constitutive of international action”.24 The argument is that the norm of humanitarian 
intervention and its acceptance within international society confers legitimacy on its 
practice, thus making it possible. Fine so far. However, when it comes to his case studies, 
Wheeler encounters a certain amount of variance in the actual practice of humanitarian 
intervention despite considerable coherence in the extent to which the norm has by now 
become accepted within international society.25 It is at this point that Wheeler brings in a 
number of material explanations for the variance in outcomes—such as self-interest, 
                                               
22 See, especially, Bull, whose ideas on international anarchy have much resonance with those of 
contemporary neorealism, but contrast Wight, who argues for an almost entirely cultural international system. 
One can also point to interesting materialist/idealist ideas on power within English School scholarship, such 
as Bull’s emphasis on the importance of recognition in conferring great power status and Wight’s conception 
of the determination of such status by underlying material capabilities. Ibid; Wight, Systems of States. 
23 Knudsen, “The English School of International Relations and the Agency-Structure Debate: A Sociological 
Approach to the Study of the Post-Cold War Order”, University of Aarhus (unpublished document on file 
with author), 1994. 
24 Wheeler, Saving Strangers, 4. 
25 Ibid. See, especially, the chapters on Rwanda and Bosnia but also, conversely, the chapters on Northern 
Iraq and Somalia. 
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institutional constraints and domestic politics26—which serve to explain the unexpected 
variance. There is, of course, nothing ontologically untoward about so doing—indeed, it is 
difficult to conceive of an explanatory framework that does not take at least some notice of 
such factors—but these elements are nevertheless absent from Wheeler’s overall 
theoretical framework, which is centrally concerned with the ideational factors at play.  
A similar criticism can be made of neoliberal institutionalism’s approach to the role of 
ideas in social explanation. As a rationalist theory, neoliberal institutionalism shares many 
of its core theoretical assumptions with neorealism (as such, Keohane and Martin describe 
neoliberalism as the “half-sibling of neorealism”),27 including a materialist conception of 
the anarchic structure of the international system, an assumption that states are self-
regarding entities concerned mainly with their own security—thus, the ‘self-help’ 
conception—and a belief that states are rational utility maximisers. Beyond the strict 
confines of neorealism, however, neoliberal institutionalists assert that the cooperation 
problem implied by the self-interest assumption can, to an extent, be overcome by the role 
of institutions in international affairs. Institutions are defined as a set of “rules, norms, 
principles and procedures, around which actor expectations converge”,28 an inherently 
idealist conception and indeed not dissimilar from the norms, rules and intersubjective 
understandings with which English School scholarship is concerned. However, despite the 
influence of idealism within neoliberal scholarship, such factors are only defined in 
instrumental terms, as intervening variables capable only of facilitating changes in payoff 
structures. Neoliberals advance multiple claims about the ways in which institutions may 
facilitate cooperation: through iteration, issue linkage and multi-level games, burden-
sharing, identification of defectors and delineation of sanctions for defection, etc.29 
However, despite this emphasis on the plurality of ways in which ideational factors may 
                                               
26 It should be noted that none of these factors are intrinsically material. However, Wheeler tends to treat 
them in instrumental terms, as a materialist would.  
27 Keohane and Martin, “Institutional Theory as a Research Program”, in Elman and Elman (eds.), Progress 
in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2003), 71-107, at 83. 
28 Krasner, International Regimes (Cornell University Press, London, 1984), 1. Actually, this is Krasner’s 
definition of a ‘regime’. Whether and to what extent institutions differ from regimes has been a matter for 
some debate but it is not one that will be taken up here. For the simple purposes of comparison, Oran Young 
defines an institution as “recognized patterns of practice around which expectations converge”, a similar 
enough definition for us simply to treat regimes and institutions synonymously for the purposes of this 
discussion. Quoted in Axelrod and Keohane, “Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions”, 
38(1) World Politics (1985), 226-254, at 252. 
29 For a good overview of neoliberal theory regarding institutions’ contribution to cooperation, see the special 
issue of World Politics 38(1), (1985) and, in particular, Axelrod and Keohane, “Cooperation Under 
Anarchy”. 
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influence political outcomes, neoliberals are wary of moving beyond the treatment of ideas 
as instrumental considerations, highlighting only the ways in which such ideational 
structures affect states’ abilities to realise their interests, defined materially in terms of 
power.30 As such, any consideration of the ways in which actors consciously or 
unconsciously interpret their interests as a consequence of ideational, cultural and social 
processes are explicitly excluded. To explicate this further, it is worth considering what is 
perhaps the most thoroughgoing treatment of ideas within a rationalist framework: 
Goldstein and Keohane’s Ideas and Foreign Policy.31 In this interesting volume, Goldstein 
and Keohane are concerned to demonstrate the extent to which ideas may function as 
independent modes of explanation from material factors. As such, they define the null 
hypothesis as the extent to which variation in foreign policy can be explained by factors 
other than ideas, i.e., power and interest. By framing the question in this way, however, 
although they demonstrate a considerable role for ideas, they are able only to demonstrate 
the extent to which ideas influence behaviour, not the extent to which they may influence 
interests themselves (see below). As such, the materialist can still argue that ideas are at 
most “relatively autonomous” from material factors, which still determine interests in the 
final analysis.32 Again, in an inverse to the English School approach, ideas are used only to 
mop up unexplained variance left out by a purely materialist analysis.  
Thus, although both the English School and neoliberal institutionalism have generated 
important insights into the nature and patterns of humanitarian intervention, they both 
make different claims as to the ontological primacy of material and ideational factors, 
which renders them unable (or, rather, unwilling) to engage in effective contemplation of 
the interrelationship between the two. In order to gain maximum leverage against the 
question of why states engage in humanitarian intervention, it is necessary to have a 
methodology that is capable of handling both material and ideational factors in a balanced 
manner. For the fervent reflectivist or rationalist, this is not only ontologically impossible 
but anathema.  
                                               
30 As the remainder of this section should show, power and interests need not be defined materially, indeed, 
usually are not even by those who describe them as material forces. However, given that neoliberals do so, 
we shall treat them here ‘as if’ they are material factors. 
31 Goldstein and Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change (Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca, 1993). 
32 Wendt, “Review of Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change by Judith 
Goldstein, Robert O. Keohane”, 88(4) American Political Science Review (1994), 1040-1041. 
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Nonetheless, such a methodology has emerged in recent years from the third debate in the 
form of weak or thin constructivism. This school of thought emerged from an internal 
debate within the reflectivist camp. Although in agreement that ideas are an important—
indeed, the paramount—factor in social analysis, the debate within the reflectivist camp 
centred around the ontological issue of whether there is an objective reality that exists 
independent of discourse. The question, as Alexander Wendt puts it, is whether reality is 
“ideas all the way down”.33 This debate produced a splinter within the reflectivist camp, 
known as ‘weak’ constructivists, who argued that, while ideas structure much of social life, 
material objects nonetheless have intrinsic qualities that distinguish them even when shorn 
of all social content. This shift has profound ontological import, implying as it does a 
commitment to external realism and an ability to work with material factors within an 
overall ideational framework. Despite this ontological shift, however, weak constructivism 
has maintained its focus on social construction, and the roles of ideas and identities, largely 
to the detriment of material factors.34 The materialism that most weak constructivists 
concede is usually only a ‘rump’ materialism, with only minimal causal force. 
Nonetheless, there is an acceptance that ideas are often rooted in material factors, just as 
material factors often only take on specific relevance when constituted by ideas. For 
example, on the one hand, a Bank of England ten pound note has little intrinsic material 
value; it is only worth ten pounds because of an intersubjective recognition of this being its 
worth. On the other hand, such recognition would not be possible were it not for certain 
intrinsic material properties that distinguish the piece of paper itself as a Bank of England 
ten pound note. With such an ontology, constructivism is capable of handling arguments 
from both materialism and idealism.  
The ‘weak’ constructivism that I espouse also incorporates a scientific realist 
understanding of the reality of unobservables. There has been a tendency within the 
international relations literature to treat material facts as ‘objective’ and ideational facts as 
                                               
33 Wendt, Social Theory. 
34 This stems from at least three considerations. Firstly, most constructivists believe that ideas are more 
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‘subjective’, thus suggesting that ideational factors cannot be, in a certain sense, real. I 
disagree. Though ideational factors are ‘socially constructed’ and thus are dependent upon 
human agency for their existence in the first instance, there nonetheless comes a point 
when ideational structures become mind-independent phenomena, which the observer 
apprehends as objective environmental factors, thus maintaining the crucial subject–object 
distinction that is necessary for a scientific realist epistemology. Ideas cannot simply be 
‘wished away’; consequently, they can form the basis for scientific examination. This 
epistemology, when related to the ontology given above, entails a belief that science 
provides a privileged insight into the world in which we live. Some theories, some 
explanations, are better than others and it is the role of science to evaluate which are which 
through empirical examinations of the available evidence. This more than anything informs 
my approach to social science research; explanation should be a consequence of rigorous 
and empirically valid examination of the available evidence.  
However, constructivism is more than simply a compromise between the more extreme 
positions of rationalism and reflectivism. Constructivism has much that is unique and 
interesting to say about the sources and explanations of social action. In fleshing out more 
clearly the value-added of a constructivist approach, it is worth considering in more detail 
what is meant by a ‘rump’ materialism. In particular, we need to problematise the 
traditional conception within international relations scholarship as to what constitutes 
material and ideational factors.  
While constructivism accepts that material factors have properties and causal powers that 
are intrinsic to them and unaffected by any meanings we may ascribe to them—as Wight 
rather caustically points out, no matter what our discourses say about them, water will be 
little use in running our cars just as petrol will be little use in putting out fires35—it also 
argues that the larger part of a material factor’s effects are a function of the ideas that 
attach to them.  
Of particular interest to the topic at hand is the concept of interest—typically considered to 
be a material factor but which constructivism shows in large part to be constituted by ideas. 
The dominant rationalist approach in international relations scholarship has tended to treat 
interest as a material factor, whether as a function of a (biologically determined) human 
nature, the material forces of production or the distribution of capabilities. The first 
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criticism that can be leveled at such an approach is that it ignores the extent to which some 
of these conceptualisations may themselves be social constructions. The realist who 
emphasises the selfish lust for power of fallen man tends to gloss over the fact that a lust 
for power cannot be derived directly from any basic human biological needs but must be 
learned in a social context. We do not emerge from the womb lusting after power but learn 
through experience and the influence of ideas that power may be desirable.36 A more 
sophisticated version of this argument is that, even if we accept, for example, that egoism 
is a direct consequence of a materially determined human nature, such a propensity is in 
fact “directionless”37 without certain beliefs about how to pursue one’s self-interest. This 
implies more than just simply a belief about the most appropriate method with which to 
pursue one’s goals—which would be compatible with materialism—but beliefs about what 
is in fact desirable. As Wendt puts it, “it is the perception of value in an object that 
constitutes the motive to pursue it, not some intrinsic biological imperative”.38 Thus, while 
the material can tell us some things about the content of interests, most of the work is still 
being done by ideas, making many materialists tacit idealists.  
A second criticism relates to the determinism of rational choice theory. Although interests 
may be defined differently by various rational choice theorists because they make different 
assumptions about the nature of the world, one of the key features of rationality is not that 
decision-making is rational in the sense of being justifiable but that it is rational in the 
sense of being consistent with a set of desires and beliefs, the latter being given by the 
theorists’ assumptions. This has led to the criticism of classical realism, for example, that it 
takes a pessimistic view of the potential for positive change in international life as it 
assumes the selfish drives of human nature are ineluctable. A more trenchant critique, 
however, is that this requirement renders human agency somewhat irrelevant in a certain 
sense. There is no room in this model for the human mind to individually settle upon what 
desires to have and whether or how to act upon them. As such, agents simply become 
                                               
36 Equally, the Marxist who emphasises the determining role of the forces of production neglects the fact that 
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“throughputs” for desires and beliefs, as Martin Hollis puts it.39 This is fundamentally at 
odds with a common sense understanding of how human agents actually work.  
Thus, constructivism criticises the traditional materialist–deterministic view of interests in 
favour of a contingent idealist conception. Although constructivism recognises that certain 
interests are a direct function of material factors (such as an interest in survival), it argues 
that many of the more interesting elements of interest are made up of idealistic meanings 
ascribed to material factors or of ‘ideas much of the way down’. In actual fact, this has 
often at least been obliquely recognised within the wider international relations literature. 
One of the central explications of the national interest in the international relations 
literature is that provided by Hans Morgenthau, who defines interest in terms of power.40 
This, as alluded to above, constitutes Morgenthau’s materialist assumption about interests: 
interests are a function of the lust for power inherent in human nature. However, 
Morgenthau recognises that such an approach provides only a limited set of 
incontrovertible interests, which he calls fixed interests, beyond which a whole range of 
sub-national, other-national and supra-national interests may form the variable part of the 
national interest.41 Nonetheless, Morgenthau was doubtful of the ability of ‘science’ to 
provide any insights into the variable component of the national interest, presumably 
because it is both variable (which compromises the rationality assumption) and idealistic 
(which compromises the assumption of materiality). Yet it is not ‘science’ that is incapable 
of providing any insight here but rationalist science. In an interesting reflection of 
Morgenthau’s schema (though Wendt is silent on whether he sees the relationship), 
Alexander Wendt also divides national interests into two categories, which he calls 
objective and subjective interests.42 A state’s objective interests are a function of a state’s 
basic needs, such as survival, autonomy, economic well-being and collective self-esteem. 
These are mind-independent interests that exist irrespective of whether they are recognised 
as such or not.43 Beyond a state’s objective interests are a whole range of subjective 
interests, which are “the beliefs that actors actually have about how to meet their identity 
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needs, and it is these which are the proximate motivation for behaviour”.44 Thus, 
constructivism allows for a dynamic conception of interest in that it recognises that 
interests may vary depending upon the culture, ideas and interpretations of actors or, in 
other words, upon their identity. This notion dovetails nicely into some of the dominant 
arguments surrounding the emergence of a new practice of humanitarian intervention, in 
that many have argued that humanitarian intervention represents an example of how states 
have come to redefine their interests in terms of emerging (and often collective) identities. 
In Chapter 4, I will argue that identity is the crucial factor that will allow us to connect the 
material and ideational arguments—and, in particular, those derived from the English 
School and neoliberal approaches—surrounding why states might engage in humanitarian 
intervention into an operational framework of analysis. 
III. ON AGENCY AND STRUCTURE 
A second major debate that has taken place within the social science literature has been the 
agency–structure debate. Again, there has been some terminological confusion in 
discussion of this debate due to the coincidental prevalence of ‘levels of analysis’ talk in 
international relations scholarship, with some arguing that they refer to the same thing and 
others that there are fundamental differences between the questions being asked. For 
example, Hollis and Smith argue that the levels of analysis problem is not just about the 
nature of structure and agency but about the relationship between and ontological primacy 
of either agency or structure.45 Thus, they argue that one must choose between a ‘top-
down’ or ‘bottom-up’ approach to theory, in terms of which structure must be reducible to 
the properties and interactions of agency or vice versa. Although, as Alexander Wendt 
argues, this does not reflect the traditional understanding of the levels of analysis 
problem,46 it does reflect the predominant response to it—namely, an adherence to one or 
other form of epiphenomenalism. Certainly, this is the treatment provided by Waltz, whom 
Wendt chooses as his own conversational partner in talking about the agency–structure 
problem (as he terms it). Waltz’s Theory of International Politics is famous for its 
argument that the properties of units are reducible to the effects of the system structure.47 
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This kind of epiphenomenalism is what Margaret Archer rather critically refers to as 
‘downwards conflation’ or ‘upwards conflation’,48 in that the properties of agents are 
inferred directly downwards from those of structure or, conversely, the properties of 
structure upwards from agency. Such approaches are fairly common but neglect the 
independence that each level has from one another. The argument that agents’ properties 
are entirely reducible to structure results in a highly deterministic analysis, in which the 
‘free will’ of agents is almost entirely constrained. This approach then runs into difficulties 
in explaining structural change, as the independent and dependent variables thus become 
confused. Likewise, the argument that system properties are entirely reducible to the 
properties and interactions of agents neglects the extent to which agential action is 
constrained and enabled by environmental factors and is unable to explain the ‘stickyness’ 
of agent properties. 
Both the English School and neoliberal institutionalism tend towards epiphenomenalism. 
The neoliberal institutionalist position is the clearest on this score, so it is with this that I 
will begin. As was stated in the previous section, neoliberals start their analysis from an 
identification of anarchy as the prevailing ordering system of the international system. 
Given that there is no hierarchical authority to moderate behaviour and/or disputes, 
neoliberals assume that the international system is therefore a self-help system, in which 
states may rely only on themselves for their security and/or improvement of their position. 
As such, states are considered to be (Hobbesian) self-regarding entities, a notion that is 
directly derived (if not uncontroversially) from the properties of the system.  
The English School also tends towards epiphenomenalism (although this is not a necessary 
consequence of the English School ontology).49 Starting from a concern with international 
society, the English School has tended to describe the state of international society first and 
derive its understanding of agent properties directly from this understanding. Given that 
the English School is capable of conceptualising multiple types of international society—
most prominently, pluralist or solidarist50—it is therefore capable of conceptualising 
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multiple types of agency. A pluralist conception of international society is likely to lead the 
English School theorist to a similar conception of agency to neoliberals—i.e., self-
regarding. Conversely, a solidarist conception is likely to have a different result. Thus, 
William Bain, talking of trusteeship, first highlights that “the foremost obligation of 
trusteeship demands that preponderant power be exercised for the benefit of the 
disadvantaged”.51 Consequently, he conceptualises agency in terms of other-regarding 
obligations, rooted in a Lockean conception of natural equality. “Locke, persuaded by 
Hooker’s claim that equality among men imposes an obligation of mutual love, argues that 
every man is to bound to preserve himself and, in a departure from Hobbes, to act so far as 
he is capable to ‘preserve the rest of Mankind’”; “[i]t is this obligation of mutual love, an 
obligation that arises from the natural equality of men, which informs Kerr’s argument and 
sanctions the legitimacy of trusteeship”.52  
Likewise, Chris Brown, talking of the agency required to fulfill the will of the 
‘international community’, posits first that “[u]se of the term ‘international community’ 
implies the possibility of altruism and self-sacrifice on the part of states” and that therefore 
the “moral agency” required to fulfill the (solidarist) will of the international community 
may only be found in the concept of a ‘coalition of the willing’ that shares a high degree of 
ideological coherence, an inherently Kantian notion.53 Thus, the English School may have 
multiple notions of agency. However, within the English School literature on humanitarian 
intervention, the dominant though not exclusive tendency is to view the growing 
international consensus on humanitarian intervention as an emerging intersubjective norm 
indicative of a strong but tempered element of solidarism.54 Thus, the (implicit) views of 
agency of such prominent English School scholars of humanitarian intervention as 
Nicholas Wheeler, Alex Bellamy and others seem to cohere most closely to a Lockean 
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conception of a society in which agents owe each other mutual responsibilities even if they 
do not quite share absolute ideological consonance.  
The contrast between the Hobbesian perspective of neoliberal institutionalists and the 
dominant Lockean conception of English School theorists is most interesting in the context 
of the humanitarian intervention debate, especially when we relate it back to the realist–
idealist conceptions discussed earlier,55 as they provide alternate conceptions of the nature 
of state agency, which may be developed into alternative propositions for explaining the 
incidence of humanitarian intervention. However, it is impossible to provide a balanced 
analysis from the epiphenomenalist perspective, as, if agency is given by structure, it is 
only structure that has independent variance, not agency. Thus, structure remains the 
primary focus of analysis. The problem that this entails is that structural analysis, while 
capable of explaining aggregate tendencies at the system level, cannot account for variance 
in the actual practices of states at the unit level. If the epiphenomenalist account is to hold 
true—and agents are entirely reducible to the properties of structures—we would not 
expect such variance in outcomes at the unit level but rather conformity among units to the 
properties and logics of appropriateness given to them by the system level. However, it has 
generally been a truism—and one accepted even by such structural determinists as 
Waltz56—that the variance in outcomes at the unit level can only be explained through 
analysis at the unit level itself. This suggests that agency has at least some independence 
from structure and the relationship requires further examination. Moreover, if we conceive 
of agency as having a degree of independence from structure, there is the possibility of 
comparing multiple—conflicting and complementary—types of agency within the same 
structure, which may then be measured against each other or explored for interactions and 
synergies. 
Fortunately, the epiphenomenalist perspective does not, of course, exhaust the possible 
answers to the levels of analysis question. A third solution is what Archer refers to as 
‘central conflation’, in which the properties of agency and structure are said to be mutually 
constitutive but are so tightly and inextricably co-bound that they become analytically 
inseparable. This view derives from Giddens’ concept of ‘structuration’, an important and 
sophisticated contribution that goes some way to unraveling the dualistic nature of 
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structure and agency. As Giddens puts it: “[b]y the duality of structure, I mean the essential 
recursiveness of social life, as constituted in social practices: structure is both medium and 
outcome of the reproduction of practices. Structure enters simultaneously into the 
constitution of the agent and social practices, and ‘exists’ in the generating moments of this 
constitution.”57 This view can be seen in certain post-structuralist analyses of foreign 
policy and humanitarian intervention. Thus, Lene Hansen argues that “identities [structure] 
are thus articulated as the reasons why policies should be enacted, but they are also 
(re)produced through these very policy discourses [agency]: they are simultaneously 
foundation and product”; “identities are produced, and reproduced, through foreign policy 
discourse, and there is thus no identity existing prior to and independently of foreign 
policy”.58  
There are two important elements to these conceptualisations that are worthy of further 
examination. Firstly, there is an issue with the tightness of the relationship between 
structure and agency here. The conceptualisation is inherently relational; as Archer puts it, 
this “proscribes any discontinuous conceptualization of structure and action—the intimacy 
of their mutual constitution defies it”.59 Likewise, Taylor argues that this means that 
“social relations are internal relations, the relata not being even definable independently of 
their relations”.60 Therefore, we cannot talk of either structure or agency, only 
structuration, a continuous flow of conduct that defies any notion of division. As a 
consequence, neither agency nor structure has explanatory autonomy; to understand 
outcomes we must focus only on the mutually constitutive relationship between them and 
how this contains ‘conditions for being’. This is important insofar as it transcends the 
dualism between voluntarism and determinism that is characteristic of the 
epiphenomenalist approach, but it has important consequences for analysis. In particular, it 
collapses the subject–object distinction that is so crucial for causal analysis, as will be 
discussed in Section IV. 
Moreover, Archer and Carlsnaes highlight the temporal problem with such a conception. It 
is notable that both Giddens and Hansen make references to a temporal dimension above—
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“simultaneously”, “generating moments”, “not existing prior”, etc. By doing so, they 
explicitly reject the notion that structure and agency may work on different time intervals. 
While not denying the historicity of certain identity representations, post-structuralists 
nevertheless argue that each identity representation must be considered to be a de novo 
articulation, which may draw upon prior articulations but bears no intrinsic relationship to 
the latter. Again, this downplays the extent to which agents are constrained by their 
environments and, in particular, the resistance that must be surmounted by certain identity 
representations that break radically with a prior (structurally given) set of identity 
representations. In their empirical work, post-structuralists are often sensitive to the 
difficulty of constructing such a radical break from their past,61 but such sensitivity seems 
entirely at odds with the given ontology; either one recognises the structural constraints 
within which identity representations are formulated and the consequent difficulty of 
establishing such a radical break or one must affirm that agents are entirely free to 
formulate their identity and no identity representation is more or less valid than any other. 
Only the former seems empirically defensible. As Meyer puts it:  
Actors do not start with a blank sheet, when they are faced with a problem or an opportunity 
to act, but draw on pre-existing and usually stable schemata, beliefs and ideas about the 
external world and deeply ingrained norms about appropriate behaviour.62 
In this sense, there is an element of path dependency in the evolution of identities, in the 
simple sense that ‘history matters’, but more importantly in the sense that prior identity 
representations may reinforce particular notions of identity or ‘lock in’ certain schemata 
into the structural reservoir of identity-related beliefs, as well as providing paradigms for 
change. The notion of path dependency is, however, problematic, but there is much that 
can be rescued from a consideration of its relevance, as will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter 4. 
The final solution to the agency–structure debate that I will consider here is the concept of 
a dynamic though partially independent relationship between agency and structure. This 
perspective derives mainly from Giddens’ structuration conception, but has been further 
developed by Archer and Carlsnaes to incorporate a dialectic between structure and 
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agency, a temporal dimension to their relationship and thus is able to encapsulate a 
historical analysis of the dynamic interplay between the two.63 Drawing on the concept of 
morphogenesis, Archer develops a more sensitive framework for analysing the ways in 
which structures condition actions and actions in turn elaborate those structures, in an 
endless but temporally divisible cycle. As Archer puts it:  
The emergent properties which characterize socio-cultural systems imply discontinuity 
between initial interactions and their product, the complex system. In turn, this invites 
analytical dualism when dealing with structure and action. Action, of course, is ceaseless 
and essential both to the continuation and further elaboration of the system, but subsequent 
interaction will be different from earlier action because conditioned by the structural 
consequences of that prior action. Hence the morphogenetic perspective is not only dualistic 
but sequential, dealing in endless cycles of structural conditioning/social 
interaction/structural elaboration—thus unraveling the dialectical interplay between structure 
and action. ‘Structuration’, by contrast, treats the ligatures binding structure, practice and 
system as indissoluble, hence the necessity of duality and the need to gain a more indirect 
purchase on the elements involved.64  
Structures thus condition actions, which then elaborate structures, which then condition 
actions, and so on in an endless progression. Conceiving of the agency–structure 
relationship in such terms allows us to engage in a deep analysis of the relationship 
between agency and structure, the attendant effects of one on the other and the 
consequences for political outcomes. In short, it allows us to analytically separate the 
agency–structure dynamic at various stages of its mutual constitution and isolate 
conditions, actions and events for investigation.  
This dynamic conception of agency–structure is perhaps the closest to that suggested by 
Wendt, who argues that: 
A key implication of the argument … about the agent-structure relationship was that theories 
of international relations must have foundations in theories of both their principal units of 
analysis (state agents and system structures). Such theories are more than simply convenient 
or desirable: they are necessary to explain state action. This requirement follows directly 
both from the scientific realist’s conception of explanation as identifying causal mechanisms, 
and from the ontological claims of structuration theory about the relationship of agents and 
structures. If the properties of states and systems structures are both thought to be causally 
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relevant to events in the international system, and if those properties are somehow 
interrelated, then theoretical understandings of both those units are necessary to explain state 
action.65 
However, despite stressing the analytical necessity of paying due attention to the properties 
of both agency and structure, Wendt fails to develop this into a comprehensive research 
programme. Rather, he chooses to adopt an almost purely structural approach to analysis, 
arguing that this is the most profitable route for constructivism, in its infancy, to take. This 
approach is unproblematic in the sense that it is necessary to isolate various conditions, 
entities, process, etc., for analysis in the first instance but, at times, Wendt seems to slip 
into language that suggests that this kind of structural analysis is the core of the 
constructivist research programme.66 If it is, it is not one I subscribe to. It is fairly clear 
from a broad survey of the constructivist literature, however, that structural analysis has 
indeed thus far taken pride of place in the constructivist toolbox.67 Such should hardly be 
unexpected given both the infancy of constructivism as a school of international relations 
theory and the current vogue in the discipline regarding structural analysis. However, if 
constructivism is to move forward and its research agenda develop towards its full 
potential, there needs to be a re-engagement with agency.68 Only if this side of the 
constructivist potential for analysing social relations is developed can we begin to engage 
in full-scale analyses of the dynamic interplay of structures and agents, a move which has 
enormous potential for enriching our understanding of international life. In this research 
project, I will therefore give full attention to the role of agency in constructivist analysis 
within the confines of a dynamic, morphogenetic agency–structure ontology. In particular, 
I will highlight the role of agency and its attendant consequences for structural elaboration 
in three case studies of post-Cold war humanitarian intervention, an enterprise that will be 
more fully fleshed out in Chapter 4. 
IV. ON CAUSATION AND CONSTITUTION 
The rationalism–reflectivism debate has also thrown up a third set of issues regarding the 
relative importance of constitutive or causal theory. While causal questions tell us why or 
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how something occurred, constitutive questions tell us what something is or how 
something is possible. The two are theoretically distinct but not incompatible. This debate, 
too, has often come under different terminological guises, in particular that advanced by 
Hollis and Smith between explanation and understanding. As Hollis and Smith put it, the 
(causal) explanation story is “an outsider’s, told in the manner of a natural scientist seeking 
to explain the workings of nature and treating the human realm as part of nature.” 
Conversely, the (constitutive) understanding story is “an insider’s, told so as to make us 
understand what the events mean, in a sense distinct from any meaning found in unearthing 
the laws of nature”.69 While Hollis and Smith, and indeed many others,70 take a pluralist 
conception of this dichotomy, arguing that both explanation and understanding have a role 
to play in social science research, for many others, this has become a virtual zero-sum 
game. In the rationalist–reflectivist debate, there has been a tendency for rationalists to 
emphasise the importance of causal theory whereas reflectivists emphasise the importance 
of constitutive theory, sometimes to the exclusion of all else. 
The reason for this zero-sum logic relates to the (apparent) conditions of possibility for 
causal and constitutive theory. The traditional view of causality holds that the subject–
object distinction, which, as previous sections should demonstrate, is far from intrinsic to 
many social science ontologies, is a fundamental prerequisite for causal theory. Thus, 
Wendt, adhering to the traditionalist view, outlines three necessary conditions for causal 
theory to work. If we take causality to mean ‘X causes Y’ or ‘if X, then Y’, we must 
necessarily assume the following three things: (1) that X and Y exist independent of each 
other; (2) that X precedes Y in time; and (3) that, but for X, Y would not have occurred. 
The first two conditions pose problems for post-positivist ontologies, while the last poses 
problems for a positivist ontology. I will address these problems in turn.  
In Section III, I discussed at length the post-structuralist conception of the duality of 
structure and agency and the contemporaneous nature of identity and foreign policy. 
According to Hansen, therefore, we cannot talk of identity as being a causative factor in 
foreign policy, as I intend to do, as “for discursive causality to be considered an actual 
causal effect, one needs to separate two variables and to observe each independently of the 
other. This, however, is precluded by post-structuralism’s insistence on the ontological 
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significance of discursive practice: identity is produced, and reproduced through foreign 
policy discourse, and there is no identity existing prior to and independently of foreign 
policy discourse”.71 Thus, the crucial subject–object distinction referred to in Wendt’s first 
necessary condition is collapsed and causation is theoretically impossible. Likewise, 
Hansen maintains that “identities are simultaneously a product of and the justification for 
foreign policy”, thus collapsing the necessary temporal separation alluded to in Wendt’s 
second necessary condition. However, as should be clear from the discussion in Section III, 
there is no necessity to collapse these distinctions in this way: if we conceive of the 
agency–structure debate in a morphogenetic fashion, we can observe a subject–object and 
temporal distinction between the two, thus making causal theorising perfectly legitimate.  
The positivist problem with the third of Wendt’s necessary conditions harks back to the 
discussion in Section II on the materialism–idealism debate and the reality of 
unobservables. The proposition ‘but for X, Y would not have occurred’ has an important 
theoretical link missing if we reject the reality of observables. For X to truly be said to 
have caused Y, there must be some missing causal mechanism or complex72 by virtue of 
which X works its effect to produce Y. For positivists of the Humean strain, this has led to 
an emphasis not on causation but on correlation, or constant conjunctions of events. Thus, 
the most we can do is to talk ‘as if’ X caused Y (an instrumentalist approach) when, in 
reality, there is no evidence to suggest that it has done so. As I discussed in Section II, 
there is no reason for our epistemological anxiety to push us towards such an 
unsatisfactory state of affairs. Simply because we can never incontrovertibly know that the 
causal complex exists is no reason to eliminate the possibility of its existence. Indeed, such 
thinking serves only to constrain a deeper causal enquiry. As Colin Wight points out, the 
problem with ‘as if’ thinking is that it precludes an investigative interest in the causal 
complex itself. “For the instrumentalist, being able to do X on the basis of Y provides 
sufficient justification for Y. The [scientific] realist, on the other hand, wants to know why 
Y allows us to do X and engages in further examination of Y. The instrumentalist stops 
when Y works. This might be good advice to the technologist, but surely not for the 
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scientist”.73 Scientific realism advocates a belief in the deep reality of unobservables. This 
allows us to question our assumptions in an analytical manner and engage in deep, 
complex causal analysis. We may not always know the ‘truth’ of our beliefs about deep 
reality, indeed may at times be forced to make ‘as if’ assumptions about the causal 
complexes with which we are dealing, but these always function only as “heuristic 
placeholders that will eventually be superseded by the realism principle”.74 
Constitutive theories, meanwhile, “have a different objective, which is to account for the 
properties of things by reference to the structures in virtue of which they exist”.75 As such, 
they have also been described as ‘property’ theories, in that they seek to describe how the 
properties of an entity are constituted.76 As Wendt points out, property theories are static in 
that they do not seek to depict the conjunction of events through time but to present a 
‘snapshot’ of the entity in question, by virtue of which the properties of the entity can be 
described. The snapshot metaphor would seem again to collapse the temporal distinction 
necessary for causal theory, meaning that constitutive theories cannot incorporate causal 
effects. As Alexander Wendt observes: “[s]ince causal relationships involve transitions 
from one state to another, property [i.e., constitutive] theories (which are static) cannot be 
causal theories, even if we can derive causal hypotheses from them”.77 On the face of it, 
this seems plausible. However, Colin Wight criticises Wendt for making the distinction 
between constitutive theories and causal effects. As Wight argues: “DNA has certain 
causal powers in virtue of its constitution, and it makes no sense to refer to these as 
constitutive effects and to set them in opposition to causal effects”.78 What seems to be at 
issue between Wendt and Wight here is at what point the constitutive effect becomes 
operational. Taking Wendt’s master and slave example, Wight argues that the master–slave 
relationship (a constitutive relationship) exists prior to and independent from the 
identification of any particular master or slave and thus cannot be said to violate the 
subject–object or temporal asymmetry requirements for causal logic. As such, we can talk 
of the causal effects of constitutive relationships. It is not clear how far Wendt’s own 
understanding is from Wight’s, in that Wendt does say that one “can derive causal 
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hypotheses from” constitutive theories. However, given that preceding sections have 
emphasised the temporal asymmetry between structural conditioning and agent behaviour, 
it seems far more appropriate to talk in Wight’s terms than Wendt’s. The idea that 
constitutive theories cannot have causal effects seems to be much more closely tied to the 
post-structuralist contention highlighted above that identity representations are always 
formulated de novo. Our morphogenetic conception of structure and agency rather argues 
that identity representations are appropriated from structural conditions but that these 
identity representations then in turn may elaborate social structure. The particular master–
slave relationship is thus abstracted from a temporally precedent abstract master–slave 
relationship and thus the constitutive relationship may have attendant causal effects.  
This distinction will become important in Chapter 4, where I will highlight the parameters 
for an identity-based theory for the practice of humanitarian intervention. I argue that 
certain logics of appropriateness are to be found in intersubjective understandings of 
appropriate conduct at the structural level. These understandings are then mediated by 
identity representations, which cause foreign policy decisions.  
V. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have highlighted some of the important ontological, epistemological and 
axiological foundations upon which my research is premised. It now remains to flesh out 
the insights gleaned from this discussion into an operational theory of humanitarian 
intervention. In Chapter 4, I will provide a theory of state identity, identify several 
dominant logics of appropriateness to be found at the level of the international system and 
provide a framework through which identity representations mediate these logics to result 
in foreign policy behaviour. I place particular emphasis on the agential dimensions of this 
process, for reasons outlined above, but also outline ways in which the theory can be 
expanded to encompass a more dynamic conception of the foreign policy decision-making 
process, which takes into account both structure and agency and their attendant interaction 
effects. Finally, in Chapter 4, I will provide an outline of the methodology that will inform 
the empirical side of the research. 
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Chapter 4 
A Framework for Action: Identity and Foreign Policy 
I. INTRODUCTION: TOWARDS A CAUSAL THEORY OF IDENTITY 
A. Identity as a Concept 
The concept of identity has become an ever more popular analytical tool in the social 
science literature. Virtually unmentioned as recently as twenty years ago, identity has 
suddenly become the variable of choice—be it dependent or independent—for an 
increasing number of emerging theses on topics as varied as ethnic conflict, 
Europeanisation or abortion policy. Identity has been used, more or less explicitly, by post-
structuralist, constructivist and rationalist approaches, and has been treated in a variety of 
different manners. For some, identity is a foundational concept for understanding the 
political make-up of states;1 for others, identity is the source of political interests in 
international society;2 and for yet others, it is a political practice that sustains, produces and 
reproduces itself.3 These are just a few of the many and varied approaches to identity, for 
which there is hardly room to provide a full survey here.4 Yet, perhaps because of the 
ubiquity and variety of uses of the concept of identity, the concept itself remains poorly 
defined and analytically loose.5 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to attempt to resolve 
what has now become a deep and divisive debate surrounding the analytical content of the 
concept of identity, so a sketch of the terrain will have to suffice.  
At least one of the problems faced in coming to an analytical definition of identity is the 
fact that there is an explicit acceptance of the multiplicity of identity. Actors do not have 
just one core identity, but multiple, often conflicting identities. Indeed, actors may have 
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multiple identities of multiple types, such as ‘collective’, ‘corporate’, ‘national’, ‘role’, 
‘relational’, etc.6 The types of identity we are likely to be interested in are therefore likely 
to vary depending on the research question with which we are interested, which, as 
mentioned above, can itself take a plethora of forms. Nevertheless, most conceptions 
converge around the core notion provided by Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein that 
identity relates to “the image of individuality and distinctiveness (selfhood) held and 
projected by an actor”.7 It is a self-image, “rooted in an actor’s self-understanding”,8 but it 
is not arrived at in isolation. A common thread running through the identity literature is 
that identity is usually—though not necessarily always—formed by a process of interaction 
between conceptions of the ‘self’ and conceptions of the ‘other’, usually conceived of as 
the dangerous or undesirable other, but not necessarily so. The ‘other’ might be an object 
of admiration that the self wishes to emulate. It could equally be an abstract notion rather 
than a concrete entity, such that one compares the self with an abstract archetype of a 
certain pattern of behaviour, rather than a concrete example. This latter conception is 
particularly relevant in the context of this research and will be returned to below.  
In the context of the state—the key actor in most international relations scholarship, 
including this study—the use of the concept of identity is complicated further. The starting 
point for most descriptions of the analytical content of identity is the individual. While in 
much international relations scholarship, a simple analogy is drawn between the individual 
and the state, such that the state is assumed to have the unitary qualities of an individual for 
the purposes of analysis, it is widely recognised that this is problematic and a 
simplification for the purposes of parsimony. However, the complications multiply when 
we try to import identities based on self-understandings on to this mythological beast. It is 
fairly redundant to say that states are incapable of thinking, interpreting or understanding, 
much less conceiving of their own identity. Therefore, if we are to apply the concept of 
identity to the state, we must do so in a slightly different manner than we would as regards 
an individual. Whereas an individual is capable of having an identity as a unitary actor, a 
state is not. The self-understandings that constitute state identity are in fact the 
understandings of the actors within the state, who believe themselves to constitute the state 
or to be acting as agents on behalf of the state. The state’s identity, therefore, if it can be 
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conceived of at all, must be conceived of in terms of the intersubjective understandings of 
these actors regarding the individuality and distinctiveness of their state and what it 
represents in international society. As such, state identity is a structural notion, which can 
only be understood in terms of the intersubjective understandings of individuals within the 
state, rather than the subjective understanding of the state itself.  
This poses an empirical problem in terms of how we can identify and delineate the 
parameters of state identities. One of the most useful and theoretically valid ways of doing 
so is to examine the two dimensions of content and contestation.9 Content refers to the 
meaning of an identity, whereas contestation refers to the degree of agreement or 
difference as regards such content. By examining the content of identity representations, 
we can delineate the parameters of what the group believes itself to be, how it understands 
its purposes, how it differentiates itself from others and how it makes sense of the world 
and its place and role in it. By examining the degree of contestation of identities, we can 
evaluate the strength of various discourses of identity, the potential outcomes of conflicts 
between competing identities, the integrity and ‘stickiness’ of identities and the evolution, 
production and reproduction of identities. The content and contestation of identity is 
therefore an empirical question: the salience and intensity of identities can only be 
understood in the site-specific context of empirical application. 
B. Identity as a Causal Variable 
To operationalise identity as a causal variable for use in an empirical evaluation of the 
development of policies of humanitarian intervention, however, we must still delineate the 
causal pathway by which identities influence policy. This enterprise is complicated 
somewhat by the relative dearth of explicitly causal analyses based upon identity. As noted 
in the previous chapter, many scholars working with identity explicitly reject the notion of 
causality,10 while many others who recognise the causal potential of identity nevertheless 
choose to focus their research on other consequences of identity.11 
At least one approach is to adopt what Ashizawa calls the “value-action framework”.12 
This framework comprises three key components—values, preferences and foreign policy 
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actions—and is based upon the common foreign policy analysis approach that holds that it 
is understanding an actor’s reasons for action that gives us analytical purchase on the 
problematic quantity of causality.13 Identities provide the intellectual context within which 
we assess the worth of various modes of actions. In other words, they provide us with “a 
motivational disposition toward a particular action (or more precisely, the meaning of 
particular action)”.14 This can be conceptualised in terms of a value, or a ‘pro-attitude’ 
towards specific modes of action.15 This value then determines, in a causal manner, a 
state’s ‘preference’ for certain foreign policy outcomes. Once preferences have been so 
established, it remains for the policy-maker to enact foreign policy actions that seek to 
realise these preferences. Though the value–preference relationship is seen as causal, the 
preference–foreign policy action relationship is not. Rather, this latter is a teleological 
relationship that involves a means–ends calculation, in which ends (or preferences) are 
defined in the first instance, and means (foreign policy actions) are calculated as a best fit 
to achieve such ends.  
There is much that is valuable in this conception. Firstly, it rightly introduces the notion 
that there is not a direct link between identity and foreign policy action, with values and 
preferences introduced as intervening variables between identity and foreign policy. 
Secondly, it also rightly emphasises the contingency of foreign policy action on the basis 
of identity: a specific identity will not always militate towards the same foreign policy 
action; a multitude of foreign policy actions may derive from a particular identity 
depending on the specifics of the case. However, it is problematic in that it concedes the 
teleological nature of the relationship between preferences and foreign policy actions to 
instrumental calculation that is uninfluenced by identity. In a sense, this framework just 
becomes a form of ‘thick’ rationality, in which we infer preferences first and then leave the 
means–ends calculation to the black box of rational calculation. Though not necessarily 
always inappropriate, I argue in what follows that this understates the extent to which 
identity influences means–ends calculations, such that both means and ends must resonate 
with identities and interests in a more complete analysis of the relevance of identity to 
foreign policy action. 
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A similar approach to modeling the causal role of identity is to focus on the nexus between 
identity and interest. Though not dissimilar to the conception of values and preferences, 
this formulation has deeper roots in the international relations literature, not limited to the 
perspectives of constructivists. In Chapter 3, I noted the parallels between Morgenthau’s 
conception of fixed and variable interests and Wendt’s conception of objective and 
subjective interests. In this context, the variable and subjective portion of a state’s interests 
may be given by identity, though Morgenthau would certainly not have put it so. More 
controversially, a strong argument might be made that key differentials between offensive 
and defensive realism, or between neorealism and neoliberalism, may inhere in differing 
conceptions of human nature or, in other words, state identity.16 There is a clear parallel 
between the notions of rival and enemy in Wendt’s conception of Lockean and Hobbesian 
states and the notions of defensive and offensive realism concerning the ways in which 
states think about their position in the world and their relationships to other states.17 
Similarly, though not the only difference, a fundamental distinction between neorealism 
and neoliberalism inheres in their differing conceptions of how states view themselves and 
others, which leads to different logics of anarchy, particularly in the approaches to relative 
and absolute gains.18 Though most offensive and defensive realists or neorealists and 
neoliberals would conceive of these notions as objective accounts of basic human nature, if 
one problematises the notion of an ‘objective’ human nature, as constructivism does, they 
may be viewed more as constructions of identity. The nexus between identities and 
interests, it seems, even though many would not conceive of it this way, is deeply 
embedded in the international relations literature.  
So too is it firmly—and explicitly—rooted in the constructivist literature. Jepperson, 
Wendt and Katzenstein argued in the influential Culture and National Security volume that 
identities “both generate and shape interests” because “actors often cannot decide what 
their interests are until they know what they are representing”.19 Martha Finnemore 
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similarly argued that “[s]tate interests are defined in the context of internationally held 
norms and understandings about what is good and appropriate. That normative context 
influences the behaviour of decisionmakers [sic] and mass publics who may choose and 
constrain those decision-makers”.20 Other constructivist writers argue that identities 
“‘underlie’, ‘shape’ and ‘imply’” interests.21 However, despite its popularity, this model 
has rarely been used to illustrate the next necessary step between the identification of 
interests and their operationalisation into foreign policy actions. Indeed, many of its 
adherents would argue, as Michael Barnett does, that “[i]dentity, however, does not cause 
action but rather makes some action legitimate and intelligible and others not so”.22 Just as 
the value-action conception leaves the analysis of foreign policy decisions to post facto 
instrumental reasoning (or some other analytical logic), so too does the identity–interest 
conception.  
A more fully realised model by which we can examine the causal relationship between 
identity and foreign policy is provided by Christian Reus-Smit in The Politics of 
International Law.23 Reus-Smit identifies four modes of reasoning in political deliberation: 
idiographic; purposive; ethical; and instrumental. Idiographic reasoning refers to questions 
about who we are (identity); purposive reasoning refers to questions about what we want 
(interests); ethical deliberation refers to questions of how to situate interests and actions 
within norms of appropriate behaviour (dilemmas); and instrumental reasoning refers to 
questions of how to achieve goals through action (foreign policy). This last category 
incorporates two modes of reasoning—resource-instrumental and strategic-instrumental—
the former being concerned with the question of what resources are required to achieve 
outcomes and the latter being concerned with the particulars of policy to achieve those 
outcomes. These four modes of reasoning provide a basis for analysing the political 
deliberations that lead from identity to policy. They are hierarchical, in that idiographic 
reasoning pre-structures purposive reasoning, which pre-structures ethical deliberation, etc. 
But the relationship of hierarchy is more important than a simple top-down approach, in 
that, as Reus-Smit identifies, these elements are held in a relation of supervenience towards 
one another. Borrowing from Wendt, who argues that “supervenience is a nonreductive 
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relationship of dependence, in which properties at one level are fixed or constituted by 
those at another”,24 Reus-Smit makes an important theoretical move in identifying the 
relationship of supervenience. This notion allows us to chart the relationships between 
these modes of reasoning into a single complex whole. 
The model thus recognises the importance of the identity–interest nexus, but allows us to 
move beyond this simple relationship into an analysis of the case-specific considerations 
that translate into policy. It has perhaps too often been the case that reflectivists will limit 
their analyses to the top tiers of this four-tier model, while conceding (or rejecting entirely) 
the instrumental ground to rationalists. Meanwhile, rationalists tend to reject (or assume 
away) the higher ground, leaving the field to reflectivists. This model provides the basis for 
a coherent and integrated approach to the relationship between identity and foreign policy, 
crucially gelled by the concept of supervenience.  
The relationship of supervenience allows us to identify that interests are indeed ‘both 
generated and shaped’ by identities, but so too is ethical and instrumental deliberation. 
Foreign policy deliberation is more than simply the rational calculation of means once ends 
have been established; means too are arrived at through a process of content and 
contestation as regards their congruence with dominant identities and interests, as well as 
norms of appropriate conduct. Nor is the process necessarily unidirectional. It may be 
possible to identify instances where ethical or instrumental deliberation prompts actors to 
reflect upon and possibly redefine their interests and even identities. Indeed, it is the 
crucial intersections between these modes of reasoning that are the primary source of 
interest for the political analyst. Politics is the complex whole of these four modes of 
reasoning, and it is at the interstices that most of the action takes place. As political 
deliberation evolves, the four modes of reasoning will become more tightly interwoven, 
their relationships more densely configured, such that certain policy outcomes become 
increasingly likely, if not inevitable. 
II. REALISM AND IDEALISM IN NATIONAL SECURITY DISCOURSE 
If, as argued in the previous chapter, policies of humanitarian intervention are justified by 
appeal to state identity, a theory of humanitarian intervention must identify the basic 
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identity discourses that form the basis of such appeals. This task is made considerably 
simpler by the main thrust of the foregoing analysis: that most studies of humanitarian 
intervention, implicitly or explicitly, have tended to emphasise a disjuncture between 
realist and idealist arguments.25 This dichotomy, an enduring focal point of much 
international relations scholarship over the years, provides us with an appropriate starting 
point for an identification of two basic discourses that are likely to inform policy debates 
on humanitarian intervention: what I call the nationalist and internationalist ethics of 
responsibility or, in other words, the national security and internationalist states. The 
nationalist and internationalist ethics of responsibility have appeared elsewhere in the 
international relations literature in various guises. Carr referred to realism and idealism in 
approaches to foreign policy,26 Hedley Bull to pluralism and solidarism,27 Wendt to 
Hobbesianism and Lockeanism28 and, in a recent study published after work on this 
research project was commenced, Coicaud and Wheeler refer to the universalist and 
particularist ethics of responsibility,29 a conception that has significant resonance with the 
ideas presented here. There are subtle but important differences between these various 
articulations of this dichotomy, given that the respective authors were concerned with 
fundamentally different social questions. Nevertheless, there is also an important sense of 
continuity between them, as each emphasises the dichotomy between approaches that 
emphasise the self versus those that emphasise the other or, more precisely, the collective. 
However, in the interest of precision in the use of terms, I will refer throughout the 
remainder of this study to the universalist or internationalist versus particularist or 
nationalist conceptions of the state, as the most appropriate terms to this analysis. 
In this context, it is worth noting that the way in which I am using identity here is 
somewhat non-standard. Identity being a relational concept, as noted above—we define 
ourselves by contrasting our own identity with that of others—most analyses of identity 
tend to define identities in terms of selves and others. Thus, for example, US identity 
during the Cold War was often defined in terms such as the democratic and capitalist 
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American self contra the authoritarian, communist Soviet other.30 The use of the self/other 
dichotomy to understand identity has tended thus to lead to analyses of identity in terms of 
a virtuous self and a radical, threatening other. However, this paradigm is not the only way 
we can think about identity. One can also think in terms of admirable others, which the self 
seeks to emulate. Thus, many analyses of Croatian identity have used the paradigm of 
Croatian identity being forged in reaction to two identities: the radical, threatening Balkan 
other, from which Croatia has sought to distance itself; and the admirable European other, 
with which Croatia has sought affinity.31 Nor does the other need to be a concrete entity. 
Thus, in the analysis offered here, the ‘other’ in the self/other relationship is an abstract 
idea, a model vision of what a state should be. This notion allows us to use the insights 
garnered in the previous chapter regarding the neoliberal institutionalist and English 
School conceptions of agency in terms of a Hobbesian state and a Lockean state, 
respectively, in order to inform the analysis in a concrete fashion. We may conceive of the 
Hobbesian state as a nationalist state and the Lockean state as an internationalist state, both 
of which are ideals to which a state might aspire. This paradigm has multiple benefits. 
Firstly, it allows us to indirectly draw upon the insights of the voluminous literature on 
humanitarian intervention that neoliberal institutionalism and the English School have 
produced. Secondly, it allows us to draw out our basic discourses by reference to an even 
more voluminous body of literature: for the Hobbesian state, the realist international 
relations literature; and for the Lockean state, the liberal internationalist international 
relations literature. By so doing, we are automatically presented with a much richer 
conception of the basic state discourses than any single study could ever possibly produce 
on its own. Finally, I argue that this conception may have great utility when it comes to 
applying it to the case study material. A number of analyses of humanitarian intervention 
have suggested that interventions may have been more self-regarding than other-regarding. 
For example, it has been widely argued that the US determination towards intervention in 
Kosovo in 1999 was driven more by considerations of maintaining its own influence in 
Europe and revitalising NATO than it was by the plight of the Kosovars themselves.32 
Likewise, it has been argued in several places that US intervention in Somalia in 1992 was 
driven less by sympathy for the plight of starving Somalis and more by the need to deflect 
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attention away from the controversial policy of non-intervention in Bosnia, coupled with a 
belief that the intervention in Somalia could be done at much lower cost than could 
Bosnia.33 Regardless of the accuracy of these arguments, it is clear that an analysis that 
simply adopts a standard virtuous self/radical other dichotomy would be unable to capture 
these introverted dynamics with the same clarity as would a self/other conception that 
draws upon abstract ideas of how states should behave. 
A more specific overview of these two opposing ethics of responsibility confirms their 
salience to the debate over humanitarian intervention in virtually all of its forms. The 
nationalist and internationalist dimension is able to encompass such central debates on 
humanitarian intervention as the debate over a particularist/nationalist conception of 
sovereignty, on the one hand, and the universalist/internationalist demands of human 
rights, on the other. We can also see the nationalist/internationalist divide in debates within 
the study of sovereignty and human rights: the debate between the traditional conception of 
sovereignty as a non-abrogable right of the sovereign, and the modernist conception of the 
ICISS of sovereignty as a responsibility, with such responsibility being potentially 
extended to the international community. Likewise, this model has relevance to the debate 
within human rights discourse as to whether human rights are culturally relative, on the 
one hand, or universal, on the other.  
In terms of individual actions, we can also see the nationalist/internationalist dynamic at 
work. For example, in another discourse analytical study of humanitarian intervention, 
Lene Hansen identifies two basic discourses that she believes dominated the discussions 
over intervention in Bosnia in 1991–1995: a Balkan discourse and a genocide discourse. If 
we look closely at the content of these two basic discourses, we find that they actually map 
very closely onto our nationalist/internationalist framework, in that the Balkan discourse 
emphasised particularist notions, the intractable nature of the Balkan conflict and the lack 
of Western responsibility for its termination, whereas the genocide discourse emphasised 
the universalist issue of genocide and the Western responsibility to prevent genocide, both 
as a consequence of membership to the 1949 Genocide Convention, as well as in terms of 
ethical commitments. Thus, we find that the nationalist/internationalist dichotomy provides 
a very useful framework for thinking about some of the debates and arguments about 
                                               
33 See, for example, Western, Selling Intervention and War: The Presidency, the Media and the American 
Public (John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2005); Strobel, Late Breaking Foreign Policy: The News 
Media’s Influence on Peace Operations (United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, DC, 1997). 
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humanitarian intervention and one which is able to encompass more specific and 
particularised sub-debates within an overall analytical framework. It thus provides us with 
a theoretically well-grounded and flexible starting point from which to begin the analysis.34  
This nationalist/internationalist dichotomy also provides us with a well-informed and 
voluminous set of policy prescriptions, given that they can be related quite closely back to 
debates on appropriate state policy between realists and liberal internationalists over the 
centuries, as well as in recent times. We are able to quite easily identify a whole body of 
academic scholarship, policy prescriptions and official statements that indicate the 
likely/preferred course of action given a particular identity representation. In fairly simple 
terms, states espousing a nationalist identity in their foreign policy representations are less 
likely to engage in humanitarian interventions than states who espouse an internationalist 
identity.  
In the following sections, I will outline the basic parameters of the nationalist and 
internationalist discourses, highlighting certain presumptive starting points through which 
the analysis is likely to flow. The idiographic, purposive, ethical and instrumental issues 
presented below represent fairly basic snapshots of the major positions likely to be taken 
by the universalist and particularist conceptions of the state in the context of what is likely 
to be relevant to the politics of humanitarian intervention. At this stage, they are presented 
in a very basic form only, providing a framework for analysis but going into no more detail 
as to specific content. The specific discourses that are going to emerge in the context of the 
case studies themselves may draw upon some but not necessarily all of the following (and 
in the case studies themselves, only the dominant discourses will be discussed, due to 
considerations of scope) and these discourses will take more concrete and specific forms 
                                               
34 Of course, the counter-argument to this is that by being so broad and amenable to manipulation, the 
nationalist/internationalist framework is too indeterminate to be of much use in analysis. This is, of course, a 
potential danger to any analysis: the broader the frame of enquiry, the more indeterminate one’s concepts are 
likely to become. While this danger should be recognised, however, it should not be over-emphasised. Not 
only are the nationalist and internationalist ethics I describe firmly rooted within an entire literature of 
international relations scholarship, making them both readily identifiable and fungible, but they also present, 
in good discourse analytical style, polar opposites, which are unlikely to be confused with one another. Any 
basic discourse is likely to subsume significant variation within it. For example, Hansen’s Balkans and 
genocide discourses—which are considerably more particular than the framework offered here—nonetheless 
encounter significant sophistications and variations (even combinations, which, indeed, may have the most 
interesting things to tell us about policy) in their everyday use. However, their roots in an extant body of 
literature and thought, as well as their dichotomous logics, renders them both readily distinguishable as well 
as analytically useful. I would argue that this is likely to be even more, not less, of the case with the 
nationalist/internationalist dichotomy, given the length and depth of their treatment in the literature. 
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based upon the specific context within which they arise. The following is therefore a 
framework only.  
III. CONTENDING DISCOURSES OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
A. Foreign Policy Role 
1. The Universalist/Internationalist State 
Within the universalist discourse, a number of key elements of foreign policy role emerge. 
Universalism implies a sense of solidarity with others in the international system, such that 
there are both shared interests between the self and the other, as well as empathetical 
understanding between the two. But what particular foreign policy role is implied by these 
ethical commitments remains a matter of interpretation. In the discourses on humanitarian 
intervention, I identify three main interpretations. The most forceful interpretation 
identifies the self as the leader, or a dynamic power within, a universalist order. In this 
conception, the state in question sees itself as a key player in a universalist order, with a 
responsibility to enforce the norms of international society and to protect the weaker 
members of that order. A more moderate interpretation identifies the self as simply a 
‘member’ of the international community. The ‘member’ of the international community 
shares the values and interests of the group, but does not identify itself as having any 
particular responsibilities over and above any other state. It will be willing to participate, 
but not necessarily take the lead, in international actions sanctioned by the group. There is 
a much more passive role accorded to the state that views itself as a member of the 
international community; it will be much more reactive than proactive in its behaviour, 
content to follow, rather than take the lead. The third interpretation is of a state that 
identifies itself as a ‘laissez-faire’ state.35 The universalism of this state is modified by a 
belief in pluralism as a universal value. The ‘laissez-faire’ state rejects external 
interference in others’ affairs, valuing self-determination over most other values. Its ethic 
of responsibility is rooted in anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism and pro-independence. 
These three basic genres of state identities are all universalist in the sense that they each 
express solidarity with an international community but their approaches are very different, 
and would predict different likely policy approaches. The ‘leader of the international 
community’ is likely to be much more forceful in its policy approach, as it sees itself as a 
                                               
35 Not to be confused with the economic connotation of the term. 
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prime initiator of positive change, such that it is more likely than the other two to become 
directed towards a policy of humanitarian intervention. The ‘member of the international 
community’ is more likely to be more cautious in its approach, gauging the policy 
directions of others before it takes its own and more likely to be supportive of political 
intervention than military intervention, though it may participate in military interventions if 
this accords with the will of the international community. The ‘laissez-faire’ state is more 
likely to be a critic of policy than an initiator of policy. It will view its duty as being to 
safeguard the rights and duties of other states from external interference rather than to 
engage in external interference itself. 
2. The Particularist/Nationalist State 
The particularist/nationalist state is the traditional ‘national security’ state that is so often 
the archetype of realist security studies. The nationalist ethic of responsibility emphasises a 
state’s responsibility for its own well-being and the well-being of its citizens. But, again, 
the particularist ethic of responsibility may manifest in different forms. Mirroring the 
universalist triad given above, the most forceful pattern for a nationalist state to follow is 
that of a dynamic power. A dynamic state seeks to shift the balance of power in its favour, 
to improve its position in the international system and augment its well-being to the 
greatest extent possible. A more moderate particularist approach is provided by the status 
quo state, which is content with its position in the international order, but will seek to 
defend that position if threatened. The status quo state will nevertheless be engaged in 
international politics to the extent that it views the balance of power as a necessary 
component of its own stability, such that threats to the status quo will be seen as threats to 
its own position. Finally, an isolationist state may view itself as entirely disconnected from 
the international system, such that it may have no interest in international life beyond 
minimising any direct threats to itself that may emerge. Otherwise, it will be content to 
focus on its own domestic affairs and to secure and augment its own well-being through 
inward reflection, rather than outwards aggression. Again, these three genres of states 
suggest different likely policy approaches.36 The dynamic state is likely to be very forceful 
in its policy approach, such that any policy that it sees as likely to fulfill its interests will be 
pursued, regardless of the interests of others. This makes the dynamic state more likely 
                                               
36 It should be noted that this conception of status quo, dynamic and isolationist states draws heavily on the 
work of Hans Morgenthau, who used a similar schema to chart variations in approaches to foreign policy. 
Following Morgenthau, this has become a commonly used schema. See Morgenthau, Power Among Nations. 
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than the others to engage in intervention for political gain. The status quo state is likely to 
be more cautious. It will be prepared to engage in intervention under some circumstances, 
if its interest and status in the system is directly threatened by certain circumstances, but is 
more likely to pursue diplomatic initiatives than military initiatives, as the policy tools 
most likely to maintain the status quo. Indeed, the status quo state is more likely to resist 
external interference than engage in it. The isolationist state is the least likely to engage in 
any kind of intervention, being largely unconcerned with developments in the outside 
world. Unlike the status quo state, it is unlikely to resist external interference by other 
states in third party states, unless such action is likely to impinge upon its own parochial 
concerns. 
B. Interests 
1. The Universalist/Internationalist Conception of Interests 
In the context of humanitarian intervention, one of the most prominent 
universalist/internationalist conceptions of interest manifests itself as a concern for human 
rights. The universalist discourse emphasises solidarity with others; thus, it is only natural 
that such solidarity should extend to cases where others are suffering gross abuses of 
human rights. A second manifestation of universalist interests inheres in a support for 
democracy. It is widely believed, especially among Western states, that liberal democracy 
is beneficial for societies, therefore those espousing a universalist discourse may 
emphasise democracy as a value to be promoted in and of itself. Thirdly, universalism may 
engender a concern with credibility. This concern takes two primary forms. Firstly, 
internationalists may be concerned to ensure the credibility of the international regimes 
that have been put in place to promote internationalist values. These regimes may be both 
concrete and abstract. Abuse of human rights may pose a threat to an international regime 
based upon respect for human rights, in much the same way as defiance of the UN may 
threaten the credibility of that institution. Secondly, credibility also involves a related 
concern with deterrence. It is often believed that the best way to ensure compliance with 
international norms is to deter deviance from these norms through the threat of sanction. 
For deterrence to work, this threat must be credible. Thus, there is a related interest in 
ensuring the credibility of the threat in order to ensure compliance with norms and to 
discourage deviance. A fourth internationalist interest is in peace and security. Internal 
conflicts may threaten the stability of the international system through the threat they pose 
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to the peace and stability of individual nations and regions. The internationalist discourse 
may emphasise an interest in maintaining international peace and security for its own sake, 
as well as for the sake of the maintenance of international stability. Finally, within the 
internationalist discourse, a sense of responsibility for past actions may generate interests 
worthy of actions. In many conflict-ridden regions, outside actors may have had a long 
history of engagement, be it positive or negative, which engenders a sense of specific 
responsibility beyond that engendered more generally by simple solidarity. Former 
colonial powers, former allies or former enemies may view themselves as having a special 
relationship with the subject, such that it is incumbent upon them to take a correspondingly 
special interest in the situation. 
2. The Particularist/Nationalist Conception of Interests 
Particularism/nationalism emphasises the state’s responsibility to itself and its citizens. The 
first and most important interest within the nationalist discourse is therefore national 
security. The well-being of the state’s citizens and its independence and security from 
outside threats must be protected. This interest may take various forms depending on the 
manifestation of the threat, but is most commonly expressed in the need for strong national 
defence. A second key conception of interest within the particularist discourse is access to 
key strategic and natural resources. In order for a nation to grow—and, indeed, survive—it 
is necessary for that nation to have access to the resources that allow it do so. Thus, states 
will seek to protect their access to the key resources that have most salience to their own 
well-being and development. Primarily, this will take effect in respect of crucial resources 
such as oil, water, etc., but applies equally to resources such as markets, trading partners, 
specialised industries, etc. A nation’s economic well-being is perhaps as important as its 
military well-being, and the nationalist state will seek to protect and augment its economic 
strength. A nationalist state may also be concerned with the strategic value of particular 
geographic areas. Instability or unfriendly regimes in areas of particular geographic interest 
may threaten the well-being of the state and its ability to improve its position in the 
international realm. This interest may be of particular relevance in terms of areas that are 
geographically close to the state in question or its allies, as well as areas that are of more 
general geopolitical concern, such as the Middle East. A fourth particularist interest may 
concern a state’s support for a particular conflict party in a conflict situation. The dictates 
of the balance of power suggest it is incumbent upon the nationalist state to ensure a 
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beneficial balance of power on its behalf. Therefore, it is in a state’s interest to have 
friendly relations with as many foreign regimes as is possible. A conflict situation may 
jeopardise friendly relations by destabilising a friendly regime, as well as providing 
opportunities to improve relations through the support of a conflict party in its bid for 
power. A fifth concern may relate to democracy. In contrast to the universalist concern 
with democracy as a value in itself, based upon the benefits of democracy for the society in 
which it takes hold, a particularist concern with democracy may inhere in respect of a 
corollary of the democratic peace thesis. If it is believed, as it widely is, that democratic 
states are less likely to go to war with each other, a nationalist democratic state may see the 
benefit to itself in promoting democracy in other countries, thereby reducing the threat to 
itself that a totalitarian state may pose. Finally, the nationalist state may also be concerned 
with credibility. In order to deter threats against itself, the nationalist state may seek to 
maintain its credibility in order that others be dissuaded from attempting to usurp or 
damage its position. Again, this may take the form of protecting the credibility of the 
nation in a general sense, as well as ensuring deterrent capability. 
C. Dilemmas 
In the context of humanitarian intervention, three primary ethical dilemmas arise. The first 
concerns the consequences of chaos, the second the consequences of interventionism and 
the third the consequences of sovereignty.  
One of the major themes to emerge from the discourses of humanitarian intervention in the 
post-Cold War era was the conception of chaos or anarchy in peripheral states.37 It was 
widely argued that, freed from the constraints of superpower rivalry, various ‘ancient 
ethnic hatreds’ and ‘violent nationalisms’ had spilled over in countries in the periphery, 
resulting in chaos and anarchy in the regions concerned. The question of what relevance 
such chaos had to other nations, however, posed a serious ethical dilemma. Within the 
universalist discourse, this elicited, firstly, a concern for the damage being done to the host 
nation by the emergence of such conditions. The unravelling of societies was a significant 
cause for solidarist concern, given the repercussions for individuals and the nation itself. A 
corollary of this concern was the threat that the anarchy might spill over to neighbouring 
countries, destabilising entire regions. Balanced against these concerns, however, was the 
                                               
37 Indeed, Michael Ignatieff describes chaos as the ‘meta-narrative’ of the post-Cold War era. Ignatieff, “The 
Stories We Tell: Television and Humanitarian Aid”, 10(1) The Social Contract (1999), 1-8. 
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perception that outsiders might be able to do little to influence the situation. The 
connotation of chaos was that conditions might have deteriorated beyond the point where it 
was possible to devise any kind of workable solution to the problems or, indeed, whether 
outside intervention might itself be counter-productive. Chaos posed a dilemma in respect 
of a particularist discourse too. Though considerably less concerned by the potential 
damage to the host nation, the particularist discourse was particularly concerned with the 
threat of spillover and the threat this may pose to areas of strategic or economic interest, as 
well as the potential for areas of chaos to become areas of free operation for undesirable 
elements, such as drug traffickers or terrorists. But, again, balanced against the threat 
posed by chaos was the question of whether anything could be done to influence such a 
disorderly situation. For both discourses, therefore, chaos posed a dilemma as regards 
whether anything could or should be done by outside actors to try to affect the situation. 
A second dilemma relates to the consequences of intervention. Intervention is a double-
edged sword, which may produce effects both beneficial and detrimental, as well as 
expected and unexpected. A dilemma that faces policy-makers in the context of 
intervention is therefore whether intervention or non-intervention is the more appropriate 
option given the dangers of intervention. In respect of the universalist discourse, the 
dangers to the target country are emphasised. A policy of non-intervention will leave the 
target country to continue on its trajectory towards anarchy, with all the potential damage 
that may entail for the state in question. However, a poorly planned or inadequate 
intervention, or one that appears to be unwarranted outside interference, may prove to be 
counterproductive. The dilemma is therefore raised as to whether to allow a country to 
descend into anarchy or to take the risks that one’s actions may compound the problems 
that country faces. Within the particularist discourse, the dilemma of intervention concerns 
the damage to the intervening nation that a policy of intervention or non-intervention may 
entail. A policy of intervention may pose a risk of depletion of resources, loss of credibility 
through failure to effect an outcome or the possibility of becoming involved in a wider war 
in which the state has no particular interest. At the same time, a policy of non-intervention 
may likewise pose a threat of a loss of credibility, of a deterioration of relations between 
the two states, or other interested parties, and a deterioration of a situation that may 
ultimately be damaging to the intervening state. Thus, the dilemma is therefore raised as to 
whether to intervene in the face of risks to one’s own well-being or to allow a situation to 
develop that may affect one’s well-being more in the long run.  
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A third ethical dilemma in the context of intervention relates to sovereignty. It has been a 
widely held norm within the international community since at least the Treaty of 
Westphalia that intervention in the sovereign affairs of another nation is not permissible. 
The veil of sovereignty, in the context of humanitarian intervention, is thus seen as a 
possible obstacle to outside intervention to resolve situations of conflict and anarchy. At 
the same time, sovereignty is seen as a key component of international stability, preventing 
as it does unwarranted outside interference in a state’s domestic affairs, and raising the 
costs of aggression. In terms of the universalist discourse, the ethical dilemma arises as to 
whether gross abuses of human rights provides a sufficient reason to violate a nation’s 
sovereignty, or whether that sovereignty is sacrosanct and a value to be protected in and of 
itself. In terms of the particularist discourse, the focus is again on the damage that may 
accrue to the intervening nation from its violation of sovereignty. The nationalist state may 
be tempted to ignore the strictures of sovereignty in order to secure its own interests within 
other states, but may nevertheless be concerned that doing so may weaken the fabric of the 
sovereign international system such that violations of its own sovereignty may be 
considered actionable by others. 
D. Instrumental Action 
1. Resource-Instrumental Deliberation 
In the context of military humanitarian intervention, one of the most obvious—and 
critical—resource-instrumental questions that is likely to arise is the question of the risk to 
personnel involved in such action. There are two dominant approaches to the issue of risk 
to personnel. The first is to emphasise the need to protect personnel, a consideration that is 
likely to militate towards military intervention, the second is to emphasise the imperative 
not to unnecessarily risk personnel, which is likely to militate against military intervention. 
A second resource-instrumental question that must be asked is what level of commitment 
is warranted by the demands of the interest the state may have in the target country. Just as 
a specific identity does not dictate a specific policy, neither does a specific interest. States 
will evaluate how much this interest means to them, and what kind of level of commitment 
should flow from such an analysis. Policies are always costly in some regard, whether it be 
in terms of power resources, finances, prestige, etc., and a state will evaluate the 
commitment required to enact a policy against the commitment warranted by its interest 
before engaging in any such policy. A third resource-instrumental question that will be 
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addressed is the question of effectiveness. A state may have a number of policy options it 
could employ in respect of a certain situation; as such, it is likely to evaluate the 
effectiveness of policy options, or policies that are in progress, to ascertain whether they 
are likely to achieve the goals dictated by its interest at a reasonable level of commitment. 
A fourth resource-instrumental question that is raised is the question of multilateralism. 
When enacting foreign policy, states have a choice between attempting to impose or 
enforce policy unilaterally, which may have benefits in terms of control, or multilaterally, 
which may have benefits in terms of burden-sharing. The benefits and detriments of 
multilateralism will therefore likely be considered. Finally, the issue of consistency may 
also arise. Given that resources are always limited and more situations suggest policy 
responses than there are resources to enact policies, states will be concerned with where 
they choose to employ those resources, and whether those choices reflect reasoned 
commitments based upon consistent criteria.  
2. Strategic-Instrumental Deliberation 
In the specific context of the study of humanitarian intervention, three dominant strategic-
instrumental options present themselves upon consideration of cases that may be 
candidates for such intervention: non-intervention; intervention and military intervention. 
The first of these, non-intervention, should be considered as much of a policy option as the 
other two and should not be differentiated from a non-decision. Often times, a policy of 
non-intervention will be the product of a reasoned decision, in that policy-makers will have 
evaluated the merits of intervention or military intervention and rejected them as 
alternatives, coming to the conclusion that non-intervention is the preferable option. 
However, even if a decision is simply deferred, or a positive decision not reached due to 
lack of consideration, the result and, indeed, the circumstances are the same. The state still 
does not intervene in any form and, if indeed the situation does arise where a state simply 
does not consider the possibility of formulating any kind of policy in regard to a specific 
situation, this can still be equated to a policy of non-intervention, as the lack of evaluation 
of options suggests simply that there is not sufficient interest to warrant intervention. The 
second of these strategic-instrumental options, intervention, should be distinguished from 
military intervention. As noted in Chapter 2, military intervention is only the most extreme 
form of intervention to alter political realities across borders. In between non-intervention 
and military intervention are a whole host of policy options, including economic sanctions, 
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arms embargoes, delivery of humanitarian relief, support for a conflict party, mediation, 
traditional peacekeeping, etc. For a range of reasons, a state may decide that adopting a 
policy of intervention, rather than a full-blown military intervention, is the more 
satisfactory option. Finally, the third option, which is the one we are most concerned with 
in the context of this research, is the option of military intervention, when a state decides 
that it has sufficient reason to employ the use of its military forces across the borders of the 
target state. 
IV. IDENTITY IN ACTION 
A. Methodological Framework 
1. Congruence and Process-tracing Applied 
Having identified the logics of appropriateness through which identities may suggest 
appropriate policy courses, we must nevertheless still elucidate how we can trace the 
causal processes through which this takes place in practice. Perhaps the most useful 
framework for analysis is provided by Alexander George’s focus on the “causal nexus” 
between beliefs and decision-making.38 Using this method, George enumerated two 
procedures through which we can assess the causal influence of ideational factors on 
policy outcomes: congruence and process tracing. According to George, by “establishing 
‘congruence’ between the content of given beliefs and the content of the decision(s)”, we 
may infer that “[i]f the characteristics of the decision are consistent with the actor’s beliefs, 
there is at least a presumption that the beliefs may have played a causal role in this 
particular instance of decision-making”.39 Of course, by establishing congruence, all we 
have done is to establish some sort of correlation, which does not necessarily entail a 
causal link. As such, process tracing provides “a more direct and potentially more 
satisfactory approach”: 
Process-tracing seeks to establish the ways in which the actor’s beliefs influenced his 
receptivity to and assessment of incoming information about the situation, his definition of 
                                               
38 George, “The Causal Nexus Between Cognitive Beliefs and Decision-making Behaviour: the ‘Operational 
Code’ Belief System”, in Falkowski (ed.), Psychological Models in International Relations (Westview, 
Boulder, 1979), 95-124. 
39 Ibid., 105-106. 
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the situation, his identification and evaluation of options, as well as, finally, his choice of a 
course of action.40 
This method would seem to provide a useful means of assessing the connection between 
identity and foreign policy that coheres exceedingly well with the theoretical framework 
established thus far. However, as Albert Yee points out, “[d]elineating ‘the steps in the 
process by means of which’ beliefs influence and shape the cognitive operations of 
decision makers does not reveal how these beliefs influenced decision-makers to take these 
steps”.41 One possible solution to this problem, according to George, is to provide some 
kind of “nomothetic explanation” based on quasi-experimental procedures to support the 
veracity of the causal claim.42 However, experimental design in qualitative analysis is 
notoriously difficult and suffers from serious drawbacks.43 Moreover, this method assumes 
the kind of Humean law-like regularities that, as discussed in Chapter 3, are rarely if ever 
found in contingent social action.  
If process tracing is to be rescued from this potential shortcoming, therefore, we must look 
to an alternative means of establishing causal connections. Albert Yee suggests the 
adoption of the notion of causal mechanisms, a suggestion which George himself later 
embraces.44 The idea of examining the causal mechanisms through which ideas become 
operationalised in policy resonates well with the scientific realist approach espoused in 
Chapter 3. As Daniel Little argues: “[t]o claim that C caused E is to claim that there is a 
causal mechanism leading from the occurrence of C to the occurrence of E”.45 This 
provides a clear reflection of the scientific realist argument adduced in Chapter 3 that, in 
order to provide deep causal analysis, we need to move beyond the instrumentalist ‘black 
box’ conception of causation rooted in the Humean notion of constant conjunctions of 
events towards an investigative interest in the causal complex itself.  
Scientific realism also provides us with an important toolkit through which we can 
investigate the development of such causal complexes. Following Bhaskar’s notion of the 
                                               
40 Ibid., 113. For more on process tracing, see George, “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method 
of Structured, Focused Comparison”, in Lauren (ed.), Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and 
Policy (Free Press, New York, 1979), 43-68; George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in 
the Social Sciences (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2005). 
41 Yee, “The Causal Effects of Ideas on Policies”, 50(1) International Organization (1996), 69-108, at 77. 
The embedded quote is from George, “The Causal Nexus”, 105. 
42 George, “The Causal Nexus”, 106-107. 
43 For further discussion, see Yee, “The Causal Effects of Ideas”. 
44 See ibid; George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development. 
45 Little, Varieties of Social Explanation: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Social Science (Westview, 
Boulder, 1991), 37. 
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RRRE (Resolution, Redescription, Retrodiction and Elimination) method of explanation,46 
scientific realist thought has emphasised the importance of establishing causal connections 
through the use of “historical narrative in which a multiplicity of transitive verbs maps a 
complex causal sequence”.47 Historical narrative provides a particularly useful method for 
making sense of the importance of contingent events, sequentiality and causal mechanisms, 
as it allows the researcher to provide “a scene by scene description of the particular causal 
paths” through which ideational factors may become manifested in policy outcomes.48 It 
also allows us to strike “a welcome balance between causal generalization and historical 
detail”.49 
2. Problems of Path Dependency 
Raising the notions of contingency, sequentiality and causal mechanisms also brings us 
back to the idea raised briefly in Chapter 3 that processes of identity formation may be path 
dependent processes. However, as I alluded in Chapter 3, using the notion of path 
dependency is not without its dangers. Despite the increasing popularity of path 
dependency as an analytical tool in social science research, the concept itself is poorly 
defined. On the one hand, many simply take path dependency to mean the simple 
proposition that “history matters” or that “the past influences the future”,50 a proposition 
with which we can be in easy agreement, but which provides very little analytical purchase 
in and of itself. In an effort to develop more conceptual clarity, on the other hand, some 
analysts have tried to tighten the definition quite significantly. For example, Margaret Levi 
argues that: “[p]ath dependence has to mean, if it is to mean anything, that once a country 
or region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high”.51 This notion 
adduces that “initial steps in a particular direction induce further movement in the same 
direction such that over time it becomes difficult or impossible to reverse direction”,52 and 
is related to the economic notion of ‘increasing returns’ and ‘transfer costs’ that solidify 
                                               
46 Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the Contemporary Human Sciences 
(Routledge, London, 1998). 
47 Collier, Critical Realism, cited in Kurki, Causation in International Relations: Reclaiming Causal Analysis 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008), 173. 
48 Reisch, “Chaos, History and Narrative”, 30 History and Theory (1991), 1-20, at 17. 
49 Haydu, “Making Use of the Past: Time Periods as Cases to Compare and as Sequences of Problem 
Solving”, 104(2) American Journal of Sociology (1998), 339-371, at 339. 
50 Mahoney, “Path Dependence in Historical Sociology”, 29(4) Theory and Society (2000), 507-548. 
51 Levi, “A Model, a Method and a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and Historical Analysis”, in 
Lichbach and Zuckerman (eds.), Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture and Structure (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1997), 19-41, at 28. 
52 Mahoney, “Path Dependence”, 512. 
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the place of certain institutional arrangements in a social system once they have been 
established.53 As such, path dependency here is a self-reinforcing mechanism, and path 
dependent analysis provides “strong tools for understanding continuity”, which are 
unfortunately “not matched by equally sophisticated tools for understanding political and 
institutional change”.54 As Jeffery Haydu puts it: “[i]f at turning points history is full of 
serendipity, along ensuing paths it becomes a steamroller”.55 
Yet there seems to be little to suggest in a theoretical sense that path dependency should be 
solely conceived of in the sense of self-reinforcing mechanisms. While advocates of such 
an approach may rightly be worried about ‘concept stretching’, there seems to be little to 
justify such a narrow conception. For example, Paul Pierson, a noted commentator on path 
dependent analysis and an advocate of the narrow approach, argues that:  
[T]here are two compelling reasons for focusing special attention on processes that exhibit 
increasing returns. First, such processes characterize many important parts of the social 
world. Second, social scientists are developing theory that makes the investigation of the 
causes and consequences of increasing returns a particularly promising area of inquiry.56 
There is nothing inherently wrong with Pierson’s argument—many of the most interesting 
path dependent processes may indeed involve increasing returns—but simply because this 
provides a promising avenue for research (even if it is the most promising avenue) seems 
hardly enough reason to stifle other avenues on an a priori basis. At least part of the 
rationale behind this move, one suspects, is that one of the dominant uses of path 
dependent analysis is to explain ‘deviant’ cases.57 If one follows the 
rationalist/instrumentalist mode of enquiry and is generally concerned with efficient 
decision-making and causal regularities, path dependency may indeed provide a useful 
means of explicating inefficient outcomes that are not predicted by theory, by emphasising 
the ways in which contingent events then produce increasing returns to an initially 
inefficient policy choice, thus explaining its continuity on the basis of rational principles. 
All very well. But if one is unencumbered by such philosophical baggage, there may surely 
be a desire to account for change as well as continuity through path dependent analysis, or 
                                               
53 For further discussion, see Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependency, and the Study of Politics”, 
94(2) American Political Science Review (2000), 251-267. 
54 Hogan, “Remoulding the Critical Junctures Approach”, 39(3) Canadian Journal of Political Science 
(2006), 657-679. 
55 Haydu, “Making Use of the Past”, 353. 
56 Pierson, “Increasing Returns”, 253. 
57 For further discussion, see Mahoney, “Path Dependence”. 
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at least something similar. Certainly, this is the position taken by a second grouping of path 
dependent analysts, who stress that, in addition to self-reinforcing sequences, path 
dependency may throw up reactive sequences, “chains of temporally ordered and causally 
connected events” that “are marked by backlash processes that transform and perhaps 
reverse early events”.58 This seems a useful notion for accounting for change within social 
systems, which, as scientific realism asserts, are open systems that are subject to just such 
change.  
3. Critical Junctures or Turning Points 
The mechanism by which these self-reinforcing and reactive processes are initiated is 
through the interposition of ‘critical junctures’, ‘turning points’ or ‘formative moments’, in 
which ‘exogenous shocks’ produce “structurally induced unsettled times [which] can 
provoke possibilities for particularly consequential purposive action”59 and “establish 
pathways that funnel units in particular directions”.60 A critical juncture represents a point 
in time where specific events within a causal pathway fundamentally alter the dynamic 
within which deliberation may occur, either by ‘locking in’ the causal pathway to a 
specific route, through increasing returns, or by providing openings for change or policy 
innovation. Following a critical juncture, then, the environment within which decision-
making must take place is fundamentally changed and debate must then take place within 
the parameters of the new context. 
The use of critical junctures as an analytical tool provides a useful means of 
conceptualising how causal pathways can become locked into or diverge from initial 
trajectories, allowing us to engage in context-sensitive causal analysis. And a brief look at 
some of the stories of humanitarian intervention seems to confirm its potential relevance. 
To give but one example, the kind of effect that shocks such as massacres can have on the 
causal pathway has been widely noted in the literature on humanitarian intervention. 
Richard Haas provides an interesting examination of US policy leading up to the 
intervention in Bosnia in which the policy environment changed significantly as a result of 
certain high profile events, including the 1994 bombing of the Sarajevo marketplace, as 
                                               
58 Ibid., 526. 
59 Katznelson, “Periodization and Preferences: Reflections of Purposive Action in Comparative Historical 
Social Science”, in Mahoney and Rueschemeyer (eds.), Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social 
Sciences (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003), 270-304, at 274. 
60 Hogan, “Remoulding the Critical Junctures Approach”, 660. 
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well as the fall of the safe areas of Gorazde and Srebrenica and the massacre that took 
place in the latter, events which fundamentally changed the ways in which the Clinton 
administration then conceived of policy.61 Likewise, much has been written about the 1999 
Račak massacre in Kosovo and its effect on the determination of members of the NATO 
alliance to respond forcefully.62 In a similar vein, the deaths of peacekeeping troops 
themselves has had notable effects on policy. In Rwanda, Belgium withdrew its 
peacekeeping contingent within the first days of the genocide there in 1994, following the 
murder of 10 of its peacekeepers, effectively rendering the ongoing mission toothless. In 
Somalia, the United States initially ramped up its commitment following the May 1993 
attacks on peacekeepers in which 24 Pakistani peacekeepers lost their lives, before then 
ending its commitments following the deaths of 18 of its own personnel. Indeed, casualties 
in peacekeeping missions have had noticeable effects in many of the cases. 
However, one of the problems with the use of critical junctures, particularly in the path 
dependency literature, is the fact that their incidence is not accounted for within the 
theoretical framework itself. Rather, they are treated as exogenous or contingent events. 
While contingency is acceptable under the scientific realist model, the ways it is employed 
is not always satisfactory in the path dependency literature. For example, Mahoney argues 
that the choice of a particular policy from a range of options may be viewed as a 
contingent event if it is inexplicable by theory.63 This suggests less that the outcome is 
contingent than that we have poor theories about it. Even, however, if we accept that 
certain critical junctures may involve events which are inexplicable under the theory with 
which we are predominantly concerned, though they may be explicable under other 
theories, there are deeper problems with the contingency approach. By accepting critical 
junctures as contingent events, we make no effort to understand how they are related to 
other elements of the theoretical framework, or how they may exert influence on other 
elements of the causal pathway. For example, given the dominant application of path 
                                               
61 Haass, Intervention. 
62 An interesting examination of the Račak massacre is provided by Chomsky, who argues that the massacre 
was staged by US operatives in order to justify the later intervention. Chomsky, The New Military 
Humanism. In a 2003 interview with a former ICTY prosecutor who wishes to remain anonymous, I was told 
a similar story. The prosecutor said that the team that exhumed the Račak grave found that the bullet holes on 
the victim’s bodies were not matched by those on the clothes they wore. This individual suspected the KLA 
of staging the massacre rather than the United States, dressing its own dead fighters in civilian garb to shock 
the world at the brutality of Serbian atrocities, but the effect is the same. Both anecdotes, whatever truth they 
contain, suggest that there is a belief among many that high-profile events such as massacres may crucially 
alter the stakes involved in intervention. 
63 See Mahoney, “Path Dependence”, 513-514. 
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dependent analysis to the explanation of deviant or suboptimal outcomes, path dependent 
analysis has tended to focus on the effects of single critical junctures on the causal 
pathway, such as Mahoney’s suboptimal policy choice, which occludes consideration of 
how there may be multiple critical junctures in a causal chain, and how earlier events may 
actually “precipitate later crises, structure available options, and shape the choices made at 
those junctures”.64 Moreover, it leaves to contingency elements that can usefully be 
theorised, such as the ways in which structures induce the ‘unsettled times’ and the ways in 
which agents react to critical junctures. This approach prevents us from engaging in 
meaningful comparison of cases in which such ‘contingent’ events appear. In the following 
section, I argue that these shortcomings can be mitigated by marrying the notion of critical 
junctures and path analysis to the morphogenetic analytical framework introduced in 
Chapter 3, allowing us to move beyond the rather narrow and problematic path dependency 
literature and to engage in deeper sequential decision analysis. 
4. Agency, Structure and Paths 
In the preceding chapters, I have raised notions such as sequential decision paths, 
contingency, intended and unintended outcomes of policy and the dialectic between agency 
and structure. Here, these ideas converge. I am not the first to raise the connection between 
morphogenetic social analysis and critical junctures,65 but here I seek to move beyond such 
recognition to elucidate how this recognition can be operationalised into a methodology for 
examining sequential decision paths.  
The first theoretical step in delineating this model is to recognise that policies are rarely the 
outcome of a single decision, but are rather the product of a series of interlinked decisions, 
punctuated by critical junctures or key events, with the dynamics of each stage being 
fundamentally affected by the consequences of the preceding stage. When policies are 
conceived or enacted, they set off a chain of events in which the policies are discussed, 
debated and evaluated. Critical junctures then provide openings for change or continuation 
based upon the effectiveness, suitability or reception of such policies.  
In the context of the theoretical framework explicated here, this means that structures 
provide the context for political deliberation in which agents interpret their identities and 
interests. On the basis of such interpretations, policies are conceived or enacted that seek to 
                                               
64 Haydu, “Making Use of the Past”, 353. 
65 See also Greener, “The Potential of Path Dependence in Political Studies”, 25(1) Politics (2005), 62-72. 
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reflect those identities and interests. We can therefore conceive, following Carlsnaes, of a 
decision-making process as taking place within three dimensions: a structural dimension; a 
dispositional dimension; and an intentional dimension.66 The structural dimension refers to 
the structural context within which policy deliberation takes place. This dimension 
includes, primarily, the identity setting within which the debate must be framed, as well as 
the objective conditions—i.e., the set of environmental and material conditions within 
which the policy event is situated. The dispositional dimension refers to the ways in which 
actors interpret their interests and ethical values within this structural environment. And 
the intentional dimension concerns the ways in which actors formulate policy in the 
context of these structural and dispositional factors. We can think of these dimensions as 
being nested, in that the higher levels set the context within which the parameters of debate 
at the lower levels must take place. Idiographic debate takes place within the structural 
level, which defines the parameters of debate on purposive and ethical issues in the 
dispositional level, which in turn constrains and enables resource-instrumental and 
strategic-instrumental deliberation in the intentional level. The product of this nested 
model of deliberation is foreign policy action. This model is illustrated in Figure 1 below.  
FIGURE 1: MODEL OF FOREIGN POLICY DECISION 
 
                                               
66 See Carlsnaes, “The Agency-Structure Problem”. 
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Source: Adapted from Carlsnaes, “The Agency-Structure Problem”.67  
However, some policies may serve identity needs better than others, and the enactment of 
policies will provide room for the evaluation of policies against a state’s identity needs, 
leading to evaluation of either the policy itself or the identity that produced it in an 
empirical setting. In other words, a new stage of the decision-making process commences, 
in which ideas about identities in the structural domain are re-evaluated, as are agents’ 
interpretations of their identity needs, which leads to a new process of deliberation on 
policy. Sometimes, this process may simply reflect incremental change, as identities, 
interests and policies are fine-tuned through a lengthy process of morphogenetic change. 
At other times, however, change is more abrupt, as critical junctures, which often 
themselves emerge from the intended or unintended consequences of policy conception, 
provide the catalyst for reflection upon the salience of the identities, interests or policies 
thus enacted. In this process, the dialectic between structure and agency is the key to 
understanding the dynamics of the process, which is illustrated in Figure 2 below. 
FIGURE 2: DYNAMIC AGENCY–STRUCTURE MODEL OF FOREIGN POLICY DECISION 
 
Source: Adapted from Carlsnaes, “The Agency-Structure Problem”. 
It can be seen here that the nested deliberation shown in Figure 1 is part of a larger cycle in 
which the effects of agency (the foreign policy decision) in turn influence the structural 
and dispositional dimensions within which later foreign policy decisions are made, which 
in turn influence the agent’s approach to the next foreign policy decision, which in turn 
influences the structural and dispositional elements once again, as the cycle begins anew 
again and again.  
Structures provide the context within which decision-making takes place, constraining, 
enabling or conditioning certain policy directions. But, as Blyth puts it, “structures do not 
                                               
67 This figure adapts Carlsnaes ‘three dimensions’ framework to incorporate the idiographic, purposive, 
ethical and instrumental modes of reasoning referred to above.  
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come with an instruction sheet”,68 meaning that there must be a role for agency in 
interpreting structural imperatives. As policies are enacted through agents’ interpretations 
in the dispositional and intentional domains, there follows a period of reflection in which 
the appropriateness of these interpretations are evaluated by policy actors. Critical 
junctures in this context then provide catalysts for invigorated reflection, as the question of 
the appropriateness of the interpretations are given impetus by some kind of interposition 
in the causal pathway. At such moments, “the politics of persuasion comes to the fore”,69 
as agents seek to reinterpret the interplay of the structural, dispositional and intentional 
dimensions.  
This analysis requires a focus on agency, as there is an explicit concern with the ways in 
which members of political communities interpret the relevance of identities, interests, 
policies and events. It also requires a consideration of structure, as intersubjective 
understandings of culture and identity pre-structure the context within which such 
interpretation may take place, constraining and enabling the range of possible outcomes. In 
this sense, Finnemore and Sikkink emphasise the need for emerging norms to “resonate” 
with intersubjective understandings of appropriate behaviour.70 This helps us to explain 
why some interpretations of identities, interests and policies are more readily accepted than 
others.  
In the context of the theory outlined in the earlier sections of this chapter, we can take this 
notion a little further. As idiographic, purposive, ethical and instrumental arguments 
develop through a policy cycle, they will exhibit greater or lesser resonance with the other 
components of the policy complex. As policy deliberation develops, the resonance of the 
different levels of discourse with each other will become a key factor in the stability of the 
policy discourse itself. Critical junctures may provide the impetus for a reinterpretation of 
the idiographic discourse, which will then feed into reinterpretation of the lower levels of 
discourse. Alternatively, critical junctures may provide the impetus for re-evaluations of 
the extent to which lower order discourses resonate with an affirmed idiographic discourse. 
In this respect, I highlight the need to identify positive and negative synergies between the 
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69 Widmaier, Blyth and Seabrooke, “Exogenous Shocks or Endogenous Constructions? The Meanings of 
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70 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”, 32(4) International 
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levels of discourse. If two levels of discourse establish positive synergies, they ‘resonate’ 
with each other, and provide stable bases for the establishment of policy. If, however, they 
do not resonate with each other, negative synergies will emerge, which threaten the 
stability of a policy discourse and may lead to re-interpretation of the offending level of 
discourse to bring it into line with the dominant discourse. Critical junctures may highlight 
the presence of these positive or negative synergies, but the causes of change are vested in 
the model itself. 
B. The Case Studies 
In order to assess the utility of the theory presented here, I will examine the evidence 
presented by three case studies of US involvement in potential cases of humanitarian 
intervention. I limit the analysis to US foreign policy for considerations of scope. While it 
would be both interesting and valid to see how approaches to humanitarian intervention 
differ among states—and, indeed, between states and international organisations, given the 
increasing practice of such institutions in this field, particularly ECOWAS, the AU and the 
EU—it would require a much greater number of case studies for such an approach to be 
effective, as well as a good deal more flexibility in dealing with the empirical materials, 
given the differences of social organisation in different states. Such an approach would be 
both a useful and valid direction for the research to go down, and could plausibly form the 
basis for further research, but it remains for the plausibility of the above theory to be tested 
before any such wider study could be considered. I choose to focus on the United States as 
the test case for a number of reasons. Firstly, the United States was an active participant in 
the majority of cases involving possible humanitarian interventions during the post-Cold 
War era. It did intervene in Northern Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo, and was 
associated with possible interventions in Rwanda, Liberia and Sudan, among others. It is 
also generally the first country to whom the international community looks when there is a 
need for military power to enforce collective objectives, as it is and remains the preeminent 
world power in the modern era. As such, it provides a particularly fruitful site for the 
research. 
I will examine US involvement in potential humanitarian interventions in Somalia, 
Rwanda and Haiti. These case studies have been chosen because they provide a robust case 
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selection in terms of the ‘most similar’ case study design.71 The case studies are closely 
related in terms of time, having taken place between 1992 and 1994. Indeed, the case 
studies overlap to a considerable degree. As political deliberation over intervention in 
Somalia built in the United States during 1992, leading to the December 1992 intervention 
decision, the issue of Haiti had already appeared on the US policy radar, following the 30 
September 1991 military coup against Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. As the US 
intervention in Somalia deepened and evolved towards the tragic events of October 1993, 
so too was US involvement in Haiti deepening and evolving, with the ill-fated Governor’s 
Island Agreement signed on 3 July 1993 and the embarrassing retreat of the USS Harlan 
County from Haiti, sent to effect this agreement, but withdrawing in the face of opposition 
from within Haiti, taking place on 12 October 1993, a mere week after the infamous ‘Black 
Hawk Down’ incident in Mogadishu on 3 October. In 1994, as the United States 
readdressed itself to Haiti, Rwanda presented itself as a serious foreign policy issue. The 6 
April 1994 assassination of Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana and Burundian 
President Cyprien Ntaryamira triggered the Rwandan genocide, an issue that would need to 
be dealt with contemporaneously with the ongoing issue of Haiti. However, whereas the 
United States did intervene in Haiti on 19 September 1994, the same approach was not 
taken for Rwanda.  
In the case study chapters themselves, the analysis is divided into various ‘phases’, 
reflecting the recognition discussed above that a foreign policy decision is not a single 
isolated event, but rather the culmination of a series of decisions, be they non-decisions, 
differentiated decisions, multiple decisions of the same type or increasing or decreasing 
levels of commitment to a decision path. In each of the case study chapters, I identify three 
major decision phases, though other numbers might have equally been used depending on 
the dynamics of the decision path itself in the empirical context. Through the case studies, 
I make use of detailed historical narrative to trace the causal pathways through which 
identity manifested itself in a particular policy decision. Though detailed and context-
specific, this narrative is nevertheless theoretically driven, as only the most salient issues 
are addressed in the context of the theoretical framework developed above.  
                                               
71 See Mill, A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive (Harper and Brothers, New York, 1846); 
Przeworski and Teune, Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry (Krieger, Malabar, 2000). Unfortunately, these 
authors use different language, with Przeworski and Teune using the language of ‘most similar systems’ 
design and Mill using the ‘method of difference’ to refer to the same logic. I use Przeworski and Teune’s 
language here. 
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C. The Empirical Materials 
Any analytical study of identity must make a methodological choice regarding where the 
discourses of identity are deemed to be located. In terms of foreign-policy decision-
making, the sources of appropriate discourse might vary depending on what it is that the 
researcher wishes to discover. For example, David Campbell’s work on Writing Security is 
concerned largely with understanding the ways in which identities are constructed through 
the articulation of radical selves/others, even in private, within the official foreign policy 
establishment.72 As such, he concentrates only on identity representations that emanated 
from within the elite and, specifically, the executive. While such an approach may do 
much to highlight the dynamics of intra-group identity politics, Campbell chose not to take 
into account oppositional, popular or other perhaps dissenting voices. Though consistent 
with his aims, as well as explicitly articulated, this type of approach may nevertheless 
exclude a possible multiplicity of policy actors who may influence identity politics, and is 
certainly not the only way to approach such research. There are, indeed, multiple possible 
discourse analytical frameworks through which we may engage with identity politics; the 
choice of which to use must be predicated on our research aims and the content of our 
subject matter. As a useful guide, Lene Hansen illustrates three potential research models: 
model 1, which focuses on “official foreign policy discourse and centers on political 
leaders with official authority to sanction the policies pursued”; model 2, which also takes 
into account “political oppositional parties, the media, and corporate institutions”; and 
models 3A and 3B, which also take into account “material not explicitly engaging official 
policy discourse or which is concerned with policy but has a marginal status”.73 Indeed, 
one can envisage numerous possibilities beyond or combining these models and the choice 
is best left to the subject matter to determine. 
The subject matter of humanitarian intervention suggests we should be concerned not just 
with official foreign policy discourse, but also with discourse emanating from political 
opposition parties, the media, international and nongovernmental organisations, as well as 
public opinion. Though the executive remains the primary decision-maker, humanitarian 
intervention remains a contested issue, with support and opposition to policies of 
humanitarian intervention emanating from various sectors of society. There is an abundant 
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literature on the role of the media in influencing policies of humanitarian intervention.74 
Likewise, a number of studies have noted the potential influence of Congressional actors 
on the development of such policies.75 Indeed, the strength of the US Congress as a policy 
actor within the US domestic system is so well established as to be almost redundant even 
to mention. Finally, human rights organisations and advocacy groups have been extremely 
active on such issues, and have often been mentioned as key actors in policy deliberation.76 
Indeed, in recent years, such groups have harnessed the power of the internet and now 
regularly organise massive petitions, funding drives and policy campaigns on these issues. 
A specific research project on the influence of such initiatives has the potential to be of 
great interest. However, in the time period considered, such activities were less ubiquitous, 
and little data from these groups was in any case available, so a full examination was 
unfeasible. Nevertheless, much advocacy at this time was engaged in through the media 
itself, so the analysis is able to capture much, though unfortunately not all, of the activities 
of these groups.  
In the case study chapters, I therefore examine representations made by members of the 
executive in major policy speeches, press conferences, press releases, question and answer 
sessions and, where available, internal documentation. In the context of Congressional 
opinion, I examine policy debate in the House and the Senate contained within the 
Congressional Record, as well as the hearings of Congressional committees, major policy 
speeches, press conferences and press releases issued by members of Congress. In respect 
                                               
74 Though considerations of scope preclude a lengthy examination of this so-called ‘CNN effect’ literature 
here, it should be noted that this literature has had mixed results. Early post-Cold War ideas regarding media 
influence that suggested a strong and direct link between media coverage and policies of humanitarian 
intervention (see, for example, Kennan, “Somalia: Through a Glass, Darkly”, New York Times, 30 September 
1993) have largely been debunked (see Livingston and Eachus, “Humanitarian Crises and US Foreign 
Policy”, 12(4) Political Communication (1995), 413-429; Robinson, The CNN Effect: The Myth of News, 
Foreign Policy and Intervention (Routledge, London, 2002); Strobel, Late Breaking Foreign Policy) and the 
more established ideas of indexing and cues (see Bennett, “Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations in the 
United States”, 40(2) Journal of Communication (1990), 103-125; Hallin, The Uncensored War: The Media 
and Vietnam (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1989), respectively), the understanding that the media 
tend to follow, rather than precede, the foreign policy establishment in paying attention to particular issues, 
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Robinson’s ‘weak’ CNN effect and Robert Entman’s model of Projections of Power remain plausible, 
though relatively untested. See Robinson, The CNN Effect; Entman, Projections of Power: Framing News, 
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75 See, for example, Mermin, “Television News and American Intervention in Somalia: The Myth of a Media 
Driven Foreign Policy”, 112(3) Political Science Quarterly (2001), 385-403. 
76 See, for example, Natsios, US Foreign Policy and the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Humanitarian 
Relief in Complex Emergencies (Praeger, Westport, 1997). 
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of the media, I choose to focus on the contribution of the print media, as the most regular, 
voluminous and accessible source of media opinion. In particular, I examine media articles 
from the Washington Post and the New York Times, not because they are the highest 
circulation papers in the United States or because they provide a balance between left-wing 
and right-wing views, but because they are widely received as the two most influential 
newspapers within the policy elite.77 Finally, although identity debate is largely influenced 
by debate within a state, it is recognised that outside influence from the international 
society is also relevant, though it may be somewhat weaker than the effect domestic 
societal discourse has on a state’s identity. Therefore, I look at Security Council 
deliberation and the activities of the UN Secretary-General as the most important source of 
such influence, though other sources are not excluded. In all, over 6,000 documents are 
analysed across the case studies.78 
V. CONCLUSION 
In the chapters that follow, I will apply this framework to the empirical material. Though 
all of the idiographic, purposive, ethical and instrumental considerations presented in the 
framework above were found to be present in the case studies, emphasis of certain of the 
elements remained muted. As such, and in light of the wealth of data that was turned up, 
specific focus is given in these presentations to the dominant discourses, those that 
influenced the parameters of the debate and, ultimately, policy. The following chapter 
examines the US intervention in Somalia in December 1992, after which the analysis turns 
to the cases of Rwanda and Haiti. 
 
                                               
77 A balance between left-wing and right-wing views or use of high circulation papers is, indeed, anyway 
difficult to achieve. The highest circulation paper in the United States is the USA Today, though it is far from 
clear whether it is the most widely read, given that much of its circulation is to hotels in the United States and 
around the world. Next is the Wall Street Journal, which has a specific focus on financial issues, rendering it 
somewhat unsuitable for an analysis such as this one. The New York Times, which I use, is the third highest 
circulation paper, and allegedly left-wing in its orientation. However, in the top 10 circulation newspapers in 
the United States, the only allegedly right-wing paper is the New York Post, which, although popular, enjoys 
the vast majority of its patronage within the New York metropolitan area only, rendering it somewhat 
unsuitable also. I therefore eschew these choice dimensions and focus on level of influence, which the 
Washington Post and New York Times provide. 
78 For Somalia, more than 1,300 documents, for Rwanda, more than 1,200 documents and for Haiti, more 
than 3,800 documents. The Haiti case study uses more documents for two reasons: firstly, it takes place over 
a longer time period (two years rather than the less than one year in respect of Somalia and Rwanda); and, 
secondly, as there were simply more documents that fell within the data collection parameters for this case 
than the others. Identical data collection methods were used across the three case studies. 
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Chapter 5 
Into the Brave New World: The US Intervention in 
Somalia in 1992 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The US intervention in Somalia in 1992 provides an interesting first case study against 
which to test the merits of the theory developed in the previous chapters. Indeed, the search 
for an explanation of the US decision to intervene in Somalia has already generated a 
considerable amount of academic speculation, perhaps in large part because it appears, on 
the surface, to run contrary to the expectations of established theories. In particular, the 
classical realist position that states will use military force in order to further their interests, 
defined in terms of power, seems hard to reconcile with intervention in Somalia, a military 
action in a faraway land of little or no strategic or economic value to the United States, 
with little prospect of power political profit.  
In the absence of an explanation that resonated with existing ideas about the rationales for 
the use of military force abroad, there followed a scramble to arrive at satisfying 
explanations, some less convincing than others. Among those who were unwilling to 
simply jettison the realist demand for a strategic-political rationale, it was suggested that 
the intervention was being used to put pressure on the Bashir regime in Sudan in its 
dealings with the SPLM; could be viewed as a pre-emptive strike against the emergence of 
a potentially hostile radical Islamic government in Somalia itself; was the first step in a 
new neo-imperialist program to establish US control in the third world; or, in a more 
Marxist vein, might even stem from more inward-looking concerns, such as the military-
industrial complex and the desire to showcase the beach-landing capability of the US 
Marines, who had not had a suitable opportunity to flex their amphibious muscle in the 
recent Persian Gulf War.1 
                                               
1 See Shalom, “Gravy Train: Feeding the Pentagon by Feeding Somalia”, 2 Z Magazine (1993); Peace, 
“Relief, Reconstruction and Reconciliation in Somalia: Views of Prominent Somalis”, USIP Special Report 
on Somalia (1992); Farah, “Praise the Marines? I Suppose So”, New York Times, 28 December 1992. For a 
critical view, see Lefebvre, “The US Military Intervention in Somalia: A Hidden Agenda?” 2(1) Middle East 
Policy (1993), 44-63. 
 98 
Few of these rationales were taken particularly seriously. Of those that were, three 
explanations dominate: that the intervention in Somalia demonstrated the new-found power 
of the media to set the policy agenda and drive foreign policy;2 that it represented an 
attempt by President Bush to increase his political capital on the eve of the Republican 
National Convention and, later, to secure his legacy before his term as president came to an 
end;3 or that it represented the triumph of humanitarian ideals over old particularist 
concerns, with humanitarian compassion driving the policy agenda towards Somalia. 
Though none of these explanations was unconvincing, neither were they particularly 
theoretically satisfying, as none seemed capable of providing a predictive rule of 
international relations theory that could be defended against the empirical record.4 
Somalia, it seemed, was destined to be considered an anomaly. 
In what follows, I chart the emergence of US policy towards Somalia through the lens of 
the theory presented in the previous chapters. The role of the media, Bush’s ‘legacy’ and 
the humanitarian imperative all transpire to have importance for the final outcome of the 
debate over intervention in Somalia, but each can be better understood through a 
conceptualisation of the role of identity in generating interests, framing debates and, 
ultimately, formulating policy. The importance of Bush’s legacy can more usefully be 
formulated in terms of identity itself; in terms of Bush’s ‘new world order’ vision, a vision 
of US identity and foreign policy role that came to be shared within the US policy 
community. One element of the new world order suggested an abiding American interest in 
humanitarian goals, which indeed played an important role in US consideration of the 
Somalia question, but this interest flowed directly from, rather than in isolation to, the 
internationalist identity of the new world order discourse. And, in the analysis that follows, 
the media does indeed play an important role, by highlighting and giving immediacy to 
existing policy concerns regarding Somalia, particularly in terms of instrumental policy. 
But, again, it emerges that the way in which the media influenced the policy debate most 
                                               
2 See Kennan, “Somalia: Through a Glass, Darkly”. 
3 See, for example, Western, Selling Intervention and War; Western, “Sources of Humanitarian Intervention: 
Beliefs, Information, and Advocacy in the US Decisions on Somalia and Bosnia”, 26(4) International 
Security (2002), 112-142. 
4 For a time, it seemed that the ‘CNN Effect’ might be developed into such a rule. However, empirical 
evaluations of the proposition of a CNN Effect, at least in the fairly simplistic sense in which it was first 
adduced, failed to produce much more than qualified support for the proposition. See Robinson, The CNN 
Effect; Livingston and Eachus, “Humanitarian Crises”. In recent years, some more sophisticated analyses 
have developed the notions in these early studies into more defensible theories, but these remain in their 
infancy, and have moved on considerably from the proposition described here, that news coverage can 
fundamentally drive the policy agenda. See, for example, Entman, Projections of Power. 
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crucially was by forcing policy-makers to reflect on the integrity of their vision of US 
identity as it was being reproduced through foreign policy action. Indeed, these three 
themes, previously entertained by other commentators, can be woven together through the 
use of the via media into a far richer patchwork of policy deliberation that is fundamentally 
driven by identity.  
In this chapter, I divide the analysis into three sections, which correspond to different 
periods in the US approach to Somalia. This division reflects the theoretical commitment 
raised in the previous chapters regarding the importance of sequentiality and critical 
junctures in the causal chain. The analysis thus demonstrates how policy debate may be 
fundamentally altered by endogenous and exogenous shocks. In each of the sections, I 
address the ways in which questions of foreign policy role, interests, ethical dilemmas and 
instrumental calculations emerge within the policy discourse on Somalia.5 The result is a 
complex whole that demonstrates the ways in which identity drove policy in Somalia, 
through a process of content and contestation, and interlinked and dynamic synergies 
between the different levels of discourse. The first section covers the period between 
January 1992 and June 1992, in which the embryonic response to the Somalia conflict 
emerged and would later be challenged. The second section charts a shift in attitudes 
towards the appropriate response between July 1992 and August 1992, as increasing 
pressure to respond adequately manifested more strongly in the political discourse and, 
ultimately, in the 14 August decision to airlift humanitarian relief to Somalia. The final 
section considers the period between August 1992 and December 1992, as the failures of 
the relief effort became increasingly apparent and increasingly widely criticised, leading 
finally to the president’s authorisation of a massive intervention force in early December 
1992. 
II. OPENING GAMBITS: JANUARY–JUNE 1992 
A. Foreign Policy Role: New World Order versus Pentagon Paper 
As America entered 1992, it found itself in a period of reflection. It had recently emerged 
from a successful and widely supported war to reverse Iraqi aggression against Kuwait (as 
well as to subsequently protect Shi’ite and Kurdish refugees in Iraq itself) and from a 
longer and colder war of attrition with its old enemy the Soviet Union. In 1992, it found 
                                               
5 Due to considerations of scope, however, attention is focused only on those elements most critical to the 
causal complex. 
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itself preeminent among world powers, and generally more well regarded globally than had 
been the case but a few years earlier. It was a natural time for the US establishment to 
reflect upon its identity, its position in the world, and the roles and responsibilities that 
would attend thereon. In particular, two dominant strands of interpretation of the United 
States’ foreign policy role in the world emerged: one based on Bush’s vision of a ‘new 
world order’ and containing strong universalist overtones; and one based upon the so-
called ‘Pentagon Paper’,6 a strongly neoconservative policy programme containing clear 
particularist overtones. The contents and strengths of these two policy paradigms would 
largely dominate the emerging debate on Somalia, structuring the discursive ground, and 
the outcome of the contest between proponents of these two divergent visions would echo 
through into later, more policy-focused debates, restricting and enabling certain discourses, 
and rendering certain policies more likely.  
1. The ‘New World Order’ 
US President George H.W. Bush’s “Towards a New World Order” speech before a joint 
session of Congress in September 1990 set the early tone for idiographic debate on 
America’s foreign policy role in the post-Cold War era. Bush’s speech covered all sorts of 
issues, from globalisation, power politics and economic interdependence, through 
Balkanisation and the rise of new nationalisms, to the domestic economy, technological 
advancement and integration.7 The speech emphasised both the challenges and 
opportunities inherent in the unique nature of the prevailing situation, and some broad 
parameters through which policy might flow. Thus, the ‘new world order’ speech marked 
more of a sketch of the terrain than a cohesive political programme. Nevertheless, this 
allowed for scope for interpretation on the part of various actors, and it is the meaning that 
the concept of ‘new world order’ had for those driving US foreign policy that is most 
clearly at stake here.  
The dominant interpretation of the new world order was a universalist vision for a 
harmonious international society. At least three primary features of the new world order 
emerged from the discourse: strong American leadership in the post-Cold War world; a 
collective internationalist approach to dealing with global problems; and a universalist 
                                               
6 The Pentagon Paper would later become the blueprint for the 2002 “National Security Strategy”, whose 
authors—including Paul Wolfowitz and Dick Cheney—were instrumental in the drafting of both. 
7 Bush, “Towards a New World Order”, Speech before a Joint Session of Congress, 11 September 1990. 
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ethic of responsibility between nations. These three key elements came for many to define 
the vision of the new world order,8 a vision that was used widely in support of deeper 
engagement with Somalia.9  
The new world order discourse, as the theory presented in this thesis suggests is probable 
of internationalist identities, provided a blueprint for engagement with crisis-ridden 
countries in the periphery. The imperative of collective intervention flowed from the 
collective internationalist identity of the new world order discourse, a notion that was 
fundamentally suited to the situation in Somalia. But in order for this identity to become 
operationalised through foreign policy, it would first have to establish its dominance over 
alternative identity formulations, of which the vision contained in the Pentagon Paper was 
the most significant rival, and then become established through the dispositional and 
intentional dimensions by establishing corresponding discourses on interests, ethics and 
actions.  
2. The ‘Pentagon Paper’ 
The collective internationalist vision inspired by interpretations of the ‘new world order’ 
speech was not the only reaction to the new and unique situation in which the United States 
found itself during this period of reflection in the early part of 1992. A significant 
counterpoint to this theme emerged in early March 1992, when a Pentagon draft strategy 
document was leaked to the press. This document, too, emphasised the new challenges 
faced by the United States in the post-Cold War era. However, despite the similarity in 
starting point, the Pentagon Paper came to very different conclusions. The Pentagon Paper 
stressed a dynamic neoconservative vision of America’s role in the post-Cold War era, in 
which the primary aim of the United States should be the maintenance of its pre-eminence 
as a world power. This overriding objective called not for a return to isolationism but a 
dynamic engagement overseas. Indeed, the Pentagon Paper explicitly addressed the need to 
engage with regional instabilities, though from the standpoint of the United States’ own 
particularist interests. The relevant section is worth quoting at length: 
                                               
8 See, for example, US House of Representatives, “Concurrent Resolution on the Budget, Fiscal Year 1993”, 
Congressional Record, 5 March 1992, H1017; US House of Representatives, “The Republican Congress—A 
Manifesto for Change in the House of Representatives”, Congressional Record, 30 January 1992, H147; 
Bush, “Remarks to the American Society of Newspaper Editors”, 9 April 1992. 
9 See, for example, Washington Post, “In Africa’s Horn: Plenty of Daring—and Grief”, Washington Post, 17 
January 1992; New York Times, “Help Needed for Forsaken Somalia”, New York Times, 9 February 1992. 
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The second objective is to address sources of regional conflict and instability … While the 
US cannot become the world’s ‘policeman’, by assuming responsibility for righting every 
wrong, we will retain the pre-eminent responsibility for addressing selectively those wrongs 
which threaten not only our interests, but those of our allies or friends, or which could 
seriously unsettle international relations. Various types of US interests may be involved in 
such instances: access to vital raw materials, primarily Persian Gulf oil; proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, threats to US citizens from terrorism or 
regional or local conflict, and threats to US society from narcotics trafficking.10  
Though calling for a dynamic engagement overseas, the Pentagon Paper programme was 
fundamentally unsuited to a policy of intervention in Somalia. Of the wide-ranging array of 
objectives outlined in this document, all were ultimately particularist and few if any could 
be brought to bear in regard to the Somalia situation. Should the Pentagon Paper’s vision 
of US identity come to dominate the debate, the prospects for intervention in Somalia 
would be poor. However, general reactions to the leaked Pentagon Paper were critical. In 
Congress, Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV) called the Pentagon Paper “myopic, shallow and 
disappointing. … In the long run, it will be counterproductive to the very goal of world 
leadership it cherishes.”11 And David Scheffer, a Senior Associate of the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, wrote in the New York Times that the Pentagon Paper 
“unwittingly isolate[s] US forces from the real enemies—internal aggression and human 
rights atrocities—that collective internationalism is confronting”.12  
In the face of these and other criticisms, the authors and supporters of the Pentagon Paper 
were forced to retreat from some of its most controversial positions. Pentagon Spokesman 
Pete Williams sought to soften the hard edges of a document that was never intended for 
public consumption: “[t]he United States is not looking for a unilateral role in the world. 
… What we are saying is that we want to stay involved with our allies. We want to remain 
part of the community of nations. … The defense planning guidance does not say, will not 
say, [that] we are abandoning collectivism”.13 This “tactical withdrawal” from some of the 
apparent implications of the Pentagon Paper was significant. It put those who wished to 
                                               
10 New York Times, “Excerpts From Pentagon’s Plan: Prevent the Re-emergence of a New Rival”, New York 
Times, 8 March 1992. 
11 Tyler, “Senior US Officials Assail Lone-Superpower Policy”, New York Times, 11 March 1992. 
12 Scheffer, “Not the World’s Policeman”, Washington Post, 7 April 1992. For more criticisms, see, for 
example, US House of Representatives, “Foreign Policy After the Cold War”, Congressional Record, 11 
February 1992, H401; Tyler, “Senior US Officials”. 
13 Tyler, “Senior US Officials”. 
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argue for a particularist approach to US foreign policy on the defensive. And, in fairly 
short order, any potential for the Pentagon Paper to drive US foreign policy became 
extinguished, as the ‘new world order’ discourse came to dominate the idiographic domain, 
becoming the linguistic touchstone for US identity and setting the boundaries within which 
policy debate should take place.  
In early 1992, US policy-makers had identified two very different potential contents for US 
identity, which had been heavily contested. However, through this process of content and 
contestation, one had clearly emerged as the dominant interpretation. This early dominance 
of a clearly internationalist identity discourse over an equally clearly nationalist discourse 
fits well with the theory outlined in the previous chapters, as it suggests a stronger 
likelihood of humanitarian intervention than the converse. However, in order to become 
operationalised in foreign policy action, this identity discourse in the structural domain 
would need to find mediation through the dispositional and intentional domains or, in other 
words, would need to give rise to corresponding lower order discourses on interests, ethics 
and actions. 
B. Interests: Undirected Humanitarianism 
Somalia began to impinge upon the policy agenda in early 1992, but had not yet become 
immediate enough, at least within the United States, to demand any serious reflection upon 
US interests in forging a response to the crisis. Nonetheless—and as is hardly surprising 
given the nature of the issue—compassion for the humanitarian suffering of the Somali 
people dominated attention. Such compassion found ready purchase in the context of an 
idiographic commitment to universalism. Moreover—as was the case with the collective 
internationalist propositions of the ‘new world order’ discourse—the strength of this 
humanitarian discourse in the early framing of the debate would mean that all later 
discussion of the Somali crisis would have to proceed from this very starting point. 
At first, discussion of the humanitarian imperative in Somalia took the form of a search to 
convey the extent of the crisis in appropriate terms. By early 1992, the UN estimated that 
at least 20,000 Somali civilians had lost their lives as a consequence of the crisis, and that 
at least 300,000 had been displaced, facts that became stock phrases for those addressing 
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the crisis.14 Beyond the dry numbers used, more visceral imagery was also used. The 
situation in Somalia was variously described as “an urban nightmare of war, lawlessness 
and impending famine”,15 “a grim symbol of human tragedy, misery and degradation”,16 “a 
tragedy of heartbreaking magnitude”,17 etc. However, the depiction that would come to be 
most associated with the Somali crisis was the less graphic but no less powerful 
characterisation by USAID Assistant Administrator Andrew Natsios that “this is the worst 
humanitarian crisis in the world right now, with no exceptions”.18 In the period that 
followed Natsios’ pronouncement, a number of other figures echoed his words. For 
example, Congressman Alan Wheat (D-KA), Senator Dave Durenberger (R-MI) and 
Director of Central Intelligence Robert Gates all described the crisis in Somalia as the 
world’s worst in the US Congress.19 The concept likewise became a stock phrase used in 
numerous media articles.20 
The effect of this structuring of the discursive ground went beyond simply an emphasis on 
the gravity of the situation, but provided a source of linking and differentiation.21 
Characterising the Somali civil war as a humanitarian crisis associated the Somali situation 
with other such crises, while, at the same time, differentiating it from those same crises, by 
characterising it as the worst in the world. This characterisation allowed room for a 
                                               
14 See, for example, Washington Post, “UN Envoy Discounts Prompt Somali Truce”, Washington Post, 6 
January 1992; Perlez, “As Fighting in Somalia Rages On, African Neighbor Seeks a Truce”, New York 
Times, 6 January 1992; Richburg, “In Somali Capital, Shrapnel Reigns; Civilians Pay Heavy Price In 
Artillery Duel for Power”, Washington Post, 11 January 1992. These numbers would also increase 
dramatically as the crisis matured and as improved reporting provided more reliable figures. 
15 Richburg, “In Somali Capital”. 
16 Lewis, “Security Council to Pledge To Stop Global Aggression”, New York Times, 24 January 1992. 
17 UN Security Council, “Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand and Sixtieth Meeting of the 
UN Security Council”, S/PV.3060, 17 March 1992. 
18 Washington Post, “For the Record”, Washington Post, 4 February 1992. The phrase ‘world’s worst 
humanitarian crisis’ has since become a popular way to ascribe particular gravity to one situation or another. 
Most notably, it has been used in recent years in connection with the crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan and 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
19 US House of Representatives, “Concurrent Resolution on the Budget”; US Senate, “Horn of Africa 
Recovery and Food Security Act”, Congressional Record, 8 April 1992, S5047; US Senate, “Humanitarian 
Crisis in Somalia”, Congressional Record, 5 May 1992, S5930. 
20 See, for example, New York Times, “Help Needed for Forsaken Somalia”; Washington Post, “The 
Sorrows of Somalia”, Washington Post, 12 May 1992; Washington Post, “Indifference and Somalia”, 
Washington Post, 19 June 1992. 
21 The identification of processes of linking and differentiation is an important theme in much post-
structuralist scholarship, following Derrida’s ideas on language as a system of differential signs. Commonly 
used in identity-based research to delineate identities through notions of the self–other dichotomy, given that 
Derrida’s concern was with language itself and not identity, there seems no reason it should not be applied in 
terms of framing effects also, as is the case here. For further discussion of linking and differentiation, see 
Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (Verso, 
London, 1985); Hansen, Security as Practice. 
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complementary discourse, which differentiated Somalia from, in particular, the crisis in 
Bosnia, and allowed for a truly universalist discourse to emerge, in which it was held that 
starving Africans must be equally worthy of attention as emaciated Europeans. This 
discourse would become crucially important in steering the course towards US intervention 
in Somalia. As the debate matured into its second phase, the international community 
would come under increasing criticism for the lack of attention paid to Somalia in 
comparison to Bosnia,22 while debate within Congress and the Bush administration would 
likewise juxtapose the two conflicts, with appropriate universalist discourses supervening 
on the debate, and conclude that intervention in Somalia was the more appropriate course 
of action. These debates will be addressed in Sections III and IV of this chapter. 
C. Instrumental Action: The Limits of Political Intervention  
The emergence of a universalist identity discourse and a definition of interests in Somalia 
in terms of support for human rights is strongly suggestive of a potential for intervention 
according to the theory outlined in the previous chapters. However, in the early part of 
1992, there was little in the way of what could be termed ‘policy’ towards Somalia. 
Nevertheless, it is striking, given the speed and determination with which this policy 
option emerged later in the debate, that, before June 1992, the question of military 
intervention was rarely, if ever, raised, and then only by implication. The nascent approach 
to Somalia’s woes in early 1992 was that this was a situation that called for, at most, a 
measured political intervention.  
The earliest—and indeed clearest—high level call for political intervention in Somalia 
came in January 1992 from Senators Nancy Kassebaum (R-KA) and Paul Simon (D-IL), 
who would become key advocates of the Somali cause, in a New York Times editorial. 
They recommended that: a special envoy to Somalia should be appointed; a cease-fire 
should be called for by the Security Council; and an arms embargo should be established.23 
Such was a fairly close mirror of the actions that were indeed undertaken by the Security 
Council during this period.24  
                                               
22 Including, prominently, by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. See Perlez, “Somalia: The 
Disaster Begins to Sink In”, New York Times, 2 August 1992. 
23 Kassebaum and Simon, “Save Somalia From Itself”, New York Times, 2 January 1992. 
24 On 23 January 1992 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 733, which imposed an arms embargo on 
Somalia and called for the Secretary-General to mediate the conflict. Under James Jonah’s mediation, a 
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This format remained the preferred approach to dealing with Somalia’s ills. There was 
little talk of peacekeeping, and such talk as there was took place behind the scenes. On 11 
March 1992, the UN Secretary-General released a report advocating the dispatch of a UN 
technical team to Mogadishu to assess mechanisms to “ensure the unimpeded delivery of 
humanitarian assistance”.25 This was approved in the Security Council’s Resolution 746 of 
17 March 1992. However, the Council’s Resolution was a watered down affair. It made 
implicit reference to the possibility of assessing modalities for a peacekeeping force, but 
explicit reference was excised between circulation of the draft resolution and approval of 
the final draft, allegedly at the behest of US negotiators.26 In open debate on the draft 
resolution, however, a number of African delegates explicitly called for the deployment of 
peacekeeping troops, and suggested that a lack of action would be perceived by African 
states as though their problems were “of limited concern to the international community, 
and particularly the United Nations”.27  
This argument was redolent of the consistency argument employed elsewhere—and to 
great effect—regarding the international community’s responsibility to devote as much 
attention to Africa as it did elsewhere (see Subsection B above and Sections III and IV 
below). Indeed, the UN, and particularly the United States, came in for some round 
criticism for their lack of purpose in responding to the Somali crisis. In line with this 
mounting criticism, on 7 April 1992, the US Congress passed the Horn of Africa Recovery 
and Food Security Act, as well as House Resolution 422, both of which called for deeper 
attention to the human tragedy unfolding in Somalia, and for improvements in the delivery 
of relief supplies.28  
                                                                                                                                              
ceasefire was negotiated between the Somali parties, which, though honoured as much in the breach as in the 
observance, did reduce the levels of violence in the nation’s capital for a time. And, on 28 April 1992, UN 
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali named Algerian diplomat Mohamed Sahnoun to be his Special 
Envoy to Somalia. See UN Security Council, “Resolution 733”, S/RES/733, 23 January 1992; Lewis, 
“Warring Somali Factions Reach a Truce”, New York Times, 15 February 1992; Associated Press, “Shelling 
Resumes in Somalia”, Washington Post, 16 February 1992; Perlez, “UN, Halted by Somalia Shelling, Says 
Food Relief Could End”, New York Times, 7 March 1992. 
25 UN Secretary-General, “The Situation in Somalia”, Report of the Secretary-General, S/24480, 24 August 
1992. 
26 See UN Security Council, “Draft Resolution”, S/23722, 17 March 1992; UN Security Council, “Resolution 
746”, S/RES/746, 17 March 1992; Lewis, “Security Council Weighs Role in Somali Civil War”, New York 
Times, 18 March 1993. 
27 UN Security Council, “Provisional Verbatim Record”, 17 March 1992. 
28 US Senate, “Horn of Africa Recovery”; US House of Representatives, “Stop the Slaughter in Somalia”, 
Congressional Record, 7 April 1992, E978. 
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The Report of the Secretary-General of 21 April 1992 that followed was the first high level 
report to make a serious call for armed intervention in Somalia. The report called for the 
deployment of 50 unarmed military observers (MILOBs), as well as a 500-strong 
contingent of UN ‘security personnel’.29 Again, however, the move towards a more 
forceful role was met with some resistance. Resolution 751 of 24 April 1992 approved the 
Secretary-General’s recommendation to deploy MILOBs, but fell short of approving the 
UN security force in anything other than “in principle”.30 Instead, the Security Council 
called upon the Secretary-General “to continue his consultations … [and] submit his 
further recommendations to the Security Council for its decision”.31 
In hindsight, Resolution 751 represented a turning point for US policy towards Somalia, a 
critical juncture in the causal complex that led to intervention. Again accused of being the 
driving force behind the dilution of Resolution 751, the US government was quickly put on 
the defensive by a series of attacks. On 28 April, the New York Times wrote that: “[w]ith 
shameful penury, the Bush Administration balks at humanitarian intervention in Somalia 
because it might cost the United States $7.5 million”.32 The Washington Post was equally 
scathing: “Somalia, however, is now part of the Cold War's flotsam and jetsam … What is 
there left to think when the Bush administration derails the United Nations Security 
Council’s effort to send a small (500-member) peace-keeping force there?”33  
These and other similar criticisms resonated with the supervening identity discourse, but 
the US policy did not.34 As such, the US government was forced to react. On 9 May 1992, 
US Ambassador to the UN Thomas Pickering wrote a letter to the editor of the New York 
Times criticising that paper’s coverage of US policy towards Somalia. Pickering wrote: 
“[t]he United States did not, as you assert, thwart a United Nations effort to send a 500-
man security force to protect United Nations and private humanitarian assistance deliveries 
to Somalis. The United States supports deployment of the force”.35 Nor was Pickering 
alone in this response. On 19 May 1992, Assistant Secretary of State for International 
                                               
29 UN Secretary-General, “The Situation in Somalia”. 
30 UN Security Council, “Resolution 751”, S/RES/751, 24 April 1992. 
31 Ibid. 
32 New York Times, “Uncle Pygmy Pleads Poverty”, New York Times, 28 April 1992. 
33 Washington Post, “The Sorrows of Somalia”. 
34 For more, see, for example, Lewis, “Reined In by US, UN Limits Mission to Somalia”, New York Times, 
26 April 1992; Lewis, “UN Chief’s First 4 Months: Red Tape Cut, Feathers Ruffled, Funds Exhausted”, New 
York Times, 3 May 1992. 
35 Pickering, “US Backs Efforts to Assist Somalia”, New York Times, 9 May 1992. 
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Organization Affairs John Bolton wrote a letter upbraiding the Washington Post for its 
coverage:  
The Post wrote that the United States attempted to ‘derail’ the UN Security Council’s effort 
to send a 500-member security force to Somalia … In fact, the United States urged 
accelerated deployment of the force authorized in Security Council Resolution 751 … The 
United States has been continuously and urgently concerned with the severe humanitarian 
and political issues in Somalia.36  
For the first time, senior members of the US government had explicitly and publicly voiced 
their support for a peacekeeping force for Somalia, largely in reaction to the criticism of 
the apparent failure to fully support Resolution 751.37 This would dovetail with other 
contemporaneous developments that changed the course of US policy, such as the 
accusation of favouritism towards Yugoslavia, increased media reporting on Somalia, as 
well as increased Congressional pressure for action.38 The explicit mention of support for 
peacekeeping in Somalia in the wake of Resolution 751 would therefore come to constrain 
the scope of the debate on US policy towards Somalia. With the discursive ground already 
receptive to a potential humanitarian intervention in Somalia, as the summer of 1992 
unfolded, new world order motifs and support for humanitarian goals became more firmly 
entrenched and now linked to the increasing debate on instrumental policy options, setting 
the stage for the 14 August announcement of a humanitarian airlift by White House Press 
Secretary Marlin Fitzwater, the first step on the path towards US intervention in Somalia. 
                                               
36 Washington Post, “Sympathetic to Somalia”, Washington Post, 19 May 1992. 
37 It seems likely that these open statements of support for a more considered Africa policy were more than 
mere spin. On 15 June 1992, the US National Security Review (NSR) 30 called for an encompassing review 
of US policy towards Africa, making explicit mention of the need to develop policy to deal with civil war. 
White House, “American Policy Toward Africa in the 1990s”, NSR 30, 15 June 1992. 
38 See Appendix 1 for a chronology of events. Notable amongst these developments were Secretary of 
Defense Dick Cheney’s intimation to the press that the United States was considering sending combat troops 
to Bosnia; US Ambassador to Kenya Smith Hempstone’s 10 July “A Day in Hell” cable to Washington 
describing the desperate conditions on Kenya’s border with Somalia; New York Times Senior Correspondent 
Jane Perlez’s front page report on the appalling conditions prevailing in Somalia on 19 July (both 
Hempstone’s cable and Perlez’s report are said to have deeply affected Bush; see Western, Selling 
Intervention and War, 154; Natsios, cited in Strobel, Late Breaking Foreign Policy, 132); Senator Nancy 
Kassebaum’s testimony before the House Select Committee on Hunger; and UN Secretary-General Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali’s criticism of the Security Council for its over-attention to Bosnia at the expense of Somalia. 
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III. BABY STEPS: JULY 1992-AUGUST 1992 
A. Foreign Policy Role: What Kind of New World Order?  
By June of 1992, the dominance of the ‘new world order’ discourse in idiographic debate 
on US identity and foreign policy role had become well established. The neoconservative 
urgings of the Pentagon Paper had been, if not consigned to the dustbin, at least back to the 
drawing board. Indeed, it is startling the extent to which, by this point in the year, new 
world order motifs dominated the debate, a development that served to narrow the 
discursive terrain in other areas too; debates on other purposive, ethical and instrumental 
issues would now have to be conducted within the context of a supervening idiographic 
commitment to collective internationalism.  
As noted above, the US government entered the summer of 1992 under some attack for its 
(lack of) policy towards Somalia. Now it found its own ‘new world order’ discourse being 
mobilised against it on this basis. Newspaper reports of the time made arguments such as: 
“the United States must not abdicate global leadership to support humanitarian relief”;39 
“[m]any US legislators say the United States has a moral obligation to take the lead in the 
international movement to help Somalia”;40 and “[t]he world is not helpless, nor are 
Americans wholly indifferent. All that is missing is leadership.”41 The new world order 
discourse was now fully operationalised in support of a more activist foreign policy role in 
Somalia.42  
But the new world order language was most prominent in the two debates that took place 
in the Senate and the House on Bosnia and Somalia, respectively, on 10 August. Events in 
Bosnia had been pushing the policy debate. On 4 August 1992, a mortar attack in Sarajevo 
striking a funeral cortege for two slain orphans was captured on camera,43 and, shortly 
thereafter, on 6 August, the now famous ITN footage of emaciated Bosniaks being held in 
a Bosnian Serb detention centre was broadcast worldwide, eliciting shocked comparisons 
with the Holocaust. As a consequence of these shocks, a policy of armed intervention in 
Bosnia became a topic of open debate. On 6 August 1992, President Bush held a press 
                                               
39 Shiras, “Before Thousands Die in Southern Africa”, Washington Post, 3 July 1992. 
40 Rudavsky, “Bush, UN Face Pressure to Aid War-Torn Somalia”, Washington Post, 27 July 1992. 
41 New York Times, “The Scourging of Africa”, New York Times, 2 August 1992. 
42 For further examples, see also Washington Post, “Indifference and Somalia”; New York Times, “The Hell 
Called Somalia”, New York Times, 23 April 1992. 
43 Burns, “Shellfire Hits Sarajevo Funeral for Slain Children”, New York Times, 5 August 1992. 
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conference in Colorado Springs in which he revealed that he was preparing a resolution 
that would authorise the use of force to protect humanitarian relief in Bosnia if necessary.44 
Through 10 and 11 August, the Senate held extraordinary debate on authorisation for the 
use of military force in Bosnia. This debate was dominated by new world order motifs. 
Senator Alan Cranston (D-CA) set the tone for this debate: 
Mr. President, the world is groping toward a new world order, a new world civilization 
where we hope that international instrumentalities under the banner of the United Nations 
will be able to keep and enforce the peace on this Earth. We also seem to be groping toward 
a time when we recognize that the violent actions of leaders or groups in various countries 
that become genocide are of concern to the world and cannot be tolerated.45  
The need for US leadership in forging this new world order was also emphasised. Senator 
Joe Biden (D-DE), for example, called upon the United States to “exercise leadership in 
dealing with a situation which, in my view, if left unresponded to, will in fact set a pattern 
for the remainder of this century for a new world order that is not one in which any of us 
should look forward to participating”.46 
There was some challenge to this new world order discourse on the part of those espousing 
a particularist discourse, but this challenge was generally weak, and found itself couched in 
universalist undertones. Senator John McCain (R-AR) was one of the strongest advocates 
of non-intervention in Bosnia. But his idiographic approach was cautious. Listing a number 
of other trouble spots in which the United States might similarly be asked to become 
involved, McCain warned that the empathy felt when viewing these crises must be kept in 
perspective, cautioning: “[a]re we now going to really become the world’s policeman? … 
[W]e must not fall into the trap of taking the lead every time, in every contingency”.47 The 
‘world’s policeman’ motif, which had featured prominently in the Pentagon Paper, was 
also echoed by Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV), who, though he admitted that his 
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“heartstrings are torn, too”, asked his colleagues to bear in mind the potential cost, both 
human and financial, of such action.48 
Despite the strong particularist emphasis of the assessments of Senators Byrd and McCain, 
their statements also betray the extent to which the ‘new world order’ discourse had 
dominated the debate. There was an implicit acceptance underlying both statements that 
the United States should rightly be concerned with the suffering of others and might 
reasonably be expected to take the lead in a collective internationalist response. As such, 
opponents of the political programme the new world order discourse espoused were forced 
to fight the main battle on different terrain. Predominantly, this would take place within a 
resource-instrumental context, in which opponents of armed action in Bosnia and Somalia 
emphasised the cost of any potential action, but ceded the purposive and even idiographical 
higher ground to the universalist discourse. The sentiments of Senators McCain and Byrd 
were isolated examples of particularism in a discursive terrain dominated by universalism. 
Nor did they go unchallenged. 
As the Senate debated US policy in Bosnia, the House considered the same question in 
respect of Somalia, debating its concurrence to Senate Concurrent Resolution 132, which 
called for the deployment of UN security guards to protect relief convoys in Somalia, a 
proposition that was met with near unanimous consent on the floor. And, again, the debate 
focused on the United States’ responsibility to take the lead in devising solutions. 
Congressman Tony Hall (D-OH), for example, urged the United States “to take the moral 
leadership at the United Nations to make Somalia a top priority”.49 Similarly, Congressman 
Doug Bereuter (R-NE) argued that: “if we are to consider ourselves a moral and civilised 
international society, it is a mission that must be undertaken. Indeed, if the United Nations 
is ever to realise its true potential as a force for peace, it must not shy away from the tragic 
and difficult problems such as the one now occurring in Somalia”.50 
By this point, it is quite clear that the new world order discourse not only dominated the 
debate, it overshadowed every other perspective. The content of this identity was by now 
firmly established, and it faced little in the way of continuing contestation. America, it 
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seemed, had determined for itself that its identity was as the leader of a collective 
internationalist world community, based on values of solidarity and respect for human 
rights. In the context of Somalia and Bosnia, this therefore militated for US leadership in 
addressing the ongoing humanitarian crises in those countries. 
B. Interests: Targeted Humanitarianism 
As noted above, although the humanitarian discourse of the early part of 1992 was a 
powerful refrain, which established humanitarianism as a significant policy concern for the 
United States, it was also relatively undirected. As the summer of 1992 wore on, however, 
the humanitarian discourse began to constitute a subvenient discourse that emphasised the 
need for robust action in Somalia. As a fairly exemplary New York Times editorial put it: 
“Somalia’s agony underscores a more basic need: an effective, mobile UN peacemaking 
force, strong enough to quell the warlords”.51 
So too did Congress tie the humanitarian imperative in Somalia to the necessity for a 
policy response. In the House, Congressman John Edward Porter (R-IL) put it simply: 
“[t]he reports of mass starvation coming out of Somalia are absolutely abominable. If there 
is a dire emergency in need of addressing, Somalia is it.”52 And one of the strongest calls 
for a response to humanitarian suffering in Somalia came from Senator Nancy Kassebaum 
(R-KA), who, on returning from her visit to Somalia, introduced Senate Concurrent 
Resolution 132: 
Mr. President, an enormous human tragedy is unfolding in Somalia, a tragedy almost beyond 
the imagining of any American … It is, in the words of relief officials, ‘the single worst 
humanitarian crisis in the world’. Mr. President, I believe we have reached the point where 
action must be taken. … Hundreds of thousands of lives could be at stake.53 
Again, we see a searching to convey the extent of the crisis, a linkage to the need for action 
and a differentiation of the crisis in terms of its status as the ‘worst’ humanitarian crisis in 
the world. In the context of the political focus of the time, this meant differentiation from 
the crisis in Bosnia, an important theme in the debate on Somalia, which now began to be 
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voiced more explicitly. As Senator Paul Simon (D-IL) argued: “the tragic picture in Bosnia 
… tears at our hearts, as it should. … But, Mr. President, the world’s greatest humanitarian 
tragedy right now is unfolding without television lights, without the press attention, and 
that is in Somalia”.54 So too did the Washington Post make this distinction: “[t]o give some 
scale to the appalling African tragedy, while close to 6,000 deaths have occurred in Bosnia 
since the vote for independence in March, the Somalian death toll is running well into the 
tens of thousands”.55 
This process of linkage and differentiation was crucial in paving the path to intervention. 
By the summer of 1992, the idiographic and purposive debates highlighted above had set 
the general course for US policy. What remained was for the details of a particular policy 
to be identified and acted upon. The Bush administration was leaning towards action in 
either (or both) Bosnia or Somalia, but it was Somalia that became the ultimate focus, not 
simply because it was the ‘worst’ of the crises, but because this discourse resonated with 
debates on ethical and resource-instrumental grounds, which would serve to differentiate 
Somalia from Bosnia and make intervention in the former the more likely course of action. 
In particular, the idiographic commitment to universalism and the purposive differentiation 
of the Somalia crisis in terms of its status as the ‘worst’ humanitarian emergency 
supervened upon two related ethical and resource-instrumental questions: in ethical terms, 
was the idiographical claim to universalism consistent with a selective approach to 
intervention; and, in resource-instrumental terms, was one or other of the potential 
interventions likely to produce outcomes consistent with the United States’ universalist 
aims?  
C. Ethical Dilemmas: Consistent Universalism 
The issue of selectivity was raised at a crucial point in the policy cycle. Just as the potential 
for intervention in Bosnia seemed to be gaining ground, a number of policy actors began to 
criticise the United States for its over-attention to Bosnia at the expense of Somalia. The 
accusation of selectivity was one that would not sit well with a professed commitment to 
universalism, as, indeed, selectivity itself implies a form of particularism. This question 
was given extra emphasis and force when it was articulated by the UN Secretary-General. 
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On 24 July, Boutros-Ghali chastised the members of the Security Council for devoting 
undue attention to Bosnia while Somalia was ignored. “‘The war of the rich’, was how Mr. 
Boutros-Ghali said many Africans describe the conflict in Yugoslavia, arguing that the 
faces seen on television are well fed compared to the victims in Africa”.56 
Boutros-Ghali’s position resonated with and reinforced opinions that had been emerging 
for some time already.57 USAID Assistant Administrator Andrew Natsios, for example, 
had said only a few days earlier that he was “frustrated at the relative lack of attention the 
crisis gets, compared with the war in former Yugoslavia”.58 And a Washington Post 
editorial the previous week had noted: 
[T]he contrast between the US policy of helping the people of Sarajevo while ignoring the 
plight of Somalis. … Administration officials have contended the US policy toward Somalia 
is the same as for Yugoslavia … Events in Sarajevo put the lie to that excuse. If the two 
situations are the same, where are the UN troops securing the Mogadishu airport, and where 
are the C-130s ferrying food and medicine to the women and children of Somalia, not only in 
Mogadishu, but in the rest of the country?59 
The issue of selectivity thus largely followed a universalist direction, with the suffering of 
different peoples in different corners of the world being held to be equally worthy of 
attention. Nevertheless, there was some resistance in the form of particularist arguments. In 
debate on the Senate floor, for example, Senator Bob Dole (R-KA) took up where McCain 
and Byrd had left off, using the Pentagon Paper imagery of the ‘world’s policeman’ to 
warn of the dangers of reacting to every ethnic conflict that arises. Again, however, it was 
the potential costs that dominated Dole’s thoughts. Unable to posit a difference between 
Somalia and Bosnia, Dole’s argument warned that reacting to one conflict might therefore 
provide grounds for involvement in yet others.60 Such arguments largely conceded the 
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ethics of the situation, at least, to the universalist discourse: the commitment to 
universalism in the new world order discourse had effectively pre-structured the ethical 
ground towards the universal, consistency argument. Nevertheless, the particularist 
argument did have some resonance, especially when it began to fall back on an issue area 
(already implicit in Dole’s speech) where it was much more likely to hold its ground: the 
question of the risk to US servicemen and women from any potential intervention in 
Bosnia or Somalia.  
D. Instrumental Reasoning: A Balance of Probabilities 
1. Resource-Instrumental Reasoning: Fighting a Rich Man’s War on the Cheap 
As debate matured on the dangers of US troops being sucked into a ‘quagmire’ in Bosnia, 
it quickly became established belief that Somalia was the less costly affair, a belief that 
would come to be shared by the Bush administration. As Strobel observed: 
By August 1992, President Bush and his top aides had reached the unanimous conclusion 
that, to be meaningful, a US intervention in Bosnia would have to involve the deployment of 
hundreds of thousands of American troops on a mission that had no clear end point. That 
same year, images from Somalia were helping to break down resistance to a humanitarian-
relief mission that seemed to have relatively few costs and risks by contrast.61  
The potential cost, especially in human terms, remained a crucially important question that 
must be answered before intervention could take place. And in this issue area, at least, 
those espousing a particularist approach to the question were especially well-armed with 
symbolic imagery to support their contentions. For example, Senator Wallop warned of 
Bosnia: “[o]nce committed militarily, we will have an obligation to follow through. We 
will come limping home, as the Soviets did after Afghanistan, as America did after 
Vietnam.”62 Likewise, Senator Byrd chose Lebanon and the loss of US life there as his 
analogy, though to much the same effect.63  
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The risks attached to committing US ground troops to Bosnia constituted a concern that 
was shared throughout the policy community.64 Though the particularist discourse had lost 
ground to the universalist discourse in the idiographic, purposive and ethical domains, the 
crucial resource-instrumental issue of the potential loss of US lives was not conceded. 
Indeed, at least in regard to Bosnia, it was largely agreed that any use of US ground forces 
would come at a possibly unacceptably high cost and be unlikely to easily achieve its aims. 
However, the same was not true of Somalia, which was believed to be both potentially 
effective and actionable at a comparatively low cost, serving to further differentiate the 
latter crisis from the former, and making intervention in Somalia the increasingly likely 
policy choice.  
2. Strategic-Instrumental: Growing Belief in the Utility of UN Guards  
In the early part of 1992, the dominant strategic-instrumental approach to Somalia had 
been to advocate limited political intervention. However, as the summer of 1992 matured, 
a growing consensus began to emerge around the need for security in Somalia as the 
primary requirement. It had been clear for some time that Somalia was on the brink of one 
of the worst famines in modern history, and one which was compounded by war and 
disease, with banditry and looting of relief supplies manifesting as a serious impediment to 
the delivery of relief.  
But a condign analysis of the need for security did not automatically ensure a response. 
Though the prospect of a security force for Somalia was bolstered by the supportive 
idiographic, purposive and ethical discourses discussed above, a robust intervention was 
still far from being a priority for US policy. It was generally agreed that something should 
be done, but quite what was another matter. The resource-instrumental concern over the 
potential loss of life in any military intervention was a significant factor reducing the 
impetus towards such a course of action. This concern was reflected in the still 
considerable degree of hesitance regarding how exactly relief efforts should proceed in the 
face of the uncertain conditions on the ground. As the Secretary-General’s report of 22 
July noted: “[t]he complexity of the situation and the inherent dangers of working in 
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Somalia … pose enormous operational difficulties for the United Nations in establishing a 
large-scale and effective presence”. Nevertheless, it was argued, “the threat of mass 
starvation … and the potential renewal of hostilities” required “an immediate and 
comprehensive response”.65 
The need to do something about the situation in Somalia was juxtaposed against the 
difficulties of doing so. Nevertheless, the resource-instrumental concerns were 
counterbalanced by the idiographic and purposive demands for action. This is well 
reflected in Senate Concurrent Resolution 132 on the Civil Conflict in Somalia, which was 
offered by 31 Senators, around a third of that body’s membership. Kassebaum’s 
introduction of the Resolution noted the problem of security, the need for action and 
weighed the latter against the potential risk, which, in the final analysis, was deemed to be 
“a risk worth taking”.66 
The outcome of this tension between competing demands manifested itself in policy. 
Though the discourse did not yet militate for full military intervention by the United States, 
the case had nevertheless been made for increased relief efforts, coupled with steps to deal 
with insecurity. This latter step might be achieved through the deployment of a UN 
security presence. Long thought to have been opposed by the Bush administration, such an 
operation was now openly approved. In a press conference on 27 July, White House Press 
Secretary Marlin Fitzwater urged the UN to “move as quickly as possible to deploy an 
effective number of security guards to permit relief supplies to move into and within 
Somalia” and indicated the US government’s willingness to “contribute generously” to the 
funding of such an effort.67 And the US government followed through on its promise. 
When, on 12 August 1992, the UN announced that agreement on the deployment of the 
500-strong security force had been reached, the White House promptly offered a military 
airlift to get the UN guards to Somalia.68 And, the next day, the White House went one 
further, by announcing that it intended to commence its own emergency airlift operations 
to Somalia, table a new Security Council resolution authorising “additional measures” to 
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ensure the delivery of humanitarian relief and to convene a donor’s conference to improve 
the delivery of relief.69 
It has widely been noted, as alluded to in the introduction to this chapter, that the timing of 
this new Bush policy towards Somalia coincided with the Republican National 
Convention, to be held on 17 August. Thus, it has been suggested that the operation may 
have been calculated to give Bush a political boost in a difficult election. This implication 
may have some merit. However, what is most important from a theoretical point of view is 
the rationale behind the move. In forging a new and daring Somalia policy, Bush 
introduced the issue of foreign policy into an election that had been dominated, if not 
overwhelmed, by domestic issues. Making foreign policy an issue would serve to remind 
the American electorate of Bush’s expertise in that field, most notably exemplified by the 
hugely popular Gulf War success, the very foreign policy issue that gave birth to the ‘new 
world order’ discourse. By raising the issue of Somalia in this manner, Bush reminded the 
US electorate that this was his vision of US identity—that he was the new world 
president—and embarked upon a course that, as the preceding analysis has shown, 
resonated with a discourse that permeated the structural, dispositional and now intentional 
domains.  
The US government had now taken the first significant step towards intervention in 
Somalia. However, as the airlift commenced, this plan would quickly become exposed as 
an insufficient band-aid on a deep bleeding wound. The Bush administration’s decision to 
undertake the airlift made Somalia now a significant political issue back in the United 
States and effectively locked the United States in to a robust Somalia policy. And, as 
greater attention was directed towards the US operation in Somalia, its flaws were exposed 
and Somalis continued to die in their thousands. Thus, a new policy discourse emerged, 
which emphasised the ineffectiveness of the relief operation. The United States had now 
committed itself to saving Somalia, but its efforts were apparently ineffectual. It is in this 
context that the radical decision to send up to 30,000 US ground troops to Somalia, made 
on 4 December 1992, becomes more comprehensible. 
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IV. A CREDIBLE COMMITMENT: AUGUST-DECEMBER 1992 
By the late summer of 1992, idiographic and purposive debate on the Somalia issue was 
starting to tail off. Over the previous eight months of contestation, Americans had largely 
established a stable notion of the content of their identity and interests in Somalia. This 
discursive context had led to the 14 August decision to commence a military airlift of relief 
supplies. But, though a policy had now been enacted, it had been based on only limited 
instrumental debate. As the US airlift got off to a shaky start—and the ‘pull’ factor of a 
major US foreign policy initiative generated increased interest in the Somalia relief 
effort—a marked increase in instrumental questions regarding US–Somalia policy 
emerged. Firstly, the US airlift was widely and effectively critiqued for failing in its goals. 
And, secondly, the emerging consensus that the need for security in Somalia was at least as 
pressing as the need for food became cemented in the policy discourse, as armed gangs 
disrupted the delivery of humanitarian relief. It was these instrumental discourses that 
presaged the policy shift from a purely humanitarian intervention focused on the delivery 
of relief supplies, to an armed humanitarian intervention where US ground troops would 
ensure the effective delivery of relief supplies. And, supervening on the instrumental 
discourse were the implicit idiographic and purposive issues that, should the United States 
wish to establish itself as a leader of a new world order, it was necessary for that leadership 
to be credible. Thus, once committed to Somalia through the 14 August airlift decision, the 
United States needed to demonstrate its resolve to properly address the situation if it were 
to realise its identity through instrumental action. A retreat from Somalia in the face of the 
difficulties encountered would strike a discordant note with the overwhelmingly dominant 
discourse of the time.  
A. Resource-Instrumental: Effective Relief 
One of the most important factors influencing policy at this time was the media. After the 
first flush of enthusiasm (or, indeed, despair) regarding the notion that the media was 
capable of driving policy in the post-Cold War world, much influenced by the perception 
of media influence in the Somalia intervention, most analyses of the so-called ‘CNN 
effect’ have concluded that this influence has been overplayed. A number of studies have 
looked at the role of the media in regard to Somalia and concluded that media coverage 
followed, rather than precipitated policy action, the most obvious manifestation of this 
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being the huge jump in media coverage following the August 14 airlift announcement, in 
comparison to what had gone before.70 This suggests that policy was driven by factors 
other than media coverage, as, indeed, is the case argued here. However, this should not 
entail a simple dismissal of the role of the media in the policy process, as to do so is to 
ignore the massive leap in policy discourse that was required to move from a relatively 
low-cost intervention in the form of delivery of relief supplies, to a high cost military 
intervention involving a heavy commitment of US ground troops.71 The media was crucial 
in this process. Once a policy in Somalia had been enacted, intense media interest was 
quickly mobilised. And coverage largely focused on the failure of this policy in securing 
the ‘new world order’ goals it sought to achieve. Consequently, this critique generated a 
significantly heightened reflection on resource-instrumental and strategic-instrumental 
questions, which were now brought more closely into line with the supervening discourses 
on identity and interests: the material facts on the ground were given meaning by the 
ideational context within which they were interpreted. If the United States was unable to 
secure its stated interests in Somalia, it would be unable to reproduce its stated identity 
through foreign policy action. This rationale provided the crucial impetus for stronger 
action in the final phase of the decision-making process.  
Media coverage that emphasised the ineffectiveness of the US airlift was intense as the 
operation struggled to get off the ground or make any impact. Despite the fact that media 
attention at this time was primarily focused on the US presidential election,72 over 80 news 
articles appeared in the Washington Post and New York Times alone in this period that 
made reference to the flaws in the airlift, many of which had the issue of effectiveness as 
the main theme and many of which were front page news. The airlift faced a number of 
problems as it attempted to get off the ground, including delays, poor targeting of 
deliveries and, crucially, lack of provision (including security) for delivery of relief once it 
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hit Somalia.73 These issues, though they became increasingly apparent and, indeed, 
undeniable as the airlift progressed, had actually been well understood for some time. In 
late July, US experts had already come to the conclusion that the insecurity in Somalia 
would jeopardise any relief efforts: “United States disaster experts … said today that 
emergency airlifts proposed by the United Nations would not solve the problem of how to 
get food to tens of thousands of starving people … [and that] the major barrier to helping 
the hungry was the continuing fighting between rival clans”.74 Similarly, the lack of an 
effective security force capable of protecting relief supplies had been identified early on by 
US officials, who noted that the 500 Pakistani peacekeepers mandated by the Security 
Council to provide security to relief deliveries would be “insufficient to guard the food 
transported to areas outside the capital”.75 
As the US airlift got underway, however, these misgivings were further underscored by 
concrete evidence as specific problems arose. The first US relief flights into Somalia 
commenced on 28 August (around a week behind schedule). But it was quickly noted by 
the media that these flights targeted not the worst areas of suffering, but the safest.76 Relief 
agencies “accused the United States of wanting the publicity of staging a dramatic airlift 
without coordinating it with other relief efforts underway and without going to the most 
needy towns”.77 World Food Program Spokesman Paul Mitchell, when asked whether the 
US airlift was helping, replied “[i]s there any valued added? No.”78 And not nearly enough 
food was actually arriving in Somalia,79 a fact that caused Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) to 
comment that “an airlift is a sure sign of doing too little, too late. Our planes cannot begin 
to deliver anything like the 50,000 tons of food per month that is needed.”80  
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As the airlift progressed beyond these early missteps, it did indeed expand to other areas of 
Somalia and begin to move more food, but this did little to improve the perception of its 
ineffectiveness. Firstly, on expanding to more rural areas, it quickly became evident that 
“the country’s famine is far worse than previously believed and that current efforts, 
including an American airlift, are falling far short of what is needed to ease the crisis”.81 
But the greatest problem that the airlift faced was security. Andrew Natsios, now named 
Special Coordinator for Operation Provide Relief, noted early on in the relief effort that: 
“[t]he problem here is not resources or food. It is security. It is the clan war. It is the 
anarchy.”82 The issue of security for the delivery of relief supplies continued to plague the 
ongoing effort, as attacks on aid convoys, looting of aid stations and suspensions of the 
relief effort became daily fodder for the news media.83 Indeed, many came to believe that 
the very influx of food supplies in the context of insecurity and famine may have 
precipitated even more violence. The front page of the Washington Post carried a story that 
opened: “[s]hooting and looting incidents last week at airfields that were receiving 
emergency food supplies illustrated a stark reality about this famine-wracked country: the 
US-led emergency airlift may actually be worsening the problems of lawlessness and 
anarchy in Somalia”.84 
It had become increasingly clear that a relief effort without the support of a security force 
was both ineffective and even dangerous. The obvious prescription was a beefed up UN 
security presence in the country. The 500 Pakistani peacekeepers that the United States had 
offered to airlift to the country had by this time arrived, but “three weeks after the full 
complement of troops arrived they have not been deployed and remain doing little that is 
visible except fetching water supplies for themselves”.85 In the face of this disastrous 
display, on 28 October 1992, UN Special Envoy Mohamed Sahnoun resigned his post, 
citing his frustration with ‘UN bureaucracy’ and protesting against the UN’s insistence that 
he secure the consent of General Aideed before deploying the 500 Pakistani peacekeepers. 
The time had come, it seemed to many, for a more forceful approach to Somalia’s 
problems. 
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B. Strategic-Instrumental: Securing Relief 
The proposition of a peacekeeping force for Somalia had received relatively widespread, 
albeit fairly uncritical, support prior to the problems that emerged in respect of the US 
airlift. But, as these problems emerged, the calls for a muscular peacekeeping presence 
became significantly more vocal, as well as better supported by a robust analysis of 
conditions on the ground. This was reflected in the UNSG’s report of 24 August, which 
argued that: “[t]he critical problem facing the United Nations in its humanitarian activities 
in Somalia is how to ensure the security of relief supplies at all stages, namely delivery, 
storage and distribution. … For this, effective security and ground arrangements are a sine 
qua non”.86  
This analysis was shared by many US policy actors. On 20 August, the Washington Post 
had written that “[s]ome US officials are said to hope for a beefed-up United Nations 
peace-keeping force deployed throughout Somalia to protect food convoys”.87 In the 
Senate, Patrick Leahy argued that “UN troops, adequately armed and with orders to shoot 
back if fired upon, are the only hope, and they are long overdue”.88 And Congressman 
Eliot Engel urged “the President to communicate to the UN Security Council that the 
United States will consider participating in the deployment of armed UN guards to secure 
relief shipments [in Somalia]”.89 
This last quote is significant. Up until now, calls within the US policy community for a 
peacekeeping force for Somalia had been couched in generalities, espousing a US 
commitment to support, but not necessarily participate in, a UN peacekeeping force for 
Somalia. From October 1992, this began to change. The failure of the airlift had done more 
than highlight the need for a security presence in Somalia. It had also threatened the 
integrity of the United States’ emerging identity as the leader of a new world order. If this 
identity was to be preserved, the United States would be required to take action to realise it 
in the context of Somalia, its first major test since the Persian Gulf War. As a Washington 
Post editorial put it, “Desert Storm-type determination is warranted, and President Bush 
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should say so and act accordingly”.90 A New York Times editorial of 19 November 
similarly noted: “[a]dministration officials already admit they need a ‘shoot-to-feed’ 
policy. Now they should act on what many of them privately believe—our own forces 
must do the shooting, and, if the UN dawdles, go it alone.”91 The next day, the same paper 
argued: “[f]orce—military force—must be used to protect the relief effort from the gangs. 
… A few thousand well-armed troops with a clear mission could make all the difference in 
Somalia.”92 
As this consensus began to emerge more and more forcefully, the Bush administration 
swung into action. On 25 November, the State Department announced a US offer to airlift 
the remaining 3,000 authorised UN security forces to Somalia. However, these troops 
would never arrive, as the Bush administration would quickly up the ante. The next day, on 
26 November 1992, Lawrence Eagleburger was sent to the UN to offer that body an entire 
division of US troops (approximately 20,000) to protect humanitarian relief. After several 
days of debate, on 3 December 1992, the UN Security Council authorised such action 
under Resolution 794. And, on 4 December 1992, President Bush addressed the nation live 
on television and radio, confirming that the United States was now ready to commit a 
substantial force of ground troops to protect relief supplies in Somalia. It is worth quoting 
this address at some length: 
Every American has seen the shocking images from Somalia. The scope of suffering there is 
hard to imagine. … In concert with the United Nations, we sent in the US Air Force to help 
fly food to the towns. … But in the months since then, the security situation has grown 
worse. … In many cases, food from relief flights is being looted upon landing … It’s now 
clear that military support is necessary to ensure the safe delivery of the food Somalis need 
to survive. … [W]e also know that some crises in the world cannot be resolved without 
American involvement … Only the United States has the global reach to place a large 
security force on the ground in such a distant place quickly and efficiently and thus save 
thousands of innocents from death.93 
Bush’s speech touched upon—and indeed was the logical conclusion of—all of the major 
themes of the policy discourse discussed in this chapter. It spoke of the need for American 
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leadership in collective internationalism, of the US interest in human rights, of the 
problems faced by the airlift and of the need for military intervention. By December of 
1992, a discursive environment had emerged that demonstrated positive synergies between 
all of the idiographic, purposive, ethical and instrumental discourses, such that a policy of 
US intervention resonated with the demands of an emerging US identity. The elements of 
US identity discourse now formed a complex whole, which suggested that the realisation 
of that identity could only be achieved through the use of military force in Somalia. 
It has been argued that Bush, by now a lame duck president with only around a month left 
in office, chose to intervene in Somalia as a means of securing his legacy. Again, however, 
even if such should be the case, what is most important here is how and why such a move 
makes sense. If we accept that the intervention was a means of securing the president’s 
legacy, we must necessarily ask how this particular action may have done so. It did so by 
highlighting the president’s foreign policy portfolio, the centerpiece of the Bush 
presidency, from nuclear non-proliferation and improving relations with the Soviet Union, 
to the stance against aggression in the Persian Gulf. And fundamentally underlying this 
foreign policy persona was the conception of Bush as the new world president, the leader 
of a nation of collective internationalist values acting in solidarity with the rest of a 
changing world. Intervention in Somalia fundamentally resonated with such an identity, 
and cohered with Bush’s prior foreign policy successes, such that they together symbolised 
an indivisible whole, a legacy indeed. America had chosen to intervene in Somalia, not 
because of some ineluctable pull elicited by the immutable demands of fixed interests or 
through the whim of an individual president, but through a collective identity-driven 
process of policy formulation. Indeed, one of the reasons the Somalia case has generated so 
much interest is for the very reason that it was far from inevitable. No traditional foreign 
policy interests seemed to militate towards a US intervention in Somalia, but this was the 
policy that emerged. And it emerged because it was entirely consistent with a shared 
understanding of who and what America was, a country committed to the establishment of 
a new world order, based upon shared principles of collective internationalism and human 
rights and secured through credible American leadership.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
The foregoing analysis of US intervention in Somalia provides strong support for the 
theory outlined in the previous chapters. In the early part of 1992, two dominant 
discourses, demonstrating a distinct cleavage between universalist and particularist ethics 
of responsibility, provided the setting within which contestation over the content of US 
identity took place. The eventual dominance of the universalist discourse, supported as it 
was by a subvenient discourse on support for human rights, suggested the strong possibility 
of a significant US response to the crisis in Somalia. However, in the absence of any 
synergies with lower order discourses, especially on the resource-instrumental and 
strategic-instrumental planes, such action was slow to emerge. It required the self-
reinforcing critical junctures of July and August 1992 to alter the strategic environment 
and lock the United States into its path of engagement with Somalia as a means of realising 
its identity, such that military intervention became a significant possibility. The possibility 
of US military action in Bosnia and the corresponding criticism of the US attention to that 
crisis in contrast to Somalia served to focus the policy debate on those resource and 
strategic-instrumental questions more fully, but still a fundamental disjuncture remained 
between the idiographic and purposive imperatives and the instrumental concerns. It was 
crucially the perception of the failure of the US airlift that provided the opening for change 
that pulled those latter discourses into line with the now established supervening 
idiographic and purposive discourses. The resolution of all of the idiographic, purposive, 
ethical and instrumental discourses into a relationship of positive synergy provided the 
crucial linkage, establishing a causal complex through which a policy of military 
intervention became the primary means by which the United States could realise its stated 
identity. 
The foregoing analysis establishes the strength of the identity-based approach to the 
analysis of rationales for humanitarian intervention, the necessity for synergies between 
different levels of discourse, as well as the importance of sequentiality and critical 
junctures. However, in the chapters that follow, the theory faces sterner tests. In the 
following chapter on US non-intervention in Rwanda, we are faced with the question of 
why, faced with a very similar problem—an African civil war featuring appalling human 
suffering—the US government retreated so far and so fast from the possibility of American 
intervention to secure the rights of the victims and to defend its own values. However, 
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despite the difference in response to such a similar situation, the case study on Rwanda 
serves to further illustrate some of the strengths of the scientific realist approach, 
particularly the notion that social systems are ‘open systems’, which are “susceptible to 
external influences and internal, qualitative change and emergence”, and the utility of the 
morphogenetic approach to mapping such change.94 This notion serves to remind us that 
the constant conjunction approach to causality is problematic, as it fails to take into 
account the possibility of system change. Rather, the importance of contextual analysis of 
causal complexes is highlighted, calling attention to the contingency of causal outcomes, 
without jeopardising the integrity of causal analysis itself.  
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Chapter 6 
Travelling Without a Map: US Non-intervention in 
Rwanda in 1994 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The US non-intervention in Rwanda in 1994 provides a crucial test case for the theory 
outlined in the first half of this thesis. Empirically very similar to the Somalia case study, 
in that it involved a civil war in an African nation featuring massive human suffering 
among a civilian population, the Rwandan case nevertheless drew a strikingly different 
approach from within the US policy community.  
The scale, the speed and the brutality with which the carnage in Rwanda unfolded has 
rightly generated serious and focused attention to the crisis that engulfed the small African 
nation in the space of a few short months in 1994. The primary focus of academic attention 
has been on those aspects that seem least comprehensible to those not directly involved in 
the proceedings. Firstly, much research has been devoted to the roots of the genocide itself, 
the ideology, motivations and political organisation behind one of the most horrific events 
of the already bloody twentieth century.1 Secondly, commentators have also sought to 
understand how, in the face of such a violation of all norms of civilised behaviour, the 
international community felt able to simply step aside and allow the violence to proceed 
unhindered.2 It is this latter question that has most relevance to the research being 
undertaken here. 
Unsurprisingly, accounts that focus on the international community’s response to the 
genocide in Rwanda have tended to do so from the standpoint of morality. In hindsight, the 
tepid response of the international community to one of the most horrific genocides in 
history seems all but incomprehensible without focusing on the evasion of moral 
responsibility that such behaviour suggests. Later claims by politicians that they ‘did not 
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know’ the extent of the crisis have been roundly debunked,3 as have notions that there was 
minimal media coverage or interest in the Rwandan situation.4 As such, many came to the 
conclusion that members of the international community simply ‘did not care’ enough 
about Rwanda or its people to ‘do something’ about it.5 Whether focused on the UN and its 
Secretariat, the UN Security Council and its leading members or other more peripheral 
players such as the world media, most analyses have followed a common form: to identify 
relevant actors who may have had a moral responsibility towards the Rwandan people and 
to identify the ways in which this responsibility was, if not rejected, at least disregarded. 
There is much that is both important and valid in such approaches. The lack of response to 
the Rwandan genocide cannot indeed be understood outside of this context. However, the 
identification of a culture of apathy leaves as many questions unanswered as it answers. As 
was identified in the previous chapter on Somalia, the international community and its 
members may indeed sometimes be moved to act—and act forcefully and courageously—
on the basis of moral imperatives. Why then was there a culture of apathy towards Rwanda 
but not Somalia? Arguments based on morality alone can only provide a small part of the 
answer.  
The following analysis provides an explanation based on the shift in US identity between 
1992 and 1994, which accounts for the differences in approaches between Somalia and 
Rwanda. There is considerable support for the notion of a lack of empathy in discussions 
of the suffering of the Rwandan people, which is partly explained by humanitarian fatigue, 
but perhaps more importantly by a perception that little could be done about the situation, 
itself vested in an idiographic climate that stressed the dangers of well-meaning but 
inappropriate action. The problem was not a lack of empathy as such, but a fundamental 
discordance between the empathy observers felt and their analysis of the prospects for 
ending the suffering. This problem was compounded by a basic lack of sophisticated 
knowledge about Rwanda itself and the dimensions of the crisis unfolding there, as well as 
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a lack of attention to the potential for further violence prior to the outbreak of genocide in 
April 1994. Ultimately, however, it was the idiographic environment within which debate 
on Rwanda took place that determined the course of events more than any other factor. 
Indeed, it was identity that set the tone for all other considerations. 
The following analysis is divided into three sections, reflecting different phases in the 
decision-making process. The first period covers January to April 1994, in which a small 
peacekeeping force was sent to Rwanda to monitor a cease-fire between warring factions, a 
period which generated very little outside attention. The second period covers April to May 
1994, the first month of the genocide, and deals with the immediate reactions of the 
international community to the shocking carnage that ensued. The final period deals with 
May to July 1994, as the world community increasingly came to grips with the facts of 
what was happening in Rwanda, but not with what to do about it. 
II. SETTING THE STAGE: JANUARY–APRIL 1994 
A. Foreign Policy Role: A Rudderless Ship 
By 1994, the collective internationalism that had propelled the United States towards 
intervention in Somalia had fallen into abject disrepute. This shift in the idiographic 
discourse was not simply the policy shift that attended upon a new presidency—indeed, for 
many, President Bill Clinton was a far more wholehearted partisan of collective 
internationalism than his predecessor had been—but was a reaction to the policies enacted 
in the name of collective internationalism. In particular, the debacles in which 18 US 
servicemen lost their lives in Mogadishu on 3 October 1993, followed shortly by the 
embarrassing about-face of the USS Harlan County as it approached Port-au-Prince on 11 
October 1993, quickly became symbolic of the failures of collective internationalism (see 
Chapter 7 for further discussion). As US involvement in Somalia had deepened throughout 
1993, while public interest had waned, the visceral imagery broadcast on CNN of dead US 
soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu shocked the nation. So too did the 
image of the world’s foremost military superpower retreating in the face of an angry mob 
wielding clubs on the docks of Port-au-Prince a few days later. Naturally, Americans 
looked for someone to blame. 
The obvious place for the buck to stop was on the desk of President William Jefferson 
Clinton. But the buck did not stop there. Also blamed were the UN and, less directly but no 
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less effectively, the United States’ commitment to collective internationalism. In stark 
contrast to the period considered in the run-up to the Somalia intervention, by early 1994 
references to collective internationalism as the driving force behind US foreign policy were 
virtually entirely absent. Collective internationalism had not so much been eclipsed by the 
persuasiveness of an alternative policy paradigm, but discredited as a direct consequence 
of the foreign policy actions enacted under its name. Here was a very clear example of the 
dynamic morphogenetic agency–structure relationship at work. The dominance of a 
collective internationalist identity at the structural level was what had driven the United 
States towards intervention in Somalia, but the effects of that foreign policy action at the 
level of agency had in turn transformed the structural domain, rendering it inhospitable to 
notions of collective internationalism (see Figure 2, Chapter 4 for an illustration of this 
dynamic).  
However, consequently, there was no new pre-formulated idiographic discourse to replace 
the old. Indeed, in the early part of 1992, it is difficult to point to any coherent idiographic 
policy programme emanating from the US policy establishment. What was left was 
negative criticism. Media coverage described Clinton’s foreign policy performance at the 
end of his first year in terms such as: “inept to disgraceful”;6 “an almost Reaganesque 
display of cluelessness”;7 “naïve paternalism”;8 “speaking loudly and carrying a small 
stick”;9 and “muddling through”.10 Nor was this criticism simply the work of his political 
opponents. As the Washington Post noted: “Clinton may not have won full bipartisan 
support for his foreign policy, but he is drawing bipartisan criticism”.11 Only a very few 
politicians were prepared to defend Clinton’s foreign policy, but these advocates were 
given little enough to work with. Clinton’s own mode of defence of his policy record was 
to focus on the (mainly domestic) successes in his first year of office, such as cutting the 
budget deficit, enacting the Brady Bill (on gun control), tax cuts for small businesses, etc. 
The only major foreign policy success to receive sustained attention was the establishment 
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of the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and improvements in world trade.12 
Certainly, among the items listed are some that could be considered to be great successes 
for a freshman president. However, what this tactic fundamentally failed to convey was 
any sense of direction to or leadership of US foreign policy, leaving the field wide open to 
his critics. 
The lack of any clear direction to US foreign policy was glaring. While it was recognised 
that “[t]he country is hardly at the stage of a great debate over foreign policy”,13 the 
administration was nevertheless still forced to admit that it was still “trying to think of 
what our bumper sticker would be about”.14 Clinton was “yet to encourage the kind of 
public debate about America’s place in the world beyond the Cold War that is needed if a 
new American consensus is to be found”.15 All that was left to fill this vacuum was the 
voice of his critics, giving the sense that Clinton was simply “feeling his way between the 
public’s isolationist and internationalist tendencies” (a point that had some merit; see 
Chapter 7).16 
The tone of this discourse critiquing Clinton’s performance was undeniably particularist, as 
attention focused primarily on the lack of forceful leadership in US foreign policy;17 and 
the lack of credibility inherent in a presidency that seemed to reverse its policy at the 
slightest hint of opposition.18 And, though the policy failure du jour varied as a focal point 
for criticisms—from most-favoured nation principle for China, North Korean nuclear 
ambitions, or Russia policy and the expansion of NATO—the examples of Somalia, Haiti 
and Bosnia remained constants, which were earnestly raised up as straw men at every 
available opportunity.19 This meant that one of the strongest elements of the critique of the 
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Clinton’s administration’s foreign policy was directed at peacekeeping policy, which, it 
was argued, was too expensive and too inefficient. Moreover, Clinton became widely 
criticised for ‘subcontracting’ his foreign policy to the UN, an idea that gelled well with 
the concept of a lack of leadership in the US presidency. As Senator Bob Dole (R-KA) 
argued: “[t]he problem in Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti was not the unilateral pursuit of 
United States national interests. Each of these foreign policy blunders was the result of the 
administration deferring to or depending on the United Nations to define US policy”.20 
While many commentators have pointed out the fundamental inaccuracy of the rhetoric 
that blamed the UN for the failure in Somalia—the US servicemen that died on that day in 
October 1993 were operating under US command and control on a mission devised by the 
United States regarding which the UN had never been informed—the culture of skepticism 
towards the UN that emerged in US idiographic discourse in late 1993 and early 1994 was 
generally based on a much more condign analysis than this. The experiment in conflict 
resolution and nation-building that had taken place in Somalia had indeed failed in certain 
important respects. Most important among these were the lessons that the UN itself was 
poorly equipped to separate warring factions and that UN intervention in such 
circumstances risked the UN simply becoming a party to the conflict with the inevitable 
dangers to its personnel that this posed. For the UN, this merited a retreat from exuberant 
hopes for humanitarian intervention towards a reconciliation with the tenets of traditional 
peacekeeping—in particular, that the UN should only keep the peace when there was 
indeed a peace to keep. The second, related lesson to be learned from Somalia was that 
only a significant military power was capable of coercing a peace between warring 
factions, but that this process too ran the risk of incurring casualties, and few nations 
would be able to sustain an intervention in which their national interests were not directly 
affected in the face of such losses. For the United States, therefore—and, indeed, for most 
other similarly placed nations—this merited a retreat from universalism towards a more 
particular approach to engagement. As Congresswoman Constance Morella (R-MD) 
argued: “[w]e cannot continue to pursue foreign policies which have no merit or virtue and 
which put American men and women in harm’s way for purposes which do not serve any 
national policy”.21 The international community would have to pick and choose where 
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engagement might have positive outcomes and act accordingly, lest the prospects for the 
entire system be undermined. This hesitance regarding the efficacy of intervention would 
resonate throughout the debate on Rwanda and significantly colour the policy actors’ 
perspectives. And, crucially, it both generated and sustained a particularist idiography. 
Though the content of US identity in early 1994 was hardly well articulated, there was 
little in the way of contestation concerning the general drift towards particularism. As 
such, America entered 1994 with a strongly particularist idiographic discourse that stressed 
the importance of forceful leadership in American foreign policy, the pursuit of particular 
US national interests, and a lack of confidence in the UN in general, and UN peacekeeping 
in particular. Equally, America entered 1994 with a president under fire for a lack of 
credibility in his foreign policy. As the New York Times put it: “[a]ssessments of the 
Clinton Presidency inevitably come down to one issue: can he be trusted?”22 In short, 
Clinton was being asked to enunciate his principles, and then stick to them. As 1994 
progressed, the president would formulate a policy programme that resonated with the 
prevalent particularist identity discourse and, in demonstrating his resolve to adhere to 
those principles, firmly drew the country back from any kind of engagement with the crisis 
in Rwanda. As the theory developed earlier in this thesis suggests, the strength of this 
nationalist identity was a key factor determining the ultimate response to the Rwandan 
crisis—non-intervention. 
B. Interests: or Lack Thereof 
In retreat from the collective internationalism of the new world order era, in early 1994 
Americans felt that their nation’s foreign policy should be focused on the big issues—those 
that directly affected America’s national interests and national security. These concerns 
were reflected in administration policy. As the New York Times observed: “the 
administration’s strategy, announced by Mr. Christopher in November, [is] to focus on big 
issues such as Russian reform and Middle East peacemaking and to treat crises in Bosnia, 
Somalia and Haiti as bothersome regional issues with little or no importance for America's 
national interests”.23 
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Indeed, in the general atmosphere of anti-UN feeling, the United States was not only 
uninterested in such matters but was openly hostile to them. Peacekeeping, it was argued, 
was fast ballooning to an unmanageable scale, with new missions regularly being voted for 
in faraway countries, with little concern for the cost involved, or the effectiveness of the 
policy. This criticism manifested in the proposed Peace Powers Act, which sought to limit 
the executive’s ability to unilaterally tie the United States into peacekeeping commitments 
and was premised on a scathing critique of UN peacekeeping. UN peacekeeping, it was 
argued, “has become an exploding international entitlement program—with some 20 
operations currently underway”. With “peacekeeping costs and deployments 
mushrooming, peacekeeping environments increasingly dangerous and hostile, and this 
administration’s increasing reliance on the United Nations for policy direction … the 
United Nations should be put on notice that the United States will not continue to pay an 
ever-escalating assessed contribution for UN peacekeeping”.24 
This message was received loud and clear within the Clinton administration. Secretary of 
State Warren Christopher, speaking on the eve of a UN General Assembly meeting, heeled 
to the prevailing winds: “[m]ultilateral action is in order only when it serves the central 
purpose of American foreign policy—to protect America’s interests”.25 US national 
interests had become the necessary touchstone for participation in UN peacekeeping and 
morality had no place in such a decision. Robert Kaplan summed up the general mood: 
“[i]n a world of parish-pump genocides, morality cannot, by itself, provide a key to 
intervention. Only when morality intersects with obvious economic and strategic interests 
does a policy begin to emerge. Morality does not intersect with our economic and strategic 
interests anywhere in Africa”.26 
In respect of Rwanda, this direction to US foreign policy held out little hope for any 
serious engagement, as, in Rwanda, a small, faraway country of which most Americans 
knew very little, an expensive new peacekeeping operation was underway, and no US 
national interest could be said to be involved. Beyond these simple facts, the dominant 
characterisation of the situation in Rwanda in the early part of 1994 was of a relatively 
stable situation moving towards resolution, hardly the kind of depiction likely to generate 
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further interest or attention. In the Security Council, the consensus was that: “recent events 
in Rwanda regarding the implementation of the peace process are encouraging. The cease-
fire has indeed been respected; the parties have cooperated with each other and with the 
United Nations for the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement”.27 The conflict, 
most agreed, was “nearing a settlement”.28 The United States, for its part, remained almost 
entirely silent on the Rwanda question up until April 1994. If it disagreed with these 
assessments, it certainly did nothing to dispel the overall sense.29 Quite why this strange 
silence on the real conditions obtaining in Rwanda persisted is a point worthy of 
consideration. The later explanation was that the intelligence these policy actors had on 
Rwanda was relatively poor,30 but declassified intelligence from both the UN and the 
United States paints a different picture. 
The most famous example is the code cable sent to UN headquarters by UNAMIR Force 
Commander Major-General Romeo Dallaire on 11 January 1994. The cable described a 
meeting with a confidential informant who was involved in training Interhamwe militia. 
The informant described deliberate attempts to destabilise the peace process and provoke 
further civil war. He also told Dallaire that he had been ordered to register all Tutsi in 
Kigali: “he suspects it is for their extermination. Example he gave was that in 20 minutes 
his personnel could kill up to 1,000 Tutsi”. Finally, he described the existence of major 
arms caches for distribution to members of the militia, many of which had already been 
disbursed. Though Dallaire recommended taking action on the basis of this intelligence, 
headquarters refused his request.31  
This example provides clear evidence that there was some early warning of the genocide to 
come, which was at odds with the characterisation of the situation as stable and moving 
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towards full resolution. Though it was later revealed that this intelligence was not shared 
with members of the Security Council,32 a glance at the declassified US record shows that 
the US government was aware of similar developments. A February 1994 assessment of 
the Rwandan military by the American Embassy in Kigali noted that: “ethnic prejudices on 
both sides persist … some senior officers still see their destiny tied to the president and his 
party, many have noisy skeletons in their closets and fear prosecution for past corruption 
and incompetence with the RPF joining their ranks”.33 The Rwandan military, it was 
believed, could respond in three ways: it might “adjust to and accept its new role”; there 
might be “a mutiny among lower-level officers”; or there might even be “a coup either by 
those in support of the president” or by those “frustrated with the political impasse”.34 Of 
equally great concern, in a meeting with Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Prudence Bushnell expressed her “deep 
concern over the mounting violence in Rwanda”. Accompanying her was Director of the 
State Department’s Office of Central African Affairs Arlene Render, who revealed to 
Habyarimana that the United States was aware of the “the distribution of arms and arms 
caches” to the civilian population, which posed a “dangerous challenge to peace”.35  
But little was said about these concerns in public. Only very late, as the genocide was 
about to commence, was much concern publicly expressed for the peace process in 
Rwanda. In his Progress Report of 30 March 1994, the UN Secretary-General noted that 
“the period under review has seen a rapid and dramatic deterioration in the security 
situation in Kigali”, and expressed “serious concern about increasing reports of the 
distribution of weapons to civilians”. However, in the same report, these worrying trends 
were softened by the observation that “despite the increased tensions and insecurity 
engendered by the political impasse described above, the cease-fire generally appeared to 
hold in the period under review”.36 For its part, speaking for the first time on Rwanda in 
the Security Council, the United States expressed its concerns over the “continuing delays 
in installing the transitional institutions”. Nevertheless, it observed, “the parties in Rwanda 
are very close to reaching agreement”.37 
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36 UN Secretary-General, “Second Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Assistance Mission for Rwanda”, Report of the Secretary-General, S/1994/360, 30 March 1994. 
37 UN Security Council, “Provisional Verbatim Record”, 5 April 1994. 
 138 
Why then did both the UN and the United States, despite the evidence they held to the 
contrary, play down the problems facing Rwanda? It seems most likely that the 
characterisation of the situation as stable was a symptom of the primary idiographic and 
purposive concerns driving the two parties. For the UN, struggling to maintain its 
reputation in the face of setbacks in Somalia and Haiti, among others, it was keen to avoid 
any further blows to its prestige and so accentuated the positives. For the United States, 
trying to chart a policy towards UN peacekeeping in a climate of overwhelming skepticism 
towards that very process, it was eager to downplay the need for any major increase in 
resources for the UNAMIR mission, from which it was already pulling back. Though on 
the basis of the evidence so far presented, these assertions remain somewhat conjectural, 
they are well borne out by the actions of the parties as the crisis deepened. More 
importantly, however, they framed the early debate (such as it was) in important ways, 
which emphasised the overriding interest in a cost-effective and viable process, regarding 
which failure was worse than inaction. Before the outbreak of serious violence in Rwanda 
had even begun, the United States was pulling back from any serious commitment, and the 
UN was on the defensive. 
C. Instrumental Action: Conditional Costing 
1. Resource Instrumental: Cutting Costs 
These idiographic and purposive discourses supervened upon a resource-instrumental 
concern with cutting costs, which was by now firmly embedded (see Chapter 7 for more 
discussion). An October 1993 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) had noted the increased 
strain being put on the international relief system by the swelling tide of ethnic conflicts 
and warned that “‘donor fatigue’ will lead to more selective responses to disaster 
situations”.38 In the same month, the US Ambassador in Kigali had bluntly told the RPF 
that, though no one was opposed to the idea of a peacekeeping force for Rwanda, the UN 
was already overextended and enthusiasm was weak: “[t]he UN and its member states just 
have other preoccupations these days”.39 A similar message was passed on to President 
Habyarimana by Secretary of State Warren Christopher, who stressed the “financial 
constraints” the United States would have to work within in its involvement with 
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Rwanda.40 As time passed, these concerns deepened. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
Bushnell likewise told Habyarimana that Rwanda was in danger of losing all international 
assistance if the crisis continued to drag on.41 Unconvinced that the Rwanda peace process 
was a cost-effective exercise, the United States expressed even deeper concern in private. 
By March 1994, what small support may have existed for the Rwandan peace process had 
withered to nothing. As Bushnell confided: 
The Security Council meeting which would decide whether to continue peacekeeping efforts 
in Rwanda was coming up fast … Next week she would meet with the interagency group 
that would decide the US position at the Security Council. Last summer she had to work very 
hard to convince skeptics that peacekeeping could work in Rwanda. Now she had absolutely 
nothing to bring to the table to override such skepticism.42 
2. Strategic Action: Conditional Support 
With little impelling the United States to take a greater interest in Rwanda, and little belief 
in the efficacy of UN peacekeeping there, the urge was to pull back. When the United 
States finally did take action on Rwanda in the Security Council, it was to push for the 
renewal of UNAMIR’s mandate only on a conditional basis, with another review of 
progress within six weeks, a highly unorthodox measure.43 
As in Somalia two years earlier, it was the United States that was seen as the driver behind 
this unconventional step back from full commitment to UNAMIR. However, it was a 
measure of the current particularist climate in US politics that, unlike the reaction to the 
Somalia pull-back in May 1992, there was no criticism of this move; indeed, there was 
virtually no attention paid to it whatsoever. 
III. THE GENOCIDE BEGINS: APRIL–MAY 1994 
A. Interests: The Pitfalls of Humanitarianism 
The high profile downing of the plane carrying Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana 
and Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira on the evening of 6 April 1994, and the 
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accompanying violence that followed it in Rwanda, pushed the Rwandan crisis—
previously of little interest to the outside world—to the forefront of international attention. 
A simple numerical comparison provides ample evidence of the sea change that took place 
in terms of the attention given to the Rwanda crisis. Between 1 January and 6 April 1994, 
the day of the plane crash, only seven articles had appeared in the Washington Post or New 
York Times that mentioned Rwanda, of which only three dealt with Rwanda as the primary 
issue. Suddenly, five new articles appeared on 7 April, with a further three appearing on 8 
April, eclipsing the sum total for three months in just two days. Rather than tailing off as 
the shock of this high-profile incident died down, this incident grabbed attention, which 
remained focused on the problems of Rwanda beyond the immediate story. A further 88 
articles on Rwanda appeared in the two newspapers during the remainder of April, an 
average of more than four per day. Thus, the rocket attack on the plane carrying 
Habyarimana and Ntaryamira provides a clear example of the kind of shock that can alter 
the course of a causal chain.  
The upsurge in violence that wracked Rwanda from 7 April onwards suggested the 
potential for a corresponding concern for humanitarian issues, but, though the 
humanitarian consequences of the violence were clearly acknowledged, in the early stages 
of the crisis they received little emphasis.44 The initial reaction of Western politicians to 
the increase in violence was to exhibit concern for the safety of their own nationals in 
Rwanda as much, if not more, than for the people of Rwanda. Indeed, the earliest high 
level policy statements concerning Rwanda expressed consternation at the assassinations, 
followed by concern for foreign nationals. On 7 April, the morning after the plane crash, 
President Clinton expressed his dismay over the assassination of Habyarimana and 
Ntaryamira, and condemned the murder of other Rwandan officials by security forces.45 
The following day in remarks to the press, the president mentioned the subject in an aside, 
informing the press that he had held discussions with the Secretary of State, Secretary of 
Defense and National Security Advisor on Rwanda, but stressing that “I want to mention it 
only because there are a sizable number of Americans there and it is a very tense situation 
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… we are doing everything we possibly can to be on top of the situation to take all 
appropriate steps to try to assure the safety of our citizens there”.46  
Indeed, the first action to be taken by Western governments was to evacuate their nationals 
under military escort, a task that was accomplished within days.47 Once this early mini-
crisis was dealt with, attention returned to Rwanda itself, but, in contrast to the empathetic 
treatment of human rights concerns in relation to Somalia in 1992, the treatment of 
humanitarian concerns in Rwanda followed a different course. In short, rather than 
emerging as an interest to be pursued, humanitarianism played out as a pitfall to be 
avoided, as the prevailing ideas in the structural domain gave meaning to the material facts, 
causing them to be interpreted in a specific light.  
In terms of media coverage, though regular (indeed, heavy) reporting emerged from 
Rwanda, the portrayal of the violence did not focus on the massacres taking place as much 
as on other aspects, such as the civil war or the ensuing refugee crisis. And, when 
massacres were reported upon, they generally emerged in characterisations that 
deemphasised the need for or responsibility to respond. For example, on 8 April, both the 
New York Times and Washington Post reported on the violence on their front pages, but 
the headlines setting the tone for the articles described the events as a ‘rampage’, evoking 
an image of senseless and terrible, though likely short-lived, violence.48 The representation 
of the massacres as a rampage remained a common theme throughout most early analyses 
of the violence in Rwanda.49 It also corresponded with the interim government of 
Rwanda’s argument that the violence was “a spontaneous reaction by the population”.50 
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More importantly, however, this characterisation deemphasised the need to respond, as this 
spontaneous rampage would likely blow itself out on its own soon enough. 
A similar theme that emerged within the media in the early days of the violence 
emphasised the ‘tribal’ nature of the violence, and the unleashing of ‘ancient ethnic 
hatreds’, a characterisation that likewise deemphasised the need for a response, especially 
as it tied in well with an ethical debate on anarchy that rejected any responsibility to 
respond (see below). Reporters repeatedly returned to this motif, describing the violence 
as: “tribal carnage”;51 “a tribal bloodbath”;52 “a centuries-old tribal hatred that erupted”;53 
“rampaging troops and gunmen looking to settle old tribal scores”;54 “ethnic warfare and 
reprisal killings”;55 “self-inflicted internecine horror”,56 etc.57 The effect of this imagery 
was to suggest that the violence was therefore somehow natural, the instinctive response of 
primitive peoples, and therefore difficult to check. Linking the idea of this primordial tribal 
violence to the concept of a rampage was the repeated use of imagery suggesting that this 
outbreak of violence was “only the latest convulsion in decades of ethnic warfare”,58 an 
apparently organic occurrence in the dark heart of Africa.59 In addition to linking the 
concepts of tribal violence and rampages, the idea of a convulsion implied an involuntary 
element to the violence; that it was a reflex symptom of the deeply ingrained ethnic hatreds 
that were native to the tribal populations of Rwanda. Such a characterisation again 
deemphasised the suitability of Western intervention, as they would not only need to tame 
‘machete-wielding youths’, but would need to curb the natural instincts inherent to all 
Rwandans.  
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There was some opposition to this mode of analysis. In the House, Congressman Edolphus 
Towns (D-NY) argued that “it is important that we not typify this as a tribal conflict, 
because it is in fact a political conflict among principals who happen to be from different 
tribes”.60 Likewise, Alison DesForges of Human Rights Watch criticised the mainstream 
coverage: “[a]s the piles of bodies mount in Rwanda, commentators are pulling out their 
generic analyses of violence in Africa: anarchy and/or tribal conflict”.61 But the very 
construction of these critiques only emphasises the extent to which the depiction of tribal 
violence had come to dominate discussions of Rwanda, with the effect that, at least at this 
stage, little interest was expressed in protecting the human rights of Rwandans. 
Finally, media coverage also tended to treat the massacres simply as a byproduct of the 
civil war, which needed to be resolved if the killing was to be halted: a far sterner task than 
simply protecting civilians from poorly armed militias and one which, most believed in the 
prevailing idiographic environment following Somalia, was beyond the capabilities of the 
UN and its members (many also implied the potential for a quick victory by the RPF, 
further reducing the impetus for outside action).62 The focus on the civil war was mirrored 
within the UN, which focused almost exclusively on this aspect. As Linda Melvern reports 
from interviews with participants, the Secretariat briefings given in private to Security 
Council members were fixated upon the re-ignition of the civil war and the need to 
establish a cease-fire.63 This tendency was also reflected in both the Secretary-General’s 
reports and in Security Council pronouncements. Though massacres were mentioned in 
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these venues, it was generally only in passing. For example, though the Secretary-
General’s report of 20 April noted that the assassination of Habyarimana had “set off a 
torrent of widespread killings”, the “most urgent task” remained “the effort to secure a 
cease-fire through contacts with representatives of the armed forces and RPF”.64 It was not 
until very late on (indeed, until after the bulk of UNAMIR had withdrawn from Rwanda) 
that massacres were mentioned with any seriousness. Even then, however, the UN 
hesitated to call the violence genocide.65 
In private, however, the US government’s analysis of the situation in Rwanda was far more 
troubling than anything found in media or UN reports. On 6 April, the day of the plane 
crash, the US Department of State already believed that: “there is a strong likelihood that 
widespread violence could break out in either or both countries, particularly if it is 
confirmed that the plane was shot down”.66 A few days later, the Department of Defense 
noted its belief that “a massive (hundreds of thousands of deaths) bloodbath will ensue”.67 
These assessments gelled with the information the US government had coming in from 
Rwanda. On 21 April, Monique Mujaramawiya, a Rwandan human rights activist who had 
been previously honoured by President Clinton at the White House, wrote to the president 
saying: “[a]lthough the situation in Rwanda now seems like anarchy, it is only a small 
group of extremists around the late President Habyarimana who have planned and 
intensified the massacres. … Their campaign is genocide against the Tutsis.”68 Likewise, 
the RPF in an open, though largely unremarked upon, letter argued that “the manner and 
scale of the massacres clearly leave no doubt whatsoever that the atrocities which have 
been committed amount to genocide”.69 Meanwhile, the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC), which spoke up on Rwanda in a manner unprecedented in its history, 
had reported on the scale of the killing. 
The ICRC delegate for Africa is certain at least 100,000 Rwandans have been killed since 
April 6, believes the actual number is closer to 300,000, and notes ICRC personnel in 
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country think the toll could be 500,000, according to Mission Geneva. The ICRC is 
concerned that the situation could worsen, citing some Hutu extremists who speak of a ‘final 
solution’ to eliminate all Tutsis.70 
This information appeared in a classified Department of State document entitled “Rwanda; 
Genocide and Partition” and contained the comment “the butchery shows no sign of 
ending”.71 Though it was yet to explicitly call the violence ‘genocide’ even in private, the 
US government had already noted its belief that the violence was ethnically motivated, its 
understanding of the scale of the killing and would also demonstrate its belief that the 
killing was being organised at the highest levels, an important component of the definition 
of genocide.72 Indeed, it was not afraid to say so to the perpetrators themselves: 
Ambassador Rawson strongly disagreed with [Rwandan Ambassador] Uwimana’s claim that 
the killing was spontaneous and could not be stopped. He emphasized to Uwimana that the 
population is being ordered to kill by high-level officials in Rwanda and that these same high 
officials must immediately order the people to stop killing.73 
These analyses were at odds with the prevailing sense being expressed elsewhere that the 
massacres were connected with the civil war. Indeed, in another cable, Ambassador 
Rawson had criticised the Rwandan government for “wrongly equat[ing] the murder of 
civilians with combat between organized armies”.74 Yet, despite this evidence, in public 
the US government continued to link the massacres of civilians to the civil war. On 30 
April, in a live radio address on Rwanda, President Clinton made just that connection, 
describing his shock and horror at the mass killings in Rwanda, and calling upon the 
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Rwandan army and the RPF to agree to an immediate cease-fire as the apparent solution to 
the problem.75 
This suggests that the United States was still, as was argued above, avoiding lending too 
much credence to reports of massacres and, particularly, shying away from using the word 
genocide, as would become much more concretely apparent in the final phase. None of 
these treatments improved the potential for any kind of robust response to Rwanda’s 
troubles. Instead, each of them played their own role in pulling the international 
community yet further back from any kind of intervention. If the notion of supervenience 
suggests that properties at lower levels of discourse are constituted by those at higher 
levels of discourse, there was little in the prevailing idiographic and purposive discourses 
that could produce a discourse recommending military intervention; such a discourse 
would not resonate with the higher levels of discourse.  
B. Ethical Dilemmas: The Logic of Anarchy 
The effect of these approaches to humanitarianism was to raise the question of what 
responsibility Western nations had to deal with the encroaching anarchy in Rwanda. This 
represented a key ethical dilemma in relation to humanitarian intervention: if anarchy is a 
recurrent feature of the post-Cold War world, what can and should be done about it, and 
what moral responsibility do outsiders have? 
There are three dominant answers to this question. The first holds that anarchy is damaging 
to the host nation and that, on this basis, others nations have a responsibility to help. The 
second holds that anarchy within a particular nation brings with it the threat of spillover to 
other nations, thereby jeopardising regional security, and therefore other nations might 
have an interest in stemming, or at least containing, the problem. The third answer holds 
that anarchy is an endemic feature of pre-modern societies, the responsibility for and 
solution to which rests solely with the affected state. 
While there were some arguments made in defence of the first two positions, it was 
answers that emphasised the third dimension that dominated, as would be suggested by the 
direction of idiographic and purposive debate. In the early part of the crisis, some feared 
spillover—particularly to Burundi, a neighbouring state with a similar ethnic balance and 
history, and whose president had also been killed in the assassination of 6 April—but these 
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arguments were not widespread, and quickly tailed off when it appeared that Burundi was 
remaining mostly calm.76 This left arguments emphasising the first and third answers, of 
which the latter not only dominated in terms of quantity, but in terms of the force with 
which the arguments were made. A 9 April New York Times article set the tone: “the 
bloodletting in Rwanda and Burundi runs through the history of both countries as fluidly as 
the meandering Akanyaru River that marks their common border”.77 In the coming days, 
this analysis would be used to argue against any outside intervention: “[a]s dismaying is 
the prospect of a conflict without end … at some point the world may need to ask, if these 
efforts fail, whether or not to stand aside if belligerents cannot agree. It has almost reached 
that stage in Burundi and Rwanda”;78 “[t]he disintegration of Rwanda into chaos and 
anarchy has evoked expressions of horror and sympathy from the international 
community—and a firm pledge to stay away”.79 These expressions of disinterest were not 
just found in the media, but reflected in elite policy. As National Security Advisor Anthony 
Lake put it: 
[T]hese kinds of conflicts are particularly hard to come to grips with and to have an effect on 
from outside because, basically, of course, their origins are in political turmoil within these 
nations. And that political turmoil may not be susceptible to the efforts of the international 
community. So, neither we nor the international community have either the mandate, nor the 
resources, nor the possibility of resolving every conflict of this kind.80  
In this light, choices would have to be made as to where to intervene, if at all. And, 
fundamentally, these choices would not be predicated upon any moral questions regarding 
a responsibility to help, but on the basis of the goals to be pursued under the dominant US 
identity, which emphasised the particularist pursuit of national interests. Thus, it was 
argued in the media that “the United States has no recognizable national interest in taking a 
role [in Rwanda], certainly not a leading one”81 and by members of Congress that “I don’t 
think we have any national interest here … I hope we don’t get involved there. I don’t 
think we will. The Americans are out. As far as I’m concerned in Rwanda, that ought to be 
                                               
76 See US Department of Defense, “Talking Points”; Lorch, “Rwandan Refugees Describe Horrors After a 
Bloody Trek”, New York Times, 25 April 1994; Lorch, “Specter of Hate Stalks Burundi, Too”, New York 
Times, 26 April 1994; Richburg, “Washington Begins to Act as Displaced Rwandans Wait: At Border 
Bridge, the Dead Pass Under Where the Living Passed Over”, Washington Post, 3 May 1994. Compare also 
Washington Post, “Not Two of a Kind”, Washington Post, 9 April 1994. 
77 Gray, “2 Nations Joined”. 
78 New York Times, “Double Tragedy in Africa”, New York Times, 10 April 1994. 
79 Sciolino, “For West, Rwanda Is Not Worth the Political Candle”, New York Times, 15 April 1994. 
80 White House, “Press Briefing by Lake and Clark on Peacekeeping Policy”, 5 May 1994. 
81 Washington Post, “One, Two, Many Rwandas”. 
 148 
the end of it.”82 Thus, the emphasis on the intractable nature of the ancient ethnic hatreds 
of Rwanda, which resonated with the idiographic and purposive leanings highlighted 
above, militated against intervention in Rwanda. 
C. Instrumental Action: An Orderly Retreat 
1. Resource Instrumental: The New Casualty Aversion 
The key resource-instrumental question that concerned policy-makers at this point was the 
risk to personnel involved in any continued UN action in Rwanda. Within a day of the 
assassination of Habyarimana, 10 Belgian peacekeepers had been murdered by Hutu 
extremists, bringing back memories of the 18 US servicemen killed in Mogadishu six 
months ago, almost to the day. In this context, Belgian Foreign Minister Willy Claes 
informed Boutros-Ghali that Belgium would be withdrawing its contingent from 
UNAMIR, fearing the continuing risk to its servicemen.83 In the circumstances, the 
Belgians also began to push for the full withdrawal of UNAMIR. 
In the prevailing idiographic context, the US policy community was very sympathetic to 
the feelings of the Belgians. The US government believed that UNAMIR was in danger 
and that further lives might be lost. The US Department of State’s talking points on 
UNAMIR’s potential withdrawal argued: “[w]e do not believe that the warring parties in 
Rwanda are likely to respect UNAMIR’s mandate nor, in the present environment, are they 
capable of adequately ensuring the safety of UN peacekeeping personnel in Rwanda”.84 
Likewise, there was little belief that any force could be at all effective: 
UNAMIR cannot fulfill its mandate under the current circumstances and is unlikely to attract 
personnel or obtain equipment for an expanded operation. There is little evidence that the 
presence of UNAMIR troops is serving as a deterrent in Kigali … Even if the UNSC 
expanded the mandate and found additional forces capable of protecting the Rwanda 
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population, it would be difficult to meet a key goal of peacekeeping operations: realistic 
criteria for ending the operation.85 
Though the United States had no troops involved itself, it was concerned that there not be a 
repeat of the debacle in Somalia, and therefore the primary goal must be the prevention of 
any further UN casualties: “[p]riority must be given to ensuring the safe withdrawal of UN 
peacekeepers and other international personnel and civilians in danger in Rwanda. To 
attempt to sustain a peacekeeping operation in the present environment would only 
undermine the Security Council’s responsibilities for international peacekeeping”.86 
2. Strategic Instrumental: Cutting One’s Losses 
Thus, as the Belgians pushed for the withdrawal of UNAMIR, the United States, for its 
own reasons, moved to support them.87 The Belgians were an important ally for the United 
States in their efforts to see UNAMIR withdrawn, as “[f]ew believe UNAMIR would be 
able to function without the Belgians”.88 As such, the United States gave the Belgians their 
full support. When it became clear that “Boutros-Ghali is putting the onus on the Belgians 
for seeking the withdrawal and termination” of UNAMIR, the United States decided to 
“make it clear that we strongly support this course—and this is not just a Belgian idea”.89 
At this point, both parties favoured the full withdrawal of UNAMIR. Indeed, in internal 
discussions, US policy-makers noted their intention to “oppose any effort at this time to 
preserve a UNAMIR presence in Rwanda”.90 
However, there were some within the Security Council at this time who did want to 
preserve a UNAMIR presence. Notable among these were the Nigerian delegation, who 
told the United States that they would “never approve of the Council directing UNAMIR to 
withdraw”.91 Indeed, the Nigerians circulated a draft resolution calling for reinforcements 
to UNAMIR, and an expanded and revised mandate allowing for protection of civilians 
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and government officials.92 With the United States, and its closest ally Britain, firmly 
opposed to such a move, this resolution would never make it out of closed session. 
Nevertheless, the debate on the draft resolution revealed that there was some support for a 
revised mandate, though little support for expanding the size of the mission. More 
realistically, it revealed that “there is no support on the Council for a total withdrawal of 
UNAMIR”.93 
As these discussions were ongoing, they did so in the virtual absence of any options 
offered by the UN Secretariat itself. It was not until 20 April that any semblance of a plan 
was offered to the Security Council and, even then, there was no pressure within the 
Secretary-General’s office for an expansion of UNAMIR’s mandate. The Secretary-
General’s Special Report tacitly supported the US line that: “[t]he dedicated personnel of 
UNAMIR, who have performed courageously in dangerous circumstances, cannot be left 
at risk indefinitely when there is no possibility of their performing the tasks for which they 
were dispatched”.94 In the circumstances, the Secretary-General offered the Council three 
options: (1) immediate and massive reinforcement of UNAMIR, with a Chapter VII 
mandate; (2) withdrawal of the bulk of UNAMIR, with the force commander and a small 
security company remaining to try to negotiate a cease-fire; or (3) complete withdrawal of 
UNAMIR. 
Though these options included the possibility of a revised mandate in line with Nigeria’s 
recommendations, there was little enthusiasm for this within the Secretariat. As mentioned 
above, the Secretariat continued to emphasise the civil war dimension to the crisis, which 
presented the Council with the massive task of separating two bitterly warring parties, and 
the potential for UN troops to be caught in the cross-fire, a prospect that would appeal to 
few. And it was the civil war, not the massacres, which the Secretary-General’s report 
deemed to be the primary target of any Chapter VII intervention, which was “predicated on 
the conclusion, described above, that … [w]ithout a cease-fire, combat … will continue 
and so will the lawlessness and the massacres of civilians.”95 
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With little enthusiasm for a massive reinforcement of UNAMIR, and in the face of 
significant opposition to its proposal to withdraw UNAMIR entirely, the US government 
accepted a British compromise resolution that withdrew the bulk of UNAMIR, suspended 
its operations but left a small, interim presence in Rwanda.96 However, this change in US 
policy did not reflect a change of heart. As an internal policy documents shows: 
UNAMIR is currently affording some degree of protection to 12,000 refugees in Kigali. We 
should not advocate (and we could not get agreement in the Security Council for) 
abandoning these people … UNAMIR is, thus, as a practical matter, stuck in Kigali until the 
situation there calms sufficiently for these people to disperse. Once this happens, however, 
we should urge an orderly withdrawal of all UNAMIR forces.97 
On 21 April, the Security Council approved the British compromise resolution under 
Resolution 912, and voted to withdraw the bulk of UNAMIR, leaving only a token force in 
Kigali. 
IV. ON THE MARGINS OF GENOCIDE: MAY–JULY 1994 
A. Foreign Policy Role: Selective Engagement 
Shortly after the Security Council vote to withdraw the bulk of UNAMIR, on 6 May, the 
US government released Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25, which specifically 
addressed UN peacekeeping, and called for a policy of ‘selective engagement’ consistent 
with US national interests, as well as low-cost and effective UN operations. While PDD 25 
was not prompted by the situation,98 nor were its precepts a massive divergence from 
existing US policy on Rwanda, it would nevertheless have a significant effect on the final 
phase of decision-making towards Rwanda, as Rwanda would become the first 
peacekeeping mission to be subjected to the new policy. 
PDD 25 was less of a new direction for US policy than a rationalisation and consolidation 
of existing policy and US temperament towards multilateral operations. If the Clinton 
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administration had been without a ‘bumper sticker’ to encapsulate their approach in early 
1994, they had one now. Moreover, in view of the criticisms of Clinton in early 1994 for 
his inability to set a policy course and stick to it, here was a slogan Clinton was determined 
to defend to the bitter end.99 Effectively, PDD 25 locked the United States in to its current 
policy path. 
PDD 25 was an explicitly particularist doctrine. Its primary focus was on US national 
interests, narrowly construed. It also contained an implicit criticism of the multilateral 
system as being overly expensive and ineffective, making US participation in, or even 
support for, multilateral action contingent on reform. The primary policy prescription of 
the document was to set criteria for UN peacekeeping. These criteria were: whether the 
mission advances US interests; whether a threat to or breach of international peace and 
security exists (including “urgent humanitarian disaster coupled with violence”); whether 
there are clear objectives to the mission; whether a ceasefire is in place and the consent of 
the parties obtained; whether the threat to international peace and security is considered to 
be significant; whether the means to accomplish the mission are available; whether the 
political, economic and humanitarian consequences of inaction by the international 
community have been weighed and are considered unacceptable; and whether the 
operation’s anticipated duration is tied to clear objectives and realistic criteria for ending 
the operation.100  
Rwanda seemed likely to score poorly against these criteria. Of those listed, only the threat 
to international peace and security in terms of an “urgent humanitarian disaster coupled 
with violence” and the unacceptability of the consequences of inaction were directly 
applicable to the Rwandan context. With the United States already fundamentally wary of 
intervention in Rwanda, the publication of this policy programme did not bode well for any 
change in approach to the Rwandan situation. Indeed, as reports of genocide in Rwanda 
became more and more common, the United States actively sought to stifle any potential 
connection between its own analyses of the situation and the two criteria in PDD 25 that 
suggested the United States might respond to such a serious humanitarian disaster. 
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As far as the potential for US support for any peacekeeping mission not involving its 
troops was concerned, PDD 25 likewise would provide a stumbling block. Though notably 
different from the particularist discourse of the Pentagon Paper discussed in the Somalia 
case study, in some respects PDD 25 was even more particularist than its predecessor. 
While the Pentagon Paper would have shared concerns with PDD 25 over US participation 
in peacekeeping missions where US national interests were not directly involved, as well 
as with the cost-effectiveness and goal-effectiveness of multilateral UN operations, 
PDD 25 went one further by suggesting that US policy should be to oppose all UN 
peacekeeping missions where its criteria were not met, regardless of whether the United 
States was a participant or not. Though feasible within the Pentagon Paper doctrine, this 
was made explicit by PDD 25. And, during May–July 1994, as the Security Council 
revived its discussions about what to do about the situation in Rwanda, the United States, 
guided by PDD 25, would become a serious impediment to effective action. 
B. Interest: Avoiding Genocide 
PDD 25 had confirmed what was already apparent from the US approach to Rwanda 
throughout early 1994: the United States had no interest in Rwanda except in the 
eventuality that a massive humanitarian disaster should unfold in respect of which the 
consequences of inaction were unacceptable. Up to now, apart from a few dissenting 
voices who saw just such an eventuality, the extant policy of inaction had been relatively 
easy to sustain. By May 1994, however, the reports of atrocities filtering out of Rwanda 
were both too numerous and too shocking to ignore, and most observers began talking 
openly of ‘genocide’, a finding that carries obligations under the 1949 Genocide 
Convention, to which the United States is a party. Though the emerging belief that 
genocide was taking place in Rwanda did not presage a complete u-turn in terms of overall 
coverage of the crisis,101 it did represent a new strand to the discourse, which would grow 
over time and place the US government under increasing pressure to defend its policy 
towards Rwanda and the identity it had articulated as a ‘selective engager’.  
As the Security Council voted to withdraw the bulk of UNAMIR from Rwanda, those 
critics who believed that genocide was taking place became more vociferous. Kenneth 
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Roth, director of Human Rights Watch, gave interviews with both the Washington Post 
and New York Times, describing the violence in Rwanda as “absolutely a case of 
genocide”; “[t]he symbolic force the Security Council may be about to authorize would be 
a thin veil over another massacre”.102 His colleague, Alison DesForges, also argued: “[w]e 
put the word genocide on the table. We don’t do it lightly. There is clearly here an 
intention an eliminate the Tutsi as a people … If people accept that this is genocide, the US 
is legally obligated as a signatory to the Convention Against Genocide to suppress and 
prevent it.”103 And for the first time, members of the US Congress, too, began to describe 
the events as genocide. Introducing Senate Resolution 207, Senator Paul Simon (D-IL) 
noted: “[w]e have all heard the grim reports … the eruption in Rwanda of brutal, 
systematic, and indiscriminate violence, resulting in the deaths of more than 100,000 
people to date. These actions constitute genocide, and clearly violate all international 
standards of human rights.”104  
As reports of massacres continued—and even intensified—on into May, it was no longer 
possible to describe events in Rwanda as a spontaneous convulsion of tribal anger, and 
coverage began to reflect this. On 5 May, the Washington Post wrote: “[a]s terrified United 
Nations peace-keepers evacuated Rwanda, other nations consoled themselves with the 
hope that the butchers would grow weary of killing. This once seemed to us a likely 
prospect too, but it does no more. The savagery continues unabated.”105 A few days later, 
the New York Times ran a story detailing the organised and systematic nature of the 
killings, and arguing that the violence was planned and premeditated.106 As the killings 
continued throughout May, more and more people began to agree that what was taking 
place in Rwanda was genocide. 
One group that could not agree, however, was the UN. The Secretary-General’s Letter of 3 
May and Report of 13 May both contained references to ethnic massacres, but neither used 
the term ‘genocide’. It was not until the Secretary-General’s Report of 31 May that 
Boutros-Ghali would describe the violence as ‘genocide’. In the Security Council, heated 
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discussions took place behind the scenes over whether to describe the violence as 
genocide.107 UN Resolution 918 of 17 May contained no such reference, though the 
delegations of New Zealand and the Czech Republic both made such reference in prepared 
statements delivered on the Security Council floor.108  
Leaving aside the fact that Rwanda was a member of the Council at this time, it seems 
likely that a major source of opposition to a classification of genocide was the United 
States.109 However, this was not because the US government was in any doubt as to the 
actual state of affairs. Internal Department of State analyses on 16 May and 18 May both 
came to the conclusion that genocide was taking place in Rwanda.110 Yet, in public, the 
United States continued to avoid labelling the genocide as such. An internal State 
Department Discussion Paper revealed the reasons why: “Legal at State was worried about 
this yesterday—genocide finding could commit the USG to actually ‘do something’”.111 A 
later, more in-depth, paper discussing this issue emerged on 21 May. Addressing the 
question of whether US officials should be authorised to state publicly that genocide had 
taken place in Rwanda, the paper argued that “[a] USG statement that acts of genocide 
have occurred would not have any particular legal consequences”.112 Nevertheless, the 
paper recommended that Department officials be authorised “to state publicly that ‘acts of 
genocide have occurred’ in Rwanda”. The reasoning behind this was practical: 
Although lacking in legal consequences, a clear statement that the USG believes that acts of 
genocide have occurred could increase pressure for USG activism in response to the crisis in 
Rwanda. We believe, however, that we should send a clear signal that the United States 
believes that acts of genocide have occurred in Rwanda. If we do not … our credibility will 
be undermined with human rights groups and the general public, who may question how 
much evidence we can legitimately require before coming to a policy conclusion.113 
                                               
107 For discussion, see Melvern, A People Betrayed. 
108 UN Security Council, “Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand Three Hundred and Seventy-
Seventh Meeting of the UN Security Council”, S/PV.3377, 17 May 1994. 
109 Interviews conducted by Linda Melvern appear to confirm this point. Melvern, A People Betrayed. 
110 See Office of the Legal Advisor, “Legal Analysis: The Definition of Genocide”, Memorandum, 16 May 
1994; Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research, “Rwanda—Geneva Convention Violations”, 
Memorandum, 18 May 1994. 
111 US Department of State, “Rwanda”, Discussion Paper, 1 May 1994. 
112 US Department of State, “Has Genocide Occurred in Rwanda?” Discussion Paper, 21 May 1994. A 
similar standpoint was taken by the Bush administration in 2005, when it classified the violence in Darfur as 
genocide. The position was that the Genocide Convention requires its parties to “undertake to prevent and to 
punish” crimes of genocide, but quite what actions are appropriate or necessary to do so are another matter 
entirely. The legal analysis is certainly sound. 
113 Ibid. 
 156 
This advice was taken, but a little too literally. Still hesitant, and now confused by the 
technicalities, US government officials doggedly stuck to the line that “acts of genocide” 
had been committed if pushed, but refrained from using the term voluntarily. This 
approach culminated in the rather embarrassing press conference held on 10 June by State 
Department spokesperson Christine Shelley, who, on characterising the violence as ‘acts of 
genocide’, was pushed by reporters to explain the difference between ‘genocide’ and ‘acts 
of genocide’, to explain how many ‘acts of genocide’ are required to constitute a genocide, 
and to admit that the US government had provided specific guidance not to use the term 
‘genocide’ in isolation. This incident was quickly picked up on by the media and generated 
a flurry of criticisms.114 Secretary of State Warren Christopher, himself a lawyer, was 
quick to step into the breach, explaining that very afternoon that the distinction was 
erroneous, and that acts of genocide did constitute genocide, but significant damage had 
already been done.  
C. Instrumental Action: The Reluctant Fundamentalist 
1. Strategic Instrumental: A Question of Tactics 
As it became ever more clear that what was happening in Rwanda was genocide, the 
demands of latent universalist sentiment began to grow and the pressure to ‘do something’ 
about Rwanda correspondingly increased. As in Somalia in 1992, the administration 
decision to oppose an effective peacekeeping force in Resolution 912 had drawn stiff 
criticism. As Kenneth Roth of Human Rights Watch put it “[t]his is yet another example of 
the United Nations sensing danger and running”.115 So too did William Schultz, executive 
director of Amnesty International, argue: “[w]e at Amnesty International are shocked by 
the assumption that the United States has no leadership role to play in the Rwandan crisis 
… The United States should press the UN Security Council and our European allies to 
expand the UN peace-keeping presence.”116 Likewise, Senators Paul Simon and Jim 
Jeffords (R-VT) wrote to President Clinton decrying the lack of action: “Mr. President: 
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[w]e are concerned about the continuing disaster in Rwanda, and the failure of the 
international community to halt or even diminish the slaughter taking place there”.117 
However, in stark contrast to Somalia, where such criticism provided the impetus for a 
serious departure in the causal chain, leading the United States on the path to intervention 
in Somalia, it would have no such impact in the Rwandan case. This difference was a 
consequence of a key distinction between the two cases: whereas in Somalia, criticisms of 
inaction resonated with a pre-existing idiographic commitment to collective 
internationalism, such that positive synergies were developed between the different levels 
of discourse, allowing for the possibility of a policy that reflected those goals, the same 
circumstances did not hold in respect of Rwanda. Though a concern for humanitarianism 
was not precluded by the idiography of PDD 25, it would have to be situated in the context 
of overriding concerns with the costs of multilateral action, the risks to personnel involved 
and the need for US national interests, narrowly construed, to be involved, for US 
participation to be a possibility. As such, at no point did any party suggest that the United 
States should contribute troops to the UN operation. Likewise, though the United States 
had been and would continue to be criticised for its recalcitrance in respect of supporting a 
beefed-up UN presence, this did not amount to an outright rejection of the policy goals 
behind its resource-instrumental concerns, but rather criticism of the ways in which the 
policy goals were being put into practice. Thus, the United States was forced to 
compromise on some of its more conservative demands, but not alter the overall direction 
of policy.118 This provides very clear support for the proposition of the theory outlined in 
the previous chapters: it is identity, not interests or other lower level discourses, that 
fundamentally drives policy. Ideas provide the context for meaning, and for elements of 
the lower level discourses to have any significant effect, they need to establish positive 
synergies with the higher level discourses, or force re-evaluations of those discourses. 
Nevertheless, it was widely agreed that the scale of human suffering in Rwanda was such 
that something needed to be done. Quite what was another matter. UN Secretary-General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali was the first to bring new impetus to the process. On 29 April, only 
a week after the Security Council had voted for Resolution 912, the Secretary-General 
wrote a letter to the Security Council indicating that he had received “reports [of] strong 
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evidence of preparations for further massacres of civilians” in Rwanda, which “raise 
serious questions about the viability of the revised mandate which the Security Council 
gave to UNAMIR by Resolution 912”,119 and urged the Council to reconsider the decision. 
Most within the Council, especially those who had not been satisfied with Resolution 912 
in the first place, agreed, and the Secretary-General was asked to report back on what 
action might be taken. The United States was among those who now felt that some action 
was necessary. On 3 May, the Washington Post reported that “White House and State 
Department officials said the administration has been galvanized by the horrifying 
massacres of innocent civilians caught in Rwanda's perpetual tribal power struggle … But 
they also said the US response is necessarily limited because money is short and US 
influence in Rwanda is minimal”.120 Likewise, on 9 May, Assistant Secretary of State for 
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor John Shattuck, who had been sent to Rwanda in an 
effort to reinvigorate peace talks, wrote on his return that he had “come back persuaded 
that Rwanda is a test of our commitment to universal principles of human rights. I strongly 
believe the international community must demonstrate the same concern for Rwanda as we 
show in Bosnia lest we weaken universal standards”.121 
The US government certainly did believe something should be done, but this fell well short 
of active US engagement; indeed, the United States explicitly and repeatedly ruled out the 
participation of US troops, a point which met with little criticism.122 The preferred course 
of action, which the UN Secretariat broadly approved, was to seek an African force to 
intervene in Rwanda. However, the United States and the UN were not in agreement on the 
modalities of such a force. Firstly, the United States remained unconvinced that the 
required number of troops could be secured: “it seems to us highly improbable that 
possible troop contributors would agree to send people into Rwanda—unless an agreed 
upon and meaningful ceasefire is implemented.”123 Ultimately, the United States was 
largely correct in this assessment, but its differences with the UN were much greater. 
Boutros-Ghali favoured a plan to airlift the proposed troops into Kigali and to allow them 
to fan out through the country from there, on the basis that those most at risk remained in 
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the centre of the country. The United States was not in favour of such a plan, as it believed 
there was “an inherent contradiction between the Secretariat’s assumptions that there will 
be no cease-fire and the expectation that this will not be a peace enforcement mission”.124 
Moreover, US officials argued, the proposed mandate “seems overly broad and would be 
more manageable if limited to creating a protective zone”.125 
The United States’ alternative plan was to establish safe zones along Rwanda’s external 
borders to accept refugees there and provide protection and humanitarian assistance. 
However, there were significant problems with this plan too, as was recognised in an 
internal interagency memo: 
One of the main problems with the NSC/State thinking is that it puts a camp for refugees on 
the Burundi/Rwanda border, right in the path of escape for any renegade Hutu forces that 
might be pursued by the RPF. Those forces (which are the reason the people are in the camp 
in the first place) must go someplace, most likely through the camp, unless the PKO force 
turns them back (not a Chapter VI operation), or unless the PKO force takes them into 
protective custody (but you can’t put them in the camps full of people they have been 
killing). Even if the PKO force did take them into custody, what will they say to the RPF 
when they demand the PKO release the Hutu killers to them?126 
The concerns raised over both plans provide a strong illustration of the structural concerns 
noted earlier in the chapter over the utility of action. It was not just a lack of empathy that 
held US policy-makers back from further engagement with Rwanda, but an idiographically 
derived doubt that effective solutions could be reached through UN peacekeeping. 
Nevertheless, there was little support for the United States’ alternative plan within the 
Security Council, with the French and African delegations, in particular, deemed to have 
serious differences with the US approach and to be demanding immediate authorisation for 
the full force.127 So, after much discussion back and forth, the United States consented to 
the Secretary-General’s plan, but with one important caveat. It insisted that the Secretary-
General should “report as soon as possible on the next phase of UNAMIR’s deployment 
including, inter alia, on the cooperation of the parties, progress towards a cease-fire, 
availability of resources and the proposed duration of the mandate for further review and 
action, as required, by the Council”. Until such time, Resolution 918 only authorised a 
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‘first phase’ of deployment in which the force of military observers that had been 
withdrawn under Resolution 912 would be returned, and the mechanised infantry division 
of UNAMIR be brought up to full strength. This modification seriously watered down the 
original proposals, such that there would be no immediate or significant reinforcement to 
UNAMIR. Later, Dallaire would say that “he knew that, with Resolution 918, Rwanda had 
been abandoned”.128 
2. Resource Instrumental: Commitment Issues 
What explained this strange reluctance to authorise a mission in which the United States 
itself was not being asked to participate on anything other than a conditional basis? The 
key issue was one of resources. The United States had committed itself in idiographic 
terms to ensuring that UN peacekeeping was a cost-effective affair, and it was determined 
to see this implemented in practice. Certainly, in some senses, the United States was 
correct in its assessments. Though UNAMIR II had been approved in principle, even had 
there been a mandate for immediate deployment, the necessary troops were not available. 
As Boutros-Ghali contacted African leaders to try to establish commitments, he met with 
little success. By the end of May, he had received firm offers of troops from only Ghana, 
Ethiopia and Senegal, and these were not nearly enough.129 By 20 June, the situation had 
not changed dramatically. Now Ghana, Ethiopia and Senegal were joined by offers from 
Zambia, Zimbabwe, Congo, Malawi, Mali and Nigeria, but, of these troop offers, only the 
Ethiopian battalion would come fully equipped; the other offers were conditional on 
equipment requirements being met, something the UN could not do itself, but would need 
to rely on Western nations to provide.130 It quickly became apparent that it would take at 
least three months for these contingents to be deployed, with even the first phase 
authorised under Resolution 918 still not scheduled until July. Understandably, Boutros-
Ghali increasingly began to despair of the entire process, describing the continuing delays 
as evidence of the “extreme inadequacy” of the international community’s response and 
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bemoaning the fact that even two months after the establishment of a revised mandate, the 
international community continued to “appear paralysed”.131 
Others too began to criticise the process. “The delay and lack of leadership shown by the 
United States government in confronting genocide in Rwanda is appalling”, argued 
Kenneth Roth. Likewise, in the House, Congressman John Mica (R-FL) argued that “the 
United States [has] failed to act to avert a genocide of our time. This administration not 
only ignored the wholesale slaughter in Rwanda, it delayed action on creating an 
international force and allowed the killing to continue”, a point which Mica felt only re-
emphasised the failings of Clinton’s foreign policy.132 But such criticisms were not yet 
enough to reverse the general flow of the overall idiographic climate, which continued to 
emphasise the need to ensure cost-effective and carefully planned action. As Chester 
Crocker wrote in the Washington Post: “[a] backlash against United Nations peace 
operations is in full swing in America. … The shift in tone from the 1992 campaign and 
early 1993 is striking.”133 As such, the Clinton policy was, if not entirely accepted, largely 
acquiesced to, at least within the United States. A fairly exemplary New York Times 
article written shortly after the passage of Resolution 918 argued: “[t]he Clinton 
Administration has rightly resisted a clamor for instantly expanding a minuscule United 
Nations peacekeeping force to halt the human carnage in Rwanda. An ill-planned military 
debacle might only deepen the conflict there and jeopardize peacekeeping missions 
elsewhere”.134 The exigencies of the situation in Rwanda demanded an ad hoc response 
with little time for full and careful planning. However, the US idiographic position on UN 
peacekeeping required the opposite. This situation largely ensured the inevitable stalemate 
that would arise.  
The delays continued throughout May and June (and, indeed, into August) with little 
progress. With African nations unable to provide the necessary forces and equipment to 
establish the expanded UNAMIR, the deadlock could only be broken by the serious 
commitment of a Western nation. A Department of Defense analysis recognised this 
necessity, but noted the US government’s continued determination to avoid being drawn 
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into too great a commitment of resources: “[t]he USG so far does not plan to take the lead, 
but expects to be asked”.135 Ultimately, it was France that offered to play this role. In the 
latter half of June, apparently frustrated by the delays, France offered to provide troops and 
equipment for an interim force to provide security until UNAMIR II could be deployed.136 
Though there was considerable opposition to French involvement on the part of many 
actors, given France’s long and complicated history of relations with the Rwandan nation, 
no other options appeared to be available to the UN, and its members grudgingly 
acquiesced. Resolution 929 of 22 June 1994, which authorised a Chapter VII mission led 
by France, effectively ended any remote prospect of US intervention, though, clearly, such 
a prospect had been largely precluded from the outset. The US identity that had emerged in 
the wake of the Somalia debacle had emphasised conservatism in the US approach to 
multilateral operations, which was fundamentally at odds with any potential intervention in 
Rwanda. And, in the absence of any lower order discourses or critical junctures capable of 
changing the tone to US idiographic debate, such was the result. 
V. CONCLUSION 
At least four important conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing analysis. Firstly, the 
analysis demonstrates the importance of the identity-based approach to foreign policy 
analysis. The empirical similarities between the Somali and Rwandan situations might 
have suggested a similarity in response. However, this was not the case. Though both 
situations involved African civil wars in which large numbers of the civilian population 
were seriously affected, US policy-makers were inclined to treat the two situations very 
differently. This difference can be explained by the differences in the prevalent identities 
that drove foreign policy during these periods. In 1992, the dominant identity of the United 
States was internationalist, whereas in 1994, the dominant identity was particularist. The 
theory outlined in the first half of this thesis suggested that internationalist identities would 
tend to be more supportive of humanitarian intervention than particularist identities, and 
such has been the case.  
Secondly, the analysis demonstrates the importance of a scientific realist approach to 
structure. The notion that social systems are ‘open systems’, which are susceptible to 
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change, permits us to allow for fluctuations in identity and to take these into account in our 
analyses. Moreover, the morphogenetic approach to agency and structure provides us with 
an important mechanism by which we can see this process at work. The morphogenetic 
approach suggests that the acts of agents may influence the nature of structures (such as 
identity), which in turn may affect the nature of agency, in a continuous and dynamic 
process. Such appears to have been the case in the fluctuations in identity highlighted 
between the Somalia and Rwanda cases. The unintended results of the Somalia 
intervention seriously impacted upon US identity discourse, such that it threw idiographic 
debate virtually in reverse. Though certain similarities obviously existed between the 
Rwandan and Somali situations, such that comparisons would be inevitable, the dominance 
of the spectre of Somalia in US identity discourse even outside of the context of Rwanda is 
robust evidence of this process. 
Thirdly, the analysis demonstrates the importance of the identity–interest nexus. Whereas 
US policy-makers viewed the protection of human rights in Somalia as a significant 
concern of US foreign policy, the approach to human rights abuses in Rwanda was to 
express sympathy and concern, but not to conclude that there was any serious US interest 
in preventing such abuses. The striking nature of this change over only two years casts 
doubt on the premise that states generally have ‘permanent interests’, let alone ‘permanent 
allies’. Certainly, some interests may be more or less stable than others, but most will be 
subject to a certain degree of variance.137 And this variance is dependent upon variances in 
identities, which may fluctuate over time. In the collective internationalism of the ‘new 
world order’ era, it was easy to establish humanitarianism as a significant policy interest 
for the United States. Though such would still have been feasible under the particularist 
idiography of selective engagement, the threshold was significantly higher and, ultimately, 
was not met in time.  
Finally, the analysis confirms the importance of synergies between discourses. Though 
interesting parallels could also be drawn between the discourses critiquing the US reticence 
to approve peacekeeping forces for Somalia in May 1992 and for Rwanda in April and 
May 1994, in the Somali case the discourse was able to establish positive synergies with 
the higher level idiographic debate and thus force policy re-evaluations, whereas in the 
Rwandan case the discourse fell on barren idiographic ground and was unable to establish 
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any purchase. Only in such a context is it possible to comprehend the drawn out delays and 
debates over the cost and modalities of the proposed Rwandan intervention force, which 
dragged on for months without any resolution, and without any significant constituency for 
more forceful US action emerging.  
In parallel with the Somalia case study, the case study of US non-intervention in Rwanda 
provides important support for the precepts of the theory outlined in the first half of this 
thesis. However, the final case study, US intervention in Haiti in 1994, presents a different 
sort of challenge. Though the Somalia and Rwanda cases provided most similar cases in 
terms of their empirical features, they were nevertheless separated temporally by two 
years. In the case of Haiti, the United States opted to intervene in September 1994, only a 
few short months after the period considered in this chapter. Indeed, much of the period 
leading up to intervention in Haiti overlaps with that leading up to non-intervention in 
Rwanda. This coincidence provides the sternest test of the theory yet, in that, at least 
partially, the two will need to depart from similar idiographic precepts. Yet, it also 
promises to tell us much about the evolution of identity, as it allows us to fill the gaps 




Balancing the Equation: The US Intervention in Haiti in 
1994 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The US intervention in Haiti in 1994 presents the most complex of the case studies 
examined here. Leaving aside for the moment the question raised in the previous chapter of 
how identity could have driven an intervention in Haiti so soon after it had precluded 
intervention in Rwanda, a point that will be examined in full in the body of this chapter, 
the Haiti case spurred the most wide-ranging and diverse set of explanations for US action 
of all the cases considered here. Unlike Somalia and Rwanda, there were no easy or 
superficial explanations for US behaviour. Indeed, the search for an explanation of the US 
intervention was confounded by a surfeit of apparently minor interests, none of which, as 
Republican critics of Clinton’s policy were quick to point out, amounted, on their own or 
collectively, to what could easily be described as a cassus belli.1  
Of the rationales that have been forwarded, a number are worthy of consideration. The first 
and most obvious is the Clinton administration’s most prominently stated rationale of the 
need to restore democracy to Haiti. The promotion of democracy and free markets had 
been a cornerstone of Clinton’s stated vision for the United States’ role in the world.2 Yet 
critics were quick to point out that a preference for democracies alone could not explain 
why Clinton chose to make his stand in Haiti, rather than in, for example, Cuba or any of 
the other undemocratic nations or victims of coups across the globe.3 The critics had a 
point. While there should be no doubt that the Clinton administration did indeed seek to 
promote the spread of democracy, there was clearly something special that set Haiti aside 
from other potential candidates for such a forceful form of democratic activism. This 
chapter will show that the role of positive and negative synergies between different 
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idiographic, purposive and instrumental levels of discourse, as well as the role of critical 
junctures, was fundamental in moving Clinton’s America from a rhetorical commitment to 
an abstract ideal to a high-cost policy in a concrete case. 
For those who did not support the democracy promotion thesis, however, there was an 
effort to identify alternative explanations for the US action. The easiest to dismiss was the 
idea that Haiti posed a national security threat. With an army totalling about 7,000 troops, 
poorly armed and poorly trained, the small Caribbean island nation could hardly pose any 
threat to the might of the United States—and nor did it seem inclined to do so. Perhaps the 
only threat the Haitian regime posed to the ‘security of the United States’ borders’4 was the 
outward symptom of the country’s malaise, the mass exodus of Haitian refugees towards 
US shores. Again, however, though the issue of refugees was clearly a major one, which 
served to maintain the US government’s focus on Haiti, on its own it was hardly a basis for 
war. Despite the fact that there was precedent for refugees as a cause for war—India had 
cited ‘refugee aggression’ as one of the reasons for its intervention in Pakistan in 1973—
the issue of refugees garnered far more attention than was perhaps merited by the empirical 
facts. Whereas in the case of India and Pakistan, some nine to ten million refugees had 
poured across the border, costing the Indian government millions every day and leading to 
severe health and economic problems in the border areas,5 the influx of Haitian refugees to 
US shores was pitiful in comparison (indeed, even in comparison to other sources of 
immigration to the United States). Though an estimated 50,000 to 150,000 tried to leave 
Haiti (for various destinations) after the 1991 coup, few made it to US shores. The majority 
of those heading for the United States did so in the immediate aftermath of the coup, 
during the Bush presidency, but Bush faced this ‘threat’ down by instating a policy of 
arbitrary return to Haiti for any refugees intercepted at sea. Beyond some embarrassing 
press, the Haitian exodus failed to seriously affect US immigration policy.  
Clinton continued the Bush policy of arbitrary return. As a consequence, Haitian 
immigration to the United States fell to almost record lows. In 1994, the United States 
admitted only 664 Haitian refugees, while only an estimated 17,000 managed to enter the 
United States illegally in the period 1992–1996, a drop in the ocean compared to the over 
1.6 million new illegal arrivals over the same period. As Girard puts it: “[h]ad he decided 
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to invade one country to stop immigration, Clinton would have been better off sending a 
Pershing-type expeditionary force across the Rio Grande”.6 Despite a vocal Florida-based 
constituency raising fears of another ‘Mariel boatlift’,7 the extent of Haitian immigration 
never really posed much ‘threat’ to the integrity of US borders. At the same time, the issue 
of refugees did keep the Haiti issue on the political radar at times when it threatened to 
fade into the background, and open Clinton up to a strain of idiographic and purposive 
criticism from his domestic supporters, as well as his critics. This theme would prove 
important in the development of US policy towards Haiti, but not quite in the way many 
critics of the invasion of Haiti alleged. 
Such critics alleged that the invasion of Haiti was, in fact, designed to appease the African-
American political constituency, which was a critical component of Clinton’s domestic 
support base. However, there is little to suggest such a straightforward linkage. Though the 
Congressional Black Caucus was vocal in its pleas for a revised Haitian policy, few of 
Clinton’s policies actually gelled with what this group demanded. In respect of the final 
policy of military intervention, the Caucus was largely divided, with some advocating 
military intervention, but others equally wary.8 A policy of military intervention would 
therefore only be likely to appease a minority of a minority constituency. Where the 
Caucus was united was in its calls for a humane refugee policy, an area where Clinton was 
unwilling to make any but minor concessions. Indeed, in this area, Clinton’s policy was far 
more in line with the desires of his (mostly Republican) critics, who were adamantly 
opposed to the United States shouldering the financial (and perhaps cultural) burden of a 
massive influx of Haitian refugees. Despite the low levels of actual Haitian immigration to 
the United States, as noted above, at no point did the Clinton administration weaken its 
resolve to find any solution to the refugee issue but widespread asylum to the United 
States. Indeed, a review of Clinton’s policies against the demands of various domestic 
groups finds that they were at least, if not more, consistent with the arguments of other 
domestic groups than they were with those of the African-American constituency. This is 
not to say that this latter group had no effect in its extensive lobbying efforts, but rather 
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that US policy was driven by idiographic and purposive sentiment from the full spectrum 
of US political society; or, in other words, was driven by identity as it came to be 
formulated by a process of inter-group contestation.  
As with the other case studies examined in this thesis, the explanations for US intervention 
in Haiti found in the existing literature are not without basis. Each explanation brings focus 
to what were clearly important issues. But, again, none provides a particularly satisfying 
explanation in isolation, or, indeed, in a non-theoretically based combination. The key to 
understanding how a set of seemingly innocuous factors conspired to drive the United 
States to war is, again, to use the via media to locate these within a theoretical framework 
in which identity drives policy, and in which positive and negative synergies between 
levels of discourse and the role of critical junctures play a significant role. The Haiti case 
does indeed constitute the most complex case considered in this thesis. As such, however, 
it is also the most illuminating.  
II. A PEACEFUL SOLUTION: JANUARY–OCTOBER 1993 
A. Foreign Policy Role: Weighing Up the Clinton Doctrine 
1993 saw a number of contradictory tendencies emerge within US idiographic discourse. 
The US intervention in Somalia in 1992 had been the high water mark of the new world 
order discourse, but even at its apex the seeds of its decline were in evidence. As a 
presidential candidate, Clinton, as were most Americans, was generally supportive of the 
precepts of the new world order discourse, expressing support for collective 
internationalism, UN peacekeeping and the Somalia intervention itself.9 At the same time, 
the 1992 presidential election was a campaign mostly fought on the basis of domestic 
issues, with Clinton the candidate promising to ‘focus like a laser’ on the economy.10 If, as 
suggested in Chapter 5, Bush belatedly tried to refocus the campaign on his foreign policy 
successes and the support his ‘new world order’ programme engendered, it was ultimately 
a futile effort, with Clinton’s domestic focus enjoying more resonance with the priorities of 
American voters. As such, though universalism continued to provide the identity setting to 
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the emerging debate, it was balanced by a set of objective conditions in the structural 
domain—primarily economic—that were beginning to influence the ways in which policy 
actors would interpret the means by which they could realise their identity needs in the 
dispositional and intentional domains (see Figure 1, Chapter 4). However, despite 
Clinton’s serious attempts to focus as promised on domestic issues (later much maligned), 
he inherited a number of thorny foreign policy issues that pulled that focus and forced him 
to develop a new doctrine in keeping with the times, however half-heartedly.  
1. Assertive Multilateralism  
It was in this context that the new Clinton doctrine of ‘assertive multilateralism’ 
emerged.11 Assertive multilateralism was in some ways a thoughtful attempt to reconcile 
the contradictory impulses in the structural domain alluded to above. However, at the same 
time, these contradictions rendered the project inherently unstable, and this instability 
would correspondingly contribute to a seeming vacillation to US foreign policy in 1993–
1994, which would have a serious effect on the two case studies in the time period 
examined here, Rwanda and Haiti.12  
On the one hand, assertive multilateralism mirrored the universalist preference for 
collective international solutions to the problems faced in the post-Cold War world. This 
meant a continuation of the United States’ stated interests in helping to solve the ethnic 
conflicts and humanitarian crises that plagued the early post-Cold War era, with continued 
emphasis on multilateralism and UN peacekeeping as an appropriate means of addressing 
such problems. On the other hand, the surfeit of crises that could claim the attention of the 
world’s only remaining superpower, now penurious, as well as the spiralling costs 
attendant on the UN’s new-found activism, militated for a more pragmatic approach, in 
which the United States would seek to share the burden with others, allowing it to attend to 
its domestic concerns without any snowballing foreign commitments. As Madeleine 
Albright characterised it: “[t]he challenge facing US security policy today … leaves us 
with what I call the two ostriches problem. One ostrich would rather not see any predators 
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and plunges its head into the sand. The other hears the clamor of friends in need and 
miseries to assuage, and runs off in all directions at once”.13 
Assertive multilateralism tried to chart a course between these two opposing positions, by 
continuing to pursue the ideals of a new world order, maintaining the United States’ 
leadership role in its development but spreading the burden of maintaining the new order 
among others. On the face of it, this seemed like a reasonable proposition, and met with 
considerable support. In debating the renewal of authorisation for US forces in Somalia in 
May of 1993, a number of members of Congress affirmed their support for the programme. 
As Congressman Tom Lantos (D-CA) argued: “[w]ith the end of the cold war … we face a 
whole new international security situation, and in instance after instance we will find that 
American interests are best protected when we are part of action of a multilateral nature 
with the bulk of the burden and the bulk of the cost borne by others”.14 Similarly, Majority 
Leader Congressman Dick Gephardt (D-MO) noted:  
[T]he genuine historic nature of what we are doing. For the first time, the United Nations is 
providing the leadership and structure for an aggressive, multilateral humanitarian 
intervention operation, equipped for strong peace enforcement. And for the first time, 
American forces are serving under a new United Nations command structure. Both events 
are vivid reminders that the cold war way of doing business is over. We are in a new world, 
and the day of genuine multilateralism has dawned.15 
The influence of assertive multilateralism would have a significant effect on the ways in 
which US policy-makers believed the Haiti question should be pursued in 1993. Long 
criticised for a taking a ‘big stick’ approach to its hemispheric diplomacy, in Haiti the 
United States would be content to sit back and let the UN take the lead, at least in public. 
Haiti, it was argued, “should serve as a precedent-setting example of a new use of 
American power in the hemisphere: muscle dramatically deployed behind concerted 
international action in favor of democracy”.16 Through this approach, “American muscle 
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[should] be held in reserve—always visible, but deployed as little as possible to make a 
United Nations diplomatic offensive successful”.17 
2. Selective Engagement 
If assertive multilateralism was a marriage of convenience between the contradictory 
dimensions to US idiographic thought, however, it was a union in which critics alleged that 
one partner dominated. If idealism was one face of assertive multilateralism, 
circumspection in the pursuit of such goals was the other face, and one which many 
thought was getting short shrift. The debate on continuing authorisation for the Somalia 
mission referenced above was far from one-sided, and is illustrative in this regard. Many 
Republican critics, and a number of Democrats too, warned against writing the 
administration—and, by implication, the UN—a ‘blank check’ to keep US troops in 
Somalia as long as they liked. While most applauded the original rationale for intervention 
in Somalia, by mid-1993 there was a growing concern that the United States might become 
overextended in the pursuit of such goals. As Congressman Gerald Solomon (R-NY) 
argued: 
Mr. Speaker, if the United States is going to get into the business of providing security cover 
for every country that may need it while it attempts to develop its political institutions and its 
infrastructure, we could end up bogged down in many far corners of the world for indefinite 
periods. And that is what we are so concerned about because it questions American lives.18 
Congressman Bill Goodling (R-PA) summed up the mood of many when he asked his 
fellow members to “think of the precedent, the consequences, and the costs of this 
resolution”.19 While most could agree that “the United States has a continuing role as a 
world leader in this new era”,20 by mid-1993 most Americans were wary of committing 
themselves to a never-ending series of engagements with crisis-ridden countries in the 
periphery, of which there were seemingly a great many.  
Much derided for his over-sensitivity to public opinion, America’s newest president was 
not unreceptive to these arguments. Though it would be fair to say that idiographic debate 
on America’s role in the world was allowed to drift throughout much of early 1993, there 
was nevertheless a noticeable change in tone from the Clinton presidency as the year 
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progressed. By late June 1993, the president was arguing that: “[e]mphatically, the 
international community cannot seek to heal every domestic dispute or resolve every ethnic 
conflict. But within practical bounds, and with a sense of strategic priorities, we must do 
what we can to promote the democratic spirit and economic reforms that can tip the 
balance for progress in the next century.”21 Though disavowed by the administration at the 
time as ‘Brand X’ and not official US policy, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs 
Peter Tarnoff’s off-the-record comments to reporters at a Washington luncheon were 
revealing of the new direction US policy was beginning to take when he admitted that “it 
was generally appropriate for the United States to pursue a less interventionist, more 
multilateral foreign policy, acting on its own only when vital interests close to home were 
threatened. And Washington must make every effort to keep the expenditure of American 
resources commensurate with the interests at stake.”22 
By the fall of 1993, as confusion persisted over the precise parameters of assertive 
multilateralism, the Clinton team felt it necessary to make its foreign policy position clear 
to the American public. In late September, therefore, its top officials made a series of high-
level speeches over the course of a week, before Clinton was to make his own speech at the 
UN General Assembly.23 These speeches only served to further confirm the veracity of 
Tarnoff’s description of the direction of US policy. National Security Advisor Anthony 
Lake acknowledged America’s “humanitarian instincts”, but noted that “we must bring 
other considerations to bear as well: cost, feasibility, the permanence of the improvement 
our assistance will bring, the willingness of regional and international bodies to do their 
part, and the likelihood that our actions will generate broader security benefits for the 
people and the region in question”.24 UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright argued “[w]e 
believe, for example, that the UN decision-making process on peace-keeping must be 
overhauled. When deciding whether or not to support a UN peace-keeping or peace-
making resolution, we are insisting that certain fundamental questions be asked before, not 
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after, new obligations are undertaken”.25 This list of fundamental questions bore a striking 
similarity to those that would later appear in Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 (see 
Chapter 6). And Clinton himself would say, in a phrase that would later be turned against 
him: “[t]he United Nations simply cannot become engaged in every one of the world’s 
conflicts. If the American people are to say yes to UN peace-keeping, the United Nations 
must know when to say no.”26 
While the excerpts selected above highlight the reticence of the United States to over-
commit to collective internationalism, its universalism had not been entirely abandoned. 
The speeches continued to stress the United States’ commitment to global leadership and 
to collective solutions to international problems. What had changed was the balance 
between the two faces of assertive multilateralism. If the United States had been overly 
idealistic in early 1993, by late 1993 it was veering towards a greater pragmatism, which 
reflected wider policy concerns in the US polity. Even before the events of October 1993, 
therefore, which would push the United States much further down this path, the trail had 
already been beaten, and did not hold much promise for robust engagement with Haiti. 
While the idealism of assertive multilateralism promised some form of engagement with 
Haiti, other more material concerns were likely to dominate the US agenda in early 1993. 
And, as the Haiti crisis moved towards a critical juncture in late 1993, the burgeoning 
conservative element of this doctrine would militate against any creeping over-
commitment. Moreover, the content of assertive multilateralism had been poorly 
articulated, and the balance between its dimensions was highly contested, rendering it 
inherently unstable as an identity formulation. The contradictions inherent in assertive 
multilateralism would therefore allow for an easy transition to selective engagement in the 
wake of the critical juncture of October 1993, but, though the bumper stickers were 
different, the policy content had only been calibrated. 
B. Interests: Democracy, But at What Cost? 
Having trumpeted greater focus on domestic issues throughout his election campaign and 
transition, the last thing Clinton wanted on entering office was a messy foreign 
entanglement to pull focus. But Haiti would prove to be the biggest issue on Clinton’s desk 
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come inauguration day; indeed, even before. In the face of a mass exodus following the 
Haitian coup, President Bush had, in November 1991, reactivated the terms of a 1981 
treaty with Haiti that allowed the United States to arbitrarily return any Haitians 
intercepted at sea to Haiti, a policy Clinton described on the presidential campaign trail as 
“cruel”, “illegal” and “immoral”.27 Clinton had argued that “[i]f I were President, I 
would—in the absence of clear and compelling evidence that they weren’t political 
refugees—give them temporary asylum until we restored the elected Government of 
Haiti”.28 These words would come to haunt him. Even before he entered the Oval Office, 
reports emerged from Haiti that thousands had begun building boats in anticipation of 
making the dangerous voyage to the United States on inauguration day. With as many as 
150,000 believed to be poised to leave, the Clinton administration was faced with a major 
dilemma that had to be addressed before it even took up the reins of state. On the one hand, 
if it allowed the exodus to proceed unchecked, it could be faced with an unmanageable 
refugee problem in its first days of office, as well as the potential discomfort of watching 
large numbers drowning in the dangerous waters of the near Atlantic as they attempted to 
navigate the hazardous crossing in their makeshift vessels. On the other hand, it would be a 
politically embarrassing start to the first democratic government since Jimmy Carter if the 
Clinton team were to retreat from their stated collective internationalist ideals at the first 
sign of trouble. The compromise solution that the Clinton team came up with was clearly 
inspired by the doctrine of assertive multilateralism, and correspondingly marked by its 
contradictory nature. 
Faced with a tricky situation, the Clinton administration refused to abandon its subvenient 
collective internationalist interests in democracy and human rights. Instead, it cited human 
rights as the reason for its reversal of position on the Haitian refugee issue. Defending his 
decision to continue the policy of arbitrary return, Clinton argued: “I did what I did 
because of the evidence that people in Haiti were taking the wood off the roofs of their 
houses to make boats that were of questionable safety, to pour in thousands of numbers to 
come to this country when we knew for sure hundreds of them would die on the high seas 
coming here”.29 
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Facing criticisms for this u-turn, Clinton assured the world that this did not presage a 
fundamental change in policy: “I still believe the policy should be changed. We are 
changing it … but I don’t think we can do it on a dime, on January the 20th.”30 
Nevertheless, words alone would not be enough to silence Clinton’s critics, who described 
the new policy as a “dramatic reversal of promises”31 and “unconscionable about-face”, 
which “betrays American values”32 and is “inconsistent with US refugee law and with the 
symbol of the Statue of Liberty”.33 Nor would words alone appease the one man Clinton 
needed to get on side if the new policy was actually going to stem the potential flow of 
refugees, Haiti’s deposed President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.  
If the Clinton administration was to maintain the integrity of the United States’ identity as 
the leader of a collective internationalist order, it would need a more far-reaching policy 
programme. And one was easily available. Aristide himself had noted that “[c]onstitutional 
government remains the only solution to Haiti’s crisis and the only way to prevent the 
waves of refugees heading for the United States”.34 So too had the Washington Post argued 
that “[t]he outpouring of refugees from Haiti will continue as long as the country remains 
in the grip of anarchy and violence”.35 If the unconstitutional and repressive government of 
Haiti was responsible for the refugee flows, the obvious solution was to restore legitimate 
government to Haiti. Doing so would dovetail nicely with Clinton’s professed commitment 
to democracy as the centrepiece of his foreign policy programme. And promising to restore 
Aristide “as soon as conditions permit”36 would also secure the deposed president’s 
support in persuading his countrymen to be patient and remain in Haiti while the new 
policy was given time to work.37  
Despite the difficulties raised by the spectre of refugees, therefore, the United States had 
still clearly articulated its interests in Haiti—democracy and human rights—in a fashion 
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that synergised with the emerging idiographic discourse of assertive multilateralism. 
Nevertheless, like the idiographic discourse that gave rise to this articulation of interests, 
the US position was riven by contradictions: it would secure one set of human rights for 
Haitians whilst violating another. In trying to craft a policy to pursue these goals, the 
Clinton administration would continue to hew to the dictates of assertive multilateralism. 
Haiti would be the first test case of the new doctrine. 
C. Instrumental Action: An Uneasy Compromise 
1. Strategic Instrumental Action: Rotten Carrot, Broken Stick 
If the United States was to achieve its goal of restoring democracy to Haiti and stemming 
the flow of refugees, it would need a carefully calibrated policy to achieve its goals. 
However, as Clinton’s critics would allege, the Haiti policy that did emerge showed a 
fundamental lack of balance. Whereas the United States had been quick to act on the 
refugee issue, the more immediate of its problems,38 it was much slower to enunciate a 
strategy for achieving its more long-term goal of restoring democracy to Haiti. Likewise, 
whereas the Clinton administration was highly assertive in its refugee policy,39 it was much 
less aggressive in putting pressure on the Haitian regime to allow for the return of Aristide.  
In line with the doctrine of assertive multilateralism (see above), the UN was to take the 
lead in diplomatic efforts to restore Aristide to power, with US might held in abeyance. 
However, this arrangement only seemed to suggest a lack of initiative. Though some 
arrangements to facilitate the transfer to democracy were floated, there was little in the 
offing that seemed designed to actually prompt such a transfer to democracy. The first 
initiative pursued by UN Special Envoy Dante Caputo was to push for the deployment of 
human rights monitors to the country.40 The deployment of monitors, it was hoped, would 
address a number of US concerns: if the monitors could contribute to an improvement in 
the security situation in Haiti, human rights violations might decline, Haitians might feel 
less impetus to flee the nation and confidence throughout the nation might improve in the 
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possibility for an orderly transition back to democratic rule. In a similar vein, in May the 
United States sponsored a resolution in the Security Council to provide for a 500-member 
international police force to be deployed to Haiti to ease the transition.41 
However, despite these well-meaning and potentially useful initiatives, by mid-1993 it still 
remained unclear quite why a transition to democracy was expected to take place at all. In 
the absence of other initiatives, human rights monitors and international police were 
unlikely to effect a change in the internal power structure of the Haitian state. Throughout 
January to June 1993, negotiations on the restoration of democracy to Haiti had been 
ongoing, but largely fruitless. While the mediators regularly stressed that a quid pro quo 
approach was being pursued, in which Aristide was to grant an amnesty to the participants 
in the coup, who would then voluntarily transfer power back to the exiled leader, quite 
wherein lay the stick (or, indeed, the carrot) that should persuade the Haitian regime that 
this was a deal worth taking was unclear. Though the Organization of American States 
(OAS) had instituted an embargo against Haiti in October 1991, it was a porous affair, and 
only applied to members of the OAS themselves. Certainly, Haiti’s economy had suffered 
as a consequence, but the junta was far from being on the brink of collapse.  
Despite vocal calls for more robust pressure to be applied, it was not until June 1993 that 
the Clinton administration opted to ask the Security Council to impose a worldwide trade 
embargo. The results of the new sanctions, however, were immediate. Within a matter of 
weeks, the Haitian regime had agreed to negotiate the terms of a return to democracy and, 
on 3 July 1993, President Aristide and General Cedras, the leader of the military junta, 
signed the Governor’s Island Accords in New York, which provided for the return of 
Aristide to the presidency by 30 October 1993, and the concomitant resignation of the 
leading junta figures.  
2. Resource Instrumental: Giving the Dog a Bone 
If the United States’ stated interests and policy goals in Haiti reflected the idealistic side of 
assertive multilateralism, its resource commitment to securing those goals reflected the 
injunction to pursue those goals through a consensual, multilateral framework in which the 
United States was a circumspect, almost passive player. Assertive multilateralism, it was 
hoped, could solve the Haitian crisis quickly and, crucially, painlessly. The idiographic 
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turn in US foreign policy suggested a subvenient lack of resource commitment to the 
Haitian crisis, which it was hoped could be picked up by the international community—in 
particular, the UN. Thus, the administration took a back seat in the early proceedings, 
providing verbal support for the process, but little in the way of material support. If this 
strategy was to work, it would be a great success for the new model of assertive 
multilateralism, but its failure would raise serious questions about the United States’ 
foreign policy role in the world.  
Unfortunately, the softly-softly approach only had the effect of suggesting that there was a 
lack of resolve on the part of the Clinton administration to finding a solution. Despite 
public statements that there would be “serious consequences if the process fails”,42 the 
Haitian military was given the definite “sense that the international community doesn’t 
have the strength to change things”.43 Within the United States, too, many doubted the 
level of commitment.44 Indeed, even sources within the Clinton Haiti team wondered aloud 
how determined the president was to resolve the crisis.45 In this atmosphere, the Haitian 
junta felt little need to pay any more than lip service to the notion of seeking a solution. As 
negotiations dragged on, a tactic of agreeing to measures and then changing the goalposts 
became a consistent feature of the Haitian regime’s dealings with the international 
community.46 In the absence of any demonstrable seriousness of purpose behind the 
international community’s efforts, the policy’s critics were right to argue that: 
[T]he military-backed regime in Port-au-Prince has no incentive to negotiate. The latest 
negotiation breakdown is just the latest example in a … choreographed minuet, in which the 
military presents a sufficient degree of interest in negotiation to keep them limping along but 
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at the last moment, when an actual agreement is to be reached, they retreat. There is very 
little incentive by those who currently control Haiti to negotiate themselves into exile, into 
poverty, into prison.47 
These sentiments were widely shared. Members of Congress argued that Clinton’s efforts 
were “totally inadequate” and that the members of the Haitian junta “have so much to lose 
that they are never going to voluntarily give up their control of Haiti”.48 The news media 
noted that “the [Haitian] military and its partners in the civilian elite apparently have 
concluded they can disregard their international critics even as they kill, jail and exile their 
domestic ones”.49 And Haitian officials argued that “[t]he confidence of the official US 
establishment in Washington working on Haiti is exceeded only by the skepticism of 
everyone else in Haiti. If you give the military any other than stark alternatives, they will 
nickel and dime you to death”.50 Even UN officials were by now unenthused by the US 
administration’s support for their efforts: “[t]he United Nations entered these negotiations 
at the behest of the United States, and will carry on as long as we have strong backing from 
Washington. They really want to play ball with the administration, but in the absence of 
something stronger,”51 “everyone else is going to withdraw and this is going to become an 
American problem again, all by itself.”52 
The problem, it seemed, was that the Clinton administration efforts were, though 
multilateral, hardly assertive. In the face of such a sustained and widespread critique of its 
policy direction, the Clinton administration needed to change tack, but even this move was 
slow and gradual. Though the news media touted reports suggesting that Clinton was 
prepared to get tough with the Haitian military—with plans for a tightening of the 
embargo, targeted sanctions, cancellation of visas and restrictions on commercial air traffic 
potentially in the offing—as early as April 1993, no decision was taken on this until June 
1993. And the critics’ concerns regarding the lack of assertiveness of US policy appeared 
vindicated by the fairly immediate effects of the first really assertive move. Voted for 
under Resolution 841 of 16 June 1993, a new worldwide embargo was set to take effect by 
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23 June. By 22 June, Cedras had written to Caputo indicating his willingness to participate 
in talks with Aristide with a view to the restoration of democracy. 
The resulting Governor’s Island Accords of 3 July 1993, despite the time taken to reach 
this point, had the potential to be viewed as a major success for the US policy of assertive 
multilateralism. As Robert White, a senior member of Aristide’s negotiating team noted: 
“[t]his is, as far as I know, certainly the first time in the Western Hemisphere, that a sitting 
President who has been expelled has then been restored to power through international 
pressure. It is a tremendous success for all of the parties, Haiti, Caputo, the United States, 
certainly.”53 Likewise US Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright declared: “[w]e have 
shown we can be serious in response to serious problems. … It is a triumph for multilateral 
diplomacy. It is a triumph for the Haitian people.”54 Momentarily, at least, the United 
States appeared vindicated, despite its early missteps, and the mood was generally 
congratulatory.  
While the Clinton administration was lauding the Governor’s Island Accord as “a sound 
agreement that provides for a peaceful transition to constitutional rule” and “a victory not 
only for the Haitian people but for the international community as well”,55 however, some 
serious questions remained about the actual prospects for its implementation. With the 
benefit of hindsight, many analysts would conclude that the Governor’s Island Accord, far 
from being the “sound agreement” trumpeted by the Clinton administration, was in fact 
“profoundly flawed”.56 At least three major shortcomings were immediately discernable. 
The first was that the embargo, the sole bargaining chip the international community held, 
was to be withdrawn before Aristide returned to power. Though the threat that the embargo 
might be reimposed remained, even a temporary suspension of sanctions would allow the 
Haitian leaders to import vital products—in particular, oil—and transfer any assets they 
might still hold abroad to safety, thus insulating themselves against the worst of any 
reimposed sanctions regime. Secondly, the Governor’s Island Accords left the military 
junta in power during the period leading up to Aristide’s return, thus putting them in a 
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position to influence developments on the island in a manner that might directly threaten 
the viability of Aristide’s return to power. Finally, beyond renewed sanctions, there was no 
other mechanism in place to enforce compliance with the agreement, and no planning for 
the eventuality that the military junta might not so easily relinquish power. 
These shortcomings became increasingly apparent as the transition period progressed. As 
soon as the embargo was lifted and oil and other critical goods began to flow again, a new 
wave of repression hit the island: in addition to increased violence against civilians, 
parliamentarians found themselves unable to enact key legislation required to effect the 
transition as a consequence of threats and intimidation from paramilitary forces, threats 
that were given immediacy by the assassination of a number of high-profile Aristide 
supporters, many in broad daylight.57 By early October, the prospects for “a peaceful 
transition to constitutional rule” were looking increasingly dim. 
This reality was recognised within at least some sections of the Clinton administration. 
When the UN authorised a lightly armed peacekeeping force for Haiti under Resolution 
867 of 23 September 1993, consisting of civilian police, military trainers and military 
construction units armed only with sidearms and no mandate to interfere in violent 
disturbances, the United States offered to provide 600 troops to participate in military 
construction projects and in retraining of the Haitian military.58 However, in a public airing 
of dirty laundry, as these troops were being readied for departure, differences of opinion 
arose between the State Department and the Pentagon over their safety.59 On 3 October, 18 
US servicemen had died on the streets of Mogadishu in the service of assertive 
multilateralism, and the Pentagon—as were many Americans—was suddenly wary of the 
idea of sending more troops into harm’s way, especially lightly armed troops. The USS 
Harlan County was due to leave for the Caribbean carrying 250 US troops to serve in the 
Haiti mission. After some delays in authorisation due to these disputes, the Harlan County 
set off on 9 October, but concerns remained about the safety of the troops on board.60 The 
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following morning, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin was being interviewed on ABC News 
about the mission. Badgered by the interviewer about the safety of the troops on board, 
Aspin made the diplomatic gaffe of suggesting to the reporter that the troops had powerful 
M-16 rifles with which to defend themselves.61 This was not the case, but certainly gave 
General Cedras all the excuse he needed to publicly oppose the troops’ landing as a 
violation of Haiti’s sovereignty and a violation of the terms of the Governor’s Island 
Accords. When the Harlan County arrived in Port-au-Prince harbour, it found that its 
designated berth had been taken up by another vessel and a crowd of angry demonstrators 
had assembled.62 Armed only with sidearms as the agreement dictated, the troops were in 
no position to force their way ashore, nor were their commanders, including the 
commander-in-chief, inclined to order them to do so. After waiting out at sea for a day 
until a decision was made, on 12 October the USS Harlan County withdrew from Haitian 
waters. With this action, the Governor’s Island Accords were essentially dead. 
III. THE PROBLEM THAT WOULDN’T GO AWAY: OCTOBER 1993-MAY 1994 
A. The First Ostrich: Foreign Policy Role in Retreat 
The twin catastrophes in Somalia and Haiti precipitated a disorderly retreat in US 
idiographic discourse. If the United States had felt itself to be economically constrained 
against greater international activism in early 1993, the events of October 1993 confirmed 
that there were significant political costs to be considered too. But though the Mogadishu 
and Harlan County affairs were the trigger for a critical re-evaluation of the United States’ 
role in the world, the lines of the retreat had already been drawn. Crucially, though there 
was room for differing interpretations of the significance of these material events, 
prevailing ideas in the structural domain conditioned US policy-makers towards a 
particular path. Greater selectivity in its foreign policy priorities had already been a key 
consideration leading up to October 1993; this process was now accelerated.  
A microcosm of the continuities and changes in US idiographic thinking is provided by the 
eventual fate of Presidential Review Directive (PRD) 13. Initiated in February 1993, 
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PRD 13 was to outline the incoming Clinton administration’s approach to UN 
peacekeeping. Early reports on the drafting of the review suggested an ambitious doctrine, 
in keeping with the more far-reaching goals of assertive multilateralism. Whereas much 
US thinking up to then had suggested that the United States should only participate in 
peacekeeping when it could make a unique military contribution, the initial drafts of 
PRD 13 suggested that the United States should be prepared to plan, train and participate in 
UN peacekeeping operations even where only general US interests were advanced, or 
where participation might mobilise greater involvement by other nations. Reflecting 
concerns over the increasing strain on the UN’s woefully understaffed Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the review also championed a strengthening of the 
UN’s capacity, including the potential for sharing of US intelligence with the UN. Under 
these circumstances, it was envisioned, the United States would not need to have any 
concerns about allowing its troops to serve under UN command and control, reserving the 
ability to disregard reckless tactical orders, but not overall strategy.63 
Though not yet sent to Clinton for approval, in June 1993 this doctrine had the broad 
support of senior figures at the State Department, Department of Defense and the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. As the review continued, however, greater conservatism crept in through a 
process of incremental change. The idea of a standby force for UN peacekeeping, which 
Clinton as a candidate had endorsed and Secretary of Defense Les Aspin had suggested at 
his confirmation hearings was being considered by the administration,64 was quietly 
jettisoned, as the Pentagon “threw ‘a major dose of cold reason’ on [the] more ambitious 
proposals from the State Department and National Security Council staff”.65 While the 
policy as it developed through the second half of 1993 still envisioned US forces being 
placed under UN command and control, it now suggested that those forces should 
nevertheless maintain direct reporting channels up the US chain of command, and should 
be prepared to disobey UN orders for a wider range of reasons, including acts judged to be 
potentially illegal, beyond the scope of the mission’s mandate or “militarily imprudent or 
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unsound”.66 This version of the policy was thought to be likely to be signed by Clinton 
sometime in August.  
But as the situation in Somalia deteriorated in August 1993, the policy was put on hold. 
After Aideed attacked and killed 24 Pakistani peacekeepers on 5 June 1993, the UN had 
engaged in increasingly aggressive operations against the Somali warlord. As these 
hostilities dragged on through the summer, four US military police were killed on 8 
August, the first US casualties since the UN had taken over from the original US-led task 
force on 4 May.67 On 13 August, a further blow to the thinking of PRD 13 emerged when 
Italy’s Foreign Minister announced the withdrawal of its contingent of troops in the 
Somalia mission, criticising what he called ‘Rambo’ commanders in the UN mission, a 
barely veiled reference to the US Envoy to Somalia, retired US Admiral Jonathan Howe.68 
If US troops were to be given the green light to disobey UN orders under certain 
circumstances, the thinking went, what was to stop other countries doing likewise, and 
with less sound judgment, potentially endangering US troops in the process? 
In this context, PRD 13 remained unsigned up until the crucial events of October 1993, 
which provided the opening for more significant change. As public and congressional 
opposition rose against its precepts in the wake of these twin disasters,69 therefore, the 
review was subjected to even further review. By November 1993, the Washington Post 
reported, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake was engaging in new discussions with 
members of Congress on the direction of the policy review, which was now no nearer to 
being finalised. Indeed, it was not finalised until May 1994, at which point it appeared as 
PDD 25, a document that, as discussed at length in Chapter 6, enumerated strict criteria for 
US participation in UN peacekeeping operations and contained few of the idealistic 
precepts of the early drafts. 
The evolution of PRD 13 is indicative of the tone of US idiographic discourse in this 
period (see also Chapter 6 for further discussion of idiographic debate in this period). The 
collective internationalism of the new world order discourse and assertive multilateralism 
had suffered a fundamental blow, from which it was initially unable to recover. As a new 
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doctrine was being hammered out, the United States found itself in almost full retreat from 
any sort of engagement with the outside world, particularly when it came to solutions to 
second-tier conflicts. This gun-shyness was starkly evident in the US approach to the 
problem of Haiti, which in this period fell into abject disarray.  
B. The Mouse that Roared: Maintaining the US Interest in Haiti 
As far as most members of the US government were concerned, the United States no 
longer had any significant interest in Haiti by October 1993–May 1994. In the wake of the 
Harlan County incident, the United States did not immediately back down—threatening a 
blockade, targeted sanctions and supporting a new mission by Caputo to Haiti to try to 
revive implementation of the Governor’s Island Accord—but it was clear that the bite had 
gone out of the situation. By early November, when this half-hearted round of sabre-
rattling had concluded with little effect, the United States began a quiet process of 
withdrawal from its stated commitment to Haiti. When France proposed a new Security 
Council resolution to tighten the embargo on Haiti at the end of October, the United States 
indicated it preferred to wait upon the outcome of the Caputo mission to Haiti.70 When on 
6 November Caputo returned from Haiti empty-handed, Clinton indicated his preference 
for targeted sanctions over a tightened embargo.71 And, by 17 November, the United States 
indicated that it would undertake no new policy initiatives, but would simply try to wait 
out the Haitian generals under the existing sanctions regime.72 
These developments constituted a major change of tack for the US government. Having 
stated throughout early 1993 that it was committed to restoring democracy to Haiti, and 
was prepared to impose serious consequences on Haiti’s military leaders should they block 
a settlement, this new position had to be justified. Simply acknowledging defeat would be 
unacceptable for the world’s remaining superpower, so, as the turn of the year progressed, 
the United States generally used its earlier purposive arguments to suggest that a more 
robust response to the Haiti crisis was not in the interests of the United States. Though the 
interests themselves remained rhetorically consistent, the idiographic context within which 
they were framed had changed, and consequently so had the meaning these interests had 
for US policy. 
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The first and most obvious of these shifts in the context of interests was the rationale 
forwarded for the abandonment of the idea of a tougher sanctions regime. Whereas in early 
1993 the United States’ support for human rights had dictated that it should restore 
democracy to Haiti as the most viable means of securing human rights for Haitians in the 
long-term, by November 1993 the human rights of Haitians were a reason for not imposing 
further sanctions, which would, as Clinton put it, “be more painful in the near term to the 
average Haitians who are already suffering”.73 By mid-November 1993, the United States 
felt able to justify its decision to undertake no new initiatives on similar grounds. As a 
senior State Department official intimated: “the administration is satisfied that relief 
organizations and volunteer groups have enough food and fuel in Haiti to stave off a 
serious humanitarian crisis for several months. That being the case … the administration 
has decided there is no urgent reason to force the pace of developments there.”74 The 
interest had not changed, nor, indeed, had the circumstances; sanctions were at least as 
detrimental to Haiti’s poor and downtrodden in June 1993 as they would have been in 
November 1993. What had changed was the United States’ idiographical commitment. If 
in early 1993 the United States had been prepared to be assertive in its pursuit of the 
restoration of democracy in Haiti, in word if not in deed, by November all the United 
States was prepared to promise was conservatism. Without greater activism on the part of 
the United States in support of any peace process, sanctions really might only hurt the 
poor.  
Of course, there was a strong element of dissimulation in this mode of argumentation. 
Clearly, US policy was not driven solely by its concern for the human rights of Haitians; 
more parochial concerns militated against a more robust policy too, but these remained in 
the hidden transcript. The casuistry of US purposive argumentation was even more 
apparent in its new approach to the question of democracy. Here, there was less wiggle-
room to argue that an interest in democracy could be served by a policy of non-
intervention. Instead, therefore, the US government began to distance itself from Aristide 
himself, who became subtly recast as undemocratic. This was not a difficult task. Aristide 
had always been a suspect figure to many within the US policy community. Clearly a 
populist, Aristide was also accused of anti-democratic practices during his brief tenure as 
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president of Haiti, including excluding opponents from the political process, inciting mob 
violence and even ordering political assassinations.75 During early 1993, these allegations 
had been dismissed as “ideological overlay”76 on the understandable grievances that must 
inevitably be felt by the first truly democratic movement in a country that had known only 
repression and violence. In any case, the important fact was that Aristide had been elected 
by almost 70% of the Haitian populace, all the democratic credentials he needed, even if he 
had also been ‘rational’ and ‘reasonable’ in his dealings with the US government.77 In late 
1993 and early 1994, however, questions were once again raised regarding Aristide’s 
suitability as the paragon of democracy in the Western Hemisphere, and these now fell on 
more favourable idiographic ground. By November 1993, Clinton was far more equivocal: 
“Aristide may not be like you and me, he’s had a very different life. But two-thirds of the 
Haitians voted for him, and he has shown a willingness to reach out and broaden his base. 
So I … disagree that the old CIA reports are conclusive.”78 
The CIA reports to which Clinton referred had been around since the Bush administration, 
but new life was breathed into them in October 1993. On 22 October, the CIA gave a 
classified briefing to members of Congress on Aristide in which the deposed Haitian 
president was described as being mentally unstable and responsible for gross human rights 
abuses.79 Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) followed up by describing Aristide as a 
“psychopath”.80 Having supported Aristide through most of 1993, the Clinton 
administration had little choice but to distance itself from the reports, but nor did it deny 
the veracity of the reports either. As Clinton put it: “they were allegations. We don’t know 
if they were true or not.”81 Even assuming the timing and content of the CIA briefing was 
unconnected with the White House’s growing disenchantment with Aristide, it gave the 
Clinton administration an established basis for the rift that was growing between itself and 
Aristide. As the winter of 1993 wore on, Clinton administration officials continued to 
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make statements that were “less than enthusiastic about the Haitian leader”82 and signalled 
a significant waning of support for his return to power, a particularist concern for support 
for a conflict party dressed up in the clothing of a universalist concern for democracy. 
But Aristide would not go away. He would become, as the New York Times put it, the 
“mouse that roared”.83 In early 1993, the United States and Aristide had reached a tacit 
quid pro quo agreement, where Aristide would support US policy towards Haiti as long as 
that policy sought to return him to power. As 1993 drew to a close and it became 
increasingly clear that the latter part of that equation no longer held, Aristide felt 
increasingly able to criticise the United States. And he was able to hit where it hurt: on 
refugee policy. In February 1994, Aristide broke his long silence on the subject, describing 
the US interdiction policy as a “floating Berlin Wall”, which violated international law, 
and threatening to unilaterally withdraw from the 1981 treaty upon which the policy was 
based.84 The assault on US refugee policy was embarrassing, as it exposed the hypocrisy of 
a US policy that was rhetorically based on a stated concern for human rights as a 
fundamental violation of those rights.  
And Aristide had a strong and vocal constituency of support, particularly among, but not 
limited to, African-American members of Congress. While Congressman Joe Moakley (D-
MA) described the policy as “absolutely morally untenable”,85 Congresswoman Carrie 
Meek (D-FL) argued that “Haitians have been singled out by a United States policy that 
discriminates against them as no other persecuted people have been discriminated against 
in our history”.86 This line of argumentation was particularly effective, as it struck directly 
at traditional American values, values which the Clinton administration professed to 
uphold. As Congressman Major Owens (D-NY) put it: “[t]he United States has always had 
a policy for treating refugees in a very liberal way. The Statue of Liberty is not the symbol 
of this country for no reason. It is because of the fact that we have always had open doors 
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to those who were suffering or persecuted.”87 Similarly Congressman John Mica (R-FL) 
asked: “has the United States, the United Nations and this Congress abandoned every 
standard of decency and international justice?”88 
By April 1994, this line of criticism had swelled to fever pitch, with voices across the 
political spectrum denouncing the policy. The ante was upped yet further when Aristide 
reiterated his criticisms, describing the policy as “racist” and contributing to a “holocaust” 
in Haiti.89 And, on 8 April 1994, Director of TransAfrica Randall Robinson announced: 
“[s]tarting Tuesday, I’ll be on a hunger strike until the administration reverses its automatic 
repatriation policy with regard to Haitian refugees. … The current policy is wrong, legally 
and morally, and Clinton is as culpable as all get-out.”90 While there was significant 
difference of opinion within the US policy community on Haiti policy in a broader sense, 
the issue of fair treatment for Haitian refugees was one area where many people could 
agree. And, as this pressure began to build, Clinton too was forced to acknowledge the 
problems in his administration’s policy. Reacting to Randall Robinson’s hunger strike, 
which received sustained media and public attention, Clinton, in a rare and bizarre 
admission of failure by a sitting president, admitted “I understand and respect what he’s 
doing … He ought to stay out there. We need to change our policy.”91 The time had come, 
it seemed, for a thorough review. 
IV. THE COMMITMENTS WE MAKE: MAY-SEPTEMBER 1994 
A. Foreign Policy Role: A Leadership Battle 
The US retreat from international engagement over the winter of 1993–1994, like most 
retreats, resulted in casualties. The debacles in Somalia, Haiti and Rwanda had “caused a 
pendulum swing away from the muscular multilateralism of the administration’s first 
months to a posture too far in the opposite direction”.92 The consequences were manifold. 
In addition to the Haitians and Rwandans who lost their lives as the United States, and the 
rest of the international community with it, took a step back, a more abstract casualty was 
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the status of US leadership in the post-Cold War world. Despite major differences within 
the US policy community over what direction the United States’ foreign policy role should 
take, one element of US identity that virtually all could agree on was that the United States 
should be—and should be seen to be—the preeminent leader in the international 
community. By May 1994, this position was in serious jeopardy. Global opinion began to 
question the United States’ ability and commitment to global leadership. At the root of this 
problem was the United States’ inability to deal with second-tier conflicts. As Finland’s 
Helsinging Sanomat put it: “[n]one of these places alone harmed vital US interests but 
together they did. A great power’s credibility and prestige have been wasted without any 
concrete results.”93  
But the problem was more than just the failures themselves, but the reaction within US 
society to those failures. Though a retreat deep into the extreme end of selective 
engagement was an understandable reaction to the painful mishaps under assertive 
multilateralism, it also carried with it a fundamental paradox: how could a desire for global 
leadership be reconciled with a fundamental casualty aversion?94 A foreign policy that 
refused to admit the possibility of incurring casualties was not only unsustainable but 
ultimately damaging in terms of credibility. As the Washington Post put it, such a policy 
“carries a cost to our world leadership and risks dangerous miscalculation by potential 
adversaries”.95 If the United States wanted to be viewed as a great power, it needed to start 
to act like one. As Edward Luttwak explained: 
In the past, while Great Powers would normally be able to rely on intimidation rather than 
actual combat, that was only so because it was taken for granted that they would use force 
when called for. Nor did a Great Power conceive of limiting its use of force to situations in 
which genuinely ‘vital’ interests, i.e., survival interests, were at stake. Unless we are content 
to cohabit with chronic disorder and widespread violence, a synthetic version of Great Power 
‘law and order’ interventionism will have to be invented.96 
It was Clinton who took much of the blame for the United States’ fall from pre-eminence. 
Derided for a lack of a clear foreign policy programme and equivocation in pursuit of his 
goals, Clinton was under direct fire for his leadership of the nation (see Chapter 6 for 
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further discussion). Increasingly, Clinton was coming under personal pressure to articulate 
a foreign policy doctrine and then implement it. The first concrete sign of this had emerged 
in PDD 25, the first test of which had come in Rwanda.  
The universalist sentiment for democracy and human rights that was starting to emerge in 
respect of Haiti was in fact mirrored in respect of Rwanda by the emerging genocide 
discourse (see Chapter 6). However, in the case of Rwanda, the United States appeared 
determined to remain aloof from Rwanda’s problems. Such remove was relatively easy to 
sustain. Beyond the humanitarian imperative, the United States had few identifiable 
interests in Rwanda, few Americans knew much about the situation, and nor had a 
significant constituency for action yet emerged. This stood in stark contrast to Haiti, where 
the interests had been well articulated and a vocal constituency for stronger action on Haiti 
was already established. Equally as important was the fact that the Haiti crisis allowed 
more time for such pressure to build. The genocide discourse in Rwanda had only first 
started to emerge in May 1994, and, by June, France had relieved the pressure this 
discourse was starting to produce by taking on the burden itself. In Haiti, the universalist 
discourse had been established for much longer and would continue to grow over a much 
longer period. The United States would be a reluctant engager in Haiti, but would do so as 
a consequence of burgeoning idiographic pressure. 
In Rwanda, Clinton sought to provide leadership by demonstrating his resolve to ‘say no’ 
to the UN and to stick to the principles enunciated under PDD 25 (see Chapter 6). But 
leadership in the negative was not the kind of leadership Americans demanded of their 
president. In the wake of Rwanda, the question remained whether Clinton was capable of 
acting forcefully in the world when the situation demanded.97 As the Washington Post put 
it: “[i]f ever there was a man who needed to change the subject in a hurry, it is President 
Clinton. He needs to do something different. He needs a situation where he would be in 
control, where he could present himself as a forceful and, yes, moral leader, a decisive and 
forceful commander in chief”.98 But this injunction raised its own questions: forceful in 
pursuit of what? If non-intervention in Rwanda had been leadership in the negative, it was 
because the corollary could be found in the doctrine of selective engagement, which was a 
doctrine of the negative, “a peace-keeping policy couched entirely in terms of the things 
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America will not do”.99 The Washington Post answered its own question, by calling upon 
the president to demonstrate himself to be “a man of compassion who is showing the world 
that the United States keeps its promises and does the right thing by fragile democracies 
that have been hijacked”.100 This argument, indeed, captured a good deal of latent 
sentiment in the United States in the wake of the Rwanda non-intervention. Though its 
idealism had been dented by the events of the past year, it had not been destroyed. As 
Robert Kaplan put it:  
Because who we are is bound up in our ability, however diminished, to overcome [the] 
ethnic animosities of our ancestral, blood-home-lands, we have to take a vigorous stand 
against such blood feuds overseas. … A coherent foreign policy designed to deal with 
violent anarchy is now absolutely essential, if, for nothing else, than to preserve our moral 
sense of ourselves: our Americanness.101 
America was viewed as a land of values, and these values, though they had fallen by the 
wayside, remained a viable north star to guide US policy. In a lengthy monologue on the 
need to return to first principles, Congressman Newt Gingrich (R-GA) argued: “we need to 
reestablish both for ourselves here at home and in our ability to work around the world our 
commitment to the basic core values of American civilization”.102 And Senator Carol 
Moseley Braun (D-IL) argued: “[o]ur foreign policy has to have some meaning to it in 
order for it to work over the short or the long term. Protection of human rights, particularly 
in this hemisphere, it seems to me, should be at the top of the list of the motivations of our 
foreign policy.”103 
However, despite the return to American idealism, this resurgence did not represent a 
straightforward return to the precepts of ‘assertive multilateralism’, but rather a further 
evolution, towards what has been described as ‘pragmatic idealism’.104 The United States 
had restored its faith in its fundamental values, but needed a new paradigm for the pursuit 
of those values. As Adam Roberts put it: 
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We are at now a stage of retrenchment in American public attitudes to, and of administration 
policies, towards the UN. This retrenchment could serve a useful purpose: there is indeed a 
need to focus attention not on lofty schemes to completely transform international relations 
(schemes which can easily be harmful in their effects), but on a more mundane and practical 
evaluation of what the UN can actually achieve.105 
Under assertive multilateralism, the UN had been seen as a key vehicle for low-cost 
American engagement with the world, leading critics to argue that the United States had 
“abdicated … its role in the world to the United Nations”.106 This would no longer be the 
case. Though pragmatism dictated that “[e]ffective United Nations peace operations [could 
still] offer an alternative for the United States to share the burden of world peace with like-
minded nations”,107 the key term was “effective”. The United States would still engage in 
multilateralism if this provided a useful vehicle for the pursuit of its interests, and the 
criteria of PDD 25 now constituted a useful guide to the parameters within which such 
action should take place. But the United States would no longer rely on multilateralism as a 
crutch to evade responsibility, but, crucially, would be forceful in the pursuit of those 
interests, now defined in terms of American ideals, taking its leadership role seriously.  
This doctrine had clear applicability to Haiti; indeed, Haiti was at the root of the problem. 
As Congressman John Mica (R-FL) put it: “[h]ow can we be a leader of nations when we 
ignore the death of a nation in our own back yard?”108 In order to re-establish credibility, a 
new Haiti policy was necessary. The problem was, what kind of Haiti policy?  
B. Resource Instrumental: In With the Old, Out With the New 
By May 1994, the US policy community was virtually united in the belief that a new Haiti 
policy was necessary. The affront to democracy and human rights so close to US shores 
was difficult to stomach, and there were constant painful reminders in the form of 
bedraggled Haitian refugees struggling to escape the island prison in their rickety wooden 
boats. Equally important, the Haitian generals had thumbed their noses at the might of the 
world’s only remaining superpower, leaving it looking ineffectual and ridiculous. But there 
were few easy answers to the question of how to achieve success in Haiti. Indeed, the 
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question of “how to remove the military, without inflicting more suffering on a nation that 
is already the poorest in the hemisphere … proved to be one of the most intractable US 
foreign policy challenges”.109 
On 8 May 1994, the Clinton team announced a series of new initiatives on Haiti, following 
a “comprehensive review” of policy.110 But there was little that was new about its 
proposals. The centrepiece was a return to the UN Security Council to seek a resolution for 
a total trade embargo, which was authorised under Chapter VII in Resolution 917 of 6 May 
1994, and would include restrictions on air travel, freezing of funds belonging to members 
of the junta and revocation of their visas.111 Also announced were changes in asylum 
screening procedures for Haitian refugees, who would now be afforded asylum interviews 
if intercepted at sea.112 For the most part, this was largely old policy in new packaging.113  
The old policy of sanctions, it was hoped, would, as it had in June 1993, quickly bring the 
military junta back to the negotiating table. But if a policy of sanctions had been 
problematic in the first two phases of US involvement in Haiti, it was, if anything, more so 
now. The sanctions regime had always been porous, allowing the military junta to 
circumvent its most deleterious effects. Of major concern was the country’s border with 
the Dominican Republic, which was like “a sieve; oil and goods continue to flow 
unimpeded from the Dominican Republic to Haiti”.114 Dominican President Joaquín 
Balaguer had always been hostile to the sanctions regime, and, with little official sanction, 
a lucrative trade in illicit goods had developed across the border, enriching Dominicans 
and the Haitian elite alike. By now, the Haitian army had developed sophisticated 
“networks and structures … to get around the embargo”,115 meaning that the only effect the 
embargo was having was “enriching the military at the expense of Haiti’s already 
                                               
109 Farah, “Aristide’s Backers: Latest Plan Falls Short”, Washington Post, 2 May 1994. 
110 See White House, “Fact Sheet on Haitian Policy”, 8 May 1994; Clinton, “Presidential Press Conference 
on Haitian Policy”, 8 May 1994. 
111 See Clinton, “Presidential Press Conference on Haitian Policy”; White House, “Fact Sheet on Haitian 
Policy”; Lewis, “UN Council Votes Tougher Embargo on Haitian Trade “, New York Times, 7 May 1994. 
The Clinton administration also continued to bolster the sanctions regime with additional targeted measures 
as the summer progressed, though it was criticised for doing so in a sequential and seemingly ad hoc manner, 
which reinforced the sense of an under-considered policy. 
112 White House, “Fact Sheet on Haitian Policy”; Clinton, “Presidential Press Conference on Haitian Policy”. 
113 The only markedly new policy initiative was the announcement of asylum interviews for Haitian refugees, 
but this generated its own problems, as discussed below. 
114 US House of Representatives, “What We Should Do About Haiti”, Congressional Record, 4 May 1994, 
H3020. 
115 Farah, “Aristide’s Backers”. 
 195 
impoverished masses”.116 While restrictions on air travel and visas meant the Haitian elite 
could no longer travel to New York to do their shopping, such restrictions were far from 
comprehensive, and Haitians could still travel to Paris for the same purpose right up until 
August.117 And while the freezing of assets had the potential to target those responsible for 
the political crisis in Haiti, by May of 1994 they had been given ample time to move those 
assets, leaving it an open question quite how effective such measures might be.118 
Of course, like the policies themselves, these failings were not new. What was new, 
however, was that the United States faced an almost total lack of credibility with Haiti’s 
military junta. If, in 1993, the Haitian leaders might have been persuaded that sanctions 
might only be the tip of the iceberg, “the moment the Harlan Country turned around, the 
United States lost all credibility”.119 It was by now clear that the Haitian junta “no longer 
think the Clinton administration is serious about anything they do or say”.120 In this 
context, Haiti’s de facto rulers were unlikely just to “throw up their hands and go”. Rather, 
they were more likely to “continue their sickening game of chicken with the United 
States—clinging to power as the suffering in Haiti goes from terrible to truly horrifying, 
betting that the US will lose its stomach for the embargo before it forces them out”.121 
What was more, the Haitian junta now had another card in their hand as a consequence of 
the only really new element of Clinton’s Haiti policy: asylum hearings for refugees 
intercepted at sea. As Congressman Porter Goss (R-FL) was quick to point out, the policy 
now featured “an explosive combination of tighter sanctions and looser asylum procedures 
likely to spark a new burst of Haitian refugees headed for Florida”.122 Goss’ analysis was 
prescient. As sanctions began to bite, a new wave of Haitian refugees headed for the seas. 
By July, the levels had reached around 800 to 1,000 a day, far more than the ad hoc 
refugee processing procedures could cope with, even as the United States struggled to find 
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third countries willing to take in some of this massive outflow.123 The consequences of the 
burgeoning refugee problem were difficult to predict. As the Haitian junta may have been 
willing to bet, it could very well force the Clinton administration to abandon its failing 
Haiti policy, just as it had abandoned Rwanda. Or it could very well accelerate the United 
States’ search for alternative solutions. 
C. Instrumental Action: The Last Resort 
The problem was, it was very easy to identify the problems with US policy, but much more 
difficult to identify solutions. An obvious solution was military intervention. Most agreed 
that a US military intervention could quickly topple the Haitian junta and its 7,000-strong 
army, but whether a stable democratic climate could be re-established in its place was open 
to question, and few Americans had the stomach for the lengthy occupation of Haiti that 
this might entail. But neither were the alternatives particularly palatable; indeed, few were 
even offered. Some argued that sanctions should simply be given time to work, but there 
was little to suggest that they ever would and, in the meantime, thousands of refugees were 
pouring out of Haiti as the military junta intensified its campaign of political intimidation 
and repression.  
An influential group of Republicans, including former President Bush, Vice-President Dan 
Quayle and National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, suggested that the United States 
should drop its support for Aristide’s return and instead press the Haitian junta for new 
elections with new candidates.124 This approach had the great advantage of removing from 
the equation a man whom many in the US policy community viewed as deeply suspect and 
as a polarising element in Haitian society. By this logic, the Haitian regime might be more 
willing to relinquish power if that did not mean returning power to its nemesis. Haiti’s new 
leader, moreover, might even be a more sympathetic figure towards the United States than 
the radical populist priest. However, the hope that this approach would actually return 
democracy to Haiti rested on the predicate that any new elections in Haiti would be free 
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and fair, which seemed far from likely.125 At the same time, jettisoning Aristide would 
open up the United States to claims of imperialism if it were to simply ignore the 
internationally acclaimed elections of 1990, in which Aristide had won, freely and fairly, 
around 70% of the vote, a position that was hardly in line with its idiographic 
commitments. Equally, it would open the Clinton administration, which had taken this line 
of argument in its support for Aristide from the beginning, up to yet further claims of 
vacillation and lack of resolve, a key idiographic issue. Though tempting, this option was 
hardly realistic and lacked resonance with the dominant identity discourse. 
A more subtle alternative was suggested by Congressman Porter Goss (R-FL), who 
recommended using the Île de la Gonâve, a sparsely inhabited island off the coast of Haiti, 
as a safe haven for Haitian refugees and as a base to which Aristide could be returned and 
from which he could re-establish his government and engineer his own return to power.126 
This option could simultaneously solve the refugee problem and the Aristide problem: 
refugees could make the short crossing to the Île de la Gonâve in far greater safety than the 
longer crossing to the United States (and would no longer be a burden on US immigration); 
and once Aristide conceded to return to this patch of Haitian soil, the restoration of 
democracy would cease to be a US problem, but would be Aristide’s. Of course, there were 
also serious problems with such a plan. The Île de la Gonâve did have a contingent of 
Haiti’s military posted on it. While Haiti lacked an effective navy, and the gulf between the 
island and the mainland could easily be patrolled by US warships, preventing any 
reinforcement, the island would nevertheless have to be occupied by the United States for 
such a plan even to get off the ground. Additionally, the island lacked an adequate supply 
of drinking water and other necessities, meaning the United States would need to establish 
means of provisioning the island over the long-term. Nor was Aristide likely to be 
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enthralled by a plan with such striking similarities to the disastrous Bay of Pigs expedition 
and with such similar prospects for success. The Île de la Gonâve proposal would deflect 
the problem away from US shores, but was unlikely to actually solve it. Nor did it solve 
the United States’ idiographic concerns, particularly the need to re-establish its leadership 
credentials. Though Goss pushed the idea on an almost daily basis in ‘special orders’ on 
the House floor, the Clinton White House seems never to have seriously entertained the 
idea.127 
In this context, “the choices facing the Clinton Administration will be increasingly stark 
and agonizing: to admit defeat and call for a lifting of the embargo, to hold tight and bear 
responsibility for enormous suffering in Haiti with an uncertain prospect of eventual 
‘victory’, or to invade”.128 None of the options were particularly palatable: “[i]ntervention 
would cut against the grain of public and congressional sentiment that the United States 
should not expose its soldiers to danger in small, out-of-the-way places such as Haiti. 
Conversely, a failure to act would undercut further the already low credibility of Clinton’s 
foreign policy.”129  
The Clinton administration had always stressed that it would not rule out the use of force. 
During 1993, it had argued that the use of force was not under serious consideration 
because none of the parties to the Haitian crisis—Aristide included—wanted a solution by 
those means. But, by 1994, Aristide’s tune had changed. Constitutionally barred from 
explicitly calling for intervention, Aristide had nevertheless begun to hint that he would not 
object to such action.130 By May 1994, the Clinton administration had become more vocal 
in its refusal to rule out military force, but it never appeared to be particularly enamoured 
by the idea. Indeed, New York Times columnist William Safire described Clinton’s threat 
of force as “the most nail-nibbling, pusillanimous ‘threat’ ever uttered by a President of the 
United States: ‘we are doing our best to avoid dealing with the military option’”.131 
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Probably the ideal solution for Clinton was to float the idea of intervention in the hope that 
the threat itself would be enough to dislodge the military junta from power. However, 
lacking credibility as he was, this seemed unlikely to bear fruit. Indeed, even as the 
intervention neared, and US plans became more overt and talk of an invasion more 
explicit, the Haitian regime never seemed cowed. As such, it was only at the 11th hour, 
when US warships were already on their way, that the Cedras regime finally became 
convinced that the invasion was really going to happen.132 By then, of course, Clinton had 
already had to convince a sceptical US public that intervention was necessary. 
Such would not be an easy task. While the prospect of military intervention was not 
without support in some sections of US society, opponents of military intervention were far 
more vocal and perhaps even more numerous.133 An illustration of the level of opposition 
the policy faced can be found in the number of amendments or resolutions offered by 
Congress that sought to express opposition to or limit in one way or another the president’s 
ability to use force in Haiti, which ran into double figures over May to September 1994.134 
Though most were defeated, most were also opposed on the constitutional grounds that a 
president’s powers should not be so circumscribed by the US Congress, with many voting 
against the amendments while simultaneously expressing opposition to military 
intervention. One amendment that did pass was the Mitchell (and Others) Amendment of 
29 June 1994, a ‘Sense of the Senate’ resolution (non-binding), which asked the president 
to seek Congressional approval before authorising an invasion of Haiti, which passed 93-
4.135 
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Much of the opposition to a policy of military intervention was based on the president’s 
own formulation of criteria under PDD 25. Many opponents argued that the president 
could not meet his own test for when US troops should be deployed abroad.136 But this 
debate only highlighted the subjectivity of such criteria. Whether one believed that there 
was a US national interest in an invasion of Haiti depended greatly on whether one viewed 
democracy and human rights as central enough concerns of US policy to justify military 
force or mere luxuries, or whether one believed that the restoration of Aristide equated 
with the restoration of democracy. And whether one thought that there was a clearly 
defined exit strategy depended on whether one thought the UN could be depended upon to 
take over the responsibility for nation-building in the aftermath of a US invasion, or 
whether the United States would fall into the same trap it had fallen into in Somalia. Such 
subjectivity only highlighted the concerns of many in the US policy establishment, as 
discussed above, over the efficacy of selective engagement as a guide to US foreign policy. 
The criteria might provide a useful checklist in planning, but selective engagement said 
little enough on its own to be employed as a road map for US foreign policy. There was a 
need to establish some positive values within which such criteria could be applied and, for 
the Clinton administration, this meant the focus on democracy and human rights implied 
by the resurgent universalist dimension to idiographic discourse.  
Nevertheless, the question of whether Haiti could meet the criteria of PDD 25 was clearly 
up for debate, and the Clinton administration also clearly sought to address these issues. 
The possibility of using military force had been floated for a full five months before the 
intervention actually came, leaving plenty of time for contingency planning. As 
Congressman Christopher Cox (R-CA) pointed out: “[t]his is the most preannounced 
invasion in history”.137 The Clinton administration sought and received a UN Security 
Council resolution, Resolution 940, as early as 31 July 1994, a full six weeks before the 
invasion. This resolution authorised a two-phase intervention, in which members of the UN 
would be authorised to intervene forcefully in Haiti to establish a permissive environment, 
following which a nation-building mission would be established under UN auspices, 
                                               
136 See, for example, US House of Representatives, “National Defense Authorization Act”, 23 May 1994; US 
House of Representatives, “National Defense Authorization Act”, 24 May 1994; US Senate, “Foreign 
Operations, Export Financing, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1995”, Congressional Record, 29 
June 1994, S7898; US House of Representatives, “What Needs to be Done about Haiti”, Congressional 
Record, 12 July 1994, H5532; US House of Representatives, “Little Support Noted for Invasion of Haiti”, 
Congressional Record, 22 July 1994, H6111, among others. 
137 US House of Representatives, “Possible United States Invasion of Haiti”, Congressional Record, 12 
September 1994, H9082. 
 201 
providing, at least on paper, for the United States’ exit strategy. And the United States 
spent considerable energies over the summer persuading, cajoling and even pressuring 
allies to join its crusade, such that the components of a replacement force would be in 
readiness well before the intervention even took place.138 Though critics would rightly 
point out that this task was not easy, as there was considerable international ambivalence 
about the prospect of a US intervention, the more important point was that the United 
States was at least making the effort to conduct its due diligence, addressing, if not to 
everybody’s satisfaction, the injunctions of PDD 25. 
What the president did not do, however, was to go to Congress to ask for permission. 
While the Clinton White House stressed it was not necessary to do so, more likely the 
president did not want to face the inevitable congressional opposition such a move would 
have entailed. Though it remained unclear whether the vote would go against Clinton, it 
would have certainly acted as a highly publicised forum for partisan attacks on his foreign 
policy. Key Republicans, especially those with an eye on a potential 1996 presidential 
campaign, had been taking every available opportunity to pillory Clinton. However, in 
some respects, those same critiques may only have reinforced the president’s determination 
to proceed with the invasion of Haiti. For example, former Secretary of Defense and 
presidential hopeful Dick Cheney argued that an “essential quality of leadership in 
statecraft is constancy of purpose”; “[a] President’s most important commodity as 
Commander-in-Chief is his credibility. Bold talk that is never followed up by bold action 
leads our adversaries to conclude we do not have to be taken seriously.”139 Similarly, 
former Secretary of State and presidential hopeful James Baker argued that “[t]he United 
States President should never, never, never, never threaten the use of force unless he is 
prepared to follow up”.140 Both men then went on to argue that the president should not 
follow through on his threat to use force against Haiti. It was no small irony that the logic 
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of both men’s statements might actually strengthen Clinton’s resolve to do just that. The 
horse had already bolted. 
Rather than address Congress and ask for permission to invade Haiti, therefore, the 
president opted instead to address the nation, betting that politics would stop at the water’s 
edge and the nation would rally round on the success of the policy. Though a gamble, it 
was not laid without basis. It was the efficacy and potential costs of an intervention that 
were in question, much more than the ideals behind it. A successful action would do more 
to assuage these concerns than mere words ever could.141 
In his speech, Clinton outlined the interests that the United States had in Haiti, which 
included human rights, democracy, stability in the hemisphere, to secure US borders and to 
“uphold the reliability of the commitments we make, and the commitments others make to 
us”.142 Acknowledging the injunction that the “United States cannot—indeed, we should 
not—be the world’s policeman”, and the fact that “many Americans are reluctant to 
commit military resources and personnel beyond our borders”, the president assured the 
nation that the mission would be “limited and specific” and that “the vast majority of our 
troops will come home in months, not years”.143 Finally, the president said to those who 
“believe that we shouldn’t help the Haitian people recover their democracy and find their 
hard-won freedoms … [that] the same was said of a people who, more than 200 years ago, 
took up arms against a tyrant whose forces occupied their land. But they … fought for their 
freedoms … and a new nation was born—a nation that, ever since, has believed that the 
rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness should be denied to none”.144 The 
president’s speech was an appeal to US identity as it had been articulated (slowly and 
falteringly, to be sure) over the past two years. The speech reflected the injunctions to 
conduct military operations in a discretionary manner, with a full view to the costs, 
objectives and potential pitfalls of any strategy. It also reflected the need for US leadership 
in the post-Cold War world, and the need for that leadership to be reflected itself in the 
credible use of US power in pursuit of US objectives. And, finally, but not least, it 
reflected the enduring power of American ideals such as democracy and human rights to 
guide and shape those objectives. If the integrity of this vision of America’s role in the 
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world was to be maintained, the United States must be prepared to make the hard choice to 
intervene in Haiti. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, the Haiti case was certainly the most complex 
of those considered in this thesis. In Somalia and Rwanda, we were able to identify the 
dominance of clearly universalist and particularist identities, respectively, which defined 
the context within which action took place along the lines posited by the theory outlined in 
Chapters 3 and 4. In both case studies, the content of the identities appeared relatively clear 
and, while contestation took place, a single clearly articulated identity was dominant at the 
crucial point in the causal chain. In Haiti, conversely, we see a much more complex 
idiographic context within which action took place, in which the contents of identities were 
never well articulated and contestation continued right up until the time of the decision. 
Elements of both universalism and particularism were present in US idiographic discourse 
over this time period, and there was considerable oscillation between the relative strengths 
of these strains of thinking. In the first period in early 1993, universalism dominated, but 
there was a burgeoning particularist element to US idiographic debate, which gained in 
force as the year drew on. In the second period between 1993 and 1994, the shocks from 
Mogadishu and Port-au-Prince jarred the United States violently towards the particularist 
end of the spectrum. By May–September 1994, the United States was slowly re-
establishing a more balanced idiography, and universalism again came to the fore. In this 
context, the foreign policy decision here seems as much an effort to re-assert a flagging 
identity as the inevitable outcome of an overwhelming identity discourse, but the process 
appears no less driven by identity. Nevertheless, though it would not be unreasonable to 
characterise the Haiti intervention as more universalist than particularist, the idiographic 
context was clearly mixed, suggesting that the universalism–particularism divide should be 
treated less as a dichotomy and more as a continuum, a point that will be addressed in more 
detail in the following chapter. 
The impact of critical junctures is also more marked than in the previous case studies. The 
events of October 1993 are the most glaring example of the ways in which events can 
significantly and, in some cases, dramatically alter the direction of the causal chain, but, in 
identifying this fact, we should not overlook the importance of the events of early 1994, 
which, though less dramatic, clearly pulled the United States back to consideration of a 
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problem it had equally clearly wished to wash its hands of, and, in the process, presented 
the United States with a dilemma it might be forced to solve in a manner it had no great 
desire to commit to. Though confirming the importance of critical junctures in causal 
chains, this also raises questions about the identification of such critical junctures, a point 
that will also be discussed in the following chapter. 
In a related vein, the issue of sequentiality comes to the fore as being of critical 
importance. The discourses that dictated non-intervention in Rwanda also held in respect 
of one of the periods in the Haiti case study. At the time, these had a similar effect: to 
cause the United States to shrink from any form of serious engagement with the crisis at 
hand. However, in Haiti, this period had been preceded by a period of stronger engagement 
with the issue, and many of the positions and ideas established in that phase remained in 
currency despite the move to greater particularism. As such, the particularist argument had 
greater hurdles to overcome in establishing its dominance. Moreover, once universalism 
began to creep back in to US idiographic debate, there was already a strong foundation 
upon which to build an argument for greater involvement in Haiti, a fact that served to 
make the case for intervention in Haiti much stronger much sooner. Finally, the very 
limited time period within which US policy-makers were engaged with the question of 
Rwanda further circumscribed the possibilities for a universalist discourse to take hold. It 
is perhaps notable that by late July, the United States had authorised a relief mission to 
alleviate the suffering of refugees from the Rwandan genocide, featuring troops, equipment 
and relief supplies at a significant cost.145 Of course, by the time this took place, the 
genocide was over, but many expressed regret that such efforts had not been mobilised 
sooner.146 The timing of the two crises may therefore have much to offer in terms of 
explaining the differences in the response. 
Finally, the case study confirms once again the point raised in the Rwanda case study that 
idiography influences the ways in which interests, even if rhetorically consistent, take on 
their meaning. The shift in the meaning of an interest in human rights and democracy 
under the shift in idiography between October 1993 and May 1994 mirrors the disjuncture 
between the treatment of human rights concerns in Somalia in 1992 versus Rwanda in 
early 1994.  
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Collectively, the case study chapters provide important support for the theory developed in 
the first part of this thesis. But they also provide a number of opportunities for reflection 
on the ways in which we should conceive of many of the theoretical precepts outlined in 
that first part. In the final chapter, I will use examples from the case study chapters to draw 
out some of these findings in a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the approach 




Identity under Audit: From Theory to Practice and Back 
Again 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The preceding three chapters established promising levels of support for the theory 
outlined in Chapters 3 and 4. Perhaps more importantly, however, the application of the 
abstract principles of the theory to three concrete cases also raised a number of important 
theoretical points that develop our understanding of the principles of the theory as first 
derived. There is much that we can learn from the application of theory to subject matter, 
and this chapter will draw out the insights from the empirical portion of this thesis. 
The second section will look at the utility of identity as a theoretical concept. One of the 
great advantages of the scientific realist identity-based model is that it allows us to work 
free from a priori assumptions about the types of data with which we may be concerned 
and, consequently, with the types of explanation that are admissible. At the same time, 
such flexibility also poses dangers for the viability of the concept of identity itself. If 
identity is capable of subsuming different types of data and producing complex and 
context-specific explanations, how are we to limit the parameters of identity such that it 
does not become bloated and of little utility? Similarly, if identity is multidimensional and 
fluid, can we rely on its validity as a conceptual tool at all? Finally, this section will look 
deeper into the multidimensionality of identity, and consider how adopting different levels 
of abstraction may be of more or less utility in our research methods. 
In the third section, this chapter will examine the viability of the framework of analysis 
adopted in this thesis. In many respects, this framework provided a robust vehicle for the 
analysis, as it allowed us to identify the causal complexes at work in a manner in which a 
simple ‘identity equals action’ equation could not hope to do. The importance of 
identifying different levels of discourse—particularly at the purposive and instrumental 
levels—was a sustained feature of the empirical chapters. At the same time, this elevation 
of intervening variables raises the question of the relative importance of the components of 
the analytical structure. In other words, how much value is added by an identity-based 
approach, rather than a more classical approach that focuses on the nexus between interest 
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and policy? Similarly, the precise nature of the nexus between identity and subordinate 
levels of discourse is worthy of further examination. Here, the question of variability again 
raises its head. Beyond the question of causal pathways and critical junctures, which will 
be discussed in Section IV, what kind of change can we account for within the parameters 
of the framework itself? Or, in other words, what is the inter-relationship between the 
levels of discourse and how do they influence each others’ development?  
A final set of insights relate to the concepts of sequentiality and causal pathways. A 
recurrent feature of the empirical studies was the identification of several phases of 
decision-making, demarcated by critical junctures. The recurrence of critical junctures 
raises difficult counterfactual questions about the contingency of causal outcomes. 
Anathema to positivists, contingency is embraced as a social reality by scientific realists. 
Nevertheless, if contingent causal analysis is to be theoretically useful, it is important to 
distinguish between the general and the specific, or between what may hold over a range of 
cases and what is unique to a particular case. Another important issue to address in this 
context is the question of what constitutes a critical juncture. The cases analysed evidence 
a range of different types of critical juncture, rendering a definition of the concept difficult. 
Finally, I will look at the conception of agency adopted in this research, and reflect on its 
utility for wider research. The evidence from the case studies provides significant support 
for the organic conception adopted here, as do speculations on the future direction such 
research might take. 
II. IDENTITY IN CRISIS 
A. A Bridge Over Troubled Water: Identity as Via Media 
The preceding chapters establish identity as a useful organising concept within which to 
conduct foreign policy analysis. In each of the analyses, policy outcomes were arrived at 
that were consistent with—indeed, driven by—dominant interpretations of identity. At the 
same time, policies that were inconsistent with these identities were rejected or revised. 
However, beyond these important correlations, the adoption of identity as the independent 
variable also fulfilled another important theoretical role: it allowed us to evaluate 
competing explanations for policy within a coherent overall framework. Oftentimes, 
ontological, epistemological or axiological anxieties (see Chapter 3) have precluded such 
consideration of alternative explanations, as the explanations themselves, or the factors on 
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which they are based, are either rejected, discounted, distorted or ignored on a priori meta-
theoretical grounds. One of the great strengths of the constructivist/scientific realist 
approach is that it provides a ‘via media’ such that these alternative explanations are not 
only admissible but may be embraced. The empirical chapters provide important support 
for such an approach. 
In each of the case study chapters, I identified a number of alternative explanations that 
had previously been voiced for the policies in the empirical cases. These reflected a range 
of arguments, including humanitarianism, humanitarian fatigue, the CNN effect, domestic 
politics, national security, credibility, democratic activism and refugee flows, each of 
which followed a different logic of appropriateness, and among which there is a clear 
admixture between ideational and material factors.1 The empirical chapters, furthermore, 
provided support for the contentions made by almost all of the arguments. At the same 
time, however, none appeared to be satisfactory either on their own or in a non-
theoretically based combination. Crucially, however, a mode of explanation based upon 
identity as the key independent variable was able to not only deal with this panoply of 
factors, but tie them together into a coherent theoretical whole that provided a more robust 
explanation of the consequent political action. This capacity constitutes a key advantage to 
the theory developed in this thesis.  
The key mechanism by which this was made possible was through the conceptualisation of 
identity formation as a continuous process of articulation in terms of content and 
contestation (see Chapter 4). None of the alternative explanations forwarded could explain 
the policy outcomes in isolation. However, the effect that they could—and often did—have 
was to prompt reflection on specific elements of discourse and allow for reflections on the 
integrity of those discourses, their relevance to identity needs and their resonance with 
other levels of discourse. At times, they also served as a focal point for contestation over 
the content of identities themselves.  
This latter mechanism, meanwhile, highlights the fact that identities are, in many senses, 
inherently unstable. They represent not monolithic conceptions of a state’s foreign policy 
role, but structural possibilities within which re-articulation and rejection are equally as 
important as articulation and affirmation. The range of factors that may prompt such re-
evaluations are potentially infinite in the same way that identities themselves are 
                                               
1 Or at least material factors commonly understood; see Chapter 3. 
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potentially infinite. This contingency means that the evolution of identities will be 
impossible to accurately predict. The best we can do is seek to understand the various 
manifestations of identity as they evolve, and then seek explanations based on these 
understandings. Such a recognition is not only borne out by the empirical record, but also 
represents a key understanding of the scientific realist approach that social systems are 
‘open systems’ that are subject to such change.2 
B. A House Built on Sand? Continuity and Change in Identity Discourse 
This openness, however, raises questions about the viability of identity as a theoretical 
concept. If identities are variable and subject to (sometimes drastic) change (under the 
influence of a potentially infinite number of subjects), how much integrity does the concept 
itself actually retain? This question is given added impetus by the findings of the case 
study chapters, which showed considerable variation in the content of US identity 
discourse over an extremely short period of time. The shift from a clearly universalist 
identity that precipitated a humanitarian intervention in Somalia in late 1992 to a clearly 
particularist identity that precluded a humanitarian intervention in Rwanda in early 1994 
appeared at first to be more like a revolution than an evolution. Though the modalities of 
this shift are accounted for in the empirical analysis itself, even advocates of an identity-
based approach may ask how such variation can be accommodated without tacit admission 
that the concept of identity is largely hollow.  
A superficial response would be to point to the time period upon which the study focuses: 
in the immediate post-Cold War era, ideas about how to engage with the wider world were 
clearly in flux, especially in the United States. With the Cold War over, US policy-makers 
needed to identify new paradigms for American engagement with the world, which were 
often hesitant, sometimes poorly thought through and regularly contested. This process 
was at its zenith during the period considered in the case study chapters. It is therefore 
highly probable that identity formulations during this period may have been far less stable 
than at other periods in history, such as the apparently more stable Cold War era, a fact that 
was often ruefully commented upon by American politicians themselves.  
While not without merit, such an argument would require further evidence than that 
provided by this thesis itself, though anecdotal support may be found in the wider 
                                               
2 See Patomaki and Wight, “After Postpositivism”. 
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literature. What the evidence in this thesis does provide, however, is support for the notion 
that, though there was significant variation in the dominant identities, the parameters of 
idiographic debate remained broadly consistent. Though the dominant US identity 
discourse in 1992 (see Chapter 5) emphasised the internationalist role of the United States, 
a strong nationalist discourse of identity was also present, though ultimately sidelined. 
Likewise, though a strong particularist discourse dominated proceedings in early 1994 (see 
Chapter 6), it was not unopposed by a universalist current of dissent. The continuity of US 
idiographic concerns was most evident in the Haiti case study, despite the fact that this 
case also demonstrated the greatest variation. The elements of assertive multilateralism, 
selective engagement and pragmatic idealism were all largely the same. The contest was 
over the weight and structure to be granted to the component parts. 
If, as suggested in Chapter 4, states or other entities always have multiple identities, these 
identities are likely to gain prominence or fall from people’s estimation depending on a 
wide range of factors. What is most notable about the identity formulations in the empirical 
portion of this thesis is not so much the variation in identity, but the stability of the 
conceptual building blocks upon which these identities were based. Certain themes, such as 
the leadership role of the United States, were common to virtually all of the identity 
representations. Others, such as the humanitarian ethic of responsibility, were ever present 
but rose and fell and shifted in meaning in different contexts. In a similar vein, the 
rhetorical language used to convey ideas about identity showed significant stability. 
Identity representations were regularly couched in terms that related to American history 
and values, including numerous references to such enduring landmarks as the Declaration 
of Independence or the Statue of Liberty. Likewise, certain key phrases, such as “the 
world’s policeman”, “moral authority”, “quagmire”, etc., remained in currency throughout, 
oftentimes long after the idiographic discourse with which they had first been associated 
had been supplanted. This evidence points towards a long history of US identity 
contestation based on broadly similar themes or, in other words, on enduring American 
values, however contradictory at times those values may be. Though the evidence in this 
thesis can only speak to the idiographic discourse in this period of US history, works such 
as Walter Russell Mead’s Special Providence lend outward support to such an analysis.3 
                                               
3 Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World (Alfred Knopf, New 
York, 2003). 
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This identification of the continuity and change in identity representations lends credence 
to many of the arguments forwarded in Chapter 3 on the scientific realist approach to 
structure, agency and causation. The criticism leveled against epiphenomenalist 
approaches that derive conceptions of agency from a priori understandings of the nature of 
structure (or vice versa) suggested that this can often lead to an uncritical and often static 
conception of both. Thus, most notably, neorealist and neoliberal conceptions of agency, it 
was argued, posit a Hobbesian conception of the nature of agency, which, given that the 
structural features upon which the analysis is based are constants, is viewed as an 
immutable fact of political life. The identification in the empirical cases of clear and 
sometimes even major variation in state identity problematises this assumption. Even if 
neorealists are right much of the time that states pursue a Hobbesian agenda—and they 
may well be—the incidence in this thesis of alternative agendas that cannot be fitted into 
such a framework suggests that there is much of interest that will remain beyond the grasp 
of such a static theory.  
At the other end of the spectrum from epiphenomenalist approaches to the agency–
structure debate, Chapter 3 engaged with post-structuralist notions of structuration. This 
approach argues that agency and structure are so tightly mutually constitutive that they in 
fact constitute an indivisible whole. The identification of significant continuities in identity 
formation problematises this assumption too. If identity is always a de novo articulation, 
which bears no intrinsic connection to prior formulations, then one would expect to see 
little in the way of structural constraints upon radical deviations from prior identity 
formulations. The case study chapters show that nothing could be further from the truth. 
The development of US identity between 1992 and 1994 did indeed undergo significant 
deviation, but these deviations were evolutions rather than revolutions, and were based 
upon pre-existing articulations of US identity. Moreover, significant resistance was 
apparent to identities that sought to break too radically with the past, and consistent modes 
of articulation showed that the formulation of US identity was seen as a continuous 
process—contested, no doubt, but along consistent lines—stretching back as far and 
further than the Declaration of Independence. This identification of a continuous tradition 
in identity formation, and an enduring structural reservoir of ideas about identity, also 
affirms the argument made in Chapter 3 on the possibility of identity-based causal analysis. 
Given that we are able to identify identity articulations that are both prior to and 
functionally independent from foreign policy action, the conditions of causality are not 
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violated. Foreign policy actions may represent a significant mode of identity articulation, 
but those identities exist prior to and independent from the actions themselves. 
C. The Fox or the Hedgehog? The Dimensions of Identity 
These are useful insights, but they also raise methodological questions about the modes by 
which identity-based analysis should be pursued. If we are to embrace both continuity and 
change, how best can we capture both within a coherent theoretical framework? Or, in 
other words, how far towards the abstract should we be prepared to move in order to 
capture continuities, and how far towards the concrete in order to capture change? 
This thesis began with the proposition that we could analyse foreign policy roles along two 
dimensions: universalism and particularism. This approach represented a move to a high 
level of abstraction. Though the analysis did indeed follow these lines, the case studies 
nevertheless threw up much more concrete conceptions of identity, such as the ‘new world 
order’, ‘assertive multilateralism’, etc. Between these highly abstract and highly concrete 
positions, there is a world of possibility in terms of the level of abstraction that might have 
been adopted. Alexander Wendt, for example, suggests that we might analyse identity 
along three lines—Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian.4 Walter Russell Mead, in contrast, 
argues for the analysis of US foreign policy along four dimensions: Hamiltonianism, 
Wilsonianism, Jeffersonianism and Jacksonianism.5 Both may provide useful alternatives 
to the approach adopted here.  
In attempting to resolve this dilemma of the abstract versus the concrete, however, I 
suggest we should be guided by the scientific realist injunction to allow the research 
question to dictate the research methods. Greater abstraction may be more useful for 
certain types of work than others. Wendt’s typology may be particularly useful for 
addressing questions of identity and system change over a long historical period and 
encompassing a diverse group of states and issue areas. Mead’s typology may provide a 
more useful basis for analysing US foreign policy than a more abstract conception, but 
may prove less applicable to other cultures or systems. And a highly concrete conception 
of identity may be most useful in seeking to explain specific foreign policy actions with a 
level of sophistication that the abstract cannot provide.  
                                               
4 Wendt, Social Theory. 
5 Mead, Special Providence. 
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The empirical application of identity theory in this case study adopted a balance between 
the abstract and the concrete. The question asked at the beginning of the thesis was not 
how may we explain foreign policy in general or, indeed, how may we explain US foreign 
policy in particular, but how may we explain humanitarian intervention as a foreign policy 
practice? Though US foreign policy was chosen as a suitable site to commence this 
examination, the United States has not been the only nation or entity to engage in 
humanitarian intervention, and it was therefore desirable to adopt a programme capable of 
moving beyond the study of US policy (see below). Likewise, though there is much that is 
applicable to foreign policy and international relations theory more generally in this thesis, 
it was also desirable to tailor the approach as much as possible to the subject matter. 
The universalism–particularism differential provided a useful dimension along which to 
view approaches to humanitarian intervention, which was justified by a review of the 
existing literature. This pre-sentiment was borne out by the application of the theory to the 
case studies. The theory predicted that policies of humanitarian intervention are more 
likely to be undertaken on the basis of universalist than particularist identities. This 
proposition seemed all but proved on the basis of the Somalia and Rwanda case studies. 
The Haiti case study provided a more difficult test, however. In this case, the identity that 
was articulated showed elements of both universalism and particularism. Though 
universalism in the end appeared the stronger element of the two, the enduring particularist 
undercurrent was impossible to ignore. This finding strongly suggests the importance of 
viewing such principles as lying on a continuum rather than as a dichotomy. It has been 
argued throughout that entities may have multiple identities, that these identities may be 
more or less salient in different issue areas, and that they may be more or less prominent or 
popular at different times or in different circumstances. It is no great stretch, therefore, to 
suggest that more or less extreme versions of certain identities may be articulated, as well 
as identities that draw upon more than one tradition.  
Thus, though abstract principles may be of great use in making general statements about 
certain classes of action, they may be too unwieldy to explain specific events. If identities 
may be articulated in different forms, they will inevitably deviate from any preconceived 
notions of ideal form. But this is hardly a shortcoming. The ability to trace the contours of 
specific discourses of identity allows us to derive a more specific set of policy 
prescriptions than would ever be possible if we were to restrict ourselves to ideal forms. 
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This proposition comes out very clearly from the case study analysis. The delineation of 
specific idiographic doctrines allowed us to more carefully examine the logics of 
appropriateness in each case, and, thus, the possibilities for action or inaction. 
III. FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS 
A. A Moveable Feast? The Context of Meaning 
These reflections bring us to a consideration of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
framework of analysis adopted in the research. As noted above, it was possible to identify 
significant variation in the identities that developed during the period under consideration. 
In contrast, however, many of the interests that were articulated over the same period were 
relatively constant. This analysis raises the question whether, despite the argument made 
above that continuity and change represents a strength rather than a weakness of the 
approach, if interests may remain relatively stable while identity varies, would a 
concentration on interests rather than identity then provide equally powerful and more 
parsimonious leverage on the questions at hand?  
Many mainstream scholars would answer in the affirmative. Lord Palmerston’s famous 
remark that “Britain does not have permanent allies, only permanent interests” has long 
informed much realist thought on international relations theory. However, as noted in 
Chapter 3, not all realists are so sanguine about the immutability of interests, and they are 
right to be so. I argued in Chapter 3 that there is much variation in interests as a result of 
variation in the ideational factors that in fact constitute many so-called ‘material’ interests. 
Indeed, even interests that remain constant in a superficial sense may vary significantly in 
the meaning they have for actors as the ideational context within which they are interpreted 
itself varies. 
This point comes out very clearly indeed from the empirical analysis. The dominant 
interest that ran through all of the case studies was an interest in human rights. Such 
dominance, of course, is hardly surprising given the subject matter, and merits no 
conclusions as to where human rights considerations rank in the panoply of a state’s 
interests. What is more interesting is the different meanings that the interest in human 
rights had in different idiographical contexts. In the US approach to Somalia, the human 
rights concern was vested in the context of a universalist commitment to engagement in the 
world. As a consequence, human rights concerns were couched in empathetical language, 
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with the obvious corollary that the United States had an interest in preventing or limiting 
the continuation of such suffering. In the US approach to Rwanda, however, though human 
rights concerns were equally prominent, they were articulated in the context of a much 
more conservative, particularist identity, featuring considerable scepticism about the ability 
of outside nations to influence human rights situations within other countries. As such, the 
human rights issues became recast as ‘ancient ethnic hatreds’—tragic, to be sure, but 
nevertheless an unfortunate feature of the ugly new world order that was not amenable to 
simple solutions. In Haiti, the context sensitivity of interests is even more apparent. In 
early 1993, the United States identified an interest in human rights that dictated a 
(conservative) long-term policy to alleviate suffering. By late 1993, however, the position 
was more like the dictum ‘first, do no harm’. Human rights remained an interest for the 
United States, but it was best secured through a hands-off policy. By late 1994, however, 
as idealism returned to the ascendancy, Americans could no longer tolerate the death by a 
thousand cuts taking place so near to their shores, and a new policy became not only 
possible, but necessary. Situating interests in the ideational context of identity discourse 
allowed the analysis to discern these shifts and confirms the importance of identity as the 
key independent variable in the analysis. 
B. A Four Part Harmony: The Resonance of Discourse 
Of course, policy-makers themselves don’t explicitly talk or think in terms of identities and 
levels of discourse. How do we then explain the process by which certain discursive claims 
are evaluated against identity needs, and thus validated or rejected? In Chapter 4, I raised 
the importance of resonance between levels of discourse, and this seems a viable approach. 
If a lower level of discourse has a positive synergy with the dominant identity discourse, its 
precepts resonate with the identity discourse and it is more likely to survive. In short, such 
discourses ‘feel right’. In contrast, discourses that have negative synergies with the identity 
discourse will ‘feel wrong’ and will likely be subjected to re-examination, revision and 
even rejection. In a similar vein, some discourses may not even begin to be articulated if 
they do not cohere with an overriding identity discourse, as the type of thinking they 
embody is simply too far ‘out of the box’. 
This is not to say that discourses that establish such resonance are the most effective 
approach to a given problem, but rather that they have a high level of coherence with 
prevailing ideas about how the state should behave in the world. Identities, no more or less 
 216 
than interests or policies themselves, may or may not provide the most appropriate means 
for dealing with a given issue. But they do structure the ways in which we think about 
problems, rendering certain discourses more or less likely to gain traction.  
This represents a serious deviation from the rational choice model of decision-making. 
Under rationalism, agents are supposed to identify ends first and then adopt the most 
effective possible means to achieve them. The notion of resonance problematises this 
assumption. Effective means of approaching a situation may be rejected out of hand if they 
do not cohere with a given identity discourse. Thus, for example, critics were quick to 
point out that the humanitarian relief operation undertaken to alleviate the suffering of 
Rwanda refugees in the aftermath of the crisis there was far more costly and far less 
effective than an immediate intervention at the outset of the crisis—or even before—would 
ever have been.6 However, in the idiographic context of early 1994, such a response was 
unthinkable and never appears to have been seriously considered (see Chapter 6).  
IV. CAUSAL PATHWAYS 
A. The Butterfly Effect: the Role of Critical Junctures 
The introduction of the notion of path analysis was a key theoretical move in the context of 
this thesis. Representing the idea that policy outcomes are rarely the product of single 
decisions, but rather of chains of decisions, and that certain events may cause deviance in 
these chains, path analysis proved to play a key role in the explanations of the cases that 
were examined. The advantages of this approach, however, are balanced by the difficulties 
of applying it. Introducing the notions of path analysis and critical junctures also implies 
the introduction of counterfactuals into the analysis. We are forced, therefore, to ask 
whether, had a certain event or occurrence not taken place, would the policy outcome still 
have been the same? This is an uncomfortable question for most causal theorists. Richard 
Ned Lebow describes counterfactuals as ‘forbidden fruit’, as they introduce notions of 
                                               
6 See, for example, Atwood, “Suddenly, Chaos”; US Senate, “Preventing Future Rwandas”. It should also be 
noted in this context, however, that governments have never been particularly far-sighted in terms of their 
approach to conflict prevention, which, though many scholars agree is a far more cost-effective method of 
crisis management, nevertheless is often eschewed in the hopes that conflicts will right themselves on their 
own and never develop beyond the ‘early warning signs’. See Ward, “NGOs Acting as IGOs: Alternative 
Mechanisms for Direct Conflict Management”, in Weller and Wolff (eds.), Institutions for the Management 
of Ethnopolitical Conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe (Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 2008), 219-244; 
Lund, “The Impact of Conflict Prevention Policy: Cases, Measures, Assessments”, Conflict Prevention 
Network Yearbook (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2000); Carment and Schnabel, Conflict Prevention: Path to Peace 
or Grand Illusion? (United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 2003). 
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contingency to causal analysis, anathema to most positivists, as well as threatening more 
holistic approaches to the study of international relations, in which the identification of 
regularities are the order of the day.7  
In regard to the first of these problems, though positivists may reject contingency as an 
unacceptable infringement on the Humean conception of causality as constant conjunctions 
of events, scientific realists do not share this anxiety. As I discussed in Chapter 3, scientific 
realists take a different view of causality, which emphasises the importance of causal 
complexes and embraces contingency as an incontrovertible fact of social life. 
Nevertheless, though contingency is hardly forbidden fruit, the threat to holistic theory 
remains. Due to the acceptance of contingency, scientific realism is antipathetic to notions 
of ‘grand’ theory. It is simply not theoretically possible to reduce the complexity of social 
life to a simple set of propositions that brook no deviation, as the range of factors that may 
intervene on those propositions are potentially infinite. So, too, therefore, are the possible 
outcomes. At the same time, however, scientific realists do not reject out of hand the 
possibility of regularities. Without the presence of at least some regularity, indeed, it would 
be hard to conceive of the notion of a science at all. We would be left only with 
understanding; explanation would be precluded. This position, of course, reflects the 
extreme post-structuralist standpoint, which I have discussed in Chapter 3, and shares its 
difficulties. 
We are left, therefore, with the need to establish theory in a context where outcomes lie 
somewhere between being law-like regularities and being absolutely unique. In a certain 
sense, of course, every outcome is indeed unique. At the same time, however, certain 
classes of action may contain more or less regular features, which we may identify as 
general trends. The stability or instability of such trends is an empirical question, and will 
vary depending on the subject matter. As such, scientific realist causal analysis can never 
be predictive. We can never say with certainty that ‘if x, then y’, because a whole host of 
(contingent) intervening variables remain to be accounted for.  
In this thesis, I posited at the outset that the presence of a universalist identity increased the 
likelihood of policies of humanitarian intervention being adopted. This contention was 
borne out by the case studies and represents an identifiable regularity. At the same time, 
                                               
7 See Lebow, Forbidden Fruit: Counterfactuals and International Relations (Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, forthcoming 2010).  
 218 
however, critical junctures played a key role in each of the cases, and it is very easy to 
imagine situations in which, had these critical junctures not emerged, or had other critical 
junctures intervened, the outcomes might have been different. We are therefore unable to 
say that the presence of a universalist identity necessarily determine a policy of 
humanitarian intervention or, indeed, that its absence necessarily precludes such a policy. 
In this sense, we may conceive of causality as being driven by insufficient but non-
redundant parts of an unnecessary but sufficient (INUS) condition, a notion that has been 
embraced within the scientific realist literature.8 
B. The Angle of Repose: the Nature of Critical Junctures 
If we accept the importance of critical junctures for causal analysis, with all the difficulties 
that entails for predictive theory, we must then establish what exactly we mean by a critical 
juncture. A common phraseology, which I have adopted at times, is to refer to critical 
junctures in terms of ‘shocks’. The language of ‘shocks’ suggests some kind of violent 
interruption of the causal pathway. Sometimes, this is the case—obvious examples are 
provided by the events of October 1993 in Somalia and Haiti, or by the assassination of 
Rwandan President Habyarimana. These dramatic and unanticipated events clearly came as 
a ‘shock’ to the prevailing approaches to policy at the time, and precipitated a significant 
change in the established causal path.  
But not all critical junctures manifest as ‘shocks’ in this sense. In the Somalia case study, 
for example, I identified a critical juncture in early July 1992. However, this critical 
juncture was not a dramatic or shocking event; indeed, it was not even a single event. 
Rather, it was a series of more minor events, which combined to significantly influence the 
causal pathway (see Chapter 5). Such concatenations of events may perhaps more usefully 
be described as ‘tipping points’ than ‘shocks’, but their effects may be equally dramatic.9 
That both ‘shocks’ and ‘tipping points’ may have important effects on causal pathways is 
abundantly clear from the case studies, in which important shifts are precipitated by both. 
                                               
8 This observation draws on the work of John Mackie, who introduced the notion of INUS conditions to 
account for problems in the Humean conception of causal regularities. See Mackie, “Causes and Conditions”, 
2(4) American Philosophical Quarterly (1965), 1-20. The conception of INUS conditions has been embraced, 
though not always uncritically, within the scientific realist school of thought. See, in particular, Kurki, 
Causation in International Relations (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008); Patomaki, After 
International Relations; Collier, Critical Realism. 
9 For an analysis that adopts the notion of tipping points in this sense, see Finnemore and Sikkink, 
“International Norm Dynamics”. 
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The identification of at least two classes of interposition does, however, pose problems of 
identification in that some critical junctures may be obvious, others may be innocuous, and 
sometimes the former may transpire to have weaker effects than the latter. As such, how 
can we know a critical juncture when we see one? 
From a materialist perspective, one would expect to treat critical junctures in terms of the 
juncture itself. For example, John Ikenberry, speaking of moments of systemic change, 
argues that “historical junctures … come at dramatic moments of upheaval … when the old 
order has been destroyed by war and newly powerful states try to re-establish basic 
organizing principles”.10 Underlying Ikenberry’s argument is the notion that the “dramatic 
moments of upheaval” “telegraph material incentives” to the “newly powerful states”, who 
then “try to re-establish basic organizing principles”. In other words, the key step is to 
identify the “historical junctures” themselves. Once this task is achieved, the logic of 
anarchy does the rest of the work. However, this approach still leaves us with the problem 
of identifying the juncture itself, a task that may not always be easy.  
More importantly, however, a materialist approach fails to capture what is critically 
important: the meanings such events have for actors themselves. The Mogadishu incident 
of October 1993 provides a useful illustration in this context. Following this episode, the 
United States drew back from engagement with the world, as US policy-makers decided 
that the deaths of 18 US soldiers was too high a price to pay for stability in Somalia. This 
reaction appears fairly axiomatic. Yet it is not difficult to imagine a scenario in which 
America reacted differently, viewing the deaths of its soldiers as a slight to its military 
prowess and sending reinforcements to engage in an intensified intervention against the 
perpetrators. Indeed, such an outcome was far more plausible than many conventional 
accounts might suggest. When four US soldiers died in Mogadishu in August 1993, the 
reactions of many (though certainly not all) US policy-makers, including Clinton, was to 
argue for intensified reprisals, and significant reinforcements were dispatched.11  
                                               
10 Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars 
(Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2001). See Widmaier, Blyth and Seabrooke, “Exogenous Shocks” for 
further discussion. 
11 See, for example, Duke, “President Promises ‘Appropriate’ Response: Clinton Rebuts Criticism of Somalia 
Mission”, Washington Post, 9 August 1994; Holmes, “US May Send Commandos To Hunt for Somali 
Warlord”, New York Times, 11 August 1994; Washington Post, “Testing Time in Somalia”, Washington Post, 
11 August 1994. See also Johnson and Tierney, Failing to Win: Perceptions of Victory and Defeat in 
International Politics (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2006), for an analysis of how the entire 
Somalia mission came to be perceived as a failure, despite its identifiable successes. 
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It was crucially the interpretation of the agents themselves that gave the critical juncture of 
October 1993 its meaning, and these interpretations cannot be ignored if we are to fully 
comprehend the import of such critical junctures. As such, though there will inevitably be 
difficulties in identifying critical junctures, we may perhaps best proceed by focusing first 
on the understandings of actors themselves within a structural context. The first sign of 
critical junctures may indeed be their effects themselves: divergences from dominant 
discourses or resistance to established modes of thinking. From there we can more 
effectively identify the interpretations of events upon which such deviations are based, 
including junctures that are less immediately obvious. 
The morphogenetic approach to social analysis provides us with a useful set of tools in this 
regard. By adopting the morphogenetic approach, we are able to first identify the structural 
factors that condition agents to act in particular ways, through logics of appropriateness. 
We are then able to identify the ways in which agents interpret critical junctures on the 
basis of these structurally derived conditioning effects, before examining the consequences 
such interpretations have for the re-elaboration of structure in the final phase. This 
approach appears to constitute a crucially important mode of analysis, not just in respect of 
critical junctures, but in terms of approaches to continuity and change, and the formation of 
policies in international politics more generally.  
C. The Devil is in the Details: the Constitution of Agency 
A final point that should be considered in this context is the nature of agency itself. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, there is a long tradition in international relations research that treats 
the state ‘as if’ it is a unitary rational actor. However, though the state remained the 
primary unit of analysis in this thesis,12 it was not considered to be a unitary rational actor, 
but was treated in a more organic sense. An analysis based on identity suggests a role for 
wider interest groups than simply those in power at any given time. Though this latter 
group is in a powerful position to influence the development of identity, identity is a 
function of collective perceptions of self among all members of the political community, 
and robust analysis necessitates a focus on more than just executive deliberation. At the 
same time, some groups will be more influential than others in driving idiographic debate, 
                                               
12 Though other options would be entirely possible and perhaps even desirable (see below). 
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and parsimony suggests a strong analysis should focus on the critical elements of 
idiographic debate without losing too much focus to extraneous data.  
In this context, the research looked primarily at three sources of idiographic discourse: the 
executive, the legislature and the media. This decision was strongly borne out by the 
findings of the case studies. At various points, we were able to identify strong influences 
from each of these groups. In Somalia, the tone for idiographic debate was set by the 
executive, but it was Congress that most forcefully tied this debate into consideration of 
Somalia in particular, and the news media that prompted reflection on the integrity of this 
identity as it was being put into practice. Similar patterns emerged from the other case 
studies. In Rwanda, the executive, Congress and the media appeared in lockstep at first, but 
as the debate developed, both Congress and the media began to increasingly resist the 
executive discourse. Ultimately, this was not enough to change policy, but it did begin a 
process of re-articulation, which significantly influenced the idiographic terrain in late 
1994, in which the Haiti intervention took place. In the Haiti case study itself, there was 
evidence of an unstable idiography, which was buffeted one way and the other by 
Congressional and media discourse through 1993 and early 1994, but by late 1994, the 
executive had once again moved out in front in terms of its articulation of US identity. 
These findings provide strong support for the notion of a broad base for understanding the 
sources of identity. Indeed, depending on the circumstances, one might want to widen the 
base even further. Though attention was paid to the role of human rights organisations and 
advocacy groups, it was generally assumed that these groups used the news media as a 
vehicle for the dissemination of their views. An analysis that looks at contemporary 
peacekeeping policy, for example, might wish to revise this assumption. The advent of 
social networking groups has in many ways changed the ways in which people think about 
exchanging information. A small but relevant part of this amazing outgrowth is the 
incidence of online advocacy groups, some new, some old using new techniques. Groups 
such as Amnesty International, the Genocide Intervention Network, Avaaz and many more 
now run online campaigns in which interested parties can donate, sign petitions and take 
myriad other actions in support of one or other policies or ideas about appropriate state 
behaviour. This sector may provide just one interesting site for further research. 
At the same time, however, the importance of popular and oppositional voices in driving 
the dynamics of the policy debate also suggests that there may be some value in a study 
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that compares cases in which such voices were present and those in which they were less 
prominent. One of the key mechanisms through which identity served to constrain and 
enable policy options was through the influence of different groups in disputing the 
resonance of policies or other levels of discourse with the dominant identity discourse, or 
forcing reevaluations of identity or other levels of discourse. This mechanism raises the 
audience costs upon governments to be seen to be engaging in action that resonates with 
overarching identity discourses, or face the costs of a failure to do so. Nevertheless, it is 
still possible to imagine situations in which policy deliberation is conducted largely in 
secret, excluding such public debate, and an identity-based theory in which this mechanism 
appears to play such a prominent role must therefore be open to the possibility of 
examining this further. At the same time, a model that adopts an organic conception of 
agency is a prerequisite for such efforts.  
Finally, a secondary advantage obtains in the adoption of an organic conception of identity 
formation: flexibility. Though US foreign policy was chosen as an appropriate site to begin 
this research, it far from exhausts the possibilities. An analysis of British, French or 
Nigerian foreign policy, for example, might require a different approach, but an organic 
conception is flexible enough to adapt to such circumstances. More importantly, perhaps, it 
would also be possible to use this framework in analyses that do not focus on the state as 
the primary unit of analysis. The new-found activism of the reincarnated African Union, or 
of the EU under the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), represent some of the 
most interesting recent developments in the context of this field of study. As discussed 
below, many of the most recent examples of muscular peacekeeping have been undertaken 
under the aegis of these two organisations. If the unitary rational actor model is 
problematic in the context of states, it is even more so in the context of international 
organisations. An organic approach, however, would have much to offer in respect of 
approaching the political orientations of these actors.  
V. CONCLUSION 
This analysis brings us full circle to the question raised in the very first paragraph of this 
thesis. Is there any reason to think that, as many have argued, the sun has set on 
humanitarian intervention? Unfortunately, nothing in this thesis can answer that question 
definitively; indeed, it has been consistently argued that predictive theory is an impossible 
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ideal. Nevertheless, certain reflections are merited by the findings of this research, which 
may go some way to addressing this question.  
The continuity of certain features of idiographic thinking, even in the face of significant 
challenges, as discussed above, was a notable finding of the research. If we also accept the 
proposition that these features have been features of idiographic debate from long before 
the period examined here, there is therefore much to suggest that such features will endure 
beyond the present period. To be sure, September 11 represented a dramatic turning point, 
and it is hardly surprising that this should have prompted a turn towards particularism in 
foreign policy, especially in the United States. At the same time, the persistence of 
universalist justifications for the ensuing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq13 only reaffirms the 
enduring power of these ideas. Nevertheless, the war in Iraq, especially, has become most 
associated with particularism, and the undeniable failures of the consequent policies have 
doubtless engendered reflection upon the viability of the extreme form in which this policy 
programme was articulated. The election of Barack Obama under a banner of ‘change’ 
may be only the most obvious manifestation of such reflection. 
At the same time as particularism appears to be falling into disrepute, however, the 
standing of universalism within the wider international society may also have suffered. 
Whereas during the post-Cold War period there seemed to be some grounds for optimism 
that levels of solidarity within international society were on the rise, in recent years 
international society has appeared increasingly fractured. This may have a significant 
effect on the prospects for humanitarian intervention. In Chapter 2, I asked whether, under 
the definition given, we could then distinguish the post-Cold War era of humanitarian 
intervention from earlier (or, indeed, later) periods of intervention that also featured 
humanitarian or altruistic justifications. The findings of the foregoing analysis may go 
some way towards answering that question.  
The post-Cold War era of intervention was largely marked by the absence of any kind of 
identifiable grand strategy on the part of the major powers. During the nineteenth century 
‘age of empire’, while there was certainly an intention to civilise and Christianise the 
colonies, at least in some cases, this was always secondary to the mercantilist demands of 
empire and the aggrandisement of the imperial metropole. Equally, while American and 
Soviet interventionism during the Cold War may have contained at least some elements of 
                                               
13 See Rieff, At the Point of a Gun, for discussion. 
 224 
an altruistic desire to promote democracy and ‘freedom’ or socialism and ‘emancipation’, 
this again was always secondary to the grand strategy of maintaining and defending 
spheres of influence. No such identifiable overall strategy appears to have marked the 
interventionism of the post-Cold War era. Indeed, while it is a simple matter in hindsight to 
ascribe self-interested motives to some such interventions, when one actually reflects upon 
the content of such motives they hardly appear to be the kinds of cassus belli upon which 
war is normally predicated. To borrow Lawrence Freedman’s phrase, they were ‘wars of 
discretion’, the prosecution of which were never a foregone conclusion.14 
To an important extent, this appears to have changed since September 11. Whether and to 
what extent the new discourses of the ‘war on terror’ or the ‘clash of civilisations’ can 
provide the kind of enduring paradigms that marked the age of empire or the Cold War is 
certainly open to debate. Nevertheless, one can say with some certainty that such ideas 
have certainly coloured political thought in recent times. This may have significant effects. 
Wheareas the lack of an overall grand strategy and the seemingly high levels of solidarism 
and respect for universalist norms of international life may have reduced resistance to 
intervention within the international community during the post-Cold War period, in an 
increasingly politicized international society such resistance may well resurface. The 
apparent disregard for the constitutive norms of international society in the rhetoric of the 
United States in the early stages of the war on terror may have weakened the fabric of this 
society,15 and the norm of humanitarian intervention, hardly firmly established, can only 
have suffered as a consequence. For example, though ultimately affirmed, the recent UN 
General Assembly debate in New York surrounding the idea of the ‘responsibility to 
protect’ highlights the continued concern of many third world nations for national 
sovereignty and the potential for abuse inherent in a norm of humanitarian intervention.16 
In this context, the threshold for legitimation of humanitarian intervention may have been 
significantly raised, as faith in the universalist principles behind such action has been 
eroded. It would be hard indeed to conceive of US intervention, even if purely altruistic, 
being well received in many Muslim nations in the current political climate. 
                                               
14 Lawrence Freedman, “The Crisis in American Strategy”, John Erickson Lecture, University of Edinburgh, 
7 February 2007. 
15 For a similar argument, see Dunne, “Society and Hierarchy in International Relations”, 17(3) International 
Relations (2003), 303-320. 
16 Agence France-Presse, “UN Debates Responsibility to Protect Threatened Populations”, Agence France-
Presse, 23 July 2009. 
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In the meantime, however, notions of how to prosecute humanitarian intervention seem to 
have changed. In the case studies examined, we could see significant variation over the 
course of only two years in terms of beliefs in the appropriateness and effectiveness of 
types of intervention. This process was taking place before the period under consideration 
and continues today. Perhaps one of the reasons that humanitarian intervention appeared to 
be such a significant feature of the post-Cold War era was related to a growing belief in its 
efficacy. Such beliefs received serious dents over the course of the decade, notably in 
Somalia, but also elsewhere. As such, beliefs in the efficacy of different forms of 
intervention may well, and certainly appear to, have evolved. From notions of muscular 
peacekeeping in the late 1990s to notions of hybrid missions in the 2000s, policy doctrines, 
like the identities that spur them, are in a constant state of evolution. In this context, the 
great power interventionism that seemed to mark the humanitarian interventions of the 
post-Cold War period seems at present to have given way to a more multilateral approach.  
Thus, we can identify at this very time certain operations that, though they may not feel as 
much like their predecessors in the 1990s, certainly share key features. Missions such as 
MONUC in the Congo or UNAMID in Darfur have mandates and practices that arguably 
meet the definition of humanitarian intervention outlined in Chapter 2. At the same time, 
they also are different from the interventions examined in this thesis. And this difference 
may well be a good thing. The humanitarian interventions of the post-Cold War era were 
hardly universally successful and it is to be hoped that we may have learned some lessons 
from their shortcomings. Moreover, there may be more lessons yet to learn from the 
current crop of missions, as well as, indeed, the current conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
which, once past the initial war-fighting periods, have required the uptake of tasks of 
striking similarity to those required by peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention. If 
humanitarian intervention has evolved, there are reasons for it. It remains to be seen how 
this evolution will develop, what lessons will be learned and how they will be applied. But 
the concerns that drive such actions seem likely to remain. 
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Appendix 1: Somalia Timeline 
31 December 1990 US Embassy personnel are evacuated by US Marines from Mogadishu. 
17 November 1991 The UN withdraws from Somalia in the face of fierce fighting. 
2 January 1992 Senators Nancy Kassebaum (R-KS) and Paul Simon (D-IL) author a NYT 
op-ed calling for political intervention (appointment of UN envoy, 
negotiation of cease-fire and arms embargo) in Somalia, but falling short of 
recommending peacekeeping. 
3-6 January 1992 Undersecretary-General for Political Affairs James Jonah makes a weekend 
fact-finding visit to Mogadishu. 
23 January 1992 The UNSC passes Resolution 733, imposing an arms embargo on Somalia. 
14 February 1992 Representatives of Ali Mahdi and Aideed sign a cease-fire under UN 
auspices in New York. A more comprehensive agreement is to be 
negotiated in Mogadishu during Jonah’s visit at the end of February. 
16 February 1992 Shelling breaks out again in Mogadishu between factions loyal to Mahdi 
and Aideed. 
29 February 1992 Jonah’s mission begins talks in Mogadishu. A cease-fire is signed on 3 
March 1992, but clashes continue. Jonah leaves Somalia criticising the 
parties for their lack of commitment to peace and suggesting the UN might 
not continue to exert such efforts in the face of such intransigence. 
8 March 1992 The NYT publishes excerpts from a leaked Pentagon policy guidance 
document that calls upon the United States to maintain its sole superpower 
status and to prevent the emergence of any rivals. 
10 March 1992 Congress debates a funding request of $810 million for additional US 
peacekeeping costs for FY 1992. 
11 March 1992 The Report of the UNSG suggests the dispatch of a technical team to assess 
possible mechanisms to “ensure the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian 
assistance”. 
17 March 1992 Resolution 746 calls for the dispatch of the technical team suggested in the 
UNSG’s Report of 11 March. Implicit reference is made to the possibility 
of a peacekeeping force. Important changes from the draft resolution to the 
final draft include omission of text making such reference explicit, 
allegedly at the behest of the US negotiators. In debate on the UNSC floor, 
African delegates explicitly call for peacekeeping forces. 
7 April 1992 The Horn of Africa Recovery and Food Security Act is passed in the 
Senate, calling for humanitarian relief to be provided to the war-torn 
countries of the region, and calling upon the President to make such 
political initiatives towards peace as is deemed appropriate. 
7 April 1992 House Resolution 422 on the Crisis in Somalia is introduced, calling 
attention to the human tragedy, and calling for humanitarian relief efforts to 
improve. 
9 April 1992 President Bush’s speech to the Society of News Editors emphasises support 
for democracy in the former Soviet bloc as the preeminent policy goal for 
the post-Cold War world. 
21 April 1992 The UNSG releases a new Report on Somalia, calling for the deployment 
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of 50 unarmed MILOBs and 500 armed “security personnel” to Mogadishu 
to observe the cease-fire and protect UN personnel, equipment and 
supplies, respectively. Any extension of the mission to areas outside 
Mogadishu would require revised personnel figures. 
24 April 1992 Resolution 751, adopted unanimously by the UNSC, authorises the 
establishment of a UN Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM), including the 
deployment of 50 unarmed MILOBs and, in principle, a security force, 
pending the final recommendations of the UNSG. Lack of definitive 
agreement on the deployment of a security force allegedly stemmed from 
concerns over the cost of such a force, in particular from US 
representatives. 
28 April 1992 UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali appoints Mohamed Sahnoun as his Special 
Envoy to Somalia. 
9 May 1992 US Ambassador to the UN Thomas Pickering writes a letter to the editor of 
the NYT criticising the paper’s coverage of Somalia for suggesting that the 
United States was obstructing deployment of the 500-man security force or 
quibbling over costs and iterates the administration’s support for the 
Somalia mission, in particular, and UN peacekeeping in general. 
19 May 1992 Senate Resolution 258 is issued, calling for a cease-fire in Somalia, as well 
as mediation and relief efforts.  
19 May 1992 Assistant Secretary of State John Bolton places an op-ed in the WP 
criticising the paper’s coverage of Somalia for suggesting that the United 
States was obstructing deployment of the 500-man security force or 
quibbling over costs and iterates the administration’s support for the 
Somalia mission, in particular, and UN peacekeeping in general.  
6 June 1992 11 Somali factions agree to a truce to allow for the delivery of humanitarian 
aid following a week long conference in Addis Ababa. 
9 June 1992 In the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee hearings on Senate 
Resolution 2560, which proposes a shift in responsibility for funding UN 
peacekeeping from the Department of State to Defense, Cyrus Vance 
makes a strong statement in support of the bill, as well as in support of US 
participation in UN peacekeeping as a core component of national policy 
and interests. 
15 June 1992 NSR 30 calls for an encompassing review of US policy towards Africa. 
17 June 1992 UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali releases “An Agenda for Peace”, a far-
reaching policy document that highlights his vision for UN peacekeeping, 
peacemaking, peacebuilding and preventative diplomacy in the post-Cold 
War era. 
22 June 1992 UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali writes to the President of the UNSC to 
inform him that Austria, Bangladesh, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, 
Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco and Zimbabwe have all offered personnel to 
participate in the UN observer mission in Somalia. Brigadier-General 
Imtiaz Shaheen (Pakistan) is appointed as Chief Military Observer (CMO) 
of UNOSOM. 
24 June 1992 A host of Somali refugees abandon the Somalia-registered ship Gob Wein 
lying off the coast of Aden, Yemen, in an attempt to reach the shore. 
Around 150 die at sea and a further 30 on the beach. 
25 July 1992 An Antonov aircraft formerly chartered by the WFP and still bearing UN 
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markings arrives at Mogadishu airport bearing Somali currency and arms 
destined for the faction controlled by Ali Mahdi Mohammed. General 
Aideed accuses the UN of bias and suspends his consent for the deployment 
of UN personnel. 
29 June-1 July 1992 The Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of 
African Unity in Dakar, Senegal, agrees “in principle” on the need for an 
African peacekeeping capacity and forms a committee to look into 
modalities. One theme informing the discussions is the lack of Western 
interest in Africa. 
30 June 1992 Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney hints in a meeting with the press that the 
United States is considering sending combat troops to Yugoslavia. 
1 July 1992 Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV) speaks out in Congress against any US 
intervention in Bosnia, citing, primarily, the risk to American servicemen 
and women. Senator Nancy Kassebaum (R-KS) responds in support of a 
potential US deployment to Bosnia, and suggests a similar course might 
also be appropriate for Somalia.  
1 July 1992 The Carnegie Endowment's National Commission on America publishes its 
final report, entitled Changing Our Ways: America and the New World, 
which criticises the lack of leadership currently being shown by American 
foreign policy, and also argues that military intervention may be necessary 
to deal with civil wars in which the destruction or displacement of large 
groups of people is taking place. 
5 July 1992 Brigadier General Imtiaz Shaheen and three other members of the UN 
observer mission arrive in Mogadishu. 
10 July 1992 US Ambassador to Kenya Smith Hempstone files a cable back to 
Washington entitled “A Day in Hell” describing his visit to refugee camps 
for Somalis in the north of Kenya. Bush is known to have read the cable 
and to have written in its margins “this is a terribly moving situation. Let’s 
do everything we can to help.” 
16 July 1992 Following assurances from Ali Mahdi that the currency delivered on the 
Antonov aircraft would not be circulated, Aideed reinstates his consent to 
the deployment of the UN observer force. 
17 July 1992 In the absence of UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the UNSC accepts a cease-
fire in Yugoslavia negotiated by Britain’s Lord Carrington, which would 
require the UN to deploy troops to locate and collect heavy weaponry in the 
conflict zones. 
19 July 1992 The NYT carries a front page article detailing the extent of the starvation 
and human suffering in Somalia. Upon reading it, Bush is said to have 
requested a briefing from the State Department on the situation, upon which 
he noted that “he was very upset by these reports and he wanted something 
done, both in Somalia and northern Kenya”. 
19-20 July 1992 Senator Nancy Kassebaum (D-KS) visits Somalia to gather information for 
a House Select Committee on Hunger hearing but is unable to visit 
Mogadishu due to security concerns. Senator Paul Simon (D-IL) applauds 
Kassebaum for her attention to Somalia and calls upon the Bush 
administration to respond to the situation more proactively. 
21 July 1992 Omar Arteh Ghalib, Interim Prime Minister in the Ali Mahdi Mohammed 
administration, calls for the deployment of 10,000 UN peacekeeping troops. 
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22 July 1992 At the House Select Committee on Hunger hearings entitled “Somalia: the 
Case for Action”, Senator Nancy Kassebaum (R-KS), recently returned 
from Somalia, says she “strongly supports” deployment of a UN security 
force and opines that “the situation has reached the point where the UN 
should go forward with the security force with or without Gen. Aideed or 
Ali Mahdi’s consent”. Representative Bill Emerson (R-OH) calls upon the 
United States to pressure Arab nations to do more, and Representative Tony 
Hall (D-OH) calls upon the Bush administration to take the lead on 
Somalia. 
22 July 1992 In his report on the situation in Somalia, UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali 
asserts that the UN must be concerned with the security and humanitarian 
situation throughout Somalia, not just in Mogadishu, and announces his 
intent to dispatch a technical team to investigate needs and modalities in the 
interior. 
23 July 1992 Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) compares Somalia to Yugoslavia and 
asks why more isn’t being done in the former. 
23 July 1992 The remainder of the UN observer mission arrives in Mogadishu. 
24 July 1992 The NYT reports on a conflict between UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali and 
the UNSC, stemming from the former not being consulted about the 
Carrington accord for Yugoslavia, especially given that this would require 
UN resources, which he estimates at 1,110 extra troops. Boutros-Ghali 
categorises the Bosnia operation as “ill-conceived” and notes that it is 
perceived in Africa as a “war of the rich”, while Somalia suffers unnoticed. 
26 July 1992 Director of USAID Andrew Natsios places an op-ed in the WP describing a 
previous op-ed in that paper as “scurrilous” for suggesting that the Bush 
administration’s policy towards Somalia was “racist” and that little was 
being done. Natsios highlights the ongoing provision of US-funded 
humanitarian aid, but admits that more can be done. 
27 July 1992 White House Press Secretary Marlon Fitzwater iterates the administration’s 
support for UN efforts in Somalia and its commitment to ensure adequate 
funding for such efforts. 
27 July 1992 Resolution 767 approves the UNSG’s proposal to send a technical team to 
assess needs outside Mogadishu and instructs the UNSG to mount an 
urgent airlift. 
28 July 1992 Representative John Porter (R-IL) calls the situation in Somalia “a dire 
emergency in need of addressing” and urges the president and the UN to 
address Somalia’s needs, beginning with the need for security. 
31 July 1992 Senate Concurrent Resolution 132 relating to the Civil Conflict in Somalia 
calls upon the president to work with the UNSC to ensure the deployment 
of the UN security force as quickly as possible. The resolution is offered by 
31 Senators. 
31 July 1992 A special task force on Somalia is formed within the State Department 
under the leadership of Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger. 
2 August 1992 Senate Concurrent Resolution 132 is agreed to. 
4 August 1992 House Concurrent Resolution 352 is introduced, mirroring Senate 
Resolution 132 in its call for the deployment of a UN security force, with or 
without the consent of the conflict parties. 
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4 August 1992 A mortar attack in Sarajevo that strikes a funeral for two slain orphans is 
captured on film by BBC and Reuters. The children had been killed when a 
bus carrying around 50 orphans was struck by gunfire on 1 August 1992. 
5 August 1992 An Amnesty International report on the situation in Somalia details 
massacres allegedly committed by former President Siad Barre’s SNF 
forces, as well as Gen. Aideed’s USC. 
6 August 1992 UN representatives arrive in Mogadishu to assess the need for and 
modalities of a UN security force, remaining until 15 August. 
6 August 1992 Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher places an editorial in the 
NYT calling for the use of military force in Bosnia. 
6 August 1992 Footage of emaciated Bosnians held in a detention centre shot by ITN news 
is broadcast worldwide on television, generating comparisons with the 
Holocaust. 
6 August 1992 President Bush holds a press conference in which he states that he is 
preparing a resolution that will authorise the use of force to protect 
humanitarian relief in Bosnia if necessary. He also fully recognises 
Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia as independent states, and advocates 
tightening economic sanctions against Serbia. 
8 August 1992 In a news conference, President Bush refuses to be drawn on the question 
of whether the United States is advocating the use of military force in 
Bosnia. 
9 August 1992 Representative Lee Hamilton (D-IN) publishes an editorial in the WP 
calling for US intervention in Bosnia. 
10 August 1992 Senate Resolution 330 calls upon the president to go to the UNSC to seek a 
resolution that authorises the use of military force in Bosnia, which may or 
may not include US forces. After extended debate and much disagreement, 
the resolution passes on 11 August 1992, by a margin of 74-22. 
10 August 1992 While debate in the Senate is ongoing on Senate Resolution 330, the House 
debates Senate Concurrent Resolution 132, which calls for the deployment 
of UN security guards to protect relief convoys in Somalia. After near 
unanimous support for the resolution is voiced on the floor, the resolution is 
concurred with, by voice vote. 
12 August 1992 The front page of the WP carries a major article criticising the lack of 
attention given to Somalia in comparison with the attention being given to 
Bosnia. A similar article appears in the NYT. 
12 August 1992 The UN announces that agreement has been reached with the Somali 
factions on the deployment of 500 UN guards to Mogadishu. 
13 August 1992 The UNSC approves a resolution authorising the use of “all necessary 
means” to ensure the delivery of humanitarian relief and to open the 
detention camps in Bosnia. 
13 August 1992 White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater announces that the United 
States will provide military airlift to the 500 UN guards authorised to 
deploy to Somalia. 
13 August 1992 Democratic Candidate Bill Clinton makes a major foreign policy speech at 
the World Affairs Council in Los Angeles in which he criticises Bush’s 
foreign policy as inertia rather than initiative. In brief comment on 
multilateral peace operations, he iterates his support for international 
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peacekeeping and his long-standing desire to see more done in Bosnia. He 
also voices his support for the idea of a standby peacekeeping capacity for 
the UN—a “voluntary UN rapid deployment force”—a subject of some 
debate both within the United States and the UN following Boutros Ghali’s 
“Agenda for Peace”, which calls for the activation of Article 43 of the UN 
Charter, which provides for such a force. 
14 August 1992 A Bush administration senior staff reshuffle is finalised, with James Baker 
ending his term as Secretary of State to become White House Chief of Staff 
and, many believe, Bush’s re-election campaign manager, and Lawrence 
Eagleburger filling the now vacant position of Secretary of State. The Bush 
administration is criticised for this reshuffle at such a sensitive time, as it 
appears to be putting election politics before foreign policy. 
14 August 1992 White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater announces that, in addition 
to the standing offer to airlift UN security forces to Somalia, the White 
House intends to begin emergency airlift operations to deliver food to 
Somalia, table a new UNSC resolution authorising “additional measures” to 
ensure the delivery of humanitarian relief and to convene a donors 
conference to improve the delivery of relief. 
16 August 1992 The NYT reports that the United States is prepared to conduct airstrikes in 
Iraq should Saddam Hussein fail to open up Iraqi government ministries to 
weapons inspectors. 
17 August 1992 A contingent of 30 US troops, the advance guard of a larger contingent 
tasked with expediting the US airlift, arrive in Mombasa, Kenya, the main 
base to be used for the airlift, to assess modalities. The airlift is scheduled 
to begin by 24 August. 
20 August 1992 Stephen Hayes, Director of USAID’s Office of External Affairs places an 
op-ed in the WP criticising its coverage of 12 August (see above) that 
suggested that the United States was paying more attention to Bosnia than 
Somalia. 
20-21 August 1992 The US plan to use airbases in Kenya is momentarily disrupted as the 
Kenyan government complains that the US government failed to ask their 
permission to overfly Kenyan airspace and that relief for Somali refugees in 
Kenya should and is being provided by the Kenyan government. The 
dispute is resolved by 22 August. The original plan for the airlift also has to 
be revised, as the airstrips in Kenya turn out to be not wide enough for the 
planes originally envisaged, and alternative means are not readily available. 
Meanwhile, in Somalia, Red Cross officials complain also of the poor 
planning of the airlift, citing the lack of provision for distribution of food 
aid once it arrives in Somalia, which the US government will leave entirely 
to other agencies. The dispute is not solved until 27 August. The original 
timetable for the airlift is delayed by at least a week on account of these 
problems. 
22 August 1992 The first flight carrying US food aid—ten tons of beans and vegetable oil—
flies from Mombasa to Wajir in Northern Kenya. It remains unclear when 
flights into Somalia itself will be able to commence. 
24 August 1992 UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali issues his latest Report on the Situation in 
Somalia, in which he recommends an expansion of the UN security force to 
areas outside Mogadishu, comprising 4 units of up to 750 troops to be 
deployed in the 4 proposed centres of UN operational division, bringing the 
total recommended troop strength of UNOSOM to 3,500, including the 500 
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already authorised. 
24 August 1992 Hurricane Andrew, the second most destructive hurricane in US history, 
strikes the Florida coast. The Bush administration will come in for severe 
criticism for its poor response to the relief effort, in which a four day lag 
preceded the provision of relief to the key election state. 
28 August 1992 The UNSC unanimously approves Resolution 775, which authorises the 
deployment of an additional 3,000 security personnel and the establishment 
of four operational zones. 
29 August 1992 Somali gunmen, supported by three tanks, attack UN vehicles at 
Mogadishu’s port, injuring two unarmed UN observers and killing some of 
the hired local guards, before making off with 25 trucks, 300 tonnes of food 
and 199 barrels of fuel, WFP’s entire supply for emergency operations in 
Somalia. 
29 August 1992 In contrast to the bulk of reporting on the US airlift to Somalia, which has 
criticised the poor planning and effectiveness of the operation, the front 
page of the WP carries a story detailing the first shipment of US food aid to 
Somalia’s interior in broadly positive terms. 
30 August 1992 A follow-up story, again on the front page of the WP, paints the first 
delivery of US aid to Somalia in more shades of grey than the initial story, 
noting the relative peace and security that prevails in Beledweyne, the site 
of the first and following three aid flights, when compared with other areas 
of Somalia. No plans are yet announced for delivery to other sites. The 
article also cites Andrew Natsios, USAID deputy administrator and 
coordinator of the Somali relief operation, as noting that security remains 
the key problem facing Somalia and the airlift, not the mere provision of 
food. 
3 September 1992 The WP again carries a front page story covering the airlift to Somalia. This 
piece describes how the militia of Gen. Aideed is in control of the feeding 
centres in Baardheere and elsewhere, taking food for themselves first and 
treating the starving with minimal respect. Food is in short supply in 
Baardheere, as the United States does not want to airlift there for fear of 
according legitimacy to Aideed. 
4 September 1992 The front page of the NYT carries a story detailing the widespread theft of 
food aid to Somalia and its resale on the black market. Around half of all 
food aid is believed to be looted and prices charged are at around a 500% 
mark up. 
6 September 1992 The NYT carries another front page story detailing the US airlift. Citing 
reports that the famine in Somalia is turning out to be far worse than 
anyone had imagined, the article criticises the effectiveness of the airlift, 
which is falling far short of what is required. 
7 September 1992 Another front page article in the NYT criticises the effectiveness of the 
relief operation in Somalia. 
8 September 1992 Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) speaks on the Senate floor of the need for 
more vigorous action in Somalia, including increased food aid, an adequate 
US diplomatic presence, and armed forces to protect relief convoys. 
10 September 1992 Senators Claiborne Pell (D-RI) and Paul Simon (D-IL) voice their support 
for the idea of a permanent peacekeeping force to be made available to the 
UN. Senator Joe Biden (D-DE) is in the process of introducing a resolution 
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on the subject. 
11 September 1992 Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Jan Eliasson, Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General Mohammed Sahnoun and 
Executive Director of UNICEF James Grant meet with Gen. Aideed to try 
to secure the latter’s approval for the deployment of the additional UN 
security guards, but Aideed refuses. 
12 September 1992 The front page of the WP again carries a story detailing the ineffectiveness 
of the airlift. 
13 September 1992 Somalia remains front page news in the WP, this time detailing the effect of 
the war and famine on the nation’s children. 
14 September 1992 The first 63 of the 500 UN security guards for Mogadishu arrive in 
Somalia’s capital. It is likely to be October before the contingent will begin 
to actually guard relief convoys. 
15 September 1992 The United States sends 2,400 US Marines to the coast of Somalia to 
support the deployment of the 500 Pakistani peacekeepers. 
17 September 1992 Responding to criticism of the ineffectiveness of the relief operation, the 
United States releases a six-point plan to improve the ongoing efforts, 
including selling cheap food to traders to reinvigorate the market supply of 
food, increasing the numbers of food centres, reinvesting in agriculture and 
trucking supplies into the interior under armed escort. 
18 September 1992 A US plane unloading food in Beledweyne is hit by a bullet. The US 
suspends flights to the town, the first Somali town to benefit from the airlift 
due to its relative safety. 
21 September 1992 The front page of the WP again details inefficiencies in the Somali relief 
effort, this time directed at the UN relief agencies. 
21 September 1992 In an address to the UN General Assembly, President Bush promises to 
increase the level of commitment of the United States to international 
peacekeeping, including developing training programmes and specialist 
units within the US armed forces, reviewing funding, providing stockpiles 
of equipment, and improving logistical support capacities. Though he hints 
at potential support for the activation of Article 43 of the UN Charter, 
which provides for a standby peacekeeping capacity, no explicit statement 
confirms such support. 
21 September 1992 A Red Cross feeding centre in Beledweyne is looted, with 789 tonnes of 
food stolen, virtually the town’s entire supply, as heavy fighting breaks out 
in the area. 
22 September 1992 The WP continues its series on the problems of the UN with a front page 
article dealing with the soaring costs and inefficiencies associated with UN 
peacekeeping. 
22 September 1992 The EC responds positively to President Bush’s UNGA speech in a joint 
declaration before the General Assembly, and calls for an expanded role for 
the UN in peacemaking, with particular emphasis on preventative 
diplomacy. 
26 September 1992 A highly critical front page article in the WP leads with the opinion that the 
“US-led emergency airlift may actually be worsening the problems of 
lawlessness and anarchy in Somalia”. 
2 October 1992 A WP front page article describes the ineffectiveness of the relief effort, 
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citing the increasing human cost of disease, in addition to famine. 
2 October 1992 Senator Paul Simon (D-IL) places his own newspaper article in the 
Congressional Record, which supports the limited use of force in Somalia 
and Bosnia, and suggests that a small number (around 2,000) of US military 
personnel should be placed on standby and the president to be authorised by 
Congress to use them as he sees fit to respond to situations such as Bosnia 
and Somalia. 
2 October 1992 The House of Representatives passes House Concurrent Resolution 370, 
which calls upon the president to express to the UNSC the willingness of 
the United States to participate in the deployment of UN guards to Somalia, 
with or without the consent of the conflict parties. 
2 October 1992 President Bush announces his intention to push for a no-fly zone over 
Bosnia and to toughen sanctions against Serbia. 
4 October 1992 Somalia remains front page news in the NYT, this time focusing on the 
Somali clan structure, the forces controlled by Aideed and Ali Mahdi, and 
the looting of food by these forces. 
5 October 1992 The front page of the WP details the work of nongovernmental aid workers 
and the dangers they face due to violence and food looting, as well as their 
inability to relieve the crisis in Somalia. 
5 October 1992 Another attack in Beledweyne prompts the Red Cross to suspend food 
airlifts there. 
5 October 1992 Under Presidential Determination No. 93-2, a further $500,000 is made 
available for the Somalia relief effort. 
5 October 1992 Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT) calls on the Senate floor for a stronger 
peacekeeping force for Somalia. 
6 October 1992 The UNSC votes unanimously to set up a war crimes tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia. 
6 October 1992 Under the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 1993, 
Congress calls upon the president to lift the arms embargo against the 
Bosnian Muslims. 
8 October 1992 Irish President Mary Robinson publicly decries the ineffectiveness of the 
relief operation in Somalia. 
8 October 1992 Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE) introduces a resolution authorising the 
president to use force if necessary to enforce a potential no-fly zone over 
Bosnia. 
8 October 1992 The Senate concurs to House Concurrent Resolution 370, which calls upon 
the president to express to the UNSC the willingness of the United States to 
participate in the deployment of UN guards to Somalia, with or without the 
consent of the conflict parties. 
10 October 1992 During the presidential debate in St. Louis, President Bush makes his 
strongest statement yet against armed intervention in Bosnia, a position 
supported by his opponents, Governor Clinton and Mr. Perot. 
16 October 1992 Following closed consultations of the UNSC, during which the body heard 
a communication from Special Representative to Somalia Mohammed 
Sahnoun, the president of the UNSC made a press statement to the effect 
that the Council considers the rapid deployment of UNOSOM personnel to 
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be essential. 
22 October 1992 Mogadishu airport is temporarily closed, as Somali gunmen demand 
payment to allow relief flights to land. 
23 October 1992 The front page of the NYT revisits its coverage of Somalia, covering the 
effect of ongoing violence on the delivery of relief. A mild glimmer of hope 
is offered in the form of reduced death tolls in Somalia’s famine belts, 
thought to be due to the fact that the young and weak have already died and 
now only the strong are left. 
26 October 1992 The US suspends relief flights to Baidoa after one of its planes is struck by 
gunfire. 
28 October 1992 Gen. Aideed declares that the Pakistani battalion of UN guards will no 
longer be tolerated to patrol the streets of Mogadishu, orders the expulsion 
of the UNOSOM Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance, Mr. Bassiouni, 
on the grounds that his activities run counter to the interests of the Somali 
people and his security can no longer be guaranteed, and warns that any 
forcible UNOSOM deployment would be met by violence and that the 
deployment of UN troops in Kismayo and Berbera is no longer acceptable. 
28 October 1992 Special Representative Mohammed Sahnoun resigns his post in protest 
against insistence from UN headquarters that he secure the consent of Gen. 
Aideed before deploying the 500 Pakistani peacekeepers, who remain in 
their base in Mogadishu. His resignation comes amid increasing disruptions 
to the relief effort caused by violence and insecurity from armed groups. 
2 November 1992 The front page of the NYT carries a story detailing the ineffectiveness of 
the Somali relief operation due to the violence between armed factions, and 
highlighting the lack of deployed peacekeepers as the reason for the failure. 
2 November 1992 An editorial in the WP calls for the deployment of well armed and equipped 
peacekeepers to Somalia. 
3 November 1992 Ismat Kittani is officially appointed as Sahnoun’s replacement as Special 
Representative to Somalia, a posting that has been known since at least 30 
October. 
3 November 1992 Governor Bill Clinton wins the US presidential election. 
4 November 1992 A NYT editorial makes a strong call for a robust peacekeeping force for 
Somalia. 
4 November 1992 President-elect Bill Clinton’s first major speech following the election 
victory focuses on foreign policy. Both Somalia and Bosnia warrant 
mention, though no particular policy direction is indicated. 
6 November 1992 Two UNOSOM vehicles operating near the demarcation line between north 
and south Mogadishu are attacked, the occupants robbed and the vehicles 
stolen. The vehicles appear to be taken back to Ali Mahdi’s side of the city, 
though Mahdi denies any involvement. 
7 November 1992 The UN and CARE abandon their feeding centres in Baardheere due to the 
security situation. 
9 November 1992 New UN Special Representative Ismat Kittani arrives in Mogadishu, on the 
only flight to have been allowed to touch down at Mogadishu airport since 
its enforced closure on 22 October. 
10 November 1992 The Pakistani battalion takes control of the airport. 
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11 November 1992 A convoy of 34 CARE trucks carrying 350 tons of wheat from Mogadishu 
is attacked by gunmen. 9 trucks are hijacked, 4 personnel killed, and the 
remainder make it to relative safety in Baidoa and Mogadishu. The attack 
on the convoy is at least partially thwarted by local townspeople, who, 
angered by looting, fight back to defend the grain supply. 
12 November 1992 Gen. Aideed demands the withdrawal of the Pakistani battalion from the 
airport, on the grounds that those who agreed to the deployment had no 
authority to do so. Kittani counters that no further authority was necessary. 
12 November 1992 After visiting several of the sites of the relief operation in Somalia, Special 
Representative Ismat Kittani makes highly critical comments regarding the 
current state of the operation. 
12 November 1992 A Pentagon spokesman indicates the United States’ intent to hand off the 
airlift to a commercial company, with the US military potentially vacating 
the region by January 1993. 
13 November 1992 The Pakistani battalion at the airport comes under heavy and sustained fire. 
Returning fire, it suffers no casualties. 
19 November 1992 A NYT editorial makes a strong call for robust US intervention in Somalia, 
amid rumours that the Bush administration is considering just that. 
19 November 1992 French troops exchange fire with Serbian forces in Bosnia, as fighting in 
the region intensifies. 
20 November 1992 Another NYT editorial makes an explicit and strongly worded call for 
armed US intervention in Somalia. 
24 November 1992 A relief plane carrying UN officials and journalists is attacked by gunmen 
in Kismaayo. Though the plane is carrying no food aid, the attackers make 
off with around $5,000 worth of cash and valuables taken from the 
passengers at gunpoint. 
24 November 1992 National Security Directive 74 provides for increased US military 
preparedness for peacekeeping operations, but falls short of authorising a 
standby capacity for the UN such as that envisaged in Article 43 or “An 
Agenda for Peace”. 
24 November 1992 Ali Mahdi is persuaded to reopen Mogadishu port to relief vessels. 
Nevertheless, a WFP ship approaching the port is shelled as it attempts to 
enter. Numerous vessels remain anchored offshore from Mogadishu as the 
port remains closed. 
25 November 1992 The State Department announces a Bush administration offer to airlift the 
remaining 3,000 authorised UN security forces to Mogadishu. The story is 
carried on the front page of the WP. 
25 November 1992 In a closed meeting, the UNSC reacts angrily to news of the 24 November 
shelling of a relief vessel. The Council asks UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali 
to provide a detailed report on the situation in Somalia, providing for “more 
tangible action to carry out the UN assistance to Somalia and restore some 
kind of normalcy to that country”. 
26 November 1992 President Bush offers the UN up to a division (approximately 20,000) of 
US troops to protect humanitarian relief to Somalia. The decision is 
believed to have been made during an NSC meeting on 25 November. 
27 November 1992 UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali sends a letter to the UNSC detailing the 
hazards faced by UN personnel in the field and the problems that are 
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derailing the relief operation, but continues to tacitly recommend tougher 
measures. 
27 November 1992 In a surprise move, Gen. Aideed indicates that he would welcome the 
proposed deployment of US troops. 
30 November 1992 UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali sends a letter to the UNSC outlining possible 
options for Somalia. Withdrawal, continuation of the current policy, and a 
security force restricted to Mogadishu are all criticised as possible options, 
leaving the US offer of troops under US command or a similar force under 
UN command as the endorsed options. 
1 December 1992 Egypt offers troops to participate in the potential Somalia mission. 
3 December 1992 The UNSC approves Resolution 794, authorising a UN security force under 
Chapter VII to use all necessary means to ensure the delivery of relief 
supplies. Morocco offers to contribute troops. 
4 December 1992 President Bush addresses the nation live on television and radio, and 
confirms that the United States will send a substantial military force to 
Somalia in accordance with Resolution 794. 
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Appendix 2: Rwanda Timeline 
October 1990 The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), an army comprised mostly of Tutsi 
refugees who had fled Rwanda in the early 1960s in the face of ethnic purges, 
invades Rwanda from Uganda, but is unable to topple the Rwandan 
government due to support given to the latter by France, in the form of two 
parachute companies, among other things. 
4 August 1993 The government of Rwanda and the RPF sign the Arusha Accords, a peace 
agreement providing for the establishment of a broad-based transitional 
government and power-sharing arrangements to put an end to Rwanda’s three 
year civil war. 
4 October 1993 In a call on the US Ambassador, RPF representatives enquire about the status 
of the proposed UN intervention force along the Rwanda/Uganda border, and 
whether the United States would be prepared to contribute troops to that 
force. The Ambassador replies that while a force was not opposed within the 
UNSC, most were preoccupied with other issues. He viewed the possibility of 
US troops as highly unlikely. 
5 October 1993 The UNSC passes Resolution 872 establishing the UN Assistance Mission in 
Rwanda (UNAMIR) to supervise and assist in the implementation of the 
Arusha Accords. The UNAMIR mission’s initial authorised strength is 2,500, 
the backbone of which is a 450-man contingent from Belgium. UNAMIR 
does not reach full strength for around five months due to piecemeal 
commitments from troop contributing countries. 
8 October 1993 US Secretary of State Warren Christopher meets with Rwandan President 
Juvenal Habyarimana in Washington. The latter asks for US assistance in 
Rwanda’s economic recovery but not for US troops to be contributed to 
UNAMIR. Habyarimana does, however, discuss the composition of 
UNAMIR, noting offers by Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria and Belgium to 
provide troops. He suggests the addition of French troops would be 
welcomed, in order to provide ‘balance’. 
6 January 1994 UNSC Resolution 893 approves the deployment of a second battalion of 
soldiers to the UNAMIR mission. In debate on the resolution, the UNSC 
generally expresses confidence in the progress of the peace process, though 
some concern over some incidents of violence is expressed. It is generally 
hoped that the deployment of the second battalion will mitigate these latter 
issues. 
11 January 1994 UNAMIR Force Commander Lieutenant General Romeo Dallaire sends a 
cable to UN headquarters detailing his contact with an informant who alleges 
to have been training Interhamwe militia. The informant says he is involved 
in mock demonstrations aimed at causing the RPF and/or Belgian troops to 
attack demonstrators, leading to renewed civil war and reprisals against 
Belgians, with the aim of forcing withdrawal of Belgian contingent. The 
informant claims to know of stockpiling and distribution of weapons to 
civilian militias, believed to be meant for ‘extermination of Tutsis’.  
29 January 1994 The NYT carries a front page story detailing the new Clinton administration 
policy on peacekeeping that would limit US involvement to a narrow set of 
conditions. This policy would later emerge as Presidential Decision Directive 
(PDD) 25, which appeared on 6 May 1994. 
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23 February 1994 Rioting in Kigali results in at least 37 casualties, as violence follows the 
assassinations of two rival political leaders. In light of the unrest, the 
Republican Democratic Movement and the RPF announce a boycott of the 
peace process and President Juvenal Habyarimana postpones the naming of a 
transitional government. 
13 March 1994 The US State Department releases a travel advisory recommending that US 
citizens not travel to Rwanda, citing increasing ethnic and political violence. 
25 March 1994 Ceremonies scheduled for this date for the inauguration of the new broad-
based transitional government do not go ahead due to continuing disputes 
over the government’s composition.  
30 March 1994 Despite increased tensions, UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali continues to report 
that the cease-fire is generally holding, although a ‘rapid and dramatic 
deterioration in the security situation in Kigali’ is noted, and reports are 
acknowledged of the distribution of arms to civilians. Extension of 
UNAMIR’s mandate for another six months is recommended. 
5 April 1994 Under Resolution 909, the UNSC extends the mandate of UNAMIR up to 29 
June 1994, subject to a review within six weeks. The Rwandan representative 
welcomes this move. So too does the US delegation, though it expresses 
concern over the continued impasse in the naming of a transitional 
government, which it hints threatens the future of the UNAMIR mission.  
6 April 1994 A plane carrying Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana and Burundian 
President Cyprien Ntaryamira is shot down, killing everyone on board. 
Though it is to this day unclear who exactly was responsible for the rocket 
attack on the plane, this event is nevertheless viewed as the key catalyst 
leading to the subsequent genocide in Rwanda. 
7 April 1994 Rwandan Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana is assassinated. She was 
being protected by 15 UN peacekeepers, who laid down their arms in the face 
of armed opposition. Of these, 4 were Ghanians, who were released by the 
armed men, but the 11 remaining Belgian peacekeepers were executed and 
their bodies mutilated.  
8 April 1994 In remarks to the press pool, President Clinton refers to the ongoing violence 
in Rwanda, but only in the context of the threat to US citizens in that country. 
The press briefing is dominated by questions on trade relations with Japan.  
9 April 1994 French paratroopers land in Kigali airport to secure the area for the 
evacuation of foreign nationals. Belgian troops and US logistical support is 
expected to be forthcoming for the operation.  
10 April 1994 After Serbs launch an attack on Gorazde, a UN ‘safe area’, NATO retaliates 
with an airstrike, provided by a US F-16 aircraft. 
13 April 1994 Belgium writes a letter to the UNSC questioning the continuing rationale for 
UNAMIR in the prevailing circumstances in Rwanda and suggesting that, 
irrespective of the Council’s decision on the future of UNAMIR, Belgium 
will withdraw its troops following the execution of 11 Belgian peacekeepers 
and the perceived anti-Belgian sentiment in Rwanda.  
13 April 1994 The evacuation of foreigners, mostly Belgians, from Rwanda is completed.  
15 April 1994 In letters to the President of the UNSC and the UNSG, Belgium confirms its 
intent to withdraw from Rwanda and requests its release from the UNAMIR 
mission.  
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15 April 1994 The NYT runs the first major media article questioning whether Rwanda 
should be a candidate for international intervention. The article concludes that 
no Western power has the stomach for an intervention.  
16 April 1994 In a closed session, the UNSC meets to decide whether to withdraw the 
peacekeepers from Rwanda. 
16 April 1994 Zaire closes its border with Rwanda after over 10,000 refugees make the 
crossing, trapping many more in Rwanda.  
17 April 1994 In an op-ed in the WP, Alison DesForges of Human Rights Watch argues that 
the slaughter of Tutsi civilians was part of a premeditated plan on the part of 
Hutu hardliners. 
20 April 1994 The Rwandan army shells the Kigali sports stadium, where upwards of 4,000 
civilians are sheltering from the violence, under tacit UN protection. At least 
20 casualties are reported. 
20 April 1994 UNSG Boutros-Ghali presents a Special Report on Rwanda to the UNSC. In 
it, he expresses his belief that there is no prospect for a cease-fire in the 
immediate future. As such he presents three alternatives on UNAMIR’s 
future for the UNSC’s decision: 1) immediate and massive reinforcement of 
UNAMIR, with a Chapter VII mandate; 2) withdrawal of the bulk of 
UNAMIR, with the force commander and a small security company 
remaining to try to negotiate a cease-fire; 3) complete withdrawal of 
UNAMIR. 
20 April 1994 President Clinton announces an initiative to broaden the use of NATO air 
power in defence of safe havens in Bosnia. 
21 April 1994 The US Senate proposes an amendment to the Bankruptcy Amendments Act 
of 1993 to end the US arms embargo against Bosnia. 
21 April 1994 Bangladesh, one of the largest troop contributing countries to UNAMIR, 
addresses a letter to the UN calling for greater support and resources to be 
provided to its peacekeeping troops in Rwanda, or for them to be withdrawn 
to safety.  
21 April 1994 Monique Mujaramawiya, a Rwandan human rights activist whom President 
Clinton had previously honoured at the White House and who had also 
recently escaped from Rwanda despite attempts on her life, writes a letter to 
Clinton urging the president to support a continued peacekeeping presence in 
Rwanda in order to stop what she describes as genocide. 
21 April 1994 In Resolution 912, the UNSC opts for option 2 in Boutros-Ghali’s proposal: 
withdrawal of the bulk of UNAMIR with the Force Commander and Special 
Envoy to remain with a token security force to try to secure a cease-fire. 
Though the Resolution was adopted unanimously, the representatives from 
Nigeria, Oman and Djibouti each expressed concerns that not enough was 
being done. So too did the representative from Rwanda. 
22 April 1994 The front pages of the NYT and WP both carry stories on Rwanda. The 
former discusses Resolution 912 and, while nominally neutral, is tacitly 
critical of the decision. The latter focused mainly on the deteriorating 
humanitarian conditions, noting that up to 100,000 were now believed to have 
died in the violence, with more at risk due to the pull-out of UN troops. Both 
featured highly critical comments from Kenneth Roth of Human Rights 
Watch. 
23 April 1994 Media reports cite aid agency criticism of the UN pullout. The reportage no 
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longer equivocates over the perpetrators of the killings, the ethnic dimension 
to the killings or using the word ‘genocide’.  
24 April 1994 The RPF announces a unilateral cease-fire, stating that it wishes to see the 
massacres stop, but refuses to negotiate with government officials. 
25 April 1994 Details of PDD 25 are again commented on, with approval, by the WP, 
though the directive is yet to be released. 
25 April 1994 The RPF commence a unilateral four-day cease-fire. However, a spokesman 
indicates that this will not stop their advance to ‘liberate’ the country, but 
rather is intended as a ‘last chance’ for government forces to halt the ongoing 
killings. 
26 April 1994 Senate Resolution 207 Relative to Rwanda is introduced, which condemns 
the ongoing killings in that country and calls for exploration of options to halt 
the violence, including military options. In introducing the Resolution, 
Senator Paul Simon describes the killings in Rwanda as ‘genocide’, and 
implicitly criticises the withdrawal of the bulk of UNAMIR.  
27 April 1994 Tanzania sends a letter to the UNSC confirming that the scheduled talks to be 
held in that country between the RPF and government forces did not go ahead 
due to the absence of any government representatives.  
28 April 1994 Amid reports that the cease-fire is failing, government officials claim they are 
not in control of the paramilitary groups guilty of the ongoing killings and are 
unable to exert control while those groups fear a rebel takeover of the capital 
and their own troops are tied up fighting the RPF.  
29 April 1994 On receipt of a report from UNAMIR providing evidence of preparations for 
further massacres in Rwanda, UNSG Boutros-Ghali writes to the UNSC 
recommending that it revisit its decision in Resolution 912 to reduce 
UNAMIR’s mandate. The letter suggests that reinforcing UNAMIR and 
contemplating forceful action may be the only viable means of preventing 
further massacres. 
30 April 1994 The front pages of the NYT and WP both carry stories on Rwanda, discussing 
Boutros-Ghali’s proposal and the prior US opposition to a larger force in 
Rwanda, as well as suggesting that the staggering figures of dead and 
displaced coming out of Rwanda may only be the ‘tip of the iceberg’. 
30 April 1994 The UNSC releases a statement condemning the ongoing violence in 
Rwanda, indicating its intention to consider Boutros-Ghali’s letter and asking 
the UNSG ‘to report further on action which may be undertaken with a view 
to assisting in the restoration of law and order’. 
30 April 1994 President Clinton makes a national radio address in which he comments upon 
the situation in Rwanda. The address is limited to condemnation of killings 
and commendation of those seeking to further the peace process. 
1 May 1994 A classified discussion paper drafted by the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense warns against moves to initiate investigations into possible genocide 
in Rwanda, as use of the term ‘genocide’ may imply an obligation for the US 
government to “do something”. 
1 May 1994 An Amnesty International op-ed in the WP condemns the US government for 
its lack of leadership in addressing the situation in Rwanda, and calls for 
increased efforts, including a reinforced peacekeeping mission. 
1 May 1994 The front page of the NYT reports that the Clinton administration is 
considering supporting military intervention in Rwanda by African states, but 
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has ruled out US military intervention. Another front page NYT article 
discusses the merits of intervention and non-intervention in humanitarian 
crises in the abstract. 
2 May 1994 Questioned about possible US initiatives in Rwanda, White House Press 
Secretary Dee Dee Myers is equivocal, but indicates that the United States is 
at least pursuing a $15 million aid package, renewed peace talks and an arms 
embargo.  
2 May 1994 Tanzania sends a letter to the UNSC informing that body that it hopes to 
resume peace talks between the RPF and the government. The letter also 
explicitly criticises the reduction of UNAMIR’s force strength.  
2 May 1994 UNSG Boutros-Ghali starts to make enquiries among African states regarding 
their willingness to participate in an expanded African-based peacekeeping 
mission in Rwanda. The RPF states its opposition to a UN peacekeeping 
force and accuses Special Envoy Booh-Booh of bias. 
3 May 1994 The UNSC, reflecting on the progress report on the Agenda for Peace 
recommendations, stipulates a list of factors that should be taken into account 
when assessing new peacekeeping missions, including a cease-fire to keep, 
clear political goals, a precise mandate and the safety of UN personnel, 
among others. 
4 May 1994 The front page of the WP carries a story depicting the shocking extent of the 
Rwandan refugee problem, which is becoming increasingly heavily reported 
on. 
5 May 1994 National Security Advisor Anthony Lake and Director for Strategic Plans and 
Policy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Wesley Clark unveil PDD 25, 
which is officially released the next day. The directive sets conditions for US 
participation in peacekeeping, including whether the mission advances 
American interests; whether there is a threat to international peace and 
security; whether it has a very clear mandate and objectives; and whether the 
forces and the funds are actually available for such an operation. 
6 May 1994 UNAMIR Force Commander Romeo Dallaire suspends relief flights into 
Kigali airport as a plane is shot at while unloading. Earlier that week, four 
Ghanian peacekeepers had been injured in fire directed towards the airport. 
Fighting between the RPF and government forces has intensified in recent 
days. 
8 May 1994 The front page of the WP carries a story suggesting that the slaughter in 
Rwanda was premeditated, organised and systematic in its targeting of Tutsi, 
though does not explicitly say ‘genocide’. 
9 May 1994 The Rwandan Ambassador to the United States writes a letter to the editor of 
the WP criticising the media’s coverage of the crisis for its depiction of Hutu 
slaughtering Tutsi, when he claims that ‘hundreds of thousands’ of Hutu 
civilians have been killed by the RPF. He also criticises the UN for a lack of 
neutrality.  
11 May 1994 As newly elected South African President Nelson Mandela expresses tacit 
support for the idea of an African force for Rwanda, the UN Secretariat 
circulates an ‘informal paper’ among members of the UNSC calling for a 
force of 5,500 troops for Rwanda. The United States is quick to criticise the 
plan for being too dangerous, as it foresees the insertion of troops into the 
heart of the conflict areas. Instead, the US advocates a force being used to 
create a ‘refugee protection zone’. 
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13 May 1994 UNSG Boutros-Ghali releases a report on the situation in Rwanda to the 
UNSC. The report confirms the recommendation of 5,500 troops to an 
expanded UNAMIR II, whose role would be to provide security for 
humanitarian relief, establish protected areas where displaced persons are 
concentrated and monitor border crossings. The report explicitly states that 
there would be no peace enforcement mandate for the force. It also talks at 
length about the problems facing displaced persons but does not mention 
ethnically targeted killing.  
13 May 1994 Senators Paul Simon (D-IL) and Jim Jeffords (R-VT) write to President 
Clinton calling for more forceful action in regard to Rwanda, including 
reinforcing and improving the mandate of UNAMIR.  
14 May 1994 The WP and NYT both report that, while broad agreement was reached on 
the UNSG’s proposed force for Rwanda in the UNSC, and authorisation is 
likely, the vote is delayed till the following week, as the United States has 
concerns and wants time to study the plan more carefully. 
16 May 1994 The UNSC meets to discuss the situation in Rwanda. In open debate, the 
Rwandan representative lays the blame for the current crisis at the door of the 
RPF and Tutsis more generally. The proposed plan for a 5,500-strong 
peacekeeping force for Rwanda is generally approved, though some 
countries, particularly New Zealand and Nigeria, suggest that more should be 
being done. This comes in response to a watering down of the original 
proposal of the UNSG to allow for a phased deployment, with the major 
influx of troops coming in the second phase, potentially conditional upon 
developments. The revised proposal is approved as Resolution 918.  
17 May 1994 The front page of the NYT reports that the dilution of the UNSG’s proposals 
came at the behest of the United States. 
18 May 1994 For the second day running, the front page of the NYT carries a story on the 
United States’ opposition to a strong mandate for and speedy deployment of 
UNAMIR II. 
18 May 1994 Reports in the US media emerge that suggest that the RPF may also be guilty 
of massacres of civilians, though on a smaller scale than the massacres by 
Hutu militias. At this stage, however, little concrete evidence is forthcoming. 
19 May 1994 Though the United States has ruled out US participation in any peacekeeping 
force for Rwanda, President Clinton indicates that military force remains a 
possibility in respect of Haiti. 
23 May 1994 After several days of heavy shelling, the RPF is reported to have secured 
Kigali airport, as well as Kigali’s Kanombe barracks, encountering minimal 
resistance. 
24 May 1994 The Red Cross revises its estimates of the numbers killed in Rwanda’s 
violence to between 200,000 and 500,000. These figures are widely picked up 
on by the media. 
24 May 1994 Despite assurances that a cease-fire would be observed by both the conflict 
parties to allow for the visit of Assistant Secretary-General Iqbal Riza, 
fighting continues in Kigali, forcing Riza to delay his scheduled visit. Riza 
does make it to Kigali the following day.  
25 May 1994 In a major foreign policy speech at the US Naval Academy, President Clinton 
reiterates the administration’s new policy on peacekeeping and humanitarian 
intervention, stressing the need for US interests to be at stake. Mentioning 
Bosnia, Rwanda and Haiti, Bosnia is the only one to receive sustained 
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attention, largely in terms of a defense of the administration’s current policy.  
26 May 1994 In accordance with Resolution 918, the Clinton administration imposes an 
arms embargo on Rwanda, under Executive Order 12918. 
26 May 1994 UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali criticises members of the international 
community for their lack of commitment to addressing the ongoing conflict in 
Rwanda, which he describes as a “scandal”, citing in particular the lack of 
offers of troops for UNAMIR II. The story is reported on the front page of the 
NYT, as well as inside the WP. 
27 May 1994 Reports emerge from Rwanda suggesting that government forces, many of 
them deserters, are fleeing Kigali in the face of the RPF advance. 
28 May 1994 In an encouraging sign that means are available to alleviate the suffering in 
Rwanda, UNAMIR evacuates two convoys of civilians, 402 Hutus and 290 
Tutsis, respectively, out of Kigali and to relative safety. 
30 May 1994 The Hutu-dominated interim government of Rwanda is believed to have fled 
its temporary base in Gitarama amid news that the RPF is on the brink of 
taking both that city (the second largest in Rwanda) and Kigali. Many now 
speculate that the RPF could quickly win the civil war, and that perhaps this 
poses the greatest hope for an end to the massacres.  
31 May 1994 With UN Envoys Iqbal Riza and Maurice Baril having now returned from 
Rwanda, UNSG Boutros-Ghali releases his latest report on the situation in 
Rwanda. The report estimates that 250,000 to 500,000 have been killed in the 
violence, with a further 1.5 million internally displaced and another 400,000 
in neighbouring countries. The report urges the prompt deployment of phase 
1 of UNAMIR II, but estimates that, given current shortfall in offers of 
troops, equipment and airlift, this will take at least 4 to 6 weeks. The report 
makes repeated reference to the lack of commitments offered by national 
governments to the expanded UNAMIR II.  
1 June 1994 As the RPF advances, more and more sites of large-scale massacres are 
uncovered, including a church in Nyarubuye where up to 20,000 people are 
believed to have been killed. 
1 June 1994 The Vatican writes to the UNSC asking it to designate a church near 
Gitarama as a ‘safe haven’, as it fears that the 38,000 refugees sheltering 
there may be murdered by Hutu militias. 
3 June 1994 The front page of the NYT picks up the story of the Nyarubuye massacre and, 
in an extensive story, reports of other similar massacres.  
3 June 1994 Former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen places 
an op-ed in the WP that is highly critical of Clinton administration policy 
towards Rwanda, arguing that support for a robust peacekeeping force should 
have been more readily forthcoming, both on the grounds of moral 
leadership, as well as realpolitik, in an oblique reference to PDD 25. 
4 June 1994 14 African nations—Angola, Benin, Botswana, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Eritrea, 
Ghana, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe—offer troops for UNAMIR II, though do not specify how many. 
Previously, only Ghana, Ethiopia and Senegal had offered troops, totalling 
2,100 of the mandated 5,500. 
8 June 1994 The new US-sponsored Resolution 925 is adopted by the UNSC. The 
Resolution calls for the speedy deployment of the troops now being offered 
by African nations, and drops the United States’ former insistence that these 
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be focused on protecting refugees along Rwanda’s borders, but allows them 
to deploy from Kigali outwards, as Boutros-Ghali had originally desired, but 
explicitly states that these shall not be used as a buffer force between the RPF 
and government forces. UNAMIR II’s mandate allows for the establishment 
of protected areas and the use of force in self-defense, including of protected 
areas. The Resolution also acknowledges “reports indicating that acts of 
genocide” have taken place. The term “genocide” appeared in the recent 
report of the UNSG and is now openly acknowledged by most members of 
the Council, the first time this has been done.  
8 June 1994 Senator David Durenberger (R-MI) writes a letter to President Clinton urging 
the administration to do more to ease the humanitarian suffering in Rwanda. 
9 June 1994 Though most of the required troops have been recruited for UNAMIR II, 
Clinton administration officials admit that it will take at least another month 
for the 50 APCs they have promised to supply the mission with to be made 
available and the troops trained in their use. 
10 June 1994 In a now infamous press conference, State Department press spokesperson 
Christine Shelley describes the violence in Rwanda as “acts of genocide”, 
but, when pressed, refuses to classify the violence in Rwanda as genocide. It 
quickly emerges that State and NSC spokespersons were instructed to 
describe the violence only as acts of genocide. In the face of widespread 
criticism, Secretary of State Warren Christopher admits the same day that the 
distinction is erroneous, the Genocide Convention defining genocide in terms 
of various genocidal acts. The story is reported on the front pages of the NYT 
and WP. 
12 June 1994 A fifth round of cease-fire talks ends with no tangible result. Though recent 
reports had suggested that the RPF were close to securing a military victory, 
recent analyses, including by UNAMIR Commander Romeo Dallaire, have 
noted a counteroffensive by government forces, who remain well-armed, and 
suggest that the conflict may continue for some time yet.  
14 June 1994 The RPF and government forces agree to an immediate ceasefire at a summit 
of the Organization for African Unity. Despite the announcement of the 
cease-fire, armed clashes in Rwanda are still reported. 
15 June 1994 Congressman Alcee Hastings (D-FL) proposes a resolution to classify the 
violence in Rwanda as genocide. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
also prepares a letter to President Clinton urging that the administration 
recognise it as genocide. 
16 June 1994 Senator David Durenberger (R-MI) calls on the Senate floor for more to be 
done by the Clinton administration to ease the humanitarian suffering in 
Rwanda. 
16 June 1994 French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé announces that France may be prepared 
to intervene militarily if massacres continue in Rwanda.  
16 June 1994 Senator Claiborne Pell (D-RI) calls the violence in Rwanda ‘genocide’ and 
calls upon the United States to live up to its commitments under the Genocide 
Convention. By now, numerous other senior figures are also describing the 
violence as genocide, including members of the Clinton administration. 
17 June 1994 In a Memorandum to the President from Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher, the latter indicates that the United States is prepared to support 
France’s proposed intervention in Rwanda. Elsewhere, Belgium, Uganda, the 
Rwandan government and the RPF, among others, criticise and indicate 
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opposition to the plan. 
19 June 1994 Despite the lack of enthusiasm for a French intervention, France announces 
that it intends to send troops to Rwanda’s borders in readiness for a potential 
intervention. France also indicates that Senegal is prepared to support the 
intervention with a contribution of troops. The troops could be in Rwanda 
within a week. 
20 June 1994 A Letter from the UNSG indicates that, due to problems with securing 
contributions from various countries, UNAMIR II may not be in a position to 
pursue its mandate for another three months. As such, the letter suggests that 
the UNSC may want to seriously consider France’s offer. 
20 June 1994 France sends a letter to the UNSG indicating its (and Senegal’s) willingness 
to send an intervention force to Rwanda pending the deployment of 
UNAMIR II, and requests a Chapter VII mandate. 
21 June 1994 France circulates a draft resolution authorising a multilateral force to 
intervene in Rwanda under Chapter VII of the UN Charter for a period no 
longer than two months, pending the deployment of UNAMIR II, and asks 
the president of the UNSC to schedule a formal session to vote on this 
resolution on 22 June. 
22 June 1994 The UNSC adopts Resolution 929, authorising the French and Senegalese 
intervention force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In the vote on the 
Resolution, ten were in favour and five abstained.  
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Appendix 3: Haiti Timeline 
16 December 1990 Aristide is elected in Haiti’s democratic elections, billed as the country’s 
first. 
7 February 1991 Aristide is sworn in as president of Haiti. 
30 September 1991 Aristide is overthrown by a military coup. 
2 October 1991 House Resolution 235 is passed, which calls upon the United States to 
support democracy in Haiti. 
24 May 1992 The WP reports that a team of Navy Seals was sent in to Haiti to rescue 
members of Aristide’s government who were in danger of their lives. The 
Pentagon neither confirms nor denies the report.  
24 May 1992 President Bush signs an order providing for the direct repatriation of 
Haitians intercepted at sea. 
2 June 1992 Marc Bazin is appointed prime minister by the military junta. 
6 January 1993 A boat carrying 352 Haitians, the largest single number of illegal aliens 
ever to reach US shores, is indicted as it tries to enter the port of Miami. 
There is insufficient room for the refugees at Krome detention centre, 
where 160 of their compatriots are already undertaking a hunger strike to 
protest against discriminatory asylum policy, so they are dispersed 
throughout the Florida jail system. Meanwhile, the incoming Clinton policy 
indicates it will unveil a new Haiti policy before the inauguration, with 
better mechanisms for processing asylum claims, though the general 
direction of policy is unlikely to differ substantially from Bush policy. The 
story is reported on the front page of the NYT. 
7 January 1993 In a rare collaboration between transitioning administrations, members of 
the outgoing Bush and incoming Clinton teams issue a joint statement on 
Haiti, voicing their support for UN mediation efforts aimed at reaching a 
political settlement in Haiti. The statement is intended to forestall any mass 
exodus of Haitians who may believe Clinton’s refugee policy is likely to be 
more lenient than Bush’s, on the basis that a settlement may be reached 
soon. 
10 January 1993 Exiled Haitian President Jean Bertrand Aristide writes in the NYT of his 
hopes for a settlement in Haiti. He urges US support for the restoration of 
democracy, citing ending human rights abuses, refugee flows and drug 
trafficking as the major interests the United States might have in his return. 
11 January 1993 After urging by members of the incoming Clinton administration, Aristide 
appeals to his countrymen not to attempt to sail to the United States. At the 
same time, it is revealed that the Haitian military junta has for the first time 
accepted the premise, at least in theory, of Aristide’s return. 
14 January 1993 The newly announced Clinton team indicates that they will not alter Bush’s 
policy of forcibly repatriating Haitians without a hearing on the new 
president’s inauguration. The policy is conveyed directly to Haitians via 
Voice of America’s Creole service. Though this is billed as a ‘temporary’ 
measure, Clinton is widely criticised for backtracking on campaign 
promises. 
16 January 1993 A flotilla of US coast guard vessels is moved to the waters off Haiti to 
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interdict any trying to make the crossing. The story makes the front pages 
of the NYT and WP. 
17 January 1993 As Clinton’s inauguration approaches, multiple front page stories on both 
the WP and NYT question the credibility of Clinton’s campaign promises, 
his ability to ‘stay the course’ or to avoid rhetorical gaffes in his foreign 
policy pronouncements. This vein of criticism is the subject of repeated 
stories over the coming weeks. 
18 January 1993 UN Special Envoy Dante Caputo announces that Haiti’s military junta has 
agreed to accept civilian human rights monitors into the country and on a 
framework for renewed talks. Meanwhile, however, the regime presses on 
with legislative elections despite Caputo’s appeal that these be postponed. 
The election is boycotted by all but members of regime-affiliated parties, 
meaning the regime can gain an easy majority in the Senate. Voter turnout 
is negligible. 
19 January 1993 In a radio address, junta leader Gen. Raoul Cedras denies giving permission 
for monitors to deploy to Haiti. 
20 January 1993 The outgoing Bush administration’s final global human rights report argues 
that political violence in Haiti is down from the initial levels after the coup, 
though admits that the refusal of Haiti’s military junta to investigate claims 
of abuse may have contributed to under-reporting.  
20 January 1993 William Jefferson Clinton is inaugurated as the 42nd President of the 
United States. After heavy anticipation of a large scale flight of boat people 
from Haiti upon Clinton’s inauguration, very few actually leave.  
21 January 1993 Despite uncertainty over whether the Haitian military junta will admit 
them, the UN and OAS announce that they expect to deploy a large number 
of observers, as early as within 10 days. Though neither organisation gives 
firm figures, around 400 observers are expected. 
28 January 1993 Haitian Prime Minister Marc Bazin explicitly rejects the terms of a 22 
January letter from the UN and OAS spelling out the proposed terms of the 
planned observer mission to Haiti. He denounces the mission as a violation 
of Haitian sovereignty. 
29 January 1993 A letter is sent to the White House by 44 members of Congress indicating 
their support for a programme aimed at restoring Aristide to power.  
31 January 1993 The WP reports that the Clinton administration commissioned the NSC to 
conduct studies into 29 foreign crises in an effort to establish policy. Of the 
29, four are listed as urgent priorities: Haiti, Iraq, Somalia and the former 
Yugoslavia. 
1 February 1993 A number of Haitian refugees interned at Guantanamo Bay go on hunger 
strike to highlight their plight. The refugees are part of a group of 267 
Haitians who have already been granted asylum but are barred from 
entering the United States because they or their relatives are carriers of the 
HIV virus, and US law prohibits the immigration of HIV-positive persons. 
As pressure develops to amend the law, the Clinton administration appears 
to back such a change. On 18 February, however, the Senate votes by a 
significant majority against any amendment to the law.  
2 February 1993 The United States indicates its likely opposition to the Vance-Owen peace 
plan for Bosnia. 
5 February 1993 UN Special Envoy Dante Caputo leaves Haiti after a three day trip in which 
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he was unable to secure the ruling junta’s support for the deployment of the 
proposed observer mission. The regime set conditions for the deployment, 
including recognition of the military regime, an end to the OAS embargo 
and restrictions on the role of the observers, which would likely have 
frustrated the mission’s objectives.  
5 February 1993 In response to the news from Haiti, Clinton and Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher both publicly voice their support for a process leading to the 
return of Aristide. The latter holds a short meeting with the deposed Haitian 
president. 
6 February 1993 Congressman Robert Torricelli (D-NJ) writes in the WP of his support for 
expanded in-country processing for Haitian asylum seekers, as well as a 
process to end the political deadlock in the country. 
8 February 1993 The NYT reports that, in a briefing given to the cabinet and senior aides at 
Camp David on priorities for the new administration, President Clinton 
makes no mention of any foreign policy issues, suggesting the president 
will keep to his campaign pledge to focus on domestic issues. 
9 February 1993 After days of diplomatic pressure, the Haitian government drops its 
objections to the deployment of an observer mission. 
15 February 1993 A team of 40 UN human rights observers, an advance party for the mission 
expected to number in the hundreds, arrives in Port-au-Prince. 
27 February 1993 The Clinton administration announces that the president will personally 
meet with Aristide on 16 March.  
2 March 1992 The Clinton administration goes to the Supreme Court to defend the policy 
of arbitrarily returning to Haiti any asylum seekers interdicted at sea. 
10 March 1993 Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee meet with Aristide to 
discuss the Haitian situation. 
11 March 1993 Congressman Benjamin Gilman (R-NY) introduces HR 1307, ‘The Haitian 
Refugee Protection Act’, which calls for an end to the policy of arbitrarily 
returning Haitian asylum seekers to Haiti without a hearing on refugee 
status. 
11 March 1993 US Secretary of State Warren Christopher announces the naming of 
Lawrence Pezzullo as Special Advisor on Haiti. 
12 March 1993 A man who had been granted asylum by the United States is arrested by 
Haitian authorities at Port-au-Prince airport as he tries to board a plane to 
the United States along with IOM officials, raising fresh doubts about the 
viability of in-country processing. 
15 March 1993 In an afternoon press conference at the White House, Press Secretary 
George Stephanopolous is grilled at length by reporters over Clinton’s Haiti 
policy, primarily focusing on refugee returns, but also the effectiveness of 
in-country processing, the status of HIV-infected asylum seekers, and 
policy to restore democracy to Haiti. 
16 March 1993 Prior to his meeting with Clinton, Aristide places an article in the NYT 
calling upon the United States to set a date for his return to Haiti. In the 
meeting, Clinton apparently persuades Aristide that a date-certain would 
not best serve the negotiations, as any such marker should be dealt with in 
the context of the negotiations. 
26 March 1993 The UNSC passes Resolution 814 on Somalia, which provides for the 
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transfer of operations from the US-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to the 
UN-led UNOSOM II. The new force’s mandate includes provisions for 
disarmament, national reconciliation and the establishment of a secure 
environment, matters which required—and were granted—extensive 
enforcement powers. Of the 28,000 US troops that were initially deployed 
under UNITAF, a 3,000 strong logistics unit will remain under UNOSOM 
II. Additionally, the United States undertakes to provide a 1,300 strong 
Quick Reaction Force (QRF) under US command, to deal with emergency 
situations.  
28 March 1993 The NYT reports that the UN negotiating team is close to reaching an 
agreement on the restoration of democracy to Haiti.  
1 April 1993 Senators Carol Moseley-Braun (D-IL) and Russ Feingold (D-WI) introduce 
Senate Resolution 89, which calls for invigorated US efforts towards the 
restoration of democracy in Haiti and fair treatment of Haitian refugees. 
7 April 1993 The NYT reports that talks aimed at restoring Aristide to power in Haiti 
may have stalled because of Aristide’s refusal to countenance an amnesty 
for the coup plotters.  
14 April 1993 The front page of the NYT carries a story suggesting a major breakthrough 
may have been reached in the talks aimed at restoring Aristide to Haiti, as 
the deposed president is said to have now agreed to offer amnesty to the 
coup leaders. 
16 April 1993 In a move that comes as a surprise to most commentators, Haiti’s ruling 
military junta rejects Aristide’s offer of amnesty, jeopardising the prospects 
for mediation. 
21 April 1993 The NYT reports that the United States is prepared to get tougher with the 
Haitian generals, with plans for a tightening of the embargo, targeted 
sanctions, cancellation of visas and restrictions on commercial air traffic 
potentially in the offing. 
10 May 1993 As negotiations on Aristide’s return continue optimistically but 
uneventfully, reports surface that the UNSC is considering readying a team 
of 500 civilian police officers for Haiti, to keep the peace on the president’s 
return.  
22 May 1993 In an effort to gain support for the proposition of an international police 
force for Haiti, UN and US envoys return to the island for a further round 
of talks.  
25 May 1993 Haiti’s military junta reject the latest plans for the restoration of democracy 
to Haiti, including its resignation under amnesty and the deployment of an 
international police force to prepare the way for Aristide’s return. 
25 May 1993 Senate Joint Resolution 45 Authorising the Use of United States Armed 
Forces in Somalia to Implement UNSC Resolutions 794 (1992) and 814 
(1993) is passed by a vote of 243 to 179. The debate on the role of US 
forces in peacekeeping operations is lengthy, with some strongly supportive 
of a continuing US role in multilateral operations, while others argue for 
such burdens to be carried by other members of the UN. Those opposed to 
a continuing US role in Somalia use arguments that will later appear in 
PDD 25, but are outvoted on the floor. 
27 May 1993 The NYT reports that Clinton plans to freeze the assets and revoke the visas 
of members of Haiti’s military junta. 
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28 May 1993 Senator Bob Graham (D-FL) calls on the Senate floor for the “threat and 
the reality of military force” to be used to underpin efforts to restore 
democracy to Haiti. Meanwhile, in an address at the City University of 
New York, Aristide calls for a tightening of sanctions. 
4 June 1993 President Clinton announces that the United States will revoke the visas 
and freeze the assets of supporters of the Haitian military junta, and push 
for a tightening of sanctions against Haiti. 
5 June 1993 In Somalia, Pakistani peacekeepers sent to investigate an arms depot 
belonging to Mohamed Farah Aideed are attacked by Aideed’s troops. 24 
peacekeepers are killed and over 50 more wounded.  
6 June 1993 The UN passes Resolution 837, which condemns the attacks on UN troops 
in Somalia and authorises all necessary means to bring those responsible to 
justice. 
8 June 1993 A federal judge orders that 158 Haitian inmates at Guantanamo be released 
to “anywhere but Haiti” (likely the United States), and the camp be closed. 
The inmates have all already been granted asylum but had been barred from 
entry to the United States due to their HIV-positive status. 
8 June 1993 Haitian Prime Minister Marc Bazin resigns as four key ministers in his 
government refuse to step down following his dismissal of them.  
10 June 1993 The front page of the NYT reports that a UNSC resolution is pending that 
would impose mandatory sanctions on Haiti, including a worldwide 
embargo on oil. Aristide notes his belief in the potential effectiveness of 
this option.  
10 June 1993 In a sign of deteriorating relations with an important political constituency, 
members of the Congressional Black Caucus refuse Clinton’s request to 
meet with him at the White House. Issues of contention between the parties 
include Clinton’s failure to support the nomination of black candidate Lani 
Guinier as Assistant Attorney General, budget policy and Haiti policy. 
11 June 1993 Congressman Major Owens (D-NY) places an op-ed in the WP calling for a 
tightening of all forms of sanctions against the Haitian military regime 
worldwide. 
11 June 1993 In a major foreign policy speech to the Council on Foreign Relations, US 
Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright outlines the United States’ 
approach to peacekeeping. The speech bears most of the hallmarks of the 
‘assertive multilateralism’ approach, with a strong US interest in 
peacekeeping identified, concurrent with the benefits of the UN as a forum 
for pursuing US interests in this sphere. At the same time, some of the 
kernels of ‘selective engagement’ are present, with an identification of the 
need to strengthen and streamline UN peacekeeping on a number of 
procedural points, many of which appear later in PDD 25. 
12 June 1993 The United States, in concert with UN troops, begins operations in Somalia 
under Resolution 837 against the facilities and assets of Somali warlord 
Mohamed Farah Aideed. 
16 June 1993 Haiti’s parliament, in a last minute effort to avoid an oil embargo, officially 
recognises Aristide’s presidency and asks him to name a new prime 
minister to replace Bazin. However, the parliament also sets steep terms for 
Aristide’s return, including acceptance of all political decisions taken in his 
absence and full amnesty for all coup participants, which Aristide rejects. 
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The international community, too, firmly rejects the move. 
16 June 1993 The UNSC unanimously passes Resolution 841, which imposes a 
worldwide embargo on Haiti, including an embargo on oil and the 
worldwide freezing of assets held by supporters of the Haitian junta. The 
embargo is due to be in place by 23 June. The Resolution, however, stops 
short of authorising a naval blockade of Haiti. 
17 June 1993 In his first live prime time press conference as president, President Clinton 
announces that the offensive operations conducted against Aideed’s forces 
in Somalia have now come to a conclusion. The president then proceeds to 
talk about a number of domestic issues at much greater length. This focus is 
reflected in the Q&A, where only two questions relate directly to Somalia, 
and most other questions are on domestic issues. 
18 June 1993 The United States ships 87 Haitian boat people back to Haiti, the first since 
the 23 January order to forcibly repatriate Haitians intercepted at sea. 
18 June 1993 The WP reveals that the Clinton administration is undertaking a major 
review of peacekeeping policy, in which it will likely seek to expand and 
improve the system for multilateral military action under the doctrine of 
‘assertive multilateralism’. The policy review is being conducted under 
Presidential Review Directive (PRD) 13, a process that normally results in 
a presidential decision directive (PDD). However, in this case, no 
PDD emerges from the review, perhaps due to changes in the political 
climate through the latter half of 1993. 
21 June 1993 In a major foreign policy speech centring on Russia, Clinton also outlines 
his overall foreign policy vision, with considerable emphasis placed on 
democracy promotion.  
22 June 1993 Having lost the first of two court cases on Haitian refugee policy in a 
federal court, the Supreme Court upholds the legality of the Clinton policy 
of forcibly repatriating Haitian boat people intercepted at sea, as the law 
requiring asylum seekers to be granted hearings is held only to apply once 
they reach US shores.  
22 June 1993 Only a day before the UN embargo is set to commence, Raoul Cedras, the 
lead figure in the Haitian military junta, sends a letter to UN Special Envoy 
Dante Caputo indicating his willingness to engage in talks with Aristide. 
23 June 1993 Aristide accedes to Cedras’ request for talks, but sets conditions for his 
participation, including Cedras’ resignation and a date set for his own 
reinstatement. These conditions come close to derailing the talks, but are 
eventually withdrawn, with talks likely to be held within the week. 
28 June 1993 Talks between Aristide and Cedras commence on Governor’s Island, New 
York, though the two are yet to meet face to face, shuttle diplomacy being 
used instead. 
29 June 1993 Talks on Governor’s Island appear close to breaking down, as the military 
junta appears unwilling to give ground on key issues such as setting a date 
for Aristide’s return or its own resignation. 
30 June 1993 Clinton announces Executive Order 12853, which blocks the property of 
the military junta and its supporters, as well as prohibiting any transactions 
with Haiti.  
3 July 1993 An agreement is reached on Governor’s Island that provides for Aristide’s 
return. Under the settlement, Aristide is to nominate a new prime minister 
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to establish a new government, at which point sanctions would be lifted, 
prior to Aristide’s scheduled return on 30 October. Cedras would resign his 
command days before Aristide’s return and an amnesty for participants in 
the coup would be granted. Issues such as the deployment of a 
multinational force are not settled under the agreement. 
5 July 1993 Secretary of State Warren Christopher indicates that US troops will 
participate, if asked, in a multinational peacekeeping force for Haiti on 
Aristide’s return. The troops are expected to number no more than 1,000 
and are expected to be limited to expert advisors. 
17 July 1993 After a weekend-long meeting in New York, representatives of Haiti’s 
parliament and exiled president Jean-Bertrand Aristide come to an 
agreement restoring authority to the parliament in order to facilitate the 
naming of a new prime minister, the first necessary step under the 
Governor’s Island Accord. 
22 July 1993 Clinton administration officials announce the United States will offer to 
send around 350 troops and military engineers as part of an international 
force to retrain Haiti’s army and assist in military construction projects, 
though the precise number remains speculative. Meanwhile, Clinton holds a 
short meeting with Aristide at the White House on progress in 
implementing the accords. 
25 July 1993 In a letter to Haiti’s parliament, Aristide nominates Robert Malval to be the 
new prime minister. Malval is viewed as a political moderate, supportive of 
Aristide but also respected by many of the businessmen who supported the 
coup against Aristide, especially as he has shown himself prepared to 
criticise Aristide when he disagrees with the exiled president. 
28 July 1993 Aristide writes to the UNSC requesting assistance in creating a police force 
and professionalising the army, with an estimate of 500-600 UN personnel 
required. 
8 August 1993 Four US military police are killed by a remote-detonated explosive in 
Somalia. Reaction is mixed, with some calling for the United States to 
withdraw, while others call for the operations against Aideed to be pursued 
more vigorously. Clinton sits in the latter camp. 
10 August 1993 US Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright places an article in the NYT 
arguing that the United States should stay the course in Somalia. 
10 August 1993 The NYT reports that the United States is considering sending special 
forces to Somalia to deal with the upsurge in hostilities. 
13 August 1993 Italy announces it will withdraw its troops from UNOSOM II following 
major disagreements in terms of command and control. The following day, 
Italy’s Foreign Minister criticises what he calls ‘Rambo’ commanders in 
the UN mission, a barely veiled reference to the UN Envoy to Somalia, US 
Admiral Jonathan Howe (Ret.). 
20 August 1993 UNSG Boutros-Boutros Ghali places an article in the NYT calling for 
support for UN peacekeeping operations and perseverance in the face of 
difficulties, with particular reference to Somalia. The article comes amid a 
flurry of criticism of the UN’s Somalia mission in the face of US casualties, 
Italian misgivings and continued failed efforts to apprehend Aideed. At the 
same time, Clinton is said to be considering sending new troops to Somalia 
at a time when many were expecting a US withdrawal.  
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25 August 1993 The UNSG presents his report on the multinational force for Haiti to the 
UNSC, recommending 567 police monitors, 60 military trainers and 500-
strong military construction unit. 
26 August 1993 Robert Malval wins final approval from Haiti’s parliament to take up the 
role of prime minister. The embargo will be lifted as soon as Malval takes 
up his office. Though no date has yet been set, it is expected to be within a 
week.  
27 August 1993 As Malval flies to Washington to be sworn in by Aristide, the UNSC 
suspends the sanctions against Haiti under Resolution 861. 
31 August 1993 The UNSC authorises under Resolution 862 the immediate deployment of 
an advance team of 30 personnel to assess requirements for the 
multinational force. The UNSG is asked to provide a further report on the 
precise costs, modalities, time-frame, etc., for the proposed mission. 
31 August 1993 Malval is sworn in as prime minister in the Haitian Embassy in 
Washington, DC.  
12 September 1993 Prominent Aristide supporter Antoine Izmery is dragged out of a church 
during mass and executed in broad daylight in the street outside in Port-au-
Prince. The mass was being held in honour of victims of a massacre at 
another church five years earlier when Aristide was its pastor. Plain clothes 
police are suspected of committing the attack. 
13 September 1993  Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat sign a peace agreement on the White 
House lawn, in a major foreign policy achievement for the Clinton 
administration. 
15 September 1993 The prosecutor overseeing the investigation of the assassination of Antoine 
Izmery resigns after receiving death threats.  
17 September 1993 Condemning the recent upsurge in violence in Haiti, the UNSC issues a 
statement warning that sanctions may be reimposed if security is not 
restored.  
20 September 1993 In the first of a series of major foreign policy speeches that will culminate 
in President Clinton’s 27 September address to the UN General Assembly, 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher addresses Columbia University in a 
speech sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, and argues that the 
United States should remain committed to an internationalist leadership 
role in the world, using multilateralism as a tool where appropriate while 
maintaining an independent and interest-oriented foreign policy. 
21 September 1993 Continuing the series of speeches, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake 
argues for America’s overriding interests in promoting democracy and free 
markets. He also highlights ethnic conflicts as a threat, arguing that the 
United States must be wary of becoming over-entangled, but that 
humanitarian or other interests may still dictate engagement. 
21 September 1993 In the wake of increased political violence in Haiti, Aristide calls for the 
early resignation of the military high command and plainclothes policemen 
believed responsible, and suggests he might support the reimposition of 
sanctions if the UNSC so decides. 
22 September 1993 The WP reports that PRD 13, which had been approved at the level of 
deputies and was expected to be signed into PDD 13 this week, is receiving 
renewed scrutiny at the cabinet level due to concerns over a congressional 
backlash, particularly in terms of the proposition of US troops serving 
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under UN command. 
23 September 1993 Senator Paul Wellstone (D-MI) introduces an amendment to the Foreign 
Operations Act calling upon the president to reimpose sanctions on Haiti in 
light of the upsurge in violence. The amendment is agreed to with no 
opposition. 
23 September 1993 Under Resolution 867, the UNSC approves the proposed peacekeeping 
force for Haiti, consisting of civilian police, military trainers and military 
construction units. 
23 September 1993 In the third such speech, US Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright 
addresses the use of force in the post-cold war world. The speech deals at 
length with UN peacekeeping, and iterates US support for peacekeeping 
and its willingness to act multilaterally when beneficial and unilaterally 
when necessary. The speech carries all the hallmarks of ‘assertive 
multilateralism’. 
27 September 1993 President Clinton addresses the UN General Assembly in the culmination 
of the week’s speeches, with continued emphasis on the US interest in 
democracy. Clinton reiterates the strength of US support for UN 
peacekeeping and its belief in the efficacy of peacekeeping and multilateral 
action. The second major theme of the speech revolves around the need for 
reform of the UN, which Clinton addresses at length, but stresses relates to 
strengthening the UN rather than criticising or sidelining it. 
28 September 1993 Defense Secretary Les Aspin announces that the United States will send 
600 troops as part of the multinational force for Haiti. The troops will be 
involved in military construction projects and in retraining of the Haitian 
military.  
30 September 1993 Clinton writes to Congress to indicate that he is not lifting the state of 
emergency with respect to Haiti, which leaves the possibility open that 
sanctions can be reimposed. 
30 September 1993 In a speech on the Senate floor, Senator Bob Dole (R-KA) addresses 
Clinton’s speech, criticising the president’s application of his professed 
policy in Somalia, Bosnia and Haiti, and arguing for much greater focus on 
the independent pursuit of US interests outside of the UN, which Dole 
describes as needing ‘reconstructive surgery’.  
3 October 1993 Aristide declares a presidential pardon for the coup leaders. 
4 October 1993 After a botched attempt to arrest senior members of Aideed’s militia leads 
to an overnight battle on the streets of Mogadishu between US forces and 
Somalis, 18 US servicemen are killed, and one captured and held hostage. 
Two US Black Hawk helicopters are shot down and a further three 
damaged in the fighting. 
4 October 1993 Newly appointed Prime Minister Robert Malval argues that the Haitian 
military stands in violation of the Governor’s Island Accord due to its 
efforts to derail the process through intimidation and political stalling, and 
suggests that the international community may need to be prepared to 
reimpose sanctions. 
4 October 1993 Col. Michel Francois, the head of the country’s military police and a 
member of the military junta’s ruling triumvirate, declares that he has no 
intention of stepping down as demanded of him by the Governor’s Island 
Accord. 
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5 October 1993 Further attacks take place in broad daylight in Port-au-Prince against Mayor 
Evans Paul, exacerbating concern over the prospects for an orderly 
transition of power. 
6 October 1993 UNSG Boutros-Boutros Ghali recommends the appointment of US Colonel 
Gregg Pulley as head of the military component of UNMIH. 
6 October 1993 The first components of UNMIH arrive in Port-au-Prince, comprising 26 
Americans and 5 Canadians. 
7 October 1993 In a live televised address to the nation, President Clinton, though he argues 
that the United States must not ‘cut and run’ in Somalia, lest it become 
‘open season’ on American troops in the knowledge that a few casualties 
will cause the United States to withdraw, nevertheless declares that all US 
combat personnel will be withdrawn from Somalia by no later than 31 
March 1994. 
8 October 1993 The NYT reports that the State Department and Pentagon are now at odds 
over sending US troops to Haiti, with the latter concerned about sending 
more American soldiers into a potentially dangerous situation. The dispute 
causes delays in the departure of the USS Harlan County, carrying 250 US 
troops. 
9 October 1993 The USS Harlan County finally leaves for Haiti. 
11 October 1993 In a clear sign of retreat from the goals of Resolution 837, newly arrived 
(re-appointed) US Envoy to Somalia Robert Oakley meets with members of 
Aideed’s militia, as reports of a potential cease-fire gain in strength. 
11 October 1993 A crowd waving clubs and other assorted weapons holds a demonstration 
on Port-au-Prince docks as the USS Harlan County tries to dock. Members 
of the welcoming party are harassed and, in the face of this demonstration, 
the USS Harlan County does not dock and remains moored out at sea. In 
response, the UN threatens to reimpose sanctions. 
12 October 1993 In a press briefing, Deputy National Security Advisor Sandy Berger all but 
confirms that the USS Harlan County will withdraw in the face of the 
demonstration in Port-au-Prince, and the deployment of the multinational 
force will be put on hold until a secure environment for their deployment 
can be demonstrated. In the meantime, the United States will push for the 
reimposition of sanctions.  
13 October 1993 Under Resolution 873, the UNSC reimposes sanctions on Haiti. 
Meanwhile, the USS Harlan County withdraws to Guantanamo. 
14 October 1993 Haiti’s Justice Minister, Guy Malary, is assassinated in Haiti.  
14 October 1993 In an effort to demonstrate continued resolve, newly appointed US 
Ambassador to Haiti William Lacy Swing presents his credentials to 
Aristide, and the two make a joint statement committing themselves to the 
restoration of democracy in Haiti. 
14 October 1993 In a press conference on Somalia, President Clinton hints that he might 
consider the use of a blockade to enforce sanctions against Haiti. 
15 October 1993 President Clinton orders six warships to patrol the waters off Haiti in order 
to ensure that the embargo is being enforced. He also sends an infantry 
company to Guantanamo to “be on standby”. Meanwhile, a senior 
administration official refuses to rule out the use of US combat forces, but 
Pentagon officials take the bite out of threat by saying it is “highly 
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unlikely”.  
15 October 1993 The Senate approves Clinton’s Somalia plan, but it comes amid one of the 
most vitriolic debates in Senate history, with the president’s policy 
described as ‘sick’, ‘namby-pamby’, ‘claptrap’, ‘irresponsible’, ‘ill-defined’ 
and ‘amateur’. 
16 October 1993 Under Resolution 875, the UNSC authorises under Chapter VII of the 
Charter the use by states of “such measures commensurate with the specific 
circumstances as may be necessary” to enforce the embargo. 
16 October 1993 All but around 30 of the OAS human rights monitors are to be evacuated to 
the Dominican Republic, Dante Caputo announces. 
17 October 1993 Aristide expresses his hope to still return to Haiti by October 30. He 
indicates that he expressed his desire to the UN that it should invoke 
Chapter VII of the Charter and says that if the embargo does not work, 
further measures should be considered, though he is quick to stress that he 
does not mean a peacekeeping force. 
17 October 1993 It emerges that Cedras sent a letter to Dante Caputo on 15 October 
suggesting the Governor’s Island Accords may be ‘at a dead end’. 
18 October 1993 As Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole (R-KA) prepares a bill limiting the 
ability of the president to use troops in Haiti, the White House indicates it 
will fight the measure and refuses to rule out the use of military force. 
Meanwhile, the president signs Executive Order 1287, which reintroduces 
targeted sanctions against the military junta. 
19 October 1993 President Clinton meets with Aristide and Malval. All sides reaffirm their 
commitment to Governor’s Island but little else of note emerges from the 
meeting. 
19 October 1993 Congress rejects an amendment requiring Congressional authorisation for 
the placing of US troops under foreign command in UN peacekeeping 
operations. The Dole amendment requiring Congressional approval for the 
deployment of US troops to Haiti also looks likely to be rejected, and starts 
to be watered down. 
21 October 1993 US and UN Envoys try to persuade Aristide to bring some of his political 
opponents into his cabinet in an effort to mitigate the hostilities between the 
two camps. While Malval seems wary of the idea, Aristide immediately 
rejects it. 
22 October 1993 After a CIA briefing to members of Congress, rumours begin to circulate of 
a CIA report describing Aristide as mentally unstable and responsible for 
human rights abuses. 
23 October 1993 UN aides warn Haiti’s rulers that unless Aristide is allowed to return by 30 
October, they could face a total blockade of all commerce.  
23 October 1993 Members of Haiti’s military junta meet with Malval and representatives of 
his civilian government in an apparent attempt to end the impasse that has 
led to sanctions.  
25 October 1993 The UNSC calls for the resignation of Cedras and Francois, as called for 
under the Governor’s Island Accords, and threatens ‘further measures’ 
should the terms of the Accord not be honoured. 
27 October 1993 A plan hammered out as a consequence of the meetings between Malval 
and the military junta, which requires the simultaneous signing into law of 
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two new bills granting amnesty and divorcing the police from the military, 
appears on the brink of failure as gunmen stake out parliament and 
legislators stay away in fear for their lives. 
28 October 1993 In a speech before the UN General Assembly, Aristide calls for a total trade 
embargo against Haiti. 
30 October 1993 UN Envoy Dante Caputo calls for renewed talks with the military junta to 
discuss means to revive implementation of the Governor’s Island Accord. 
Aristide indicates he is prepared to participate. Though France has already 
drawn up a draft resolution for a total embargo against Haiti, the United 
States is reported to be hesitant and waiting on the outcome of Caputo’s 
initiative. Meanwhile, pro-Army Haitian legislators threaten to establish a 
new government that excludes Aristide and his supporters. 
1 November 1993 Reports emerge that participants in the coup against Aristide were on the 
CIA payroll, contributing to arguments that CIA assessments of Aristide 
may have been one-sided, as much of the information on which they were 
based came from Aristide’s opponents. 
2 November 1993 In a change of tack, the White House is reported now to support, rather than 
a total trade embargo, more targeted sanctions against supporters of the 
Haitian regime. 
6 November 1993 Caputo’s efforts to reinitiate a political dialogue fail as Haiti’s military 
rulers fail to appear at what was scheduled to be the start of two days of 
talks. 
7 November 1993 Clinton confirms the White House’s preference for targeted sanctions rather 
than a complete trade embargo.  
10 November 1993 44 prominent African Americans, including a number of members of 
Congress, implicitly criticise Clinton’s strategy on the restoration of 
Aristide, and several explicitly call for military intervention. Aristide notes 
that he is constitutionally barred from calling for US intervention but 
nevertheless implies his support by warmly thanking the participants for 
their sentiments. 
17 November 1993 Administration officials reveal that the United States will not undertake any 
new initiatives towards Haiti and will simply try to wait the military junta 
out. 
18 November 1993 The administration begins consultations with members of Congress on the 
parameters of its new peacekeeping policy, which will later emerge as 
PDD 25. 
26 November 1993 Malval and Cedras meet for the first time since the failure of the 
Governor’s Island Accords, but little of substance emerges from the 
meeting. 
27 November 1993 Malval announces he will resign in light of the failure of the Governor’s 
Island Accords. 
3 December 1993 Malval urges Aristide to broaden the composition of his cabinet to include 
opponents, but Aristide is wary, and neither appear to believe this would 
result in Aristide’s return. 
6 December 1993 Following talks with Aristide and on the morning of a meeting with 
Clinton, Malval indicates he may be prepared to stay on as acting prime 
minister after he resigns on 15 December. He also calls for renewed talks 
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on the restoration of democracy. 
14 December 1993 Frances continues to push for a total trade embargo against Haiti, but 
appears to have secured little support from the United States. 
15 December 1993 Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs 
John Shattuck suggests that there should be a thorough review of US 
refugee policy towards Haitians. The Clinton administration immediately 
rebukes Shattuck and indicates there will be no change in policy, but 
criticisms grow. 
20 December 1993 As White House support for Aristide declines, with tepid comments from 
Secretary of State Christopher emerging in the week, Malval also publicly 
criticises Aristide for a failure to compromise. Malval has tried to restart 
talks between the military and Aristide, but Aristide, citing security 
concerns, clearly remains concerned that this will simply mean making 
more concessions. The US and UN Envoys, however, pressure Aristide to 
agree to the talks. Clinton, too, weighs in supporting renewed talks. 
23 December 1993 With Malval’s plans for talks having collapsed due to Aristide’s refusal to 
participate, Aristide announces he will organise a conference in Miami on 
15 January to discuss the restoration of democracy to Haiti, but US officials 
refuse to endorse it, as the military junta is not invited. There is also 
concern that the conference may focus on human rights and refugee issues. 
27 December 1993 A mob attack and kill two civilian supporters of the military junta in Port-
au-Prince and, in response, supporters of the military retaliate against 
inhabitants of a slum thought to be supportive of Aristide. 
6 January 1994 Aristide intimates to the Miami Herald and WP that he would welcome a 
US intervention to restore him to power in Haiti, though he is 
constitutionally barred from asking for such. The Clinton White House 
responds, with Julie Reside, a State Department press officer, rejecting the 
suggestion and calling it ‘unhelpful’. 
6 January 1994 Clinton suggests in comments to the press that his support for Aristide is 
waning, though the White House quickly backpedals on 7 January, saying 
they are sticking to the goal of reinstating the Haitian leader. 
15 January 1994 At a conference organised by Aristide in Miami, the deposed Haitian 
president calls upon the international community to see him returned to 
office by 7 February, the 8th anniversary of the ouster of former Haitian 
dictator Jean-Claude Duvalier and the 3rd anniversary of Aristide’s own 
election. The following day, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, 
speaking from Geneva, rejects the timeline as unrealistic. 
23 January 1994 The WP carries a front page story detailing the devastating effect of the 
embargo on Haiti’s poor. 
29 January 1994 The NYT carries a front page story detailing the new Clinton 
administration policy on peacekeeping that would limit US involvement to 
a narrow set of conditions. This policy would later emerge as Presidential 
Decision Directive 25, which appeared on 6 May 1994. 
5 February 1994 A shell explodes in a Sarajevo marketplace, killing 66 civilians and 
resulting in renewed uproar regarding the continuing civil war in Bosnia 
and the lack of an effective international response. 
6 February 1994 Randall Robinson, Executive Director of TransAfrica and a notable activist 
for the restoration of democracy in Haiti, places an Op-Ed in the WP 
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expressing support for sanctions as a policy course and arguing that it is the 
military junta, not the sanctions, that are the cause of the malnutrition and 
human suffering in Haiti. 
8 February 1994 Deposed Haitian President Jean Bertrand Aristide breaks his gentleman’s 
agreement with the US government not to criticise US refugee policy and 
describes it as a ‘floating Berlin Wall’ that is in violation of international 
law. The White House describes his statement as ‘mystifying’. 
9 February 1994 NATO issues an ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs to remove their heavy 
weaponry 20km from Sarajevo by 21 February or face consequences.  
11 February 1994 Haitian parliamentarians, backed by the United States, come up with a new 
plan to resolve the crisis in Haiti, which calls upon Aristide to name a new 
prime minister and a broad-based government that would pass legislation to 
prepare for the military junta to step down. Strikingly similar to the failed 
Governor’s Island Agreement, Aristide rejects the plan as being ineffective 
and unspecific, much to US chagrin. Under pressure from Washington, 
Aristide agrees to meet the parliamentarians on 17 February but remains 
unconvinced by the plan.  
13 February 1994 The front page of the NYT carries a story about an explosion of a 
warehouse filled with contraband fuel in Port-au-Prince on 12 February, 
which highlighted the huge gaps in the embargo, from which members of 
the military junta were profiting due to their sale of black market gasoline. 
The report notes the lack of impact on the ruling elite, but the harsh impact 
on Haiti’s poor of the continuing embargo. 
23 February 1994 In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator 
Warren Christopher suggests that the deployment of US ground forces may 
be necessary to secure a peace deal in Bosnia. The United States is said to 
be prepared to provide a third of the troops for the proposed 50,000 strong 
force. Members of Congress greet the proposition with little warmth. At the 
same hearing, Christopher admits the United States is no longer planning to 
tighten sanctions on Haiti, as ‘there is no plan that we can be promoting 
effectively with the sanctions’. 
23 February 1994 Two senior senators within Haiti announce they plan to form a new 
government without the participation of Aristide. The plan is criticised in 
virtually all sectors.  
23 February 1994 Aristide presents an alternate plan for peace in Haiti in which he calls for 
the military junta to surrender power immediately, prior to the passing of 
amnesty laws and the naming of a new government.  
6 March 1994 UNSG Boutros Boutros-Ghali meets with Aristide to try to secure the 
latter’s support for the US peace plan, but Aristide remains adamant that 
the plan will be counterproductive and withholds his support. 
8 March 1994 The Henry Stimson Center releases a report based on the findings of a 
working group chaired by Senator Nancy Kassebaum (R-KA) and 
Congressman Lee Hamilton (D-IN) entitled ‘Peacekeeping and the US 
National Interest’, which finds peacekeeping to be in the US national 
interest and urges US support for peacekeeping along specified lines. 
8 March 1994 Testifying before the Senate Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, 
Lawrence Pezzullo, President Clinton’s special adviser on Haiti, admits US 
policy towards Haiti is at an impasse in light of Aristide’s refusal to support 
the US-backed peace plan. Chairman of the Committee Senator Christopher 
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Dodd (D-CT) and Congressman Joseph Kennedy (D-MA), among others, 
publicly criticise the plan, which calls upon Aristide to name a parliament 
and pass an amnesty law prior to the military junta ceding power and under 
no set timetable. Kennedy suggests the need to back efforts to restore 
Aristide to power with a credible threat of force. 
22 March 1994 The Congressional Black Caucus sends a bluntly worded letter to President 
Clinton criticising the weakness of his Haiti policy and calling for tougher 
action, including severing air links, revoking visas for the military junta and 
imposing sanctions on any country that breaks the embargo against Haiti. 
The letter is followed by highly critical comments against the White House 
in the press by numerous members of the CBC.  
23 March 1994  Congresswoman Corrine Brown (D-FL) places an op-ed in the WP 
criticising US Haiti policy and calling for tougher intervention. Brown is a 
member of the Congressional Black Caucus, who are becoming 
increasingly vocal on Haiti. 
23 March 1994 Congressman Ron Dellums (D-CA) and 38 other representatives table 
House Resolution 4114, which calls for increased sanctions against the 
Haitian junta and an end to interdiction and return of Haitian refugees. 
23 March 1994 Under Resolution 905, the UNSC extends the mandate of UNMIH until 30 
June 1994. 
26 March 1994 Under pressure from its critics, the Clinton White House comes up with a 
new Haiti policy, which includes a tightening of the embargo, and 
jettisoning its earlier peace plan in favour of one that calls for the military 
junta to step down, a new prime minister to be named and an amnesty law 
passed on the same day. Warmly welcomed by many Congressional 
figures, the plan is closer to Aristide’s own ideas, but still leaves the 
question of whether the junta leaders will be allowed to remain in Haiti and 
continue to participate in politics unanswered, which Aristide views with 
misgivings. 
1 April 1994 The NYT carries a strident article denouncing US Haiti policy and deriding 
the Clinton administration for a lack of credibility and the perception of 
such on the part of all of the parties to the Haitian conflict. 
1 April 1994 The UN openly denounces the Haitian junta and its allied paramilitary 
organisation FRAPH for waging a campaign of terror against supporters of 
Aristide. 
2 April 1994 The front page of the NYT carries an article documenting the same 
campaign of terror so recently condemned by the UN and highlighting the 
fate that awaits those who are returned as part of the US refugee 
interdiction program. Later that morning, State Department spokesman 
Michael McCurry admits to a rise in violence in Haiti and condemns the 
country’s ruling junta.  
6 April 1994 Aristide sends a letter to Clinton informing the latter that he is abrogating 
the 1981 Refugee Treaty that allows the United States to interdict Haitian 
refugees at sea and return them to Haiti.  
8 April 1994 Randall Robinson, Executive Director of TransAfrica, announces he is 
going to go on hunger strike in protest against President Clinton’s Haiti 
policy.  
10 April 1994 After Serbs launch an attack on Gorazde, a UN ‘safe area’, NATO retaliates 
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with an airstrike, provided by a US F-16 aircraft. 
14 April 1994 In Congressional hearings, amid growing criticism of Clinton policy 
towards Haiti, Congressman David Obey (D-WI) calls for US military 
intervention to restore democracy in Haiti. 
15 April 1994 Clinton holds a morning meeting on Haiti. In a press briefing that 
afternoon, White House Press Secretary Dee Dee Myers, when asked if the 
administration is considering the Obey option, refuses to rule anything out, 
though maintains that this does not constitute a change in policy.  
19 April 1994 Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT) and four cosponsors introduce the 
Haitian Restoration of Democracy Act, which calls for the imposition of a 
total trade embargo, an end to summary repatriation of Haitian refugees, 
who should instead be granted temporary protected status. 
21 April 1994 In the face of continued Serb attacks on the protected area of Gorazde, the 
US Senate debates at length a motion to unilaterally lift the arms embargo 
against Bosnia 
21 April 1994 Aristide harshly criticises US Haitian policy, describing it as ‘racist’, 
‘cynical’ and contributing to a holocaust in Haiti. Meanwhile, six 
democratic members of Congress are arresting after staging a sit-in in front 
of the White House to protest US Haitian policy. 
22 April 1994 The White House indicates it will go before the UNSC to seek a total trade 
embargo against Haiti. 
22 April 1994 A boat carrying 406 Haitian refugees is intercepted within US territorial 
waters but allowed to land in Florida, rendering its passengers eligible for 
asylum. The Clinton administration, however, stresses that this does not 
constitute a change in policy, but was due to the extraordinary 
circumstances of the case, in which many of the refugees were in serious 
need of medical attention. 
25 April 1994 Haitian police kill 23 fishermen and merchants in Gonaïves over the 
weekend. The victims are believed simply to have been supporters of 
Aristide. Hundreds flee the area in fear of further violence. 
26 April 1994 In a move designed to show it is serious about finding new solutions to the 
Haiti problem, the Clinton administration forces the resignation of US 
Envoy Lawrence Pezullo from his post. Pezullo was seen as a key architect 
of the current failed policy and was also unpopular with Aristide. 
30 April 1994 Around 3,000 protestors march on the White House to demand that more be 
done to restore Aristide to Haiti. 
2 May 1994 Asked by reporters whether the United States is considering military action 
if sanctions fail against Haiti, White House Press Secretary Dee Dee Myers 
refuses to rule the possibility out, but neither does she rule out the 
possibility in respect of Rwanda. 
2 May 1994 Congressman Eliot Engel (D-NY) and members of the Congressional Black 
Caucus introduce the Governors Island Reinforcement Act of 1994, which 
would impose a total trade embargo on Haiti, as well as end the summary 
repatriation of Haitian refugees.  
2 May 1994 Former President Bush speaks out on Haiti, calling for a shift in US policy, 
but recommending that the use of force be ruled out. Instead, Bush 
recommends ending the United States’ support for Aristide and using 
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diplomacy to press for new elections in Haiti. 
3 May 1994 In a series of press conferences, President Clinton reiterates that the United 
States refuses to rule out the possibility of military intervention in Haiti, 
lending credence to the possibility. Meanwhile Senator Bob Graham (D-
FL) calls on the Senate floor for US military intervention, while Senator 
Larry Pressler (R-SD) and Congressman Porter Goss (R-FL) stand in 
opposition. So too does ousted US Envoy Lawrence Pezzullo.  
4 May 1994 Congressmen Doug Bereuter (R-NE) and Christopher Cox (R-CA) speak 
out against military intervention in Haiti. 
4 May 1994 President Clinton is threatened with a sexual harassment suit by Paula 
Corbin Jones. 
4 May 1994 The front page of the WP reports that, despite recent sabre-rattling, there is 
little support for a policy of military intervention within the Clinton 
administration.  
5 May 1994 Senators Jesse Helms (R-NC) and Bob Dole (R-KA) join the growing 
chorus of Republicans arguing against military intervention in Haiti, with 
the latter offering the Dole-Mitchell Amendment, which would limit the 
president’s ability to intervene in Haiti without congressional approval. 
Meanwhile, however, Senator Alan Simpson (R-WY) breaks party ranks by 
voicing support for military intervention. 
5 May 1994 National Security Advisor Anthony Lake and Director for Strategic Plans 
and Policy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Wesley Clark unveil 
PDD 25, which is officially released the next day. The directive sets 
conditions for US participation in peacekeeping, including whether the 
mission advances American interests; whether there is a threat to 
international peace and security; whether it has a very clear mandate and 
objectives; and whether the forces and the funds are actually available for 
such an operation. 
5 May 1994 Former US Envoy Lawrence Pezzullo publishes a highly critical article on 
US Haitian policy in the WP. 
5 May 1994 In the 23rd day of his hunger strike to protest US refugee policy for 
Haitians, Randall Robinson is hospitalised. Meanwhile, the Clinton 
administration reveals that it will release the 400 Haitian refugees brought 
to US shores on 22 April, but argues that its basic policy remains in place.  
6 May 1994 Three more democratic members of Congress chain themselves to the 
White House gates to protest the lack of a robust Haiti policy. 
6 May 1994 The UNSC, under Chapter VII, adopts Resolution 917, which will apply a 
complete trade embargo on Haiti, including restrictions on air travel, 
freezing of funds belonging to members of the junta and revocation of their 
right to travel. President Clinton acts to implement the plan by the 
following morning under Executive Order 12914. 
8 May 1994 After a ‘comprehensive review’ of Haiti policy, the White House 
announces new initiatives in its attempts to restore democracy to Haiti, 
including the naming of William Gray as Special Advisor to the President 
on Haiti, changes in asylum screening procedures (including asylum 
interviews for Haitian intercepted at sea, once facilities are in place) and a 
new emphasis on sanctions. The release also notes US interests in Haiti as 
comprising democracy, human rights and the protection of Americans 
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overseas. 
9 May 1994 Following the administration’s announcement of a new Haitian policy, 
which could be viewed as a partial victory, Randall Robinson ends his fast. 
11 May 1994 Cedras names 80-year-old Supreme Court Justice Emile Jonassaint as 
‘provisional president’ of Haiti in an attempt to sideline Aristide. The 
White House criticises the move as “cynical, unconstitutional and illegal”. 
13 May 1994 As the Organization of American States prepares a resolution condemning 
the appointment of a provisional president in Haiti, the United States is 
unable to get text refusing to rule out the use of force into the resolution, 
due to considerable opposition to the idea among Latin American nations. 
The United States was believed to have hoped for support, perhaps even 
extending to multilateral participation, should military intervention become 
an eventuality. Separately, France indicates that it would not consider 
participating in a military intervention. 
13 May 1994 Former Bush administration NSC member Richard Haass makes the case 
for military intervention in Haiti in the WP. 
15 May 1994 Randall Robinson places an article in the WP calling for US military 
intervention in Haiti. 
16 May 1994 Senator John Kerry (D-MA) joins those advocating military intervention in 
Haiti with an article in the NYT 
17 May 1994  Former Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs 
during the Bush administration John Bolton writes in the WP arguing 
against intervention. 
17 May 1994 Provisional Haitian President Emile Jonassaint appoints himself as prime 
minster by presidential decree, in an attempt to sideline acting Prime 
Minister Robert Malval, who had criticised Jonassaint’s appointment. 
21 May 1994 The UN High Commissioner for Refugees agrees to assist with US refugee 
processing, lending an air of respectability to a much-criticised process. 
24 May 1994 Increasing numbers of people begin to call upon the United States to 
provide safe havens for fleeing Haitian refugees. Randall Robinson 
suggests the use of Guantanamo as a safe haven, while in a bolder move, 
Congressman Porter Goss (R-FL) offers an amendment supporting the use 
of the largely uninhabited Île de la Gonâve off the coast of Haiti both as a 
safe haven for Haitians fleeing persecution and as a base from which 
Aristide can re-establish his government and seek a Haitian solution to the 
crisis. 
24 May 1994 Two amendments are offered in the House of Representatives that would, 
among other policy recommendations, seek to stymie the potential use of 
military force in Haiti. The Dellums-Hamilton is defeated but the Goss 
Amendment (see above) passes by a slim majority.  
25 May 1994 As US Navy vessels fire warning shots across the bows of two vessels 
attempting to flout the Haitian embargo, they intercept one, while the other 
escapes to shore. It emerges that a number of vessels have thus evaded the 
blockade since its imposition.  
27 May 1994 UNSG Boutros-Ghali says he believes sanctions should be given several 
weeks to work before stronger measures are considered, but refuses to be 
drawn on whether he supports military intervention. 
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31 May 1994 After weeks of trying to find a third country where refugee processing of 
Haitian asylum seekers could be held, the United States reaches a deal with 
Jamaica. The agreement will allow the United States to anchor ships in 
Jamaican waters in order to conduct interviews. 
1 June 1994 Brent Scowcroft places an article in the NYT arguing against military 
intervention in Haiti. Instead, Scowcroft, recommends ending support for 
Aristide, barring his return to Haiti, and from there trying to negotiate a 
new presidential election. 
1 June 1994 The Clinton administration is considering a total ban on air traffic to Haiti. 
The existing ban had not covered commercial passenger flights. 
2 June 1994 Aristide makes his strongest statement yet in support of military 
intervention. Still maintaining that the constitution bans him from directly 
asking for it, Aristide expresses doubts as to the potential effectiveness of 
sanctions and suggests a ‘surgical action’ may be more effective, citing the 
removal of Noriega in Panama as a precedent. 
3 June 1994 An agreement is reached with the Turks and Caicos Islands, a British 
dependency, to allow for a refugee processing centre on Grand Turk Island.  
7 June 1994 Administration officials announce that they have secured the cooperation of 
around a dozen countries that are willing to participate in a multinational 
force for Haiti. Though no details are released on the composition of the 
parties, France, Canada, Venezuela and Argentina are believed to be among 
the number. It is also believed, however, that some countries would not 
participate if the restoration of democracy comes from a US military 
intervention.  
9 June 1994 Members of the House force a revote on the Goss Amendment that rejects 
military intervention in Haiti. This time the House reverses itself and the 
amendment is rejected, but again only by a narrow margin. Meanwhile, the 
House also votes on an amendment calling upon the United States to 
unilaterally lift the arms embargo against Bosnia and Herzegovina, which 
passes by a larger, but still not substantial, margin.  
9 June 1994 Following a meeting held in New York on 3 June, the ‘Friends of Haiti’—
Argentina, Canada, France, the United States and Venezuela—
communicate their conclusions to the UN. In the letter, they recommend 
contingency planning for the holding of elections on the restoration of 
democracy to Haiti, as well as revised plans for a strengthened UNMIH.  
10 June 1994 President Clinton announces that the United States will add two further 
measures to its economic campaign against Haiti’s military junta—banning 
all commercial air traffic and banning any financial transactions between 
the two countries. In the announcements, there is little mention of military 
intervention, prompting speculation that the United States may be pulling 
back from that option. 
12 June 1994 Senior administration officials suggest they have the backing of a majority 
of Latin American nations for military intervention in Haiti should the 
eventuality arise.  
13 June 1994 Haiti’s military junta-backed provisional president Emile Jonassaint 
declares a state of emergency, citing an ‘imminent threat of invasion’.  
15 June 1994 Amid growing reports of feuds between Cedras and Police Chief Michel 
Francois, Francois’ brother suggests in a radio interview that his brother 
may be prepared to step down and that the military junta should implement 
 266 
the Governor’s Island Accord rather than risk military intervention. By the 
following day, Police Chief Francois has denied that there is any truth to his 
brother’s statements. 
20 June 1994 Though refusing to engage in direct negotiations, the Clinton administration 
hints that it may be willing to arrange a comfortable exile for the members 
of the military junta if they agree to step down. In a contradictory move, 
however, US Envoy William Gray argues that the military junta should be 
punished for their crimes. 
21 June 1994 Under Executive Order 12922, Clinton tightens the embargo further, 
blocking the US-based assets of all Haitians still residing in Haiti, which it 
is hoped will put additional pressure both on those who have actively 
supported the junta and on those who have profited by association with the 
junta. 
24 June 1994 The Clinton administration indicates that it is putting the final touches on a 
plan for a UN peacekeeping force to smooth the transition when Aristide is 
returned to power, which is likely to be in the region of 12,000-14,000 
troops, including several thousand US troops, a much larger force than 
many had envisioned. Clinton is believed not yet to have signed off on the 
plan. 
25 June 1994 Cedras is reported to have withdrawn $500,000 from Haiti’s central bank, 
but it is unclear whether the withdrawal is to finance opposition to the 
return of Aristide or a prelude to flight. 
25 June 1994 Further confusing reports of a potential military intervention, Aristide 
suggests on NPR that he would not return to Haiti if there was a military 
intervention. 
28 June 1994 Amid increasing reports of fractures within Haiti’s military high command 
and the possibility of some or all of the major players being prepared to 
step aside to end the crisis, reports emerge from Haiti that Cedras may be 
willing to step down at the end of his term in October 1994. 
28 June 1994 The exodus of Haitian boat people reaches its highest level in over a year as 
around 1,200 are picked up by the coastguard over four days, while the 
acceptance level for asylum claims also rises to around 30%. Critics 
suggest these developments are a combined consequence of sanctions and 
the more lenient processing system (i.e., US policy), but the administration 
maintains they are due to heightened human rights abuses in Haiti. There 
are also fears that the new processing system may be overwhelmed by the 
influx, and Guantanamo is reopened as a processing centre in response. 
29 June 1994 An amendment in the Senate that would require the president to seek 
congressional approval before undertaking military intervention in Haiti is 
defeated. The amendment, however, was offered as a rule of law rather than 
a sense of the Senate, leading some to oppose it on constitutional grounds. 
Later, the Senate voted 93 to 4 in support of a sense of the Senate resolution 
asking Clinton to ask for congressional approval before deploying troops to 
Haiti. 
30 June 1994 Under Resolution 933, the UNSC votes to extend UNMIH’s mandate and 
calls upon the UNSG to report to the UNSC on the requirements for an 
expansion of the mission. 
1 July 1994 Refugee levels have risen to 800 to 1,000 persons a day, putting increasing 
strain on the system. Administration officials acknowledge the situation 
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may have accelerated contingency planning for military intervention, 
though the lack of a crisis action team or joint task force suggests this 
option is still some way off. 
3 July 1994 US Envoy William Gray says on CBS that a military invasion of Haiti is 
not imminent, but refuses to rule it out entirely. At the same time, the 
Pentagon is said to be actively seeking commitments from other nations for 
contributions to a peacekeeping force to take over after any intervention.  
5 July 1994 The United States announces that it has reached an agreement with Panama 
that the latter will host a ‘safe haven’ for up to 10,000 Haitian refugees who 
are eligible for asylum. Similar deals with two other countries are said to be 
likely.  
6 July 1994 US forces undertake a training exercise that involves seizing airports and 
ports similar to those in Haiti, in a clear and acknowledged sign that US 
military forces are practicing for a potential intervention in Haiti.  
7 July 1994 At the end of a summit, CARICOM leaders say they will support and 
provide troops for a peacekeeping mission in Haiti, but do not say whether 
this extends to an invasion. Meanwhile, Antigua promises to host 2,000 
Haitians under the safe haven scheme, and Dominica and St. Kitts and 
Nevis may also follow suit. 
8 July 1994 Only a few days after the Clinton administration’s announcement of the 
deal to relocate Haitian refugees to Panama, Panama reneges on the deal.  
11 July 1994 Ernest Perez Balladares, Panama’s president-elect, says he may be willing 
to provide a safe haven for 5,000-10,000 Haitians upon assuming office. 
12 July 1994 Haiti expels MICIVIH, the UN/OAS civilian observer mission. In response, 
the UNSC releases a statement saying that “this provocative step threatens 
peace and security in the region”, language that is redolent of Chapter VII. 
13 July 1994 The Senate debates the Dole-Warner amendment, which calls for a 
bipartisan commission to travel to Haiti and examine conditions there with 
an eye to examining the United States’ policy options. Critics of the 
measure, however, argue that Congress might not have the commission’s 
findings until well into 1995, during which time intervention would be off 
the table. Meanwhile, Cedras states his support for the idea, presumably for 
the same reason. Eventually, the amendment is defeated by a vote of 57 to 
42. 
13 July 1994 US forces practice an invasion and rescue operation in the Bahamas. 
Administration officials suggest this is intended to ready them for rescuing 
American citizens, rather than for a full-scale invasion of Haiti. 
14 July 1994 Aristide again calls for ‘swift and definitive’ action but reiterates that he is 
constitutionally barred from asking for military intervention. 
14 July 1994 US Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright identifies 11 nations that 
she says have pledged to participate in a multilateral force for Haiti after 
the military regime has left power. The countries, said to have pledged 
between 2,000 and 4,000 ‘military and/or police’ personnel, are Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Panama, El 
Salvador, Honduras, Belize and Guyana. 
15 July 1994 In a report on an expanded UNMIH, UNSG Boutros-Ghali recommends 
5,000 combat troops, 6,500 combat support troops, an offshore reserve 
force of 3,500 troops, 60 military trainers and 550 civilian police. His plan 
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suggests that the need for coercive means cannot be ruled out, so the 
mission would need to be authorised under Chapter VII. The mission 
should proceed in two phases, with combat troops first establishing a secure 
environment, after which training and rebuilding should begin. The report 
notes the difficulties of establishing a truly multinational force, so suggests 
the alternative possibility of authorising a group of member states to 
conduct the mission, or allowing a group of states to conduct phase 1, 
before the UN takes over in phase 2. 
20 July 1994 The WP reports on its front page that US officials have been in talks with 
the UN over the modalities of a possible invasion of Haiti, though a vote on 
a resolution authorising force is thought to be weeks away. 
21 July 1994 In perhaps the clearest indication yet of the United States’ leaning towards 
an invasion of Haiti, White House Press Secretary Dee Dee Myers confirms 
that UN Ambassador Albright is seeking the support of UNSC members for 
a two phase resolution, which would authorise ‘any means necessary’ to 
create a permissive environment in Haiti, following which a nation-building 
mission could be established. Seeking UNSC approval will, however, take 
time, meaning an invasion is still not imminent. 
21 July 1994 Supporters of Haiti’s military junta claim they have support in Washington, 
including from Senators Bob Dole (R-KA) and Jesse Helms (R-NC), even 
claiming they have enjoyed back channel communications, forcing Dole to 
strenuously deny the allegations on the Senate floor. Meanwhile, 100 
members of Congress sign a letter asking the president to seek 
congressional approval before authorising a military intervention in Haiti. 
21 July 1994 The UNSC authorises a peacekeeping mission in Georgia in which Russian 
troops are deployed, which Russian authorities had linked to the mission in 
Haiti, threatening to veto any resolution if Washington did not support them 
in Abkhazia.  
24 July 1994  Congressman Ron Dellums (D-CA), a leading member of the 
Congressional Black Caucus, places an article in the NYT arguing against 
intervention, instead supporting continued sanctions, with increased 
pressure put on the Dominican Republic to enforce the embargo. 
26 July 1994 The Haitian regime begins organising elections to find a replacement for 
Aristide, which are believed likely to be held in early November. 
29 July 1994 In a letter to the UNSC, Aristide again calls for ‘prompt and decisive 
action’, but still shies away from explicitly calling for military intervention. 
31 July 1994 The UNSC, under Resolution 940, approves a draft resolution put forward 
by Argentina, France, Canada and the United States, authorising option 3 in 
the Secretary-general’s report, a group of nations to go into Haiti to 
establish a secure environment before a UN force takes over the nation-
building project. Though lacking voting rights, Mexico, Cuba and Uruguay 
ask to be heard in UNSC debate, and each take a strong stand against 
military intervention in Haiti. Brazil and China abstain out of concern for 
the content of the resolution, which passes by a vote of 12 to 0 (Rwanda is 
absent). The resolution sets no timeline for intervention. 
2 August 1994 President Carlos Menem of Argentina asks his Congress for authorisation 
for Argentine troops to participate in a US-led invasion of Haiti. There is 
still no indication of whether Clinton intends to ask the US Congress. 
Meanwhile, Israel refuses a US request for troops. 
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3 August 1994 Senator Bob Dole (R-KA) offers an amendment stating that the UN 
resolution does not constitute authority under US law to invade Haiti, thus 
implicitly asking the president to seek congressional approval before 
authorising an invasion of Haiti. The amendment is approved unanimously. 
In debate, Senator Arlen Spector (R-PA) suggests he may force a vote on 
congressional authorisation for the Haiti invasion. 
3 August 1994 The NYT reports further divisions between the State Department and 
Pentagon over Haiti. The debate revolves around whether to set a deadline 
after which force will be used and whether to offer inducements to tempt 
the military junta to step down. The Pentagon opposes a deadline and 
supports inducements, while State takes the opposite position. 
4 August 1994 Faced with significant domestic opposition, Argentine President Carlos 
Menem is forced to withdraw his request for authorisation to participate in 
an invasion of Haiti, but indicates Argentina will still likely participate in a 
post-invasion peacekeeping force. 
5 August 1994 Senator Arlen Spector (R-PA), as threatened, offers an amendment 
prohibiting the use of force in Haiti unless congressional approval is given. 
The amendment is defeated, but much of the opposition is on constitutional 
grounds. Meanwhile, Clinton officials indicate an intervention is unlikely to 
take place until mid-September. 
5 August 1994 Continuing its defiance of the international community, the Haitian regime 
announces it plans to put Aristide on trial for treason for his tacit support of 
military intervention in his letter to the UNSC of 29 July (see above). 
6 August 1994 General Cedras states on CNN that he believes an invasion of Haiti is now 
inevitable, that the Haitian regime will resist and that Clinton will be 
responsible for any bloodshed. 
11 August 1994 Clinton indicates that if the Bosnian Serbs do not accept the current peace 
plan by 15 October, he will go to the UNSC to ask for a lifting of the arms 
embargo, a move Congress has long demanded. 
12 August 1994 With many Latin American nations wary of US intervention in Haiti, 
Venezuela indicates it is planning on sending a group of regional foreign 
ministers to Haiti to try to persuade the military junta to step down.  
15 August 1994 800 Haitians who have been granted political asylum by the United States 
remain in hiding in Haiti in fear for their lives, as no transportation is 
available to take them out of Haiti. 
15 August 1994 Around 20 US military police and 45 Haitians are injured in violence in the 
Guantanamo refugee camp, sparked off by frustrations among Haitians over 
poor living conditions. About 120 Haitians scale the barbed wire fences and 
attempt to escape by swimming across Guantanamo Bay, but are picked up 
by the coastguard.  
16 August 1994 The United States closes two of its three refugee processing centres in Haiti 
due to its inability to secure transport out of the country for the now 1,857 
refugees already approved for asylum. 
16 August 1994 UNSG Boutros-Ghali says he will send an envoy to Haiti to ask the military 
junta to step down or face a US invasion, in an effort to avoid military 
intervention. The envoy will not enter, however, into negotiations or set a 
deadline for departure. The initiative is expected to happen within the next 
few weeks. 
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19 August 1994 In the face of a wave of repression in Cuba, increasing numbers of boat 
people head for US shores. In normal times, Cubans intercepted at sea are 
allowed to reach the US coast, rendering them eligible for asylum. In the 
face of this new wave, however, Clinton officials announce that Cubans 
intercepted at sea will be sent to Guantanamo, at least temporarily, after 
which either the Cuban Adjustment Act, allowing Cubans to change their 
status after a year, or safe havens may be utilised. 
20 August 1994 Clinton moves to prohibit Americans from sending money to Cuba and to 
cut off all charter flights to the island in an attempt to put pressure on 
Castro. 
23 August 1994 As fuel supplies run low in Haiti, the government refuses to distribute its 
remaining stockpiles, putting increasing pressure on already strained 
humanitarian operations. 
29 August 1994 As the crisis with Cuba takes centre stage, administration officials admit 
this may have slowed the timetable for a potential invasion of Haiti. 
30 August 1994 The Haitian junta rejects the proposed UN mission announced on 16 
August, causing Boutros-Ghali to announce he has given up on diplomacy. 
Meanwhile, CARICOM backs the US invasion, with four of the seven 
members with armed forces pledging troops, totalling 260. In Haiti, another 
high-profile political assassination takes place, this time of a priest who 
supports Aristide. 
31 August 1994 After days of delays, Haiti’s military junta finally releases fuel supplies for 
relief work. Meanwhile, senior administration officials warn Haiti’s 
military junta that if they have not voluntarily left power by the time the 
United States invades, they will be arrested and held for trial, but still no 
deadline is set. 
2 September 1994 Clinton administration officials are now describing a military invasion of 
Haiti as a certainty.  
5 September 1994 The news that the 2,100 troops sent to the Rwandan border to facilitate 
humanitarian relief are to be withdrawn by the end of September elicits 
expressions of regret in Congress that more is not being done.  
7 September 1994 Clinton and his top aides meet to discuss plans for the invasion of Haiti. 
Meanwhile, administration officials continue to stress the inevitability of an 
invasion. 
9 September 1994 A number of influential democrats suggest that Clinton does not need 
congressional approval for an invasion of Haiti. Meanwhile, US officials 
announce that the USS Eisenhower, an aircraft carrier, will be deployed to 
Haiti’s coast within the week. The Eisenhower’s deck space will largely be 
used for helicopters, to carry troops and equipment into Haiti. 
12 September 1994 As Congress returns from recess, Haiti is a major talking point, with many 
calling for the president to come to Congress to make his case, and many 
others outright rejecting the need for intervention. Describing the potential 
invasion as a ‘police action’, however, administration officials say there is 
no obligation on the president to seek congressional approval. 
14 September 1994 As congressional demands for consultation over an invasion of Haiti 
intensify yet further, Clinton aides announce that the president will address 
the nation on 15 September. With continued administration assertions that 
there is no need to have a debate on Congress, it looks increasingly unlikely 
that Clinton will go to that body for approval. Meanwhile, Senator John 
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McCain (R-AR) offers an amendment stating that there is no US interest in 
invading Haiti, and Senators George Mitchell (D-ME) and Sam Nunn (D-
GA) offer an amendment withholding funds for the Haiti operation unless 
Clinton comes to Congress. The McCain amendment is defeated, while the 
Mitchell-Nunn amendment doesn’t come to a vote before Congress closes 
for Yom Kippur. 
15 September 1994 President Clinton addresses the nation to spell out the rationale for an 
invasion of Haiti. Among the US interests, he lists human rights, 




Appendix 4: Bibliography 
Abdelal, Rawi, Herrera, Yoshiko, Johnston, Alastair Iain and McDermott, Rose, “Identity as a 
Variable”, 4(4) Perspectives on Politics (2006), 695-711. 
Abiew, Francis Kofi, The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention 
(Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1999). 
Adebajo, Adekeye, Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau 
(Lynne Rienner, London, 2002). 
Agence France-Presse, “UN Debates Responsibility to Protect Threatened Populations”, Agence 
France-Presse, 23 July 2009. 
Akehurst, Michael, “Humanitarian Intervention”, in Bull, Hedley (ed.), Intervention in World 
Politics (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984), 95-118. 
Albright, Madeleine, “A Strong United Nations Serves US Security Interests”, Address before the 
Council on Foreign Relations’ Conference on Cooperative Security and the United 
Nations, 11 June 1993. 
Albright, Madeleine, “Use of Force in a Post-Cold War World”, Address at the National War 
College, 23 September 1993. 
Allen, Arthur, “Rebels Enter Rwanda’s Capital: Country’s Week-Old Cabinet Flees”, Washington 
Post, 13 April 1994. 
Archer, Margaret, Culture and Agency: The Place of Culture in Social Theory (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1988). 
Aristide, Jean-Bertrand, “A Safe Harbor for Haiti; Aristide: How Clinton Should Help My 
Country”, Washington Post, 10 January 1993. 
Armitage, Richard L., “Bend the UN to Our Will”, New York Times, 24 February 1994. 
Ashizawa, Kuniko, “When Identity Matters: State Identity, Regional Instititution Building and 
Japanese Foreign Policy”, 10(3) International Studies Review (2008), 571-598. 
Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research, US Department of State, “Rwanda—Geneva 
Convention Violations”, Memorandum, 18 May 1994. 
Associated Press, “Shelling Resumes in Somalia”, Washington Post, 16 February 1992. 
Associated Press, “Haitian Premier Rejects UN Terms”, Washington Post, 28 January 1993. 
Associated Press, “US Dispatching 600 On Haiti Assignment”, New York Times, 29 September 
1993. 
Associated Press, “Tribes Battle for Rwandan Capital: New Massacres Reported”, New York 
Times, 16 April 1994. 
Associated Press, “Rwanda Killings Continue, Peace Talks Go Nowhere”, Washington Post, 25 
April 1994. 
Associated Press, “Haitian Premier Rebels, And Promptly Loses Post”, Washington Post, 17 May 
1994. 
Associated Press, “Visas Revoked for Haitians Seeking to Travel to US”, Washington Post, 30 
June 1994. 
Atwood, Brian, “Suddenly, Chaos”, Washington Post, 31 July 1994. 
 273 
Axelrod, Robert and Keohane, Robert, “Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions”, 
38(1) World Politics (1985), 226-254. 
Ayoob, Mohammed, “Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty”, 6(1) International 
Journal of Human Rights (2002), 81-102. 
Bain, William, “The Political Theory of Trusteeship and the Twilight of International Equality”, 
17(1) International Relations (2003), 59-77. 
Banchoff, Thomas, “German Identity and European Integration”, 5(3) European Journal of 
International Relations (1999), 259-289. 
Bannon, Alicia, “The Responsibility to Protect: The UN World Summit and the Question of 
Unilateralism”, 115(5) The Yale Law Journal (2006), 1157-1165. 
Barnett, Michael, “Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change: Israel’s Road to Oslo”, 5(1) 
European Journal of International Relations (1999), 5-36. 
Barnett, Michael, Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda (Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca, 2002). 
Bellamy, Alex, “Humanitarian Responsibilities and Interventionist Claims in International 
Society”, 29(2) Review of International Studies (2003), 321-340. 
Bellamy, Alex, “Motives, Outcomes, Intent and the Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention”, 
3(3) Journal of Military Ethics (2004), 216-232. 
Bennett, Lance, “Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations in the United States”, 40(2) Journal of 
Communication (1990), 103-125. 
Berke, Richard, “Another Presidency Brings Another Credibility Gap”, New York Times, 16 
January 1994. 
Berke, Richard, “Presidential Hopefuls at a Republican Forum Jab at Clinton’s Foreign Policy”, 
New York Times, 28 July 1994. 
Bhaskar, Roy, The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the Contemporary 
Human Sciences (Routledge, London, 1998). 
Blyth, Mark, “Structures Do Not Come with an Instruction Sheet: Interests, Ideas and Progress in 
Political Science”, 1(4) Perspectives on Politics (2003), 695-706. 
Booth, Ken and Dunne, Tim (eds.), Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order 
(Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2002). 
Booth, William, “Navy, Coast Guard To Surround Haiti; US Seeks to Stop Expected Exodus at 
Sea”, Washington Post, 16 January 1993. 
Brenfors, Martha and Petersen, Malene Maxe, “The Legality of Unilateral Humanitarian 
Intervention—A Defence”, 69(4) Nordic Journal of International Law (2000), 449-499. 
Brglez, Milan, “Reconsidering Wendt’s Meta-theory: Blending Scientific Realism with Social 
Constructivism”, 4(4) Journal of International Relations and Development (2001), 339-
362. 
Broder, David, “Report Card on Clinton”, Washington Post, 16 January 1994. 
Brown, Chris, “Moral Agency and International Society”, 15(2) Ethics and International Affairs 
(2006), 87-98. 
Brownlie, Ian, “Humanitarian Intervention”, in Moore, John Norton (ed.), Law and Civil War in the 
Modern World (Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1974), 217-252. 
Brubaker, Rogers and Cooper, Frederick, “Beyond Identity”, 29(1) Theory and Society (2000), 1-
47. 
 274 
Brysk, Alison, Parsons, Craig and Sandholtz, Wayne, “After Empire: National Identity and Post-
Colonial Families of Nations”, 8(2) European Journal of International Relations (2002), 
267-305. 
Buchanan, Allen, “The Internal Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention”, 7(1) Journal of 
Political Philosophy (1999), 71-87. 
Buchanan, Allen, “Reforming the International Law of Humanitarian Intervention”, in Holzgrefe, 
Jeff L. and Keohane, Robert O. (eds.), Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and 
Political Dilemmas (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003), 130-175. 
Bull, Hedley, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (Palgrave, Basingstoke, 
1977). 
Bull, Hedley, Intervention in World Politics (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1984). 
Burkhalter, Holly, “What Took Us So Long In Somalia?” Washington Post, 6 September 1992. 
Burns, John, “Shellfire Hits Sarajevo Funeral for Slain Children”, New York Times, 5 August 1992. 
Bush, President George H. W., “Towards a New World Order”, Address before a Joint Session of 
Congress, 11 September 1990. 
Bush, President George H. W., “Remarks to the American Society of Newspaper Editors”, 9 April 
1992. 
Bush, President George H. W., “Remarks on the Situation in Bosnia and an Exchange With 
Reporters in Colorado Springs”, 6 August 1992. 
Bush, President George H. W., “Address to the Nation on the Situation in Somalia”, 4 December 
1992. 
Buzan, Barry, From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social 
Structure of Globalisation (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
Buzan, Barry, “Will the ‘Global War on Terrorism’ Be the New Cold War?” 82(6) International 
Affairs (2006), 1101-1118. 
Byers, Michael and Chesterman, Simon, “Changing the Rules About Rules? Unilateral 
Humanitarian Intervention and the Future of International Law”, in Holzgrefe, Jeff L. and 
Keohane, Robert O. (eds.), Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political 
Dilemmas (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003), 177-203. 
Campbell, David, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity 
(Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1998). 
Carlsnaes, Walter, “The Agency-Structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis”, 36(3) 
International Studies Quarterly (1992), 245-270. 
Carment, David and Schnabel, Albrecht, Conflict Prevention: Path to Peace or Grand Illusion? 
(United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 2003). 
Carothers, Thomas, “The Making of a Fiasco”, New York Times, 12 May 1994. 
Carr, Edward Hallett, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of 
International Relations (Harper Perennial, London, 1964). 
Checkel, Jeffrey, “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory”, 50(2) World Politics 
(1959), 324-348. 
Chesterman, Simon, “Legality versus Legitimacy: Humanitarian Intervention, the Security Council 
and the Rule of Law”, 33(3) Security Dialogue (2002), 293-307. 
Chomsky, Noam, The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo (Common Courage Press, 
Monroe, 1999). 
 275 
Christopher, Warren, “The Governor’s Island Accord: A Victory for Diplomacy And Democracy in 
Haiti”, Opening Remarks at a News Conference with UN/OAS Special Envoy Dante 
Caputo and US Special Adviser on Haiti Lawrence Pezzullo, 19 July 1993. 
Clinton, President William, “Remarks by President at Town Hall Meeting Detroit”, 10 February 
1993. 
Clinton, President William, “Remarks to the American Society of Newspaper Editors”, 21 June 
1993. 
Clinton, President William, “Confronting the Challenges of a Broader World”, Address to the UN 
General Assembly, 27 September 1993. 
Clinton, President William, “Comments While Jogging”, 23 October 1993. 
Clinton, President William, “Remarks on Meet the Press”, 7 November 1993. 
Clinton, President William, “State of the Union Address”, 25 January 1994. 
Clinton, President William, “Presidential Statement on Deaths of Rwanda and Burundi Presidents”, 
7 April 1994. 
Clinton, President William, “Remarks by President to the Press Pool Minneapolis”, 8 April 1994. 
Clinton, President William, “Presidential Radio Address on Situation in Rwanda”, 30 April 1994. 
Clinton, President William, “Presidential Press Conference on Haitian Policy”, 8 May 1994. 
Clinton, President William, “Joint Press Conference with President and PM Rao”, 19 May 1994. 
Clinton, President William, “Address to the Nation on Haiti”, 15 September 1994. 
Cohen, Richard, “Obliged to Lead”, Washington Post, 3 May 1994. 
Coicaud, Jean-Marc and Wheeler, Nicholas J. (eds.), National Interest and International Solidarity: 
Particular and Universal Ethics in International Life (United Nations University Press, 
New York, 2008). 
Collier, Andrew, Critical Realism: An Introduction to Roy Bhaskar’s Philosophy (Verso, London, 
1994). 
Cook, Nicolas, “Liberia: Transition to Peace”, Congressional Research Service Report, 2004, 
available at  <http://www.opencrs.cdt.org/rpts/RL32243_20041028.pdf>. 
Crocker, Chester A., “Peacekeeping We Can Fight For: Beyond Bluffs and Trial Balloons, Rules of 
Constructive Involvement”, Washington Post, 8 May 1994. 
Cullather, Nick, Secret History: the CIA’s Classified Account of its Operations in Guatemala 
(Stanford University Press, Palo Alto, 1999). 
Daalder, Ivo H., Getting to Dayton: The Making of America’s Bosnia Policy (Brookings Institution, 
Washington, DC, 2000). 
Dallaire, Romeo, “Request for Protection for Informant”, UN Code Cable, 11 January 1994. 
Dallaire, Romeo, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (Arrow, 
London, 2004). 
Davidson, Donald, Essays on Actions and Events (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980). 
Delbruck, Julie, “A Fresh Look at Humanitarian Intervention Under the Authority of the United 
Nations”, 64(898-899) Indiana Law Journal (1992), 887-901. 
DesForges, Alison, “The Method in Rwanda’s Madness: Politics, Not Tribalism, Is the Root of the 
Bloodletting”, Washington Post, 17 April 1994. 
 276 
Devroy, Ann and Williams, Daniel, “GOP Attacks Clinton, Claims Incompetence In Foreign 
Relations”, Washington Post, 28 July 1994. 
Devroy, Ann and Williams, Daniel, “Best Time to Invade Haiti Is Weeks Away, Aides Say: 
Clinton Must Decide Among Several Options”, Washington Post, 5 August 1994. 
Director of Central Intelligence, “Global Humanitarian Emergencies, 1993-94”, National 
Intelligence Estimate 93-36, October 1993. 
Donnelly, Jack, “Human Rights, Humanitarian Intervention and American Foreign Policy: Law, 
Morality and Politics”, 36 Journal of International Affairs (1983), 311-328. 
Dowd, Maureen, “Mission to Haiti; Aristide: The Mouse That Roared Says ‘Thanks’”, New York 
Times, 22 September 1994. 
Downie, Andrew, “Aristide Foe Installed As Haitian President: US Calls Move ‘Affront’ to 
Democracy”, Washington Post, 12 May 1994. 
Doyle, Kate, “Hollow Diplomacy in Haiti”, 11(1) World Policy Journal (1994), 50-58. 
Duffield, Mark, Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security 
(Zed Books, New York, 2001). 
Duke, Lynne, “President Promises ‘Appropriate’ Response: Clinton Rebuts Criticism of Somalia 
Mission”, Washington Post, 9 August 1994. 
Dunne, Tim, “Society and Hierarchy in International Relations”, 17(3) International Relations 
(2003), 303-320. 
Dunne, Tim, Inventing International Society: A History of the English School (Palgrave Macmillan, 
London, 1998). 
Entman, Robert, Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and US Foreign Policy 
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2003). 
Evans, Gareth, “The Responsibility to Protect: Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention”, 
International Crisis Group, Paper presented to The American Society of International Law, 
98th Annual Meeting, Panel on “Rethinking Collective Action”, 2004, available at  
<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=2561&l=1>. 
Faison, Seth, “UN Chief Mired in Dispute With Security Council”, New York Times, 24 July 1992. 
Faison, Seth, “UN Head Proposes Expanded Efforts for Somali Relief”, New York Times, 25 July 
1992. 
Farah, Douglas, “Aristide Asks Haitians to Stay Home, Await His Return”, Washington Post, 13 
January 1993. 
Farah, Douglas, “Haitians Boycott Army-Backed Poll: Vote Seen as Disapproval of Government”, 
Washington Post, 19 January 1993. 
Farah, Douglas, “Prospects for Prompt Resolution of Haitian Crisis Begin to Dim”, Washington 
Post, 24 January 1993. 
Farah, Douglas, “Haiti Rejects Proposal to End Crisis: Rulers’ Move Risks Tougher Sanctions”, 
Washington Post, 25 May 1993. 
Farah, Douglas, “Aristide’s Backers: Latest Plan Falls Short”, Washington Post, 2 May 1994. 
Farah, Nuruddin, “Praise the Marines? I Suppose So”, New York Times, 28 December 1992. 
Farer, Tom, “Humanitarian Intervention Before and After 9/11: Legality and Legitimacy”, in 
Holzgrefe, Jeff L. and Keohane, Robert O. (eds.), Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, 
Legal and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003), 53-90. 
 277 
Farer, Tom, Archibugi, Daniel, Brown, Chris, Crawford, Neta, Weiss, Thomas and Wheeler, 
Nicholas, “Roundtable: Humanitarian Intervention After 9/11”, 19(2) International 
Relations (2005), 211-250. 
Findlay, Trevor, The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2002). 
Finnemore, Martha, National Interests in International Society (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 
1996). 
Finnemore, Martha and Sikkink, Kathryn, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”, 
32(4) International Organization (1998), 887-917. 
Finnemore, Martha and Sikkink, Kathryn, “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in 
International Relations and Comparative Politics”, 4 Annual Review of Political Science 
(2001), 391-416. 
Fitzwater, Marlin, “Statement by White House Press Secretary Fitzwater on the Situation in 
Somalia”, 27 July 1992. 
Fitzwater, Marlin, “Statement by White House Press Secretary Fitzwater on the Military Airlift for 
Humanitarian Aid to Somalia”, 13 August 1992. 
Fitzwater, Marlin, “Statement by White House Press Secretary Fitzwater on Additional 
Humanitarian Aid for Somalia”, 14 August 1992. 
Fixdal, Mona and Smith, Dan, “Humanitarian Intervention and Just War”, 42 Mershon Review of 
International Studies (1998), 283-312. 
Franck, Thomas M. and Rodley, Nigel S., “After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian 
Intervention by Military Force”, 67(2) American Journal of International Law (1973), 275-
305. 
Lawrence Freedman, “The Crisis in American Strategy”, John Erickson Lecture, University of 
Edinburgh, 7 February 2007. 
French, Howard, “Aristide Urges Big UN Observer Team for Haiti”, New York Times, 14 January 
1993. 
French, Howard, “Haitians’ Advocates Admit Some Feelings of Betrayal”, New York Times, 15 
January 1993. 
French, Howard, “Envoy Says Haiti’s Military Agrees to Allow a UN Observer Force”, New York 
Times, 18 January 1993. 
French, Howard, “Mediation Effort in Haiti Collapses”, New York Times, 5 February 1993. 
French, Howard, “Haiti Removes Obstacles to UN Observer Mission”, New York Times, 10 
February 1993. 
French, Howard, “A Clinton Doctrine, Perhaps, to Be Tried Out in Haiti”, New York Times, 18 
April 1993. 
French, Howard, “US to Push for a UN Police Force of 500 for Haiti”, New York Times, 10 May 
1993. 
French, Howard, “500 Foreign Police Readied for Haiti”, New York Times 19 May 1993. 
French, Howard, “Observers See Haiti Police Force As Brutal Obstacle to Democracy”, New York 
Times, 24 May 1993. 
French, Howard, “Leaders in Haiti Spurn Police Plan”, New York Times, 25 May 1993. 
French, Howard, “Clinton Faulted on Haiti Sanctions”, New York Times, 6 June 1993. 
 278 
French, Howard, “Haitian Military and Aristide Sign Pact to End Crisis”, New York Times, 4 July 
1993. 
French, Howard, “Restoring Stability to Haiti Is Seen as the Next Big Test”, New York Times, 5 
July 1993. 
French, Howard, “Many Disappear in Haitian Terror Campaign”, New York Times, 5 September 
1993. 
French, Howard, “Haiti in Turmoil as It Awaits Aristide”, New York Times, 22 September 1993. 
French, Howard, “Study Says Haiti Sanctions Kill Up to 1,000 Children a Month”, New York 
Times, 9 November 1993. 
French, Howard, “US Hint of Force to End Haiti Crisis Draws Opposition”, New York Times, 13 
May 1994. 
French, Howard, “Doubting Sanctions, Aristide Urges US Action on Haiti”, New York Times, 3 
June 1994. 
Friedman, Thomas, “Despite Good News, Clinton Says, Economic Ills Remain”, New York Times, 
9 December 1992. 
Friedman, Thomas, “Clinton’s Japan Card: As Trade Deficit Talks Lead Nowhere Tokyo Awaits 
President’s Next Move”, New York Times, 12 February 1994. 
Ganzglass, Martin, “Somalia Deserves as Much as Sarajevo”, Washington Post, 12 July 1992. 
Garrett, Stephen, “How Governments Decide”, in Garrett, Stephen (ed.), Doing Good and Doing 
Well: An Examination of Humanitarian Intervention (Praeger, Westport, 1999). 
Gelb, Leslie, “Foreign Affairs: Shoot to Feed Somalia”, New York Times, 19 November 1992. 
Gellman, Barton, “Wider UN Police Role Supported”, Washington Post, 5 August 1993. 
George, Alexander, “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused 
Comparison”, in Lauren, Paul (ed.), Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and 
Policy (Free Press, New York, 1979), 43-68. 
George, Alexander, “The Causal Nexus Between Cognitive Beliefs and Decision-making 
Behaviour: the ‘Operational Code’ Belief System”, in Falkowski, Lawrence (ed.), 
Psychological Models in International Relations (Westview, Boulder, 1979), 95-124. 
George, Alexander L. and Bennett, Andrew, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2005). 
Giddens, Anthony, Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure, and Contradiction in 
Social Analysis (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1979). 
Girard, Philippe, Clinton in Haiti: The 1994 US Invasion of Haiti (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 
2004). 
Goldstein, Judith and Keohane, Robert, Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and 
Political Change (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1993). 
Goshko, John, “Aristide Assails US Refugee Policy: Deposed Haitian Leader Ends Agreement Not 
to Criticize Clinton”, Washington Post, 9 February 1994. 
Goshko, John, “Aristide Renounces Treaty Allowing Return of Haitians”, Washington Post, 7 April 
1994. 
Goshko, John, “Effects of Shifts on Haiti Unclear: Changes Unlikely to Resolve Situation, Foreign 
Diplomats Say”, Washington Post, 13 May 1994. 
Goshko, John, “US Asks Allies to Pledge Troops for Haiti”, Washington Post, 8 June 1994. 
 279 
Goshko, John and Farah, Douglas, “Clinton Aides Try to Halt Haitian Flight: Deploying UN 
Observers, Appeal by Ousted Aristide Are Considered”, Washington Post, 12 January 
1993. 
Goshko, John and Lancaster, John, “Despite Dispute, Troops Head to Haiti: White House 
Overrules Pentagon”, Washington Post, 9 October 1993. 
Gounev, Phillip, “Stabilizing Macedonia: Conflict Prevention, Development and Organized 
Crime”, 57(1) Journal of International Affairs (2003), 229-240. 
Gray, Jerry, “2 Nations Joined by Common History of Genocide”, New York Times, 9 April 1994. 
Greene, Marilyn, “Senator Reaches out to Somalia”, USA Today, 20 July 1992. 
Greener, Ian, “The Potential of Path Dependence in Political Studies”, 25(1) Politics (2005), 62-72. 
Greenhouse, Steven, “Clinton–Aristide Ties Worsen Amid New Dispute”, New York Times, 10 
February 1994. 
Greenhouse, Steven, “Aristide Condemns Clinton’s Haiti Policy as Racist”, New York Times, 22 
April 1994. 
Greenhouse, Steven, “A Haiti Invasion Wins Hemisphere Support”, New York Times, 13 June 
1994. 
Guzzini, Stefano and Leander, Anna (eds.), Constructivism and International Relations: Alexander 
Wendt and his Critics (Routledge, London, 2006). 
Haass, Richard N., Intervention: The Use of American Force in the Post-Cold War World 
(Brookings Institute, Washington, DC, 1999). 
Hallin, Daniel, The Uncensored War: The Media and Vietnam (University of California Press, 
Berkeley, 1989). 
Hansen, Lene, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War (Routledge, London, 
2006). 
Harris, John, “Force Grows For Invasion Of Haiti: 4 Caribbean Nations Pledge 266 Troops For 
Possible Assault”, Washington Post, 31 August 1994. 
Haydu, Jeffrey, “Making Use of the Past: Time Periods as Cases to Compare and as Sequences of 
Problem Solving”, 104(2) American Journal of Sociology (1998), 339-371. 
Herbert, Bob, “In America: The Truth Sculptor”, New York Times, 12 January 1994. 
Hoagland, Jim, “Hung Up On Appearances”, Washington Post, 23 January 1994. 
Hoffmann, Stanley, “The Problem of Intervention”, in Bull, Hedley (ed.), Intervention in World 
Politics (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1984), 7-28. 
Hoffmann, Stanley, The Ethics and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention (University of Notre 
Dame Press, Chicago, 1997). 
Hogan, John, “Remoulding the Critical Junctures Approach”, 39(3) Canadian Journal of Political 
Science (2006), 657-679. 
Hollis, Martin, The Cunning of Reason (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987). 
Hollis, Martin and Smith, Steve, Explaining and Understanding International Relations (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1990). 
Hollis, Martin and Smith, Steve, “Beware of Gurus: Structure and Action in International 
Relations”, 17(4) Review of International Studies (1991), 393-410. 
Holmes, Steven, “US Sends Flotilla to Prevent Exodus from Haiti by Sea”, New York Times, 16 
January 1993. 
 280 
Holmes, Steven, “Administration Is Fighting Itself On Haiti Policy”, New York Times, 23 October 
1993. 
Holmes, Steven, “US Disenchantment With Aristide Growing”, New York Times, 18 December 
1993. 
Holmes, Steven, “With Persuasion and Muscle, Black Caucus Reshapes Haiti Policy”, New York 
Times, 21 July 1994. 
Holmes, Steven, “US May Send Commandos To Hunt for Somali Warlord”, New York Times, 11 
August 1994. 
Holzgrefe, Jeff L. and Keohane, Robert O. (eds.), Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and 
Political Dilemmas (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003). 
Hopf, Ted, Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow, 
1955-1999 (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2002). 
Horowitz, Michael, “Research Report on the Use of Identity as a Concept in International 
Relations”, Weatherhead Center for International Relations and the Harvard Identity 
Project, 2002, available at  
<http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/misc/initiative/identity/publications/horowitz1.pdf>. 
Howe, Reed B., “A Social-Cognitive Theory of Desire”, 24 Journal for the Theory of Social 
Behaviour (1994), 1-23. 
Hurrell, Andrew, On Global Order. Power, Values and the Constitution of International Society 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007). 
ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty (International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, 2001). 
Ifill, Gwen, “The Democrats: Clinton Says Bush Failed Leaderships Tests Abroad”, New York 
Times, 14 August 1992. 
Ifill, Gwen, “US Will Reassess Support For Haiti’s Exiled President”, New York Times, 6 January 
1994. 
Ignatieff, Michael, “The Stories We Tell: Television and Humanitarian Aid”, 10(1) The Social 
Contract (1999), 1-8. 
Ikenberry, John, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of Order after 
Major Wars (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2001). 
Jakobsen, Peter Viggo, “National Interest, Humanitarianism or the CNN Effect: What Triggers UN 
Peace Enforcement After the Cold War”, 33(2) Journal of Peace Research (1996), 205-
215. 
Jehl, Douglas, “Officials Told to Avoid Calling Rwanda Killings ‘Genocide’”, New York Times, 10 
June 1994. 
Jepperson, Ronald, Wendt, Alexander and Katzenstein, Peter, “Norms, Identity and Culture in 
National Security”, in Katzenstein, Peter (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms 
and Identity in World Politics (Columbia University Press, New York, 1996), 33-78. 
Johnson, Dominic and Tierney, Dominic, Failing to Win: Perceptions of Victory and Defeat in 
International Politics (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2006). 
Kamen, Al and Marcus, Ruth, “Clinton to Continue Forcible Repatriation of Fleeing Haitians”, 
Washington Post, 15 January 1993. 
Kant, Immanuel, Perpetual Peace and Other Essays (Hackett, Indianapolis, 1983). 
 281 
Kaplan, Robert, “Into the Bloody New World: A Moral Pragmatism for America In an Age of 
Mini-Holocausts”, Washington Post, 17 April 1994. 
Kassebaum, Nancy and Simon, Paul, “Save Somalia From Itself”, New York Times, 2 January 
1992. 
Katzenstein, Peter (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics 
(Columbia University Press, New York, 1996). 
Katznelson, Ira, “Periodization and Preferences: Reflections of Purposive Action in Comparative 
Historical Social Science”, in Mahoney, John and Rueschemeyer, Dietrich (eds.), 
Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2003), 270-304. 
Kennan, George, “Somalia: Through a Glass, Darkly”, New York Times, 30 September 1993. 
Keohane, Robert (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics (Columbia University Press, New York, 1986). 
Keohane, Robert, “International Institutions: Two Approaches”, 32(4) International Studies 
Quarterly (1988), 379-396. 
Keohane, Robert and Martin, Lisa, “Institutional Theory as a Research Program”, in Elman, Colin 
and Elman, Miriam (eds.), Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the 
Field (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2003), 71-107. 
King, Gary, Keohane, Robert and Verba, Sidney, Designing Social Enquiry (Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 1994). 
Knudsen, Tonny Brems, “The English School of International Relations and the Agency–Structure 
Debate: A Sociological Approach to the Study of the Post-Cold War Order”, University of 
Aarhus (unpublished document on file with author), 1994. 
Krasner, Stephen, International Regimes (Cornell University Press, London, 1984). 
Krauss, Clifford, “The Clinton Budget; Arm-Twisting; When the President Rings, Mavericks Run 
for Cover”, New York Times, 29 May 1993. 
Krauthammer, Charles, “Inept to Disgraceful”, Washington Post, 22 April 1994. 
Kubulkova, Vendulka, Onuf, Nicholas and Kowert, Paul (eds.), International Relations in a 
Constructed World (M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, 1998). 
Kurki, Milja, “Critical Realism and Causal Analysis in International Relations”, 35(2) Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies (2007), 361-378. 
Kurki, Milja, Causation in International Relations: Reclaiming Causal Analysis (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2008). 
Laclau, Ernesto and Mouffe, Chantal, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical 
Democratic Politics (Verso, London, 1985). 
Lake, Anthony, “From Containment to Enlargement”, Address at the School of Advanced 
International Studies of Johns Hopkins University, 21 September 1993. 
Lebow, Richard Ned, Forbidden Fruit: Counterfactuals and International Relations (Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, forthcoming 2010). 
Lefebvre, Jeffrey A., “The US Military Intervention in Somalia: A Hidden Agenda?” 2(1) Middle 
East Policy (1993), 44-63. 
Leopold, Evelyn, “US, UN Pressure Khartoum to Accept UN Darfur Force”, Reuters, 19 August. 
Levi, Margaret, “A Model, a Method and a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and Historical 
Analysis”, in Lichbach, Mark and Zuckerman, Alan (eds.), Comparative Politics: 
Rationality, Culture and Structure (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997), 19-41. 
 282 
Lewis, Anthony, “Abroad at Home: Action or Death”, New York Times, 20 November 1992. 
Lewis, Paul, “Security Council to Pledge To Stop Global Aggression”, New York Times, 24 
January 1992. 
Lewis, Paul, “Warring Somali Factions Reach a Truce”, New York Times, 15 February 1992. 
Lewis, Paul, “Reined In by US, UN Limits Mission to Somalia”, New York Times, 26 April 1992. 
Lewis, Paul, “UN Chief’s First 4 Months: Red Tape Cut, Feathers Ruffled, Funds Exhausted”, New 
York Times, 3 May 1992. 
Lewis, Paul, “Conflict in the Balkans: US and Allies Divided Over Role of UN Forces”, New York 
Times, 9 August 1992. 
Lewis, Paul, “Security Council Weighs Role in Somali Civil War”, New York Times, 18 March 
1993. 
Lewis, Paul, “Security Council Votes to Cut Rwanda Peacekeeping Force”, New York Times, 22 
April 1994. 
Lewis, Paul, “US Examines Way to Assist Rwanda Without Troops”, New York Times, 1 May 
1994. 
Lewis, Paul, “UN Council Votes Tougher Embargo on Haitian Trade”, New York Times, 7 May 
1994. 
Lewis, Paul, “Boutros-Ghali Angrily Condemns All Sides for Not Saving Rwanda”, New York 
Times, 26 May 1994. 
Lippman, Thomas W., “US Relaxes Its Drive For Haitian Democracy: No Humanitarian Problems 
Seen Imminent”, Washington Post, 17 November 1993. 
Lippman, Thomas W., “Administration Sidesteps Genocide Label in Rwanda”, Washington Post, 
11 June 1994. 
Little, Daniel, Varieties of Social Explanation: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Social Science 
(Westview, Boulder, 1991). 
Livingston, Steven and Eachus, Todd, “Humanitarian Crises and US Foreign Policy”, 12(4) 
Political Communication (1995), 413-429. 
Lorch, Donatella, “Anarchy Rules Rwanda’s Capital And Drunken Soldiers Roam City”, New York 
Times, 14 April 1994. 
Lorch, Donatella, “UN in Rwanda Says It Is Powerless to Halt the Violence”, New York Times, 15 
April 1994. 
Lorch, Donatella, “Rwandan Refugees Describe Horrors After a Bloody Trek”, New York Times, 
25 April 1994. 
Lorch, Donatella, “Specter of Hate Stalks Burundi, Too”, New York Times, 26 April 1994. 
Lorch, Donatella, “Rwanda Aide Calls Truce ‘Last Chance’”, New York Times, 27 April 1994. 
Lund, Michael, “The Impact of Conflict Prevention Policy: Cases, Measures, Assessments”, in 
Conflict Prevention Network Yearbook (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2000). 
Luttwak, Edward, “Twilight of The Great Powers: Why We No Longer Will Die for a Cause”, 
Washington Post, 26 June 1994. 
Lyman, Princeton N. and Morrison, J. Stephen, “The Terrorist Threat in Africa”, 83(1) Foreign 
Affairs (2004), 75-86. 
MacFarlane, S. Neil, “Intervention in Contemporary World Politics”, 350 Adelphi Papers (2002). 
 283 
Mackie, John, “Causes and Conditions”, 2(4) American Philosophical Quarterly (1965), 1-20. 
Mahoney, James, “Path Dependence in Historical Sociology”, 29(4) Theory and Society (2000), 
507-548. 
Malone, David, Decision-making in the UN Security Council: The Case of Haiti 1990-1997 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998). 
Matthews, Jessica, “The Least Bad Choice”, Washington Post, 18 April 1994. 
McGrory, Mary, “Buoying Haiti in Whitewater”, Washington Post, 10 March 1994. 
Mead, Walter Russell, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the 
World (Alfred Knopf, New York, 2003). 
Melvern, Linda, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide (St. Martin’s 
Press, New York, 2000). 
Melvern, Linda, Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide (Verso, London, 2004). 
Mermin, Jonathan, “Television News and American Intervention in Somalia: The Myth of a Media 
Driven Foreign Policy”, 112(3) Political Science Quarterly (2001), 385-403. 
Merton, Robert K., “The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action”, 1(6) American 
Sociological Review (1936), 894-904. 
Meyer, Christoph, “Convergence Towards a European Strategic Culture? A Constructivist 
Framework for Explaining Changing Norms”, 11(4) European Journal of International 
Relations (2005), 523-549. 
Mill, John Stuart, A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive (Harper and Brothers, New York, 
1846). 
Milton, Suzanne, “Promote Sustainable Life in Africa”, Washington Post, 6 October 1992. 
Morgenthau, Hans, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (Knopf, New 
York, 1948). 
Morgenthau, Hans, “Another ‘Great Debate’: The National Interest of the United States”, 46(4) 
American Political Science Review (1952), 961-988. 
Mujaramawiya, Monique, “Letter to President Clinton”, 21 April 1994. 
Mujaramawiya, Monique, “So That the World Does Not Forget Rwanda”, Washington Post, 24 
April 1994. 
Murphy, Sean, Humanitarian Intervention: The UN in an Evolving World Order (Pennsylvania 
University Press, Philadelphia, 1996). 
Nardin, Terry, “The Moral Basis of Humanitarian Intervention”, 16(1) Ethics and International 
Affairs (2002), 57-70. 
Natsios, Andrew, US Foreign Policy and the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Humanitarian 
Relief in Complex Emergencies (Praeger, Westport, 1997). 
Neack, Laura, “UN Peace-Keeping: In the Interest of Community or Self?” 32(2) Journal of Peace 
Research (1995), 181-196. 
New York Times, “Help Needed for Forsaken Somalia”, New York Times, 9 February 1992. 
New York Times, “Excerpts From Pentagon’s Plan: Prevent the Re-emergence of a New Rival”, 
New York Times, 8 March 1992. 
New York Times, “The Hell Called Somalia”, New York Times, 23 April 1992. 
New York Times, “Uncle Pygmy Pleads Poverty”, New York Times, 28 April 1992. 
 284 
New York Times, “Too Much Stress at the UN”, New York Times, 25 July 1992. 
New York Times, “The Scourging of Africa”, New York Times, 2 August 1992. 
New York Times, “For Haitians, Cruelty and Hope”, New York Times, 17 January 1993. 
New York Times, “Haiti Gunmen Menace Government Workers”, New York Times, 16 September 
1993. 
New York Times, “No Time to Dump Aristide”, New York Times, 8 January 1994. 
New York Times, “Double Tragedy in Africa”, New York Times, 10 April 1994. 
New York Times, “Look Before Plunging into Rwanda”, New York Times, 18 May 1994. 
New York Times, “US Aides Avoid Labeling Horror”, New York Times, 10 June 1994. 
Norton, Michael, “Aristide Supporter Slain During Mass in Haiti: Attack Marks Challenge to 
President’s Return”, Washington Post, 12 September 1993. 
Nyanzaki, Edward L., Genocide: Rwanda and Burundi (Schenkman Books, New York, 1998). 
Oberdorfer, Dan, “US to Start Food Airlift to Somalia; Security Problems Could Jeopardize Relief 
Efforts, Officials Say”, Washington Post, 19 August 1992. 
Office of the Legal Advisor, US Department of State, “Legal Analysis: The Definition of 
Genocide”, Memorandum, 16 May 1994. 
Oudraat, Chantal de Jonge, “Making Economic Sanctions Work”, 42(3) Survival (2000), 105-127. 
Parekh, Bhiku, “Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention”, 18(1) International Political Science 
Review (1997), 55-74. 
Parmelee, Jennifer, “Americans Are Out Of Rwanda: Rebel Army Advances On Bloodied Capital”, 
Washington Post, 11 April 1994. 
Parmelee, Jennifer, “Rebels Advance in Rwanda, Vow to Take Over Capital: More Foreigners Flee 
Central African Nation’s Tribal Slaughter”, Washington Post, 12 April 1994. 
Parmelee, Jennifer, “Rwanda’s ‘Sad, Sad, Sad’ Self-Immolation: Free-for-All Slaughter Continues 
Among Tribes, Rebels, Army and Roving Gangs”, Washington Post, 14 April 1994. 
Parmelee, Jennifer, “Rwandans Ever More Isolated: Reporters, Belgian Troops Pulling Out”, 
Washington Post, 16 April 1994. 
Parmelee, Jennifer, “Rwandan Army Shells Refugees Huddled in Stadium”, Washington Post, 20 
April 1994. 
Parmelee, Jennifer, “Fears Mounting for Rwandans: Aid Agencies Say Pullout of UN Peacekeepers 
Endangers Refugees”, Washington Post, 23 April 1994. 
Patomaki, Heikki, After International Relations: Critical Realism and the (Re)Construction of 
International Politics (Routledge, London, 2002). 
Patomaki, Heikki and Wight, Colin, “After Postpositivism: The Promise of Critical Realism?” 
44(2) International Studies Quarterly (2000), 213-237. 
Perlez, Jane, “As Fighting in Somalia Rages On, African Neighbor Seeks a Truce”, New York 
Times, 6 January 1992. 
Perlez, Jane, “UN, Halted by Somalia Shelling, Says Food Relief Could End”, New York Times, 7 
March 1992. 
Perlez, Jane, “US Says Airlifts Fail Somali Needy”, New York Times, 31 July 1992. 
Perlez, Jane, “Somalia: The Disaster Begins to Sink In”, New York Times, 2 August 1992. 
 285 
Perlez, Jane, “Officials Say Somali Famine Is Even Worse Than Feared”, New York Times, 6 
September 1992. 
Perlez, Jane, “No Easy Fix for Somalia”, New York Times, 7 September 1992. 
Perlez, Jane, “Food Piling Up In Somali Port As Many Starve”, New York Times, 2 November 
1992. 
Pezzullo, Ralph, Plunging into Haiti: Clinton, Aristide, and the Defeat of Diplomacy (University 
Press of Mississippi, Jackson, 2006). 
Pickering, Thomas, “US Backs Efforts to Assist Somalia”, New York Times, 9 May 1992. 
Pierson, Paul, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependency, and the Study of Politics”, 94(2) American 
Political Science Review (2000), 251-267. 
Power, Samantha, “Bystanders to Genocide”, Atlantic Monthly, September 2001. 
Preston, Julia, “Death Toll in Rwanda Is Said to Top 100,000: UN Votes to Pull Out Most 
Peacekeepers”, Washington Post, 22 April 1994. 
Prial, Frank, “UN Lifts Haitian Oil Embargo as Junta Prepares to Step Aside”, New York Times, 28 
August 1993. 
Price, Richard, “Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World Politics”, 55(4) World Politics 
(2003), 579-606. 
Prunier, Gerard, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (Hurst, London, 1995). 
Przeworski, Adam and Teune, Henry, Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry (Krieger, Malabar, 
2000). 
Putnam, Hilary, Mathematics, Matter and Method: Philosophical Papers (Cambridge University 
Press, London, 1975). 
Ramsbotham, Oliver and Woodhouse, Tom, Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict 
(Polity Press, Cambridge, 1996). 
Raspberry, William, “Equality for Haitians”, Washington Post, 8 April 1994. 
Razsa, Maple and Lindstrom, Nicole, “Balkan Is Beautiful: Balkanism in the Political Discourse of 
Tudjman’s Croatia”, 18(4) East European Politics and Societies (2004), 628-650. 
Reisch, George, “Chaos, History and Narrative”, 30 History and Theory (1991), 1-20. 
Reisman, Michael, “Coercion and Self-determination: Construing Charter Article 2(4)”, 78 
American Journal of International Law (1984), 642-645. 
Reus-Smit, Christian, The Politics of International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2004). 
Reuters, “UN Meets with Rival Factions in Somalia”, New York Times, 7 August 1992. 
Reuters, “Excerpts From Clinton’s Speech on Foreign Policy Leadership”, New York Times, 14 
August 1992. 
Reuters, “Italian Minister Denounces ‘Rambo’ UN Commanders”, Washington Post, 14 August 
1993. 
Reuters, “UN Considers Pulling Troops Out of Rwanda”, Washington Post, 14 April 1994. 
Reuters, “UN Force Nears Collapse in Chaotic Rwanda”, Washington Post, 21 April 1994. 
Reuters, “Rebel Official Calls a Truce For Rwanda”, New York Times, 24 April 1994. 
Reuters, “France May Move In to End Rwanda Killing”, New York Times, 16 June 1994. 
 286 
Reuters, “UN Presses Haiti Army to Comply”, Washington Post, 31 October 1993. 
Richburg, Keith B., “In Somali Capital, Shrapnel Reigns; Civilians Pay Heavy Price In Artillery 
Duel for Power”, Washington Post, 11 January 1992. 
Richburg, Keith B., “Delivery Questions Delaying Airlift of Food Aid to Somalia”, Washington 
Post, 20 August 1992. 
Richburg, Keith B., “Solutions for Somalia Complicated by Chaos: Authority Is Absent and Food 
Is Power”, Washington Post, 30 August 1992. 
Richburg, Keith B., “Warlord’s Well-Fed Forces Rule Starving Somali Town”, Washington Post, 3 
September 1992. 
Richburg, Keith B., “US Airlift of Food To Somalia Expanding: New Flights to Needy Areas Start 
Today”, Washington Post, 5 September 1992. 
Richburg, Keith B., “Somali Aid May Spur New Violence: Armed Clans Battle to Steal—and to 
Guard—Food From US Airlift”, Washington Post, 26 September 1992. 
Richburg, Keith B., “Rwanda Wracked By Ethnic Violence: Rampages Follow Presidents’ 
Assassination”, Washington Post, 8 April 1994. 
Richburg, Keith B., “Slayings Put Rwanda In Chaos: Clerics, Foreigners Among Casualties; 
Americans to Leave”, Washington Post, 9 April 1994. 
Richburg, Keith B., “Westerners Begin Fleeing Rwanda: 170 Americans Leave by Convoy”, 
Washington Post, 10 April 1994. 
Richburg, Keith B., “Rwandan Rebels Call Truce, but Bloodshed Goes On”, Washington Post, 27 
April 1994. 
Richburg, Keith B., “‘Mass Killings’ Continue, Rwandan Officials Say”, Washington Post, 28 
April 1994. 
Richburg, Keith B., “Washington Begins to Act as Displaced Rwandans Wait: At Border Bridge, 
the Dead Pass Under Where the Living Passed Over”, Washington Post, 3 May 1994. 
Richburg, Keith B., “Witnesses Describe Cold Campaign of Killing in Rwanda: Leaders Allegedly 
Sought to Wipe Out Tutsis”, Washington Post, 8 May 1994. 
Rieff, David, At the Point of a Gun: Democratic Dreams and Armed Intervention (Simon and 
Schuster, New York, 2005). 
Robinson, Geoffrey, “If You Leave Us Here We Will Die”, in Mills, Nicolaus and Brunner, Kira 
(eds.), The New Killing Fields: Massacre and the Politics of Intervention (Basic Books, 
New York, 2002), 159-184. 
Robinson, Piers, The CNN Effect: The Myth of News, Foreign Policy and Intervention (Routledge, 
London, 2002). 
Rohter, Larry, “Haiti Plans Ballot Likely to Yield a Replacement for Aristide”, New York Times, 27 
July 1994. 
Rosenau, James, “Intervention as a Scientific Concept”, 13(2) Journal of Conflict Resolution 
(1969), 149-171. 
Rosenfeld, Stephen, “When a President’s Expected to Show His Stuff”, Washington Post, 18 
February 1994. 
Roth, Kenneth, “Was the Iraq War a Humanitarian Intervention?” 5(2) Journal of Military Ethics 
(2006), 84-92. 
 287 
Rousseau, David, “Relative or Absolute Gains: Beliefs and Behavior in International Politics”, 
Unpublished Report, University of Pennsylvania, 1999, available at 
<http://www.ssc.upenn.edu/~rousseau/ABSREL5.PDF>. 
Rudavsky, Shari, “Bush, UN Face Pressure to Aid War-Torn Somalia”, Washington Post, 27 July 
1992. 
Rwandese Patriotic Front, “Statement by the Political Bureau of the Rwandese Patriotic Front on 
the Deployment of a Proposed UN Intervention Force in Rwanda”, 30 April 1994. 
Safire, William, “Essay: For a Haitian Legion”, New York Times, 9 May 1994. 
Sayer, Andrew, Realism and Social Science (Sage, London, 2000). 
Scheer, Richard, “Intentions, Motives and Causation”, 76 Philosophy (2001), 397-413. 
Scheffer, David, “Not the World’s Policeman”, Washington Post, 7 April 1992. 
Scheffer, David, “Toward a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention”, 23 University of 
Toledo Law Review (1992), 253-293. 
Schmidt, William, “Troops Rampage in Rwanda: Dead Said to Include Premier”, New York Times, 
8 April 1994. 
Schmidt, William, “Terror Convulses Rwandan Capital as Tribes Battle”, New York Times, 9 April 
1994. 
Schmidt, William, “Strife in Rwanda; the Fighting: Deaths in Rwanda Fighting Said to Be 20,000 
or More”, New York Times, 11 April 1994. 
Schmidt, William, “Rwandan Rebels Reported Closing In on Capital”, New York Times, 12 April 
1994. 
Schmidt, William, “Rwandan Rebels Push into Capital”, New York Times, 13 April 1994. 
Schmidt, William, “Once Chosen, Tribal Elites Now Suffer Consequences”, New York Times, 17 
April 1994. 
Schmidt, William, “Rwanda Puzzle: Is Uganda Taking Sides?” New York Times, 18 April 1994. 
Schmitt, Eric, “US Set to Limit Role of Military in Peacekeeping”, New York Times, 29 January 
1994. 
Schultz, William, “US Leadership in Rwanda’s Crisis”, Washington Post, 1 May 1994. 
Sciolino, Elaine, “Clinton Says US Will Continue Ban on Haitian Exodus”, New York Times, 15 
January 1993. 
Sciolino, Elaine, “Haiti’s Man of Destiny Awaiting His Hour”, New York Times, 3 August 1993. 
Sciolino, Elaine, “Pentagon and State Dept. at Odds Over Sending of Soldiers to Haiti”, New York 
Times, 8 October 1993. 
Sciolino, Elaine, “US and France Resolve Dispute on NATO Talks”, New York Times, 8 January 
1994. 
Sciolino, Elaine, “For West, Rwanda Is Not Worth the Political Candle”, New York Times, 15 April 
1994. 
Sciolino, Elaine, “Haitian Impasse: A Special Report. Failure on Haiti: How US Hopes Faded”, 
New York Times, 29 April 1994. 
Shalom, Steven, “Gravy Train: Feeding the Pentagon by Feeding Somalia”, 2 Z Magazine (1993). 
Shapiro, Jeremy and Suzan, Benedicte, “The French Experience of Counter-terrorism”, 45(1) 
Survival (2003), 67-98. 
 288 
Shiras, Peter, “Before Thousands Die in Southern Africa”, Washington Post, 3 July 1992. 
Simes, Dimitri, “Clinton’s Innocence Abroad: How Naive Paternalism Skews the Administration’s 
Vision”, Washington Post, 9 January 1994. 
Smerdon, Peter, “Rwandan Capital Awash in Chaos and Corpses: Knife-Wielding Gangs Roam 
Streets as Workers Hurry to Dig Mass Graves”, Washington Post, 11 April 1994. 
Smith, Jeffrey and Goshko, John, “CIA’s Aristide Profile Spurs Hill Concern”, Washington Post, 
22 October 1993. 
Smith, Jeffrey and Preston, Julia, “United States Plans Wider Role in UN Peacekeeping”, 
Washington Post, 18 June 1993. 
Snyder, Jack, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca, 1991). 
Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, “The 
International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience”, 
March 1996. 
Sterling-Folker, Jennifer, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Assertive Multilateralism and Post-
Cold War US Foreign Policy Making”, in Scott, James (ed.), After the End: Making US 
Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World (Duke University Press, Durham, London, 
1998). 
Stevenson, Jonathon, “Hope Restored in Somalia?” 91 Foreign Policy (1993), 138-154. 
Strobel, Warren, Late Breaking Foreign Policy: The News Media’s Influence on Peace Operations 
(United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, DC, 1997). 
Taylor, Michael, “Structure, Culture and Action in the Explanation of Social Change”, 17(2) 
Politics and Society (1989), 115-162. 
Teson, Fernando, Humanitarian Intervention: An Enquiry Into Law and Morality (Transnational, 
New York, 1997). 
Trowbridge, Erin, “Back Road Beckoning”, in Mills, Nicolaus and Brunner, Kira (eds.), The New 
Killing Fields: Massacre and the Politics of Intervention (Basic Books, New York, 2002). 
Tyler, Patrick, “Senior US Officials Assail Lone-Superpower Policy”, New York Times, 11 March 
1992. 
Tyler, Patrick, “UN Chief’s Dispute With Council Boils Over”, New York Times, 3 August 1992. 
UN Secretary-General, “The Situation in Somalia”, Report of the Secretary-General, S/24480, 24 
August 1992. 
UN Secretary-General, “Second Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Assistance Mission for Rwanda”, Report of the Secretary-General, S/1994/360, 30 March 
1994. 
UN Secretary-General, “Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Assistance 
Mission for Rwanda”, S/1994/470, 20 April 1994. 
UN Secretary-General, “Letter from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the 
Security Council”, S/1994/518, 29 April 1994. 
UN Secretary-General, “The Situation in Rwanda”, Report of the Secretary-General, S/1994/260, 
31 May 1994. 
UN Security Council, “Resolution 733”, S/RES/733, 23 January 1992. 
UN Security Council, “Draft Resolution”, S/23722, 17 March 1992. 
 289 
UN Security Council, “Resolution 746”, S/RES/746, 17 March 1992. 
UN Security Council, “Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand and Sixtieth Meeting 
of the UN Security Council”, S/PV.3060, 17 March 1992. 
UN Security Council, “Resolution 751”, S/RES/751, 24 April 1992. 
UN Security Council, “Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand Three Hundred and 
Twenty-Fourth Meeting of the UN Security Council”, S/PV.3324, 20 December 1993. 
UN Security Council, “Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand Three Hundred and 
Twenty-Sixth Meeting of the UN Security Council”, S/PV.3326, 6 January 1994. 
UN Security Council, “Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand Three Hundred and 
Fifty-Eighth Meeting of the UN Security Council”, S/PV.3358, 5 April 1994. 
UN Security Council, “Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand and Sixty-Eighth 
Meeting of the UN Security Council”, S/PV.3368, 21 April 1994. 
UN Security Council, “Statement by the President of the Security Council: An Agenda for Peace”, 
S/PRST/1994/22, 3 May 1994. 
UN Security Council, “Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand Three Hundred and 
Seventy-Seventh Meeting of the UN Security Council”, S/PV.3377, 17 May 1994. 
UN Security Council, “Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations 
during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda”, 15 December 1999. 
US Department of State, “Death of Rwandan and Burundi Presidents in Plane Crash Outside 
Kigali”, Memorandum, 6 April 1994. 
US Department of Defense, “Talking Points On Rwanda/Burundi”, Memorandum, 11 April 1994. 
US Department of State, “Rwanda: Update”, Brief, 12 April 1994. 
US Department of State, “Phone Call to UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali on Bosnia and 
Rwanda”, Memorandum, 13 April 1994. 
US Department of State, “Talking Points on UNAMIR Withdrawal”, US Code Cable, 15 April 
1994. 
US Department of State, “UN Security Council Action in Rwanda”, Memorandum, 21 April 1994. 
US Department of State, “Rwanda: Genocide and Partition”, Brief, 26 April 1994. 
US Department of State, “Rwandan Ambassador Says Killings Continue”, US Code Cable, 27 
April 1994. 
US Department of State, “Situation on the Ground”, Memorandum, 28 April 1994. 
US Department of State, “Bushnell Tells Bagasora to Stop the Killings”, Outgoing Telegram, 29 
April 1994. 
US Department of State, “Rwanda”, Discussion Paper, 1 May 1994. 
US Department of State, “Shattuck: My Trip to East and Central Africa”, Memorandum, 9 May 
1994. 
US Department of State, “Rwanda Interagency Telecon”, Briefing Notes, 11 May 1994. 
US Department of State, “Rwanda: Security Council Discussions”, Memorandum, 13 May 1994. 
US Department of State, “Daily Activity Report”, Memorandum, 16 May 1994. 
US Department of Defense, “Rwanda Conflict Watch”, SecDef Weekly Update, 17 May 1994. 
US Department of State, “Has Genocide Occurred in Rwanda?” Discussion Paper, 21 May 1994. 
 290 
US Embassy Brussels, “Rwanda Portion of May 13 Trilateral Meeting”, US Code Cable, 13 May 
1994. 
US Embassy Kampala, “RPF Inquires About UN Peacekeepers”, US Code Cable, 6 October 1993. 
US Embassy Kigali, “President Habyarimana and Secretary Christopher Discuss Peace Process”, 
US Code Cable, 14 October 1993. 
US Embassy Kigali, “The Military and the Transition to Peace”, US Code Cable, 17 February 
1994. 
US Embassy Kigali, “DAS Bushnell Meets Habyarimana and RPF”, US Code Cable, 25 March 
1994. 
US House of Representatives, “The Republican Congress—A Manifesto for Change in the House 
of Representatives”, Congressional Record, 30 January 1992, H147. 
US House of Representatives, “Foreign Policy After the Cold War”, Congressional Record, 11 
February 1992, H401. 
US House of Representatives, “Concurrent Resolution on the Budget, Fiscal Year 1993”, 
Congressional Record, 5 March 1992, H1017. 
US House of Representatives, “Stop the Slaughter in Somalia”, Congressional Record, 7 April 
1992, E978. 
US House of Representatives, “Supplemental Appropriations, Transfer, and Rescissions Act, 
1992”, Congressional Record, 28 July 1992, H6783. 
US House of Representatives, “Concerning the Situation in Somalia”, Congressional Record, 10 
August 1992, H7829. 
US House of Representatives, “Concerning the Situation in Somalia”, Congressional Record, 2 
October 1992, H10822. 
US House of Representatives, “Haiti Watch”, Congressional Record, 2 February 1993, H327. 
US House of Representatives, “Situation in Haiti Grave as Ever”, Congressional Record, 12 May 
1993, H2456. 
US House of Representatives, “Resolution Authorizing the Use of United States Armed Forces in 
Somalia”, Congressional Record, 20 May 1993, H2608. 
US House of Representatives, “Commerce, Defense, and Justice Departments at Bottom of Clinton 
Appointment Priorities”, Congressional Record, 25 January 1994, E19. 
US House of Representatives, “Plight of Haitian Refugees”, Congressional Record, 1 February 
1994, E44. 
US House of Representatives, “Restore Democracy in Haiti”, Congressional Record, 1 February 
1994, E55. 
US House of Representatives, “A Tribute to Veterans”, Congressional Record, 8 February 1994, 
E121. 
US House of Representatives, “Haitian Sanctions Violate Standards of Decency and International 
Justice”, Congressional Record, 10 February 1994, H418. 
US House of Representatives, “Set Deadline for Haiti”, Congressional Record, 11 February 1994, 
H503. 
US House of Representatives, “Update on the Situation in Haiti”, Congressional Record, 2 March 
1994, H988. 
 291 
US House of Representatives, “Clinton Team Fumbles in China”, Congressional Record, 22 March 
1994, E516. 
US House of Representatives, “Lessons from a Visit to Russia”, Congressional Record, 12 April 
1994, H2208. 
US House of Representatives, “Rwanda’s Situation Bears Watching”, Congressional Record, 18 
April 1994, E696. 
US House of Representatives, “What We Should Do About Haiti”, Congressional Record, 4 May 
1994, H3020. 
US House of Representatives, “A Better Way for Haiti”, Congressional Record, 10 May 1994, 
H3193. 
US House of Representatives, “Slaughter in Rwanda”, Congressional Record, 18 May 1994, 
H3530. 
US House of Representatives, “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995”, 
Congressional Record, 23 May 1994, H3869. 
US House of Representatives, “Accomplishing Something Positive in Haiti”, Congressional 
Record, 24 May 1994, H3890. 
US House of Representatives, “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995”, 
Congressional Record, 24 May 1994, H3933. 
US House of Representatives, “Resolution Authorizing the Use of United States Armed Forces in 
Somalia”, Congressional Record, 25 May 1993, H2744. 
US House of Representatives, “What Needs to be Done about Haiti”, Congressional Record, 12 
July 1994, H5532. 
US House of Representatives, “Threatened Invasion of Haiti may be Politically Motivated”, 
Congressional Record, 21 July 1994, H5958. 
US House of Representatives, “Little Support Noted for Invasion of Haiti”, Congressional Record, 
22 July 1994, H6111. 
US House of Representatives, “American Leadership in the New Security Environment”, 
Congressional Record, 28 July 1994, E1601. 
US House of Representatives, “Possible United States Invasion of Haiti”, Congressional Record, 
12 September 1994, H9082. 
US Institute of Peace, “Relief, Reconstruction and Reconciliation in Somalia: Views of Prominent 
Somalis”, USIP Special Report on Somalia, 1992. 
US Mission to the United Nations, “Security Council Informals on Rwanda”, Memorandum, 20 
April 1994. 
US Senate, “Horn of Africa Recovery and Food Security Act”, Congressional Record, 8 April 
1992, S5047. 
US Senate, “Humanitarian Crisis in Somalia”, Congressional Record, 5 May 1992, S5930. 
US Senate, “Help Somalia”, Congressional Record, 25 June 1992, S8867. 
US Senate, “Senate Concurrent Resolution 132—Relating to the Civil Conflict in Somalia”, 
Congressional Record, 31 July 1992, S11083. 
US Senate, “Authorization of Multilateral Action in Bosnia-Hercegovina”, Congressional Record, 
10 August 1992, S12022. 
US Senate, “Bosnia”, Congressional Record, 10 August 1992, S11991. 
 292 
US Senate, “Authorization of Multilateral Action in Bosnia-Hercegovina”, Congressional Record, 
11 August 1992, S12106. 
US Senate, “Senate Resolution 330”, Congressional Record, 11 August 1992, S12283. 
US Senate, “Statement of Yugoslavia”, Congressional Record, 12 August 1992, S12740. 
US Senate, “Somalia”, Congressional Record, 8 September 1992, S12799. 
US Senate, “Passing of Democracy in Haiti”, Congressional Record, 28 May 1993, S6830. 
US Senate, “United Nations, Divided World: The Challenge of Selective Security”, Congressional 
Record, 28 June 1993, S7778. 
US Senate, “Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1994”, Congressional Record, 18 
October 1993, S13565. 
US Senate, “Selective Leaks of Classified Information on Haiti”, Congressional Record, 5 
November 1993, S15202. 
US Senate, “Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions”, Congressional Record, 26 
January 1994, S177. 
US Senate, “Peacekeeping and the US National Interest”, Congressional Record, 8 March 1994, 
S2437. 
US Senate, “Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions”, Congressional Record, 19 
April 1994, S4465. 
US Senate, “Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1993”, Congressional Record, 21 April 1994, S4640. 
US Senate, “Crisis in Rwanda”, Congressional Record, 26 April 1994, S4922. 
US Senate, “Senate Resolution 207—Relative to Rwanda”, Congressional Record, 26 April 1994, 
S4900. 
US Senate, “Haiti”, Congressional Record, 3 May 1994, S5019. 
US Senate, “United States Military Action in Haiti”, Congressional Record, 5 May 1994, S5245. 
US Senate, “Getting Rwanda Wrong”, Congressional Record, 10 June 1994, S6786. 
US Senate, “A Critique of US Foreign Policy under President Clinton”, Congressional Record, 22 
June 1994, S7466. 
US Senate, “Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 
1995”, Congressional Record, 29 June 1994, S7898. 
US Senate, “Mitchell (and Others) Amendment No. 2118”, Congressional Record, 29 June 1994, 
S7966. 
US Senate, “Rwanda”, Congressional Record, 1 August 1994, S10174. 
US Senate, “Preventing Future Rwandas”, Congressional Record, 19 August 1994, S12233. 
Valdes, Juan Gabriel, Pinochet’s Economists: The Chicago School in Chile (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1995). 
Various, “Forum: Scientific and Critical Realism in International Relations”, 35(2) Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies (2007), 343-416. 
Verwey, Wil, “The Legality of Humanitarian Intervention”, in Ferris, Elizabeth (ed.), A Challenge 
to Intervene: A New Role for the United Nations? (Life and Peace Institute, Uppsala, 
1992), 112-136. 
Vincent, R. John, Nonintervention and International Order (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
1974). 
 293 
Vincent, R. John, Human Rights and International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1986). 
Waltz, Kenneth, Man, The State and War (Columbia University Press, New York, 1959). 
Waltz, Kenneth, Theory of International Politics (McGraw Hill, New York, 1979). 
Walzer, Michael, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (Basic 
Books, New York, 2000). 
Walzer, Michael, “Arguing for Humanitarian Intervention”, in Mills, Nicolaus and Brunner, Kira 
(eds.), The New Killing Fields: Massacre and the Politics of Intervention (Basic Books, 
New York, 2002), 19-36. 
Ward, Matthew, “NGOs Acting as IGOs: Alternative Mechanisms for Direct Conflict 
Management”, in Weller, Marc and Wolff, Stefan (eds.), Institutions for the Management 
of Ethnopolitical Conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe (Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 
2008), 219-244. 
Washington Post, “UN Envoy Discounts Prompt Somali Truce”, Washington Post, 6 January 1992. 
Washington Post, “In Africa’s Horn: Plenty of Daring—and Grief”, Washington Post, 17 January 
1992. 
Washington Post, “For the Record”, Washington Post, 4 February 1992. 
Washington Post, “The Sorrows of Somalia”, Washington Post, 12 May 1992. 
Washington Post, “Sympathetic to Somalia”, Washington Post, 19 May 1992. 
Washington Post, “Indifference and Somalia”, Washington Post, 19 June 1992. 
Washington Post, “Boutros-Ghali Prepares UN For Broad Role in Somalia”, Washington Post, 25 
July 1992. 
Washington Post, “Mr. Clinton and the Haitians”, Washington Post, 16 January 1993. 
Washington Post, “Tightening the Screw on Haiti”, Washington Post, 26 May 1993. 
Washington Post, “Not Two of a Kind”, Washington Post, 9 April 1994. 
Washington Post, “One, Two, Many Rwandas”, Washington Post, 17 April 1994. 
Washington Post, “Stopping Rwanda’s Bloodbath”, Washington Post, 5 May 1994. 
Washington Post, “Testing Time in Somalia”, Washington Post, 11 August 1994. 
Weiss, Thomas G., “The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect in a 
Unipolar Era”, 35(2) Security Dialogue (2004), 135-153. 
Wendt, Alexander, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory”, 41(3) 
International Organization (1987), 335-370. 
Wendt, Alexander, “Bridging the Theory/Meta-theory Gap in International Relations”, 17(4) 
Review of International Studies (1991), 383-392. 
Wendt, Alexander, “Identity and Structural Change in International Politics”, in Lapid, Yosef and 
Kratochwil, Friedrich (eds.), The Return of Culture and Identity to International Theory 
(Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1994), 47-66. 
Wendt, Alexander, “Review of Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change 
by Judith Goldstein, Robert O. Keohane”, 88(4) American Political Science Review (1994), 
1040-1041. 
Wendt, Alexander, “On Constitution and Causation in International Relations”, 24(5) Review of 
International Studies (1998), 101-117. 
 294 
Wendt, Alexander, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1999). 
Western, Jon, “Sources of Humanitarian Intervention: Beliefs, Information, and Advocacy in the 
US Decisions on Somalia and Bosnia”, 26(4) International Security (2002), 112-142. 
Western, Jon, Selling Intervention and War: The Presidency, the Media and the American Public 
(John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2005). 
Weymouth, Lally, “Haiti’s Suspect Savior: Why President Artiside’s Return from Exile May Not 
Be Good News”, Washington Post, 24 January 1993. 
Wharton Jr., Clifton R., “The Nightmare in Central Africa”, New York Times, 9 April 1994. 
Wheeler, Nicholas, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2000). 
Wheeler, Nicholas and Dunne, Tim, “East-Timor and the New Humanitarian Interventionism”, 
77(4) International Affairs (2001), 805-829. 
White House, “American Policy Toward Africa in the 1990s”, National Security Review 30, 15 
June 1992. 
White House, “Press Briefing by Lake and Clark on Peacekeeping Policy”, 5 May 1994. 
White House, “US Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations”, Presidential Decision 
Directive 25, 6 May 1994. 
White House, “Fact Sheet on Haitian Policy”, 8 May 1994. 
Widmaier, Wesley, Blyth, Mark and Seabrooke, Leonard, “Exogenous Shocks or Endogenous 
Constructions? The Meanings of Wars and Crises”, 51(4) International Studies Quarterly 
(2007), 747-759. 
Wight, Colin, Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2006). 
Wight, Colin, “A Manifesto for Scientific Realism in IR: Assuming the Can-Opener Won’t Work”, 
35(2) Millennium: Journal of International Studies (2007), 379-398. 
Wight, Martin, Systems of States (London School of Economics, London, 1977). 
Wight, Martin, International Theory: The Three Traditions (Leicester, Leicester University Press, 
1991). 
Williams, Daniel, “Clinton Peacekeeping Policy to Set Limits on Use of US Troops”, Washington 
Post, 6 February 1994. 
Williams, Daniel and Devroy, Ann, “Defining Clinton’s Foreign Policy; Spate of Speeches Will 
Seek to Kill Suspicions of U.S. Retreat”, Washington Post, 20 September 1993. 
Willis, Gary, “Clinton’s Year at Sea”, New York Times, 9 January 1994. 
Yannis, A., “Kosovo under International Administration”, 43(2) Survival (2001), 31-48. 
Yee, Albert, “The Causal Effects of Ideas on Policies”, 50(1) International Organization (1996), 
69-108. 
Yoroms, Gani J., “ECOMOG and West African Regional Security—A Nigerian Perspective”, 
21(1/2) Issue: A Journal of Opinion (1993), 84-91. 
